State of Tennessee v. Philip Trevor Lenoir
A Monroe County jury found the Defendant, Phillip Trevor Lenoir, guilty of aggravated child neglect. Thereafter, the trial court judge recused herself and a successor judge was appointed. The successor judge sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals claiming: (1) the successor judge failed to engage in the proper analysis as the thirteenth juror; (2) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion for a continuance; (3) the State was statutorily required to make an election between aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (5) the trial court failed to require the jury to announce the fines imposed; (6) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on “third-party culpability;” and (7) the trial court erred when it did not allow the Defendant to offer “reliable hearsay” in his defense. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that because the successor judge was unable to properly approve the verdict as “thirteenth juror,” a new trial must be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Woods
A jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Woods, of one count of facilitation of intent to deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class D felony, and one count of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of six years for the facilitation conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple possession conviction. The physical evidence in the case was seized pursuant to a search warrant issued for the home of the defendant’s girlfriend and the defendant’s teenage daughter. The defendant’s original appeal was dismissed due to an untimely notice of appeal. State v. Woods, No. W2010-01301-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 134243, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2012). The defendant then brought a postconviction petition, and the post-conviction court granted the defendant this delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113(a)(1). The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s refusal to admit an audio recording or transcript of the preliminary hearing into evidence, and the legality of the search warrant. Because the search warrant failed to adequately establish the credibility of the confidential informant and because the defendant had standing to challenge the warrant, we reverse the defendant’s convictions. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Jensen v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Russell Jensen, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the trial court summarily dismissed. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Broderick Devonte Fayne
The defendant, Broderick Devonte Fayne, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, both Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of three years at 30% for the aggravated burglary conviction and to six years at 100% for the employing a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction, for a total effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor’s introduction of his defense counsel as employees of the public defender’s office; (3) whether the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s accomplice to testify regarding his understanding of the charges against him; (4) whether his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s arguing alternate theories of his guilt; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for jury instructions defining possession and constructive possession. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Madkins v. State of Tennessee
Richard Madkins (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed his petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner presents three claims: (1) that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it sentenced him to twenty-five years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction; (2) that the trial court did not have authority to sentence the Petitioner as a Range I offender because the State waived Range I sentencing when it filed a notice of intent to seek Range III punishment; and (3) that the Petitioner’s sentence violates principles of double jeopardy. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome S. Barrett v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jerome Sidney Barrett, was convicted of first degree murder stemming from a murder that occurred in Davidson County in 1975 and received a life sentence. State v. Jerome Sidney Barrett, No. M2010-00444-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2914119, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul 18, 2012), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2012). He was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *32. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, he argued that the DNA evidence used at this trial was not independently evaluated and that the forensic pathologist, Dr. Bruce Levy, who testified at his trial regarding the DNA evidence, was not a credible witness because he was arrested for drug crimes in Mississippi more than a year after Petitioner’s trial. The lower court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Shane Hayes
The State appeals the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress filed by the Defendant, Joshua Shane Hayes. The State contests the trial court’s finding that the "Exclusionary Rule Reform Act," which took effect July 1, 2011, did not apply retroactively to the search wherein officers seized drugs from the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Morris Cobb v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petitions for writs of error coram nobis. Having determined that the petitions were properly dismissed, this Court hereby affirms the orders of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dameion Nolan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dameion Nolan, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to explain that he would be required to remain on the sexual offender registry for life as a result of his guilty pleas to five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary and the resulting effective twenty-five-year sentence. The petitioner also contended that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. In addition to his ineffective assistance claim, the petitioner maintains that the post-conviction court erred by allowing trial counsel to remain in the courtroom during the proceedings. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Todd Whitaker and David Paul Coffey
The Defendants, Gregory Todd Whitaker and David Paul Coffey, were both indicted for manufacturing twenty or more, but less than 100, marijuana plants, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(g)(3), -425(a)(1). The Defendants both filed motions to suppress the evidence recovered during a search of Defendant Whitaker’s trailer home. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions and dismissed the indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ suppression motions. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie C. Pratcher, Jr. v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals et al. - Dissent
This case has gone unresolved for far too long. It was finally tried more than six years after Ms. Pratcher’s death and after the filing of four amended complaints. After the jury returned a defendant’s verdict, the trial court granted a new trial because of a perceived shortcoming in the verdict form and because of its disagreementwith the jury’s verdict. With the second trial pending, one of the defendants sought to amend its answer to include a substantively meritorious defense based on the statute of repose in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26116(a)(3) (2012). With little explanation or analysis, the trial court denied the motion to amend on the ground of waiver. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Beau Clayton Epperson - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a trial court may impose both a period of partial confinement for a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction and a two-year probationary period. I write separately, however, to explain more fully the reasoning supporting my conclusion. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mack Phillips, Et Al. v. Montgomery County, Tennessee, Et Al.
Property owners submitted a subdivision plat to the local planning commission for approval. The planning commission denied the proposed plan because the property lies in the path of a planned highway extension. The property owners filed a complaint alleging the planning commission’s denial constitutes a regulatory taking that is prohibited by the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 21, and, also, inverse condemnation that is compensable pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123. The trial court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the claim based on inverse condemnation, but reverse the judgment refusing to dismiss the regulatory taking claim. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Crunk Telfer v. George Curtiss Telfer
This divorce appeal involves the classification of the appreciation in value of separate property. During the marriage, the wife’s family gave her ownership interests in two family companies. The parties used marital funds to pay their tax liabilities arising out of income from the companies that was attributed to them for tax purposes but retained by the companies. The trial court held that the appreciation in value of the wife’s ownership interests in the family companies were her separate property. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the parties substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation in value of the wife’s separate assets, and so reverse the trial court’s classification of the appreciation in value as her separate property. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Robert e. Cooper, Jr., Tennessee Attorney General, Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District Attorney General, Kim Helper, District Attorney General, and The State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause and firearm rights. The petitioner was convicted of felony drug offenses in Georgia. The State of Georgia granted the petitioner a full pardon for his crimes; his Georgia pardon expressly restored his right to possess a firearm. The petitioner now resides in Tennessee. A Tennessee statute provides that it is a felony for a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense to possess a firearm, and it does not make an exception for persons who have been pardoned for their crime. The petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action against the State of Tennessee, seeking a declaration that, because he received a pardon for his drug offenses in Georgia, he can purchase or possess a firearm in Tennessee without violating the Tennessee statute. The trial court held in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize Georgia’s pardon in full and to permit the petitioner to carry a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee now appeals. On appeal, we consider the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We hold that Tennessee’s public policy on the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted non-violent drug felon is not entirely inconsistent with Georgia’s public policy, so the public-policy exception to full faith and credit is not applicable in that situation. However, Tennessee public policy proscribes the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted violent drug felon, contrary to Georgia’s public policy allowing the restoration of firearm rights for all felons, violent or not. This Tennessee policy implicates public safety so as to warrant application of the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Timothy Brown v. Janine Biache Brown
In this divorce case, the trial court divided property which had not been previously divided by agreement of the parties and awarded Wife alimony in solido. Wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property as marital or separate prior to division, and in failing to award her alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, or attorney’s fees. Finding no error we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
James Eberle et al v. Lisa Parrott Elliott, et al.
This is a contested easement action regarding wooded mountain property in Monroe County. The Plaintiffs/Appellants, James and Edna Eberle, filed a complaint requesting that the Defendant/Appellee, Lisa Parrott Elliott, be enjoined from crossing the Eberles’ property from her adjoining thirty-acre tract without benefit of an easement. Following a bench trial, the Monroe County Chancery Court dismissed the Eberles’ complaint for injunctive relief and ruled that an easement exists for ingress and egress over the Eberles’ property, appurtenant to and serving Ms. Elliott’s property. The Eberles have appealed. At issue is whether the trial court erred by finding the existence of an easement, either express, prescriptive, or implied. The Eberles also assert that the trial court erred by failing to limit the easement to a use no greater than the use previously made over the servient property. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that an easement exists for ingress and egress and the court’s dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert C. Scott
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Albert C. Scott, of two counts of rape. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve months of incarceration, followed by nine years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the State’s evidence against him, asserting that the State failed to prove the Defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for the crime. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude there exists no error. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beau Clayton Epperson
Defendant, Beau Clayton Epperson, entered a “best interest” guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Sevier County to the offense of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. There was no negotiated plea agreement as to the length or manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court announced the following sentence: eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail, specifying that under the “sentencing structure” the sentence was to be “one hundred percent of seventy-five percent of eleven months and twenty-nine days.” The trial court declined to grant a fully suspended sentence, but imposed a sentence of split confinement, with ninety (90) days to be served by incarceration, with the balance of the sentence suspended, to be served on supervised probation. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(c)(2)(B), the trial court ordered the probationary period to be two (2) years. Defendant has raised two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence which exceeded the maximum statutory allowable sentence. Second, he argues the trial court erroneously ordered a two year probationary period when it failed to make mandatory findings of fact. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm Witherow
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Malcolm Witherow, of first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Witherow argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in not allowing prior inconsistent recorded statements by a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26), and the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon statements the prosecutor made in closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney Dewayne Burton
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Rodney Dewayne Burton, entered a "no contest" plea for criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, with sentencing to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years, suspended the sentence, and placed appellant on probation. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor when determining his sentence and asks that this court reduce his sentence to a one-year suspended sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzoe Landell Wilson
The Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzoe Landell Wilson, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s imposition of consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement for his vandalism conviction in case number 117014 and eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 180 days to be served in confinement and the balance of the sentence to be served on probation, for his assault conviction in case number 118034. These sentences were imposed by the circuit court after it revoked Wilson’s probation in these cases. Wilson also appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s imposition of a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for his second assault conviction in case number 118603, which the court ordered to be served consecutively to the aforementioned sentences. On appeal, Wilson argues: (1) the circuit court wholly departed from the sentencing act when sentencing him for the second assault conviction, and (2) the circuit court, in revoking his probation, erred in failing to restart his probation anew, given his ability to comply with the terms of probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment showing that the percentage of service for the sentences in case numbers 118034 and 118603 is zero percent. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Ewing Kennedy
Appellee, Charles Ewing Kennedy, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, second offense; speeding; and violation of the implied consent law. Appellee moved to suppress the evidence against him regarding the driving under the influence count. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. This court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court incorrectly applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard when granting appellee’s motion to suppress rather than making a probable cause determination. The State urges this court to reverse the trial court’s ruling and to conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest appellee for driving under the influence. Following our review, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Oscar Thomas v. State of Tennessee
Oscar Thomas (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his plea was constitutionally invalid due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raleigh Commons, Inc. v. SWH, LLC, et al.
This appeal arises from a prolonged dispute among business associates which they have come to refer to as a “business divorce.” The parties in this matter, each doctors, formed a limited liability company for the purpose of acquiring property and constructing a medical office building on the property. In order to acquire the property from the current owner, the doctors executed an assumption and modification agreement whereby the LLC and the doctors each individually agreed to be jointly and severally liable to the current owner for its obligations on a promissory note. Subsequently, one of the doctors, the Appellee, withdrew membership from the LLC and executed an indemnity agreement with the remaining LLC members whereby the Appellee would be held harmless from any liability of the LLC, including the note. Thereafter, the LLC and its remaining members defaulted on the note, and the holder of the note filed a complaint against the Appellee, the LLC, and the individual LLC members, seeking to collect the balance due under the note. In order to avoid having a judgment entered against him, the Appellee purchased the note and pursued a claim against the LLC and its individual members for indemnification and breach of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on his indemnification claim, awarded him attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and dismissed the Appellant’s cross-claims against the Appellee. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |