State of Tennessee v. Antonio Butler
Antonio Butler ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to one count each of robbery and aggravated assault. In his plea agreement, he agreed to concurrent sentences of five years for each count, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the manner of service of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrea Blackwell and Frederick Blackwell, Co-Conservators for the Estate and Person of Robert Blackwell v. Comanche Construction, Inc. and Comanche Construction of Georgia, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the statutory employer rule under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendant subcontractor rented a crane from a construction rental company. The crane rental company sent its employee to the job site to operate the crane. On the job site, the crane rental company’s employee sustained crippling injuries. The employee’s co-conservators sued the subcontractor in tort. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was a statutory employer of the crane rental company’s employee, pursuant to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically T.C.A. § 50-6-113, and thus was immune from liability under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The trial court held that the subcontractor was not a statutory employer and therefore was not shielded by the exclusive remedy provision. The subcontractor was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether it is a statutory employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act. We hold that, to reach the issue of whether the subcontractor is a statutory employer, it is first necessary to determine if the crane rental company was a subcontractor within the meaning of the Act, an issue not addressed by the trial court. Consequently, as we are unable on this record to consider the issue raised on appeal, we hold that this Court improvidently granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and dismiss the appeal. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Pledged Property II, LLC v. Maurice Morris
The trial court dismissed this matter on appeal from general sessions court upon finding that Appellant failed to perfect his appeal where he failed to file a bond for good surety or pauper’s oath. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Collins v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Collins, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and the resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of the ineffectiveness of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Snipes
The Defendant, James Snipes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, second degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, a class A misdemeanor, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-210, 39-14-406, 39-17-1324 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that mutually exclusive verdicts require dismissal of the felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Tyre
Appellant, Mark Tyre, entered a guilty plea to violation of the sex offender registry act, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence as a Range I offender. He was subsequently placed on probation. While appellant was on probation, the State indicted him for sexual exploitation of a minor based on criminal conduct that pre-dated the guilty plea and judgment in the instant case. After the State requested revocation of the suspended sentence, the trial court held a hearing and revoked appellant’s probation. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation based on criminal conduct that pre-dated his guilty plea. We discern no error in the proceedings and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Holly Geneace Garrett v. Mark Anthony Garrett
This post-divorce appeal concerns the agreed-upon parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent. When Mother registered the Children in a new school district, Father objected. The trial court entered an order requiring the Children to remain in their current school district, despite the Cumberland County Board of Education’s policy providing otherwise. The Cumberland County Board of Education filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. Following a limited hearing, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent, allowing the Children to remain in their current school district per the applicable policy. Mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Health and the Division of Health Related Boards v. Kandala Chary, et al
The Tennessee Department of Health appeals from the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to four doctors following the dismissal of its administrative action against the doctors. Following a contested case hearing in which all material facts were stipulated, the Board of Medical Examiners dismissed all charges upon the finding that “the Department had not proven facts sufficient to establish that Respondent[s] violated Tenn.Code Ann.§§ 63-6-101 et seq., 63-6-214, and Tenn Comp. R. [and] Regs.” When the Department did not seek judicial review of the dismissal, the doctors requested and were awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the award. The chancery court affirmed the award and this appeal followed. Finding there is substantial and material evidence to support the administrative law judge’s decision to award the attorneys’ fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith A. Davis v. Shaw Industries Group, Inc. et al
Plaintiff was terminated from his at-will employment for violating company policy by allegedly lying during an investigation into whether he was involved in a romantic relationship with a human resources manager. Plaintiff filed this action against his former supervisor, and his former employer, for intentional interference with his employment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, the corporate employer cannot be held liable for intentionally interfering with its own employment contracts, and that the undisputed facts established the supervisor did not act outside the scope of his authority in assisting in the investigation; thus, he could not be held liable. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Perry v. Lennox Hearth Products
An employee alleged that he suffered a work-related hearing loss. After finding that the employee established a compensable injury, the trial court awarded 40% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee suffered a compensable injury. Alternatively, the employer contends that the award was excessive. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Quincy Deangelo Gardner v. State of Tennessee
Quincy Deangelo Gardner ("the Petitioner") filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Carrigan v. Davenport Towing and Recovery Services, LLC, et al.
In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his lower back while using a sledge hammer. He had injured his back in a similar manner a year earlier, and his employer asserted that the earlier event was the cause of the employee’s symptoms and need for additional medical treatment. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded additional temporary and permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed, challenging both the temporary and permanent disability benefits awarded. The employee raises two additional issues: the adequacy of the vocational disability award and the trial court’s decision not to award certain discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s decision not to award the employee each of the discretionary costs requested; we affirm judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Alonzo W. Howard
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee reported to his employer that he had sustained bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work activities. The employer provided the employee with medical treatment. After the parties reached an impasse at the benefit review conference, the employer filed a petition seeking a determination of whether the employee was entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits. The employee’s pre-trial motion to compel discovery was denied by the trial court. At trial, both sides presented expert medical evidence to support their positions as to the cause and nature of the employee’s condition. The trial court denied the employee’s claim, accrediting the testimony of the employer’s expert witness that the employee did not suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and that his symptoms did not arise out of or occur in the course and scope of his employment. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to compel discovery and in accrediting the testimony of the employer’s expert witness. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Vaughn
The Defendant, Donald Vaughn, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-eight years, to be served at 100%. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; (2) that his guilty pleas were not valid because the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense; and (3) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that these issues are without merit and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jaiden C.W. and Caiden J.W.
This is the second appeal of this case, involving the issue of child support and arrears. In In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2011), this Court vacated the trial court’s determination of Appellant Father’s child support obligation because the trial court did not base its determination on Father’s actual income. Upon remand, the trial court interpreted the law of the case to limit its review only to Father’s income,and to negate any consideration of other variables affecting child support. Because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case to limit its review of the parties’ actual circumstances, we vacate the order on child support and remand for reconsideration. Vacated and remanded. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Paul J. Frankenberg, III v. River City Resort, Inc., et al
The former president and chief operating officer of a corporation brought this action against the corporation and its CEO, alleging that Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101, which grants “employees and laborers of any corporation . . . a lien upon the corporate and firm property . . . for any sums due them for labor and service performed for the corporation,” provided him a lien in the amount of his alleged unpaid bonus and severance payments. The trial court dismissed the statutory lien claim, holding that the claimant was not included in the statutory definition of “employee.” The claimant has appealed. We hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in State ex rel. McConnell v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 296 S.W. 12 (Tenn. 1927) that a corporation’s “managing officers” are not “employees” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101 controls. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sylvia Susana Marquez v. Pedro Marquez
This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over custody of five children. Sylvia Susana Marquez (“Mother”) and Pedro Marquez (“Father”), divorced in 2003, are mother and father of the five minor children (“the Children,” collectively). Father was designated the primary residential parent of the Children. Mother filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the parenting plan and for emergency custody based on allegations of violence involving Father. In her petition, Mother also argued that a material change of circumstances had occurred such as to justify her being designated the primary residential parent of the Children. The Trial Court found an emergency had arisen and awarded temporary emergency custody of the Children to Mother. Later, after a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order restoring custody to Father after stating that the emergency had been “removed by [Father].” Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Morris L. Marsh v. NECX Disciplinary Board, et al
The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Morris L. Marsh, seeks to appeal was entered on November 28, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 28, 2012 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 10, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Mackenzy Ruth Murdock, et al. v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, et al
After a defense verdict in this medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court, sitting as the thirteenth juror, to determine that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and grant them a new trial. The court denied the motion. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s remarks from the bench show that it did not properly perform its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Hazel N. Ledford
Hazel N. Ledford died on June 22, 1991. Her will (“the Will”) was a joint holographic one made with her husband, Wilson A. Ledford, who predeceased her. Her stepdaughter, Martha Ledford Powell, became the sole personal representative (“the Personal Representative”) and executor of her stepmother’s estate (“the Estate”). The Will was admitted to probate in July 1991, but the Personal Representative did not file her first accounting until 2009. The final accounting was filed in February 2010. The final accounting revealed that the Estate had paid approximately $350,000 toward remediation of soil contamination caused by underground petroleum storage tanks (“the USTs”) on a parcel of land Mr. Ledford conveyed before his death to a family trust. While Mrs. Ledford was never a title owner of the property, she did join in the execution of the deed to the trust. The Will left a portion of Mrs. Ledford’s residuary estate to a charitable trust. The charitable trust and the Tennessee Attorney General (sometimes referred to collectively as “the Objectors”) objected to the final accounting on the ground that the remediation payments were not a proper expense of the Estate. The court denied the objections and approved the final accounting. The court also approved, in part, the Personal Representative’s request for attorney’s fees. The Objectors appeal. We reverse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Lue Holcomb v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Lue Holcomb, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that his discovery of a written statement containing the victim’s recantation of her allegations against him constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence of aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Alysia M. S.
A couple who had cared for a minor child filed a petition alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court awarded the couple temporary custody, and after finding that the child was dependent and neglected, directed custody to remain with the couple. Mother appealed. Grandparents filed an intervening petition. After a trial de novo, the circuit court found that the child was not dependent and neglected, dismissed both petitions, and directed the juvenile court to implement Mother and child’s reunification. The couple appealed. Discerning no error and finding no clear and convincing evidence of dependence and neglect, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Dickerson, et al v. Rutherford County, Tennessee
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Rutherford County on the basis of foreseeability and comparative fault in this negligence action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Franklin v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc. et al.
After the employee sustained a compensable injury to his low back which required surgery, he returned to work. The company for which he worked was sold to another entity after the date of injury but before the employee’s return to work. At trial, both parties agreed that the one and one-half times multiplier cap did not apply because the sale of the company was a “loss of employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6241(d). At trial, the employee was awarded 78% permanent partial disability, the maximum permitted under law, based on an anatomical rating of 13%. The employer has appealed and is contending that the award is excessive. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carl Bohannan v. Expedited Transport Associates, Inc. et al.
In this workers’ compensation appeal, the employee, a truck driver, alleged that he injured his right shoulder and low back when his tractor-trailer overturned. His employer stipulated that the shoulder injury was compensable, but denied that he had sustained a permanent back injury. Instead, the employer contended that the employee’s back symptoms were the result of a previous back injury, which had been the subject of a previous workers’ compensation claim and settlement. The trial court determined that the employee had suffered a new, compensable back injury and was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned 80% of the liability for the award to the employer and 20% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that a new, compensable back injury occurred. In the alternative, it argues that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Workers Compensation Panel |