State of Tennessee v. Jereme Dannuel Little
The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the robbery charges. The jury found the defendant guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial court erred by failing to inform the jury that he had been acquitted of the robbery charges, by prohibiting defense counsel from mentioning the acquittals in closing argument, and by allowing the State to refer to the robbery during its closing argument. The defendant also alleged that the trial court committed error during jury instructions and that the cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Davey Mann and wife, Teresa Mann, v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc., a non-profit organization, et al.
Plaintiffs sued the defendant national fraternity, among others, following an automobile accident with an apparent fraternity pledge. The trial court granted summary judgment to the national fraternity finding that it owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs, and it denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend to allege the national fraternity’s vicarious liability based upon a principal/agent relationship between the national fraternity and the local fraternity chapter and/or between the national fraternity and local fraternity chapter members/prospective members. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the national fraternity as well as its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ina Ruth Brown - Concur
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to comment upon the specific question presented in this appeal and the effect of our decision on prior Tennessee case law. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James David Moats
While on routine patrol in the early hours of the morning, a police officer observed a pick-up truck parked in a shopping center lot. Because the truck’s headlights were turned on, the officer drove into the lot, stopped her patrol car directly behind the truck, and activated her blue lights. Although the officer had seen no indication of criminal activity or distress, she approached the truck, observed a beer can in a cup holder inside, and found the defendant in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition. When she determined that the defendant had been drinking, he was arrested and later convicted for his fourth offense of driving under the influence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant was seized without either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. While we acknowledge that the activation of blue lights will not always qualify as a seizure, the totality of the circumstances in this instance establishes that the officer seized the defendant absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion and was not otherwise acting in a community caretaking role. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed, the conviction is reversed, and the cause dismissed. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James David Moats - Dissent
We respectfully dissent. We would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court, which denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because Officer Bige initially “ approached [Mr. Moats’s] vehicle in her community caretaking function.” We are convinced that prior Tennessee decisions have erroneously limited the community caretaking doctrine to consensual police–citizen encounters. We believe the Court should acknowledge this error, overrule the errant precedents, and recognize that the community caretaking doctrine functions as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. We would then conclude that, in this case, the seizure of Mr. Moats was justified under the community caretaking exception. We would not reach the additional question of whether the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, et al.
This lawsuit concerns the extent to which a bookstore/café area and fitness center/gymnasium contained in a church family life center facility are exempt from property taxation under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-212. The trial court upheld the determination of the State Board of Equalization and the Assessment Appeals Commission that the bookstore/café area was not exempt from taxation, and that the fitness center qualified for a 50 percent exemption under the statute. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Milburn L. Edwards v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Jo Earl Headrick v. William H. Headrick, Jr.
This is a post-divorce matter. The trial court found the appellant, William H. Headrick, Jr. (“Husband”), in contempt and set forth what Husband was required to do to purge himself of contempt. All of this was accomplished in an order entered on March 21, 2012. Husband filed a timely motion to alter or amend that was denied by the trial court in an order entered on June 13, 2012. Husband filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2012. The appellee, Mary Jo Earl Headrick (“Wife”), filed a motion to dismiss in this Court predicated on her argument that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. We dismiss Husband’s appeal as untimely filed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
James Anthony Burgess v. State of Tennessee
This is a post-conviction appeal of the trial court’s order denying appellant relief from his jury convictions of felony murder (two counts); second degree murder (two counts); aggravated burglary; and reckless endangerment. The trial court, which heard the post-conviction petition, sentenced appellant to two consecutive life sentences plus thirteen years. We affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.
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Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Debbie West, Individually and as the Surviving Spouse of William P. West, Deceased v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Hospital, et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The General Sessions Court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). Plaintiff timely sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court, paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, and paid an additional cash bound in the amount of $250.00. On appeal in Circuit Court, the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the TMMA. After raising the issue sua sponte, the Circuit Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the General Sessions Court because Plaintiff failed to file a surety bond as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103. Alternatively, the Circuit Court further concluded that, even if it had jurisdiction, the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to comply with the TMMA. Plaintiff appeals. Although we conclude that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the appeal from General Sessions Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Walker
Appellant, William Walker, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417; 39-17-425. Appellant received a sentence of 12 years for possession of cocaine for sale and 11 months, 29 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, to be served concurrently. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm appellant’s convictions and the court’s judgment.
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Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee
Tennessee prisoners whose convictions and sentences are upheld on appeal have one year to file a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge their convictions and sentences. This appeal involves the narrow circumstances in which fundamental fairness demands the tolling of this deadline. A prisoner filed his petition for post-conviction relief after the statutory deadline had passed because his former attorney provided him the wrong deadline date and failed to give the prisoner his legal files until after the actual deadline had passed. Following a hearing, the Criminal Court for Shelby County dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Whitehead v. State, No. W2010-00784-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3912856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal. We find that the facts of this case reflect that the prisoner was effectively abandoned by his appellate attorney after his petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court. This abandonment impeded the prisoner’s otherwise diligent efforts to file a timely post-conviction petition. Therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and remand the prisoner’s case to the trial court so the prisoner may pursue his petition for post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Anthony Dodson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of having a witness testify at the post-conviction hearing, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call the aforementioned witness to testify at trial for the purpose of impeaching the victim’s testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jodie Williams Henson
The Defendant-Appellant, Jodie Williams Henson, was indicted by a Lake County Grand Jury for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Henson entered an open guilty plea to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(2). The charge for leaving the scene of an accident was dismissed upon entry of Henson’s guilty plea. The trial court subsequently ordered Henson to serve her sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Henson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a probationary sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Debbie West, Individually and as the Surviving Spouse of William P. West, Deceased v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Hospital, et al. - Partial Dissent
In this case, the majority concludes that the plaintiff’s payment of $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk and her posting of an additional $250.00 cash bond satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103, and therefore, that the Circuit Court erred in sua sponte dismissing her appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The majority further concludes, however, that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the certificate of good faith requirement. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 so as to properly perfect her appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. I would find that the requirements of section 27-5-103 were not satisfied because the fee paid and the bond posted were insufficient to secure all costs incurred throughout the appeal, and, therefore, that the circuit court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction in the cause. Although I would rely upon divergent grounds, however, I fully concur in the majority’s ultimate dismissal of the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony W. Welcher v. Central Mutual Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal arises from a petition for post-judgment medical care. The trial court initially found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury to his neck and awarded benefits, including future medical care. Shortly after the entry of a final judgment, which designated a treating physician, a dispute arose over employee’s medical treatment and a proposed surgical procedure. The employee petitioned the trial court to directhis employer to payfor his medical treatment. The employer requested an independent medical evaluation. The surgery took place while the petition was pending. Several days later, the employee suffered a brain hemorrhage. The trial court ruled that the surgical procedure was reasonably related to the work injury, but the hemorrhage was not; thus, it directed the employer to pay for the former but not the latter. After additional proceedings, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to the employee, but not the full amount requested. The employer has appealed, contending that the fee award is excessive. The employee contends that the trial court erred byfinding that treatment of the hemorrhage was not related to his work injury and by not awarding the attorneys’ fees requested. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court declining to order the employer to provide treatment for the hemorrhage. Because the record is insufficient to allow for review, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Franklin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jonathan Adams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jonathan Adams, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his direct appeal, the Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief challenging the performance of trial counsel. Although the issue of timeliness was raised by the parties, the post-conviction court addressed the petition on the merits and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely filed, alleging two alternative dates as supplying the requisite final action of this court for purposes of the post-conviction one-year statute of limitations: (1) the date the corrected judgments were filed in accordance with this court’s order on remand; or (2) the date this court’s mandate was filed. Having reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we hold that the final action of this court was the filing date of its opinion on direct appeal, and therefore, the post-conviction petition was filed outside of the applicable one-year limitations period. The appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward William Crandall
The Defendant, Edward William Crandall, challenges his conviction for aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, alleging (1) that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient to prove penetration of the victim and to identify him as the perpetrator and (2) that the trial court erred when denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case-in-chief because the State had failed to prove the victim’s age. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. The case is remanded to the Loudon County Criminal Court for correction of the judgments to reflect that service of Count 3 is consecutive to Count 1 and that service of Count 2 is concurrent to Count 1. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process requires tolling of Mr. Whitehead’s post-conviction statute of limitations based on attorney abandonment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Phillip Douglas Seals v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Phillip Douglas Seals, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the postconviction court erred in denying his request for transcripts of the opening and closing statements so he could determine whether the original prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Lyle Graham v. Barbie Phylissa Graham
This post-divorce appeal concerns an agreed-upon parenting plan, which designated Father as the primary residential parent and denied Mother any form of visitation with the Child. Years after the plan was entered, Mother filed a petition to modify the plan, alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred. The trial court agreed and provided Mother with liberal visitation. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Autumn R.W., et al
This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of two grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the children’s best interest, revoked the mother’s parental rights to three of her minor children. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Danny Keith Ellis
This case involves a dispute between the administrators of the estate of a man who died intestate and the decedent’s’s former wife over the legal ownership of funds that were held in jointly titled accounts at two banking institutions. After the man’s death, his former wife withdrew almost all the funds from the accounts. The administrators asked for a declaratory judgment that the funds belonged to the estate on the basis that the husband and wife had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) before their divorce which designated those funds as belonging solely to the husband. However, the husband never changed the titles on those accounts, and the ex-wife insisted that the unaltered designation of joint ownership conclusively established her right to the funds after her ex-husband’s death. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the bank accounts were the sole property of the estate, and the former wife was obligated to return the funds. The trial court reasoned that because the MDA was approved by the court and was binding on the parties, it amounted to an amendment to the contract that the parties had created when the accounts were established. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Russell, et al. v. Hendersonville Utility District
Property owners sued utility district for damages and an injunction as a result of the excessive use of an easement across the property owners’ land by the district’s assignees. The utility district denied any wrongdoing and moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted. The property owners appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the property owners’ complaint because the property owners have stated a cause of action for which relief can be granted. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Dobbins, As Conservator of the Estate of Frank Bailey, Jr., v. Gerald S. Green, et al.
This is a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 case. Following plaintiff’s death and the filing of a suggestion of death in the trial court, no motion to substitute party was made within the ninety day time period set out in Rule 25.01. The trial court determined that the failure to file a motion for substitution of party was not the result of excusable neglect and granted the Rule 25.01 motion to dismiss the lawsuit. The court subsequently also granted the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. We conclude that, in the absence of excusable neglect, failure to comply with Rule 25.01 requires mandatory dismissal of the case with prejudice and the lawsuit may not thereafter be revived by the filing of a motion for voluntary dismissal. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |