State of Tennessee v. Andrew Reginald Mackinnon
In 2007, a Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Andrew Reginald Mackinnon, of violating the implied consent law. The Defendant appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment, remanding the case for the trial court to determine whether the Defendant violated the implied consent law. State v. Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, No. E2009-00093-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1460167 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 30, 2011), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On remand, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to suppress, both of which the trial court denied after a hearing. After a non-jury trial, the trial court determined that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law. The trial court ordered the Defendant’s license be revoked for a period of one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it:(1) denied his motion to dismiss; and (2) denied his motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel., Wendy Harrison v. Danny Scott
This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition to modify the father’s child support obligation as set in 2000 under a previous version of the child support guidelines. The dispositive issue is whether there is a “Significant Variance” in the father’s income as required by Department of Human Services Rule 1240-2-4-.05(2)(b)(1) to allow a modification. The trial court found no significant variance in the father’s income; nevertheless, it modified his child support obligation, setting it at the presumptive amount as calculated under the current child support guidelines and using the parties’ current income. We have determined the trial court’s finding of no significant variance was based upon a mathematical error, and we find there is a significant variance entitling the father to a modification of his child support obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the modification of the father’s support but on different grounds than those relied upon by the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Berlinda Lane, and Edward L. Montedonico, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Berlinda Lane v. Jacob L. Daniel and Daniel J. Lund
This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to an intervening personal injury complaint filed by a bankruptcy trustee after the defendants asserted that the original plaintiff, the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding, lacked standing to bring the claim. Once the bankruptcy trustee became aware of the claim, he filed a motion for intervention, or in the alternative, for substitution pursuant to Rule 17.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the trustee’s motion and the trustee later filed an intervening complaint. The trial court, however, later dismissed the case, reasoning that because the first complaint was filed by a party without standing, the original complaint was a nullity. Under this theory, the trial court concluded that the action was commenced upon the filing of the trustee’s intervening complaint, which was undisputedly outside the applicable statute of limitations. Having determined that the plaintiff’s original complaint was not a nullity, we conclude that the trustee’s intervening complaint relates back to the original complaint and, thus, was filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin T. Saulter v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Kevin T. Saulter, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis and a motion to reconsider the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the lower court was correct that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: A Way Out Bonding
The appellant, A Way Out Bonding, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of its Petition to Operate a Bail Bonding Company. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by summarily denying the petition without conducting a hearing. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nitra Lynn Haggard v. Dylan Haggard
After the trial court entered a final decree of divorce, the wife filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking a modification of the division of marital property. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, stating that the court was operating under a misconception concerning the wife’s position at trial, which rendered the division of marital property inequitable. The court awarded an asset previously awarded to the husband to the wife instead. Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ruby W. Graham
The defendant, Ruby W. Graham, appeals her White County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempt to possess with the intent to sell morphine, oxycodone, and marijuana, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the total fine imposed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Glen Crocker v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner challenges the Carroll County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing the petition as time-barred because his mental incompetence tolled the one-year statute of limitations for filing the petition. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Glen Crocker v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion save one point. My colleagues infer that the post-conviction court discredited the Petitioner’s testimony, although the court made no such finding. I believe the record reflects that the court’s findings accepted all the testimony as true but that the court concluded the Petitioner did not provide clear and convincing evidence of his claim. The record supports such a conclusion. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathanael Little
A Chester County jury convicted appellant, Nathanael Little, on count 1 for selling more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; on count 2 for delivering more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; on count 3 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; on count 4 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony; and on count 5 for possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, a Class A misdemeanor. After appropriately merging some of the counts, the trial court sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days for two Class E felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his motion to suppress and by improperly sentencing him. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathanael Little - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to hear the Defendant’s suppression motion. I respectfully dissent, though, because I believe the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to support the conclusions regarding both full confinement and consecutive sentencing. I also believe the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act were not best served by the sentence imposed. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Tonya Dotson v. Donald Howard
The father of one child appeals the trial court’s finding of ten counts of criminal contempt for failing to pay ten weekly child support payments and the imposition of consecutive sentences of ten days for each count for a total sentence of 100 days in jail. Petitioner introduced little evidence other than proof that the father had not paid child support; the father defended the petition insisting he did not have the ability to pay support. Medical records introduced into evidence, along with the testimony of the father and his optometrist, established that the father suffered from an autoimmune medical condition that substantially impairs his vision and prevents him from working in bright light, including sunlight, and from working in a hot environment. Additionally, the father has a tenth grade education and is a convicted felon, facts which further impair his employability. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are unable to conclude that a trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the father had the ability to pay and that his failure to pay support was willful. Accordingly, his conviction of ten counts of contempt for willfully failing to pay child support is reversed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bringle Farms Partnership v. State of Tennessee
The claimant has filed a notice of appeal from an Order Denying Claimant’s Motion for En Banc Review entered by the Tennessee Claims Commission on February 26, 2013. Because the claimant did not file its notice of appeal with the clerk of the Claims Commission within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Estate of Joe Boyd Martin
This case involves a claim first asserted against a decedent’s estate by the decedent’s longtime companion, and then pursued after her death by her heirs The claim was transferred from the probate court to the chancery court and then, by agreed order, to the circuit court for a jury trial. The jury upheld the validity of the claim, and the court entered a judgment on the verdict. The decedent’s heirs then filed post-trial motions contending that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the claim. After extensive briefing, the circuit court agreed with those arguments and vacated its own judgment. We reverse the trial court and reinstate its original judgment. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Ponce DeLeon
The Defendant, Carlos Ponce DeLeon, entered best interest guilty pleas to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, two counts of automobile burglary, Class E felonies, theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402, 39-14-103, 39-14-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years for the theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 conviction, four years for each automobile burglary conviction, three years for the theft of property value at more than $500 but less than $1000 conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each theft of property valued at $500 or less conviction. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing for an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Board of Professional Responsibility
An attorney suspended from the practice of law for eleven months and twenty-nine days,with all but forty-five days of the suspension probated, was assessed costs associated with the proceedings that resulted in his suspension pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 24.3. The attorney timely filed a petition seeking relief from costs, and a panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility convened and conducted a hearing on the petition. The panel denied the petition, and the attorney has appealed to this Court, as permitted by Rule 9, section 24.3. Having carefully and thoroughly considered the record and each of the nine issues raised, we affirm the panel’s decision denying the petition for relief from costs. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Tarence Nelson
Defendant, Tarence Nelson, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the State failed to prove that Defendant did not act in self-defense; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a revolver found during the search of Defendant’s residence that was not the murder weapon; 3) the prosecutor misquoted Defendant during closing argument in an inflammatory manner; and 4) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Gaines
Appellant, Kenneth Gaines, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in September of 2009 with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment. Appellant pled guilty to all three charges. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Appellant was placed on judicial diversion for three years under the supervision of the department of probation. The State filed a petition for revocation of Appellant’s probation in March of 2011 after Appellant was charged with rape, failed to report the arrest, failed to pay court costs, and failed to pay probation fees. After a jury trial on the rape charge, Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault. The trial court approved the jury verdict, terminated Appellant’s judicial diversion, and set both matters for a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years for each aggravated assault conviction and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the six-month sentence Appellant received for the assault conviction, for a total effective sentence of six years and six months. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he challenges the termination of judicial diversion without a formal hearing and insists that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s rights to due process were not violated when the trial court made the determination that Appellant violated the terms of his judicial diversion contemporaneously with his trial on subsequent charges. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to an effective sentence of six years and six months. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delmonta Hill
The Defendant, Delmonta Hill, entered a best interest plea to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by failing to classify him as an especially mitigated offender and (2) by denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dean Heath
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dean Heath, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed a total sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of felony murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Renee Cantrell v. Jessie Arvil Cantrell
Former wife appeals the assessment of past child support to her and the court’s disposition of her motion to hold former Husband in contempt of court. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Martis J. Kelley and Joseph Kelley, Sr. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, individually and d/b/a Erlanger Health System
This is a medical malpractice action filed pursuant to the Tennessee 1 Medical Malpractice Act (“the TMMA.”) The plaintiffs are wife and husband. The sole defendant is a governmental entity subject to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The defendant operates a hospital in Chattanooga. The complaint alleges that wife was a victim of medical malpractice at the hospital in February 2010. On February 2, 2011, the plaintiffs sent the notice required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a) (2012), a part of the TMMA. On June 3, 2011, the plaintiffs filed suit against the Hospital Authority. The Authority filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12(6), arguing that the suit was not timely filed because it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012), set forth in the GTLA. The plaintiffs responded that the period of limitations was extended by 120 days by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) because the plaintiffs had complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-121(a). The trial court dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernest Dodd
Appellant, Ernest Dodd, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury in 2010 along with three other defendants for initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Appellant was convicted by a jury of initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine and attempt to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of nineteen years at thirty-five percent. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court improperly denied Appellant’s motion in limine to exclude photographs of precursors to manufacturing methamphetamine; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) whether the convictions should be reversed for cumulative error. After a review of the record, we determine: (1) that the trial court properly admitted photographs of the precursors to manufacturing methamphetamine where the actual evidence was destroyed as hazardous material; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (3) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley Mai Cook v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ashley Mai Cook, was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for which she received consecutive sentences of life in prison and twenty years, respectively. In this petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise her with regard to whether to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Earl Brown, Jr.
This appeal arises from the second jury trial in this matter. At his first trial, a Davidson County jury convicted appellant, Willie Earl Brown, Jr., of eleven counts of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of seventy-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court reversed his convictions based on the improper admission of evidence relating to uncharged sexual conduct and remanded for a new trial. See State v. Willie Earl Brown, Jr., No. M2009-00505-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4396490, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2010). Following the remand, the parties amended the indictment to charge eight counts of rape of a child. At his second trial, the jury convicted him as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, appellant argues that (1) the State’s election of offenses failed to distinguish count seven from counts one and four; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (3) the trial court erred by imposing a harsher sentence after appellant’s second trial; and (4) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |