Matthew Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Matthew Jackson, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to an effective ten years of incarceration. The petitioner filed a prior application for the writ of error coram nobis, the denial of which was affirmed on appeal. The petitioner brings this subsequent petition for the writ of error coram nobis, asserting various grounds for relief. The trial court denied the writ, noting that the claim was time-barred and that the petitioner failed to allege facts which would negate the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas. After a review of the record, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Agnew
The Defendant, Thomas L. Agnew, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court conviction for third offense driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in jail at 75%. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in imposing six months of confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jackie Caldwell vs. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jackie Caldwell, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of aggravated rape and is serving a twenty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she raises the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and an improper sentence. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Ray Starnes
The appellant, Ricky Ray Starnes, pled guilty to a violation of a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony, and a violation of registration, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rose A. Chapman, et al. v. Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center
Rose A. Chapman and Alfred C. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) sued Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (“the Hospital”) regarding a fall Ms. Chapman suffered while a patient at the Hospital. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding that the Hospital was not at fault. Plaintiffs appeal raising one issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting the Hospital’s motion in limine to exclude testimony about an apology and offer to pay bills allegedly made by one of the Hospital’s nurses. We find this issue has been waived, and we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
David Ivy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David Ivy, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006). On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that (1) he is actually innocent of the offense; (2) counsel were ineffective in both phases of the trial and on appeal; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments in both phases of the trial; (4) the application of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2) was improper; (5) the Capital Defense Team of the Shelby County Public Defender’s Office is “constitutionally ineffective”; and (6) the death penalty is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danielle Sims
The defendant, Danielle Sims, was convicted of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of three years, with eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve at 75% and the remainder on intensive state probation. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her rape conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas D. Taylor
This case is the consolidation of appeals by the Defendant, Thomas D. Taylor (a/k/a James Ray McClinton), of two cases, a direct appeal and the appeal from a the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixty years, at 100%, for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and ten years, at 35%, for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of seventy years. In his direct appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) for numerous reasons, he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred when it limited cross-examination of the victim; (3) prosecutors engaged in misconduct; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to consider new evidence presented during the motion for new trial. In the appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition because the victim’s medical records contained newly discovered evidence. After consolidating the appeals and thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, in the Defendant’s direct appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. In the Defendant’s appeal from his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory N. Brown
Defendant, Gregory N. Brown, was charged in a two-count indictment with domestic aggravated assault and cruelty to animals. Defendant pled guilty to domestic aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the cruelty to animals charge was dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six years as a Range I standard offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Defendant appeals his sentence and argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charmon D. Copeland
The Defendant, Charmon D. Copeland, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-305 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years’ confinement at 100% service as a violent offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the prosecutor engaged in three instances of improper conduct, and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Saundra Thompson v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education
We granted this appeal to determine whether a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave amounts to a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. We hold that, although a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. Accordingly, by dismissing the plaintiff tenured teacher without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing, the defendant board of education violated her rights under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional right to due process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement, back pay consisting of her full salary, compensatory damages for the actual harm she sustained, and attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the trial court, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
James Lueking, et al. v. Cambridge Resources, Inc., et al.
Plaintiffs filed an action in the Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment and damages against defendants. Plaintiffs are property owners and lessors to defendants/appellees, who are lessees and operators of an oil and gas production unit. The Trial Court bifurcated the issues raised in the Complaint, and a trial was held before a jury. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs, determining that there was an oral lease "expanding the said storage yard from approximately 1/3 acre to approximately 2 and ½ acres." Based upon the jury's verdict, the Trial Court found there was proof of a lease and that plaintiffs were entitled to rentals of $1,000.00 per month from October 1994 through November 2010, totaling $194,000.00 with pre-judgment interest of $243,043.04. The Trial Court, in its discretion, referred the remaining issues to the Tennessee Oil and Gas Board for resolution and entered final Judgment. Plaintiffs appealed and we affirm the Trial Court Judgment, as modified. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert L. Hall v. Chona S. Hall
This appeal arises from a divorce. After approximately four years of marriage, Herbert L. Hall (“Husband”) sued Chona S. Hall (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital estate. Wife filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Wife appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in entering a decree for divorce when the parties had not engaged in mediation, and, that the Trial Court failed to adhere to applicable local court rules. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Green
Terry Green (“the Defendant”) entered a best interest plea to one count of theft of property of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, with no agreement as to his sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to a term of four years, with four months to be served in confinement. The trial court suspended the remainder of the sentence, placing the Defendant on probation for a period of five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s application for diversion and/or his request for full probation. The Defendant also claims that the trial court, in determining whether to grant or deny judicial diversion, erred in allowing “evidence of allegations of wrongdoing that had nothing to do with the case before the [c]ourt” and erred in “giving more weight to that evidence.” After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Barrick, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, insurance company and its agent, on Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence on the basis of duty. We dismiss for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Norman Hill v. Danny Tapia, Jr., et al.
This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile accident. After the accident, Plaintiff/Appellant learned that he suffered from a degenerative disc disease, which required surgery. Appellant sued the two drivers involved in the accident for damages, which included his medical expenses for the disc surgery. At trial, Appellant’s surgeon’s deposition testimony was read to the jury, in which the surgeon testified that while the accident “aggravated” Appellant’s existing condition, the treatment he received was not “causally related” to the accident. Appellant offered another expert’s testimony, however, that did relate the treatment to the accident. At the close of proof, Appellant moved for a directed verdicton the issue of causation for his medical expenses, arguing that because the surgeon’s testimony was contradictory, it was subject to the cancellation rule. The trial court denied the motion and sent the issue to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Appellant, but in an amount that did not include the medical expenses he incurred to treat the degenerative disc disease. Appellant was also awarded discretionary costs. After a careful review of the record, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Berry's Chapel Utility, Inc. v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
This is a direct appeal by newly incorporated Berry’s Chapel Utility, Inc., from a declaratory order by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. The dispute hinges on whether the TRA had jurisdiction over Berry’s Chapel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010). The TRA held that Berry’s Chapel was a public utility as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010), thus, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the TRA. Berry’s Chapel asserts it was a non-profit and, thus, it was a non-utility by statutory definition and not subject to the TRA’s jurisdiction. We affirm the decision of the TRA. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Chris Eric Strickland v. Pennye Danielle Strickland
Divorce action in which Mother raises numerous issues, including the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, the parenting plan in which Mother’s parenting time was limited to 120 days a year, child support, and the classification and division of marital property. Mother also challenges the trial court’s decisions to admit the testimony of two witnesses and to exclude the testimony of two other witnesses. We have concluded that the trial court erred in excluding two of Mother’s expert witnesses and in admitting testimony regarding child abuse allegations that should have been excluded based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409. Having considered the record, including the testimony of Mother’s two experts and excluding the testimony that must be excluded pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s designation of Father as the Primary residential parent; however, the evidence does preponderate against the parenting schedule which greatly limits Mother’s parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate in all respects. Because we have concluded that the evidence preponderates against the parenting schedule, we remand this issue to the trial court to adopt a parenting schedule that affords Mother additional parenting time, although not equal parenting time, and to modify the child support award to comport with Mother’s income and the new parenting schedule. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Whitesell v. Kaylene Miller and Patricia Moore
The appeal concerns a dispute over personal property. The appellant landlord refused to permit the appellee tenant to renew her lease, and the tenant was forced to leave the premises. Several items of personal property belonging to the tenant were apparently left behind. The tenant sued the landlord for reimbursement for the value of the property. After a bench trial, the trial court ordered the landlord to reimburse the tenant. The landlord now appeals. As the appellate record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a statement of evidence, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Athena H. Melfi v. Joseph Thomas Melfi
The parties to this action were divorced by Decree on December 15, 2009. The former husband filed a Motion asking the Court to reopen the case on June 28, 2011. The Motion was styled as a Rule 59 and/or 60 Motion, Tenn. R. Civ. P. At a hearing before the Trial Court, the Trial Judge dismissed the Motions on the grounds that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain these Motions. On appeal, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Latony Baugh, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al.
Shortly after the mother of four children was killed in an accident, her husband instituted an action to recover damages for her death; the father of the children moved to intervene in the action and for the court to hold a hearing on whether the husband had abandoned the mother, thereby waiving his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action. The trial court did not hold a hearing; rather, it held that the husband was the proper party to pursue the action, allowed the Guardian of the children to represent the interest of the children in the action, and dismissed Father’s petition. The surviving spouse, Guardian and tortfeasor subsequently petitioned the court for approval of a settlement of the wrongful death claim; the court granted the petition. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the issue of whether the husband was estranged from the mother, in approving the settlement, and in placing the settlement documents under seal. We remand the case for a hearing on whether the husband waived his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action and reverse the court’s placement of the settlement documents under seal; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gatlinburg Roadhouse Investors, LLC., v. Charlynn Maxwell Porter, et al.
In this action plaintiff charged defendant had breached the contract between them and sought specific performance. The Trial Court held the contracts were ambiguous and construed them in accordance with the actions the parties took in regard to the contracts. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the Complaint, but refused to award the prevailing party attorney's fees as was required in the parties' contract. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, but modify and remand, with instructions to the Trial Court to award the prevailing party her attorney's fees. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger A. Beu, Jr.
A Roane County jury convicted the Defendant, Roger A. Beu, Jr., of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, to serve thirty days in jail, with the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury during closing argument; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the written statement of the victim; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Theresa A. Kerby v. Melinda J. Haws, MD, et al.
A woman who suffered a series of persistent infections after surgery filed a malpractice complaint against the defendant surgeon. Her complaint alleged that the infections were cause by a small metal object that the defendant had negligently left in her body during the surgery. The plaintiff attached to her complaint the statutorily required certificate of good faith, which certified that she had consulted with an expert, who provided a signed statement confirming that he believed, on the basis of the medical records, that there was a good faith basis to maintain the action. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. After the object was discovered to be a surgical clip of a type that was designed to be retained by the patient’s body, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff did not oppose. The defendant surgeon subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 (d)(3), which gives the court the authority to punish violations related to the certificate of good faith. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded the defendant doctor over $22,000 in attorney fees. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandy Womack, et al. v. Corrections Corporation of America d/b/a Whiteville Correction Facility
This appeal involves the transfer of a state prisoner’s action based on improper venue. The prisoner was housed in a correctional facility located in Hardeman County, Tennessee. The correctional facility is operated by a private entity. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-803,the Circuit Court of Davidson County transferred this action to Hardeman County, where the correctional facility is located. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |