State of Tennessee v. Travei Pryor
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Travei Pryor, of eleven counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of employing and possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as provided by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). This court concluded that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury pursuant to White constituted reversible error, reversed his eleven convictions of aggravated kidnapping, remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial as to those offenses, and affirmed the appellant’s remaining convictions. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinions in State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2015), and State v. Williams, 468 S.W.3d 510 (Tenn. 2015). After revisiting the issue pertaining to the White instruction, we conclude that the appellant’s convictions of aggravated kidnapping in counts 13 and 14 and counts 20 and 21 must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to those offenses. The appellant’s remaining convictions are affirmed. However, upon remand, the trial court is to merge the appellant’s convictions in counts 7 and 8, counts 9 and 10, counts 11 and 12, counts 15 and 16, and counts 17 and 18. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Brandon Stewart
The defendant, James Brandon Stewart, appeals the summary denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the challenged sentence has expired, we affirm the summary dismissal of the defendant's motion. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Wilson
Defendant, Patrick Wilson, appeals the trial court's denial of an alternative sentence after the entry of a guilty plea to aggravated statutory rape. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travei Pryor - concurring and dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reasoned opinion with regard to its conclusion that the absence of the White instructions constituted reversible error. I would affirm the convictions as they were entered, although merging those counts which were alternatively charged. In all other regards, I join in the majority's opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy James Hardin v. Veronica Hensley-Hardin
This appeal concerns a divorce action in which the trial court referred all issues to a special master. As pertinent to this appeal, the special master recommended awarding the parties a divorce based upon stipulated grounds and found that the husband was entitled to an award of alimony in solido and retroactive child support. The special master's detailed report also contained specific recommendations concerning the classification and division of the marital property. Both parties filed exhaustive exceptions to the report. Following a hearing, the trial court adopted the report. The wife appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tanya Nicole Slimick
A jury convicted the defendant, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree (premeditated) murder for shooting her boyfriend. The defendant received a life sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to show premeditation or to negate self-defense. She also raises numerous challenges to the jury instructions, including that the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of raising the issue of self-defense; that the self-defense instruction was confusing to the jury; that the jury instructions improperly failed to list the negation of self-defense in the litany of items which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the instructions failed to list lesser included offenses whenever the “charged offense” was referenced. The defendant also asserts that there was reversible error in the use of a demonstrative aid in the prosecution’s closing argument. After a thorough review of the law and the facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jordan Curry v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jordan Curry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest and his effective forty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raphael Cortez Ferguson
Appellant, Raphael Cortez Ferguson, pleaded guilty to facilitation of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to resell, a Class C felony, and received the agreed-upon sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The department of correction placed appellant in its special alternative incarceration unit and, approximately six months later, released him from custody subject to supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued, alleging the following infractions: (1) committing new criminal offenses for theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, criminal simulation, and identity theft; (2) testing positive on two drug screens; and (3) failing to complete community service as ordered. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered his sentence into execution. On appeal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting his new criminal offenses and that the remainder of the evidence warranted a lesser consequence than complete confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Shane Hixson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy Shane Hixson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery and resulting twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shelley Denise Blair v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shelley Denise Blair, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by relying solely on her pro se petition, and not considering the allegations of fact in the amended petition prepared by post-conviction counsel, in concluding that she failed to make out a prima facie case of mental incompetence to toll the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Jones, et al. v. City of Union City, Tennessee
This appeal involves three former police officers who were terminated from their employment with the Union City Police Department. They filed this lawsuit claiming that they were terminated solely for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities, in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish an exclusive causal relationship between their refusal to remain silent and their discharge and that the City terminated Plaintiffs for rational and non-pretextual reasons. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Joel A. Conkin, Administrator with Will Annexed of The Estate Of Mattie L. Mettetal v. Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., M.D., et al.
Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., M.D. (“Dr. Mettetal”) and Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., M.D., Inc. (“Corporation”) appeal the judgment of the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that Dr. Mettetal breached his fiduciary duty to Mattie L. Mettetal (“Deceased”), improperly converted Deceased's funds to his benefit and the benefit of his Corporation, and failed to show that the funds were in keeping with gifts pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-110. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dean Hodges
The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Michael Dean Hodges, for aggravated child abuse in counts one through three and aggravated child neglect in count four. After a jury trial, the appellant was acquitted of count one but convicted as charged in counts two and three and convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect in count four. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child abuse convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-five-years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to sever the charge of aggravated child abuse in count one from the remaining two counts of aggravated child abuse; that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a portion of his statement in which he admitted to prior bad acts; that the trial court erred by giving the jury a supplemental instruction on “knowingly” that failed to include language about non-accidental conduct; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that the appellant had been “in trouble” previously. However, we conclude that the error was harmless. Nevertheless, we conclude that the appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault must be reversed because aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demontise Martez Drumwright a.k.a Demontise J. Drumwright
Demontise Martez Drumwright a.k.a. Demontise J. Drumwright (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated burglary and robbery. The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering the Defendant to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. On this appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it (1) considered the Defendant’s pending case in Knox County as a basis for denial of alternative sentencing and (2) ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Porrazzo
The defendant, Anthony Porrazzo, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers, that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain witness testimony and by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Anthony McDaniel
The Appellant, William Anthony McDaniel, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the Appellant timely appealed the ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Frazier
Appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and later filed a motion challenging his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion without appointing counsel after he had stated a colorable claim for relief. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tom Moore
The defendant, Tom Moore, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to set aside his 1991 convictions of aggravated rape. Because the defendant has failed to present a cognizable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the order of summary dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Brooks v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mark Brooks, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Vernon Campbell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John Vernon Campbell, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for his premeditated first degree murder conviction because the offense was committed in the Cherokee National Forest; and (2) that the indictment charging the Petitioner was invalid due to the State’s dismissal of a charge of felony first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice McAllister
In 2012, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Maurice McAllister, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) admitted evidence seized from his vehicle; and (3) imposed a twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement. The Defendant lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require a reversal of his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Holliday v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s award of a judgment against it. While he was an inmate in the State’s custody, Plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell out of a pickup truck that was being operated by a State employee. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Claims Commission in which he alleged that the State’s negligence caused his injuries and sought damages for, among other things, the medical expenses that were incurred as a result of the fall. The State argued that it should receive a credit against any award of damages for the medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration because it paid those expenses through its contracts with two private medical vendors. The Claims Commission disagreed and held that evidence of payments made by the medical vendors for Plaintiff’s treatment was barred by the collateral source rule. The Claims Commission awarded Plaintiff $125,000 in damages, which included damages for the medical expenses that he allegedly incurred. On appeal, we conclude that because the State was required by law to pay for all medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration, the Claims Commission erred in considering the cost of the medical services provided to Plaintiff in calculating his damages. We therefore vacate the Claims Commission’s award of damages and remand this matter for a new trial on the issue of damages. |
Court of Appeals | ||
City of Memphis, et al. v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family LLC, et al.
This is the second appeal of this eminent domain case. In the first appeal, City of Memphis v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family, LLC, et al., 391 S.W.3d 60 (2012), this Court held that Appellee City of Memphis, a municipal corporation for the use and benefit of Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division, was entitled to condemn a portion of Appellants’ property to erect poles and other facilities to provide utility services to MLGW customers. In addition to the provision of utility services, Appellee also sought co-location rights to allow telecommunications and cable providers to attach to MLGW’s poles. In the first appeal, Appellants argued that the co-location rights transformed the condemnation from public to private use. In our first opinion, we held that the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, mandated that MLGW would allow co-location rights. On remand, the trial court held that it was bound by the law of the case as set out in our first opinion and denied Appellants discovery concerning the co-location rights before granting those rights to Appellee. In the instant appeal, Appellants contend that our previous holding was incorrect because the Pole Attachment Act specifically exempts MLGW from the definition of “utility.” We agree, and reverse our previous holding to the extent that we held that the Pole Attachment Act is mandatory on MLGW. Because of our erroneous holding, the issues of whether MLGW is entitled to co-location rights and the proper compensation, if any, for these rights have not been addressed in the trial court. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order insofar as it grants Appellee co-location rights and remand the case for discovery and hearing on these issues. We affirm the trial court’s order insofar as it allows Appellee to condemn Appellants’ property for utility purposes. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones
In this consolidated case, the defendants, Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones, appeal their convictions of aggravated burglary and first degree murder. Mr. Jones challenges the trial court's admission of a photograph of him provided by the Department of Correction and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the out-of-court identification of him as a perpetrator. Both defendants challenge the admission of the audio-recorded statements of two witnesses, the admission of the audio recording of a 9-1-1 call made by a State's witness, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Benita Renee Yocum v. Jason Richard Yocum
This is a divorce action involving a five-year marriage between a husband who was employed overseas at the time of the parties' separation and a wife who had worked primarily during the marriage as a homemaker and caretaker of the parties' three minor children, including a child with special medical needs. Following a hearing in December 2012, during which the husband testified telephonically, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $3,500.00 per month in temporary support. Following subsequent hearings in April and May 2014, during which the husband also testified telephonically, the court, inter alia, granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds, delineated a residential co-parenting schedule, entered a judgment against Husband for support arrearage, and set the husband's child support obligation in the amount of $1,842.00 monthly and spousal support obligation in the amount of $1,000.00 monthly. The court reserved remaining issues for a bench trial, which it set for September 23, 2014, with notice that it would not allow the husband to testify telephonically unless the wife waived any objection to such testimony. At the beginning of trial, the court denied the husband's counsel's motion to allow the husband to testify telephonically upon the wife's objection. Also at the beginning of trial, the court ordered that the $1,000.00 previously ordered be continued as an award to the wife of alimony in futuro. The court also directed that its previous orders as to co-parenting time and child support be incorporated as a permanent parenting plan order. At the close of proof, the trial court distributed the marital estate and awarded to Wife $10,500.00 toward her attorney's fees. The husband appeals. Having determined that no income shares worksheet for child support purposes was attached to the final judgment, we vacate the amount of child support awarded and remand for the limited purpose of child support calculation according to the Child Support Guidelines based upon the trial court's previous findings concerning the parties' respective incomes and co-parenting time. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |