State of Tennessee v. Brian Le Hurst
Defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder after a trial by jury. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by admitting three pieces of evidence: (1) an excerpt from a 911 call made by the victim several days before his death, in which the victim claimed to be "a little . . . concerned" about the defendant’s behavior; (2) testimony from one of the defendant’s friends to the effect that the friend did not believe that any affair had occurred between the defendant and the friend’s then-wife; and (3) testimony concerning various searches performed on the defendant’s computer involving the name "Missy." Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction concerning the destruction of evidence. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err with respect to the evidentiary and jury instruction claims raised by the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Le Hurst - Concurring
I respectfully concur in the results in this case. My departure relates to only one issue – the rationale for affirming the trial court’s admission into evidence a portion of a recording of the victim’s telephone call to the police in which the victim expressed his concern over the defendant’s behavior. Assuming that this evidence passes the hearsay barrier as evidence of the victim’s state of mind, I would have held that the victim’s state of mind as expressed in the recording was irrelevant to the issues on trial. I note that the recording itself does not express the date of the telephone call, but the prosecutor’s oral, in-court preface to the playing of the recording indicates to the trial court that the call was placed on June 5, 2008. Given the somewhat banal comment offered on the recording and the remoteness of nearly three weeks, I see no relevancy of the statement to the issues joined at trial. That said, I would have also held that the error was harmless. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Ralph, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lawrence Ralph, Jr., appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his drug-related convictions and effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel; and (2) that he was denied access to legal materials that he needed to prepare to represent himself at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julio Villasana v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Julio Villasana, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. Petitioner entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to the maximum sentence of 25 years for aggravated vehicular homicide and two years for leaving the scene of an accident. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence on direct appeal. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Keen v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1991. Nineteen years later, he filed a petition in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceeding on the ground that he possessed new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. His evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. test score purportedly showing that he could not be executed by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010) because he was intellectually disabled. The trial court declined to hold a hearing and denied the prisoner’s petition. The trial court determined, as a matter of the law, that the prisoner’s newly-obtained I.Q. test score was not new scientific evidence of his actual innocence of the offenses to which he earlier pleaded guilty. The prisoner filed an application for permission to appeal the denial of his petition to reopen in the Court of Criminal Appeals. In addition to asserting that the newly-obtained I.Q. test score was new scientific evidence of his actual innocence, the prisoner asserted that this Court’s decision in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), announced a new constitutional right and, therefore, provided another basis for reopening his petition for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order on June 29, 2011, affirming the trial court’s denial of the petition to reopen because the I.Q. test score did not amount to scientific evidence of actual innocence for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2006) and because Coleman v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(1). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) encompasses ineligibility for the death penalty in addition to actual innocence of the underlying crime and whether our holding in Coleman v. State established a new constitutional right to be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 40-30-117(a)(1). We hold that the Tennessee General Assembly, when it enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2), did not intend for the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” to include ineligibility for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. We also hold that Coleman v. State did not establish a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30117(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals denying the prisoner’s petition to reopen his post-conviction petition. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David Keen v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
In Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tenn. 2001), this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of [intellectually disabled] individuals because such executions violate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case.” The next year, the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Akeem T. Goodman
The Defendant, Akeem T. Goodman, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, -403 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive Range I terms of twenty-two years at 100% service as a violent offender for an effective forty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Isaiah L.A.
This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The appellees filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to the minor child at issue. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of several grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the child’s best interest, revoked the biological father’s parental rights to the child. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Ray Carter v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Walter Ray Carter, pro se, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pleadings entitled “Motion of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Motion to Dismiss Indictment and/or Arrest Judgment” filed on July 18, 2011 in four separate cases. The motions sought relief from certain drug-related convictions entered in 1996 and in 2005. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to construe the pleadings as petitions for post-conviction relief which are now time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations. The summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Scotty V. Nunn v. Tony Howerton, Warden, et al
The Petitioner, Scotty V. Nunn, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 convictions for fraudulent breach of trust and misapplication of contract payments and resulting sentence of fourteen years. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief because of an improper extradition from the Commonwealth of Virginia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen D. Good v. Sunkote Plastic Coatings Corporation et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he injured his back at work on September 30, 2008, and is now totally and permanently disabled. The employer denied that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury, but alternativelyargued that the employee is not totallyand permanently disabled. The trial court concluded that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury and awarded 80% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable and that, even if the employee proved a compensable injury, the evidence preponderates against the award of 80% permanent partial disabilitybenefits. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Van Buren | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mikel Hamrick v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against petitioner, Mikel Hamrick. He entered guilty pleas to four of the counts, including aggravated 1 burglary, especially aggravated stalking, domestic assault, and theft of property less than $500, for which he received an effective four-year sentence. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his mental instability rendered his guilty pleas involuntary and that the infirmity was compounded by trial counsel’s failure to adequately advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Keith Solomon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Donald Keith Solomon, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for being untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick Pope v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Patrick Pope, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective eleven-year sentence for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate possible alibi witnesses in preparing the case for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nathaniel Richardson v. State of Tennessee
Nathaniel Richardson (“the Petitioner”) entered a best interest plea to second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty years. The Petitioner subsequently filed for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pamela J. Booker
The Defendant, Pamela J. Booker, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking her probation for her three convictions for violating a habitual traffic offender order and ordering her to serve her effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the court erred in ordering her to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Paul Boling, Jr.
The defendant, Donnie Paul Boling, Jr., pled guilty to reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and to driving under the influence, possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, all Class A misdemeanors. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of one year. In this appeal, the defendant’s sole claim is that the trial court erred by denying him probation or an alternative sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Lee Augustus Grimmig
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ngoc Dien Nguyen
Defendant, Ngoc Dien Nguyen, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his sentences of probation. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of writing or passing worthless checks over $1,000. He received a sentence of two years for each count, as a Range I standard offender, to be served concurrently on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed, which alleged that Defendant had violated his probation by committing new offenses, failing to report the new offenses to his probation officer, failing to notify his probation officer that he was back in Tennessee after serving a parole violation in California, and failing to provide proof of payment of court costs and fines. Following the hearing the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective two-year sentence in confinement, with credit for time served. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Michael Watkins
James M. Watkins (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for burglary of a business, vandalism of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and possession of burglary tools. He received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range III, career offender. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contents found as a result of a stop and subsequent search of the Defendant and a bag in his possession. He also argues the following: that the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s objection to a jury instruction; that newly acquired evidence exists that would have affected the outcome of the trial; and that Officer Rogers’ testimony was perjury that prejudiced the Defendant. Lastly, the Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio J. Bullard v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, Derrick D. Schofield, Bruce Westbrooks, Jack Middleton, and Josh Paschall
This appeal involves an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The petitioner inmate was convicted of disciplinary offenses by the respondent prison disciplinary board. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the convictions for the disciplinary offenses. The trial court found that the inmate’s petition was not timely filed, and therefore that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Thomas Edmunds v. Delta Partners, L.L.C. et al.
Appellant corporation appeals the trial court’s rulings finding it liable for breach of contract damages, prejudgment interest, and damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Additionally, the corporation’s president appeals the trial court’s action in piercing the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for the contract damages. We reverse the trial court’s finding with regard to veil piercing, but affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
In 2000, an affidavit of complaint was issued charging “John Doe” with an aggravated rape that had occurred in 1994. The affidavit, which included a detailed DNA profile of “John Doe,” led to the issuance of an arrest warrant. In 2008, police officers discovered that fingerprints taken from the scene of the crime matched those of the defendant. Later, police determined that the DNA profile was that of the defendant,and a superseding indictmentwas issued in his name. The defendant was tried and convicted of attempted aggravated rape, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the “John Doe” warrant with the DNA profile was adequate to identify the defendant and commence prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations. Because the issue is one of first impression in this state, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that a criminal prosecution is commenced if, within the statute of limitations for a particular offense, a warrant is issued identifying the defendant by gender and his or her unique DNA profile. Furthermore, a superseding indictment in the defendant’s proper name provides the requisite notice of the charge. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert Thomas Edmunds v. Delta Partners, L.L.C., et al. - CONCUR
I agree fully with the majority’s analysis in this case. I concur separately only to add a comment as to the portion of the opinion on the Fair Labor Standards Act. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Rusty Ing v. City of Milan
Plaintiff is a business owner who was informed by the City of Milan that his business license would not be renewed because the City had determined that he was a “transient merchant” within the meaning of the City’s municipal code. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking an injunction preventing the City from prohibiting the operation of his business. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that Plaintiff was a transient merchant. The trial court agreed and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals |