Kathy Bode v. The Hartford Insurance Company
The employee successfully pursued a Request for Assistance (“RFA”) through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“DOL”) for treatment of deep vein thrombosis resulting from a fall at work in February 2006. In January 2013, she filed a second RFA alleging that she required knee replacement surgery as a result of the same incident. DOL denied her request, and she filed this action in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The trial court dismissed her claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel. She has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment on that issue. Additionally, there are genuine issues of fact as to the equitable defenses. Therefore, we remand the case for further consideration consistent with this ruling. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carolyn Primm v. Tennessee Board of Appeals, et al
The plaintiff has appealed from a final order entered on September 25, 2015, dismissing her Petition for Judicial Review. Because the plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Raven P.
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order assessing a portion of the mother’s attorney’s fees against the father’s counsel. Because the father’s counsel did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre De'Lane Ross
The Appellant, Andre De'Lane Ross, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of a clerical error on the face of his possession of cocaine judgment. In this appeal, the Appellant submits that the trial court erred in denying his motion because, at the guilty plea hearing, the court found that his plea to this charge lacked a sufficient factual basis but a guilty judgment was, thereafter, erroneously entered. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Mitchell
The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Mitchell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1). As a Range III, persistent offender, he was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in applying certain enhancement factors. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Denver Case
A Dickson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Denver Case, of first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court immediately sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eight years for aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by instructing the grand jury in the presence of the jury venire, and that the trial court erred by allowing the deliberating jury to view a video in the courtroom without the appellant’s being present. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Rose Beeler v. Barry Allen Beeler
This appeal arises from a divorce and the entry of a permanent parenting plan. Pamela Rose Beeler (“Mother”) filed for divorce from her husband Barry Allen Beeler (“Father”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”). After a prolonged and contentious legal battle, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The parties ultimately reached a settlement regarding the custody of their three minor children, which was announced in open court. Father appeals, arguing that, despite his agreeing to the settlement, he actually opposes the settlement and that the final judgment should be overturned. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We further find this appeal frivolous and remand to the Trial Court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to Mother. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Central Woodwork, Inc. v. Cheyenne Johnson, Shelby County Assessor of Property
Taxpayer appealed the Shelby County Assessor of Property's tax assessment regarding unreported tangible personal property and raw materials to the Tennessee State Board of Equalization. The administrative judge ruled partially in favor of taxpayer but against taxpayer regarding the raw materials. Taxpayer appealed to the State Board's Assessment Appeals Commission, and the administrative judge's ruling was upheld. Taxpayer then challenged the Appeals Commission's ruling in the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Appeals Commission's ruling, finding that taxpayer was not a manufacturer and that its inventory should not have been assessed as raw materials. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Traion Davis
Defendant, John Traion Davis, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal for failure of Defendant to state a colorable claim. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tyrone Musgrave v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tyrone Musgrave, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief arising from his guilty plea to one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his guilty pleas because counsel did not spend adequate time meeting with him and failed to fully explain the consequences of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Antuan Gray
The Defendant, Corey Antuan Gray, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of four counts of attempted first degree murder; four counts of aggravated assault; four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of evading arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each count of attempted murder, six years for each count of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one year and six months for evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support all four of the convictions for attempted first degree murder and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deangelo Jackson aka Deangelo Webb
Deangelo Jackson (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of especially aggravated robbery, attempted second-degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for especially aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted second-degree murder and imposed an effective thirty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the trial court erred when it held that the State would be allowed to impeach the Defendant’s testimony with evidence of his prior convictions for theft and felon in possession of a handgun. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie L. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ronnie L. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Traion Davis - Dissenting
Reluctantly and respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 movant in this case stated a colorable claim to relief, and based upon the current wording of the rule, that is all that is required. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b). |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Analilia R.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Luis M. (“Father”) to the minor child Analilia R. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions against Father, and that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals, arguing DCS failed to meet its burden of proof on the ground of persistent conditions. DCS raises its own issue of whether the Juvenile Court erred in failing to find the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Leon Kelley v. Kenneth D. Varner et al.
Stephen Leon Kelley (“Plaintiff”) filed suit seeking, among other things, to have the 1958 divorce decree of Mary Joyce Long Kelley v. Joseph Gordon Kelley, Jr. (“the Divorce Decree”) set aside so that Plaintiff could be declared one of only two heirs at law of Mary Joyce Long Kelley (“Deceased”) entitled to inherit by intestacy. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, among other things. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff’s collateral attack upon the Divorce Decree cannot be sustained because the Divorce Decree is not void upon its face. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s suit. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Santos Castillo Mechado v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Santos Castillo Mechado, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Wade Wilson v. Randy Lee, Warden
Petitioner, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges that his conviction for felony murder is void because the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine by merging the conviction for second degree murder into the conviction for felony murder in direct contravention of this Court’s directions upon remand of Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner also alleges that his conviction for felony murder violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy because he was already serving a sentence for the second degree murder conviction before he was retried for felony murder. Upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not violate the law of the case doctrine and that Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate record for review of his double jeopardy claim. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Earl Starks
The defendant, William Earl Starks, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Akilah Louise Wofford, et al. v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home Inc., et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute between a consumer and funeral home. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, finding no meeting of the minds as to the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the funeral home argues that this Court should consider not only the signed agreement, but also another document allegedly incorporated by reference into the parties‘ contract in compelling arbitration. We hold: (1) the additional document providing details regarding arbitration was not incorporated by reference into the parties‘ contract; and (2) the arbitration provision actually contained in the parties‘ contract is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Norfleet and Terence Mitchell
A Shelby County jury convicted Mario Norfleet and Terence Mitchell of theft of property valued at more than $60,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant Norfleet, as a career offender, to serve thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court sentenced Defendant Mitchell, as a standard offender, to eight years suspended to ten years of probation after the service of ten months and twelve days in jail. On appeal, Defendant Norfleet asserts that: (1) the State made improper statements during closing argument to the jury; (2) there is a variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial; (3) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted theft; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant Norfleet as a career offender. Defendant Mitchell also challenges the prosecutor's statements made during closing argument as improper, but additionally asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly admitted testimony from a witness that referenced his gang affiliation; (3) the trial court improperly ordered restitution; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments but remand for the entry of a corrected judgment pertaining to Defendant Mitchell's order of restitution. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Kevin Duke v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Kevin Duke, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on newly discovered evidence of new medical evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence of the child rape victim’s inconsistent statements. The petitioner further argues that the newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different verdict had it been presented at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court denying the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eugene Bernard Cuddy, III
Defendant, Eugene Bernard Cuddy, III, was indicted in a three-count indictment by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for possession of Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of Alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, with intent to sell or deliver. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of Defendant's person. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of seven years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress; 2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; 3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer Defendant's intent from the amount of controlled substances Defendant possessed; and 4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fredrick Sledge v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Fredrick Sledge (Petitioner), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), challenges TDOC’s calculation of his release eligibility date. The chancery court (the trial court) granted TDOC summary judgment, finding that “the undisputed facts and law establish [Petitioner’s] sentence has been correctly calculated.” Because the criminal court’s order sentencing Petitioner awarded him 3,521 days of pretrial jail credit, while TDOC’s calculation of his release eligibility was based upon only 516 days of credit, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the correct calculation of his release eligibility date. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Howard Allen, Jr.
A former tenant of Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency (“MDHA”) appeals the decision of the circuit court dismissing the case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(1). We have concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. The order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |