Eric D. Wallace v. Arvil Chapman, Warden
M2012-00749-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

Eric D. Wallace (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that (1) his indictment for attempted first degree murder is defective because it was amended improperly to include a factual basis for aggravated assault; (2) the judgment and sentence imposed for felony murder and attempted first degree murder are void; and (3) the felony murder conviction must be dismissed. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Wayne Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Lee Colbert
M2012-00225-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway

Appellant, Kristopher Colbert, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury in April of 2011 for driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, reckless endangerment, vehicular assault,and aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to reduce sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and/or Tennessee code Annotated section 40-35-212(d). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Appellant initiated this appeal to determine whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to reduce the sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Allen Kelley
M2011-02758-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

This is an appeal from the dismissal of Appellant/juvenile’s appeal of the juvenile court’s determination of delinquency to the circuit court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-159. While the appeal was pending, Appellant ran away from the group home, where he had been ordered to live. Appellee Department of Children’s Services filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court determined that the appeal should be dismissed based upon application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court further determined that Appellant had capacity, under the Rule of Sevens, to be held responsible for his actions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Franklin Court of Appeals

Leon Marshall v. Civil Service Commission of the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Department of Safety
M2011-02157-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, a former Tennessee State Trooper appeals the chancery court’s judgment affirming the Tennessee Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate his employment. The Commission affirmed the initial order of the Administrative Law Judge, who upheld the Tennessee Department of Safety’s decision to terminate the trooper’s employment for violations of its policies and procedures and for the good of the service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-30-326. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Jason Everett Nickell
W2011-02155-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

Jason Everett Nickell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of misdemeanor stalking, with no agreement as to his sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not consider two mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company v. Jami McNair Tuck, et al.
M2011-02445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

An insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that mother and child were residents of the insured’s household, and therefore, that coverage for the death of the child was excluded bythe relevanthomeowner’s insurance policy. The chancery court found that mother and child were not residents of the insured’s household at the time of the child’s death, and we affirm.
 

Lincoln Court of Appeals

In the Matter of: Connor S.L.
W2012-00587-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert W. Newell

In this paternity case, Father appeals the Carroll County Juvenile Court’s rulings with regard to custody and parenting time with his minor child. The trial court’s ruling as to the paternity of the child is affirmed. However, because the trial court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to custody and the parenting schedule and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Carroll Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Michael Eugene Rutherford
E2011-02409-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bob R. McGee

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rutherford, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his fiveyear sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation, (2) there is new evidence related to testimony relied upon by the trial court in revoking his probation, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim of the Defendant’s new theft charge to testify at the revocation hearing, and (4) the court erred by insufficiently weighing his good behavior. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Isobel V. O. and Bree'Ana J.A.
M2012-00150-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donna Scott Davenport

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father based on abandonment for failure to support and failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. We reverse termination on the grounds of abandonment, and affirm termination of parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Leroy J. Humphries, et al. v. Nicolas C. Minbiole, et al.
M2011-00008-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ronald Thurman

This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent landowners over Defendants’ installation of a private water line within a right-of-way easement across the Plaintiffs’ property. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Defendants’ private water line trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property. Further, the trial court ordered that the Defendants would be incarcerated if they did not remove the water line and return Plaintiffs’ property to its previous condition within thirty (30) days. Defendants appealed. We affirm in part and remand for further proceedings.

DeKalb Court of Appeals

Odell Shelton v. State of Tennessee
W2012-00617-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley Jr.

Petitioner, Odell Shelton, seeks relief via a writ of error coram nobis from his plea agreement that resulted in a conviction of aggravated assault and a sentence of ten years. He claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a multiple (Range II) offender and erroneously relied upon a presentence report in denying his request for a suspended sentence. Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s reliance on the presentence report is “newly discovered evidence.” The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Discerning no basis for coram nobis relief, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Richard Tipton
E2011-02354-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John F. Dugger, Jr.

The Defendant, Richard Tipton, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10- 401(a)(2), 55-50-504, 55-9-603(a)(1), and 55-12-139. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve one year and six months in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that the trial court failed to consider the eight-year span of time in which the Defendant committed no crimes when determining his sentence, showing a lack of consideration of other sentencing factors. Following our review, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments because the Defendant was sentenced to the county jail instead of the Department of Corrections (DOC), as required by statute. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Greene Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. James D. Ledford, II
M2011-01136-CCA-R30CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

The defendant, James D. Ledford, II, appeals the Seqautchie County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing. The defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of nine years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the same time, the defendant also pled guilty to a violation of probation in a separate case with a sentence of two years, which the trial court revoked and ordered to be served concurrently with the homicide sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

Sequatchie Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Donald E. Fentress
M2011-01505-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway

The defendant, Donald E. Fentress, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that his sentence for rape is excessive under the facts and circumstances of his case. Specifically, he faults the trial court for failing to apply mitigating factor (8), that the defendant was suffering from a mental condition which significantly reduced his culpability for the offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(8) (2010). Following review of the record before us, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

William J. Ferris, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
W2011-00746-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paula Skahan

William J. Ferris, Sr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

James D. Holder and Barbara L. Holder v. S & S Family Entertainment, LLC
M2011-00601-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

Plaintiff purchased family entertainment center businesses from defendants and it leased, from defendants, buildings in which the entertainment centers were operated. Plaintiff also purchased certain assets from defendants, but a dispute ultimately arose regarding certain assets’ inclusion within the sale. At the expiration of the building leases, defendants filed suit claiming that plaintiff had damaged their property, that plaintiff had improperly removed certain items from the buildings, and that it had failed to remove other items which it should have removed. Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim asserting ownership of the allegedly damaged, improperly removed, and non-removed property, and further claiming that defendants had reneged upon an agreement to sell it one of the buildings at issue. The trial court entered a brief order awarding defendants damages and dismissing plaintiff’s counterclaim. Plaintiff moved the trial court to alter or amend its judgment and for entry of a final order. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding there were no remaining issues in need of resolution. We find that the order appealed is not a final judgment, and therefore, that this Court lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Thus, we must dismiss this appeal and remand to the trial court for appropriate findings and entry of a final order.

Sumner Court of Appeals

Sammie Netters v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
M2012-01591-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia Bonnyman

This appeal involves an inmate’s petitions for writ of certiorari challenging the Board of Probation and Parole’s decisions to deny him parole on two separate occasions. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s claims related to one parole hearing but requiring further proceedings as to his claims related to the second parole hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

City of Memphis Civil Service Commission v. Steven Payton
W2011-02501-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin

A City of Memphis firefighter who participated in the City’s employee assistance program was terminated after his second positive drug screen. The firefighter appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission. He argued that his drug screen results were confidential under federal law and that he had not executed a consent form to authorize the disclosure of the results to the City. The Commission overruled the firefighter’s motion to exclude the test results and upheld his termination. The chancery court reversed, finding that the drug screen results were inadmissible because the City had failed to comply with federal law. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the Commission, and therefore reverse the decision of the chancery court.

Shelby Court of Appeals

City of Memphis Civil Service Commission v. Steven Payton - Concurring
W2011-02501-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin

I concur in the majority’s holding that the followup drug screen at issue was not a “[r]ecord[] of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment” of Mr. Payton, and therefore was not covered by 42 U.S.C.A. § 290dd-2(a).

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Patrick Lynn Crippen
E2011-01242-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bob R. McGee

Defendant, Patrick Lynn Crippen, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, failing to provide proper evidence of financial responsibility, and violation of state registration law. Defendant waived his right to the appointment of counsel and subsequently filed motions to dismiss for want of prosecution and to suppress evidence of his performance on field sobriety tests, which were both denied by the trial court. Following a jury trial, at which Defendant represented himself, Defendant was convicted of DUI and found in violation of the implied consent law. The remaining charges were dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75 percent. Defendant appeals his conviction pro se and asserts that: 1) he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the officer to testify about Defendant’s field sobriety tests; 3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the Knoxville Police Department unlawfully “stacked” charges against him; 4) that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 5) that the jury should have been instructed as to the availability of audio/visual equipment in the jury room; and 6) that Defendant was not properly informed of a hearing on his motion for new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Montorius G. Herron v. State of Tennessee
W2012-00482-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan

Petitioner, Motorius G. Herron, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. In his post-conviction proceeding, Petitioner challenged his conviction following a jury trial for identity theft. The sole issue for appeal is whether Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to make a written request for the inclusion of the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card as a lesser included offense of identity theft. Since the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card is not a lesser included offense of identity theft, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Willie Thomas v. State of Tennessee
W2011-01795-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

Petitioner, Willie Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel “scared” him into pleading guilty; and (2) he was not fully informed regarding the plea. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al. - Concur
M2012-00356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones


I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the disciplinary action taken by the city must be set aside because of the failure to follow its own procedures for such action. However, I want to make clear that, in my opinion, Constitutional due process was not implicated. I believe relief is appropriate under the petition for other reasons.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Debbie Sikora ex rel. Shelley Mook v. Tyler Mook et al.
M2011-01764-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Franklin L. Russell

This is a custody action in which the father and paternal grandparents appeal the trial court’s designation of the maternal grandmother as the primary residential parent of the father’s seven-year-old daughter following the disappearance of the mother of the child, who was the primary residential parent. The trial court found that the father was unfit to parent the child and that he posed a substantial risk of harm to the child due to his history of domestic violence and the danger from exposure to the father’s drug activities and father’s associates. On appeal, the father and the paternal grandparents raise numerous issues relating to the trial court’s decision. They argue, inter alia, that the trial court erred in considering evidence of the father’s conduct that occurred prior to the entry of the Final Divorce Decree, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to overcome the father’s superior parental rights, that the decision to award custody to the maternal grandmother was not in the best interest of the child, that the trial court erred in awarding custody to the maternal grandmother, and that the trial court erred in allowing the maternal grandmother to relocate to Pennsylvania. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s factual findings and that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that designation of the father as the primary residential parent would expose the child to the risk of substantial harm. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s designation of the maternal grandmother as the primary residential parent of the father’s seven-year-old child.

Bedford Court of Appeals

Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al.
M2012-00356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

Former police officer sought certiorari review of the City of Clarksville’s decision to terminate his employment, contending that the City failed to follow the disciplinary procedure set forth in the City Code and that, as a consequence, his termination deprived him of due process of law. The trial court held that there was material evidence to support the decision to terminate petitioner and returned the case to the City to have the head of the human resources department conduct a review of the investigation and appropriateness of the penalty; following a report from the head of the human resources department, the court entered a final order granting judgment to the City. Concluding that the failure of the City to follow its disciplinary procedure deprived petitioner of his due process right, we reverse the judgment, vacate the termination and remand the case for further proceedings.

Montgomery Court of Appeals