State of Tennessee v. Charles Mandel Moss, Alias Charles Mandell, Alias Pookie Doo
The Defendant, Charles Mandel Moss, alias Charles Mandell, alias Pookie Doo, was convicted of violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, a Class E felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, eleven months and twenty-nine days each for possession of marijuana and evading arrest, and thirty days each for violation of the open container law and violation of the seatbelt law. The court imposed partially consecutive sentences that resulted in an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the Defendant's previous arrests. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Frith
The defendant, Ricky Frith, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sherry Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P. and Orangeco, L.P.
This case involves the question of whether Appellee entities are partnerships under Tennessee law. Appellant appeals the trial court’s order, which found that Appellee entities were not partnerships. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Hutson v. State of Tennessee
In June 2005, a Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Timothy Hutson, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to provide timely information about a plea agreement, failed to develop a working relationship with the petitioner, and advised the petitioner to wear jail clothes rather than civilian clothes during the trial. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rashad G. Robinson
.A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Rashad G. Robinson, of possession of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, two counts of misdemeanor assault, Class A misdemeanors, and vandalism under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively to each other and to case number 07-372. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert J. Miller vs. Stephanie L. Miller
Wife appeals the entry of an order of protection against her. Because the order of protection has expired, the appeal is moot, and therefore, is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Joy Lamberson McNaughten, et al. v. Larry Lunan, et al.
The owners of a piece of commercial property brought an unlawful detainer action against a lessee who had stopped paying rent. The trial court issued a judgment of $33,450 against the lessee for past-due rent, followed by a writ of ejectment. After the lessee moved from the property, the owners sued to collect the rent due on the five-year lease and for damages to the property. The lessee argued that irregularities in the execution of the lease rendered it unenforceable. The trial court determined that the lease was enforceable and that the lessee could be held personally liable for a judgment in the amount of $326,716.74. We find that the parties did not reach the meeting of the minds that is necessary to form an enforceable contract, and we accordingly reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Scott Walker v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Tony Scott Walker, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process considerations should toll the statute of limitations and that he is entitled to error coram nobis relief on the basis of his discovery that one of the State's witnesses may have fabricated or falsified evidence at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Carlos Ward
The defendant, James Carlos Ward, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, see T.C.A. _ 39-13-305, and two counts of aggravated robbery, see id. _ 39-13-402. The defendant received an effective sentence of 45 years to serve in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, the defendant claims:(1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress a victim's identification of the defendant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support two verdicts of guilty of aggravated robbery and two verdicts of guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping; (3) the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions violate principles of due process; (4) the trial court erred on principles of double jeopardy in imposing two convictions of aggravated robbery; and(5) the trial court erred in finding the defendant to be a Range II offender, in imposing excessive sentences, and in consecutively aligning some of the sentences. Following our review, we modify one conviction of aggravated robbery to aggravated assault, affirm the remainder of the convictions, and remand for resentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phedrek T. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phedreck T. Davis, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and assault, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. See State v. Phedrek T. Davis, No. M2006-00198-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2007), aff'd, 266S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2790 (2009). He claims that newly discovered evidence proves that the State solicited damaging perjury during his initial trial, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed his claim as having been previously determined. See T.C.A. _ 40-30-106(f). We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Alexander Smith
The Defendant, Andre Alexander Smith, was tried before a jury on an indictment charging one count of first degree felony murder. He was found guilty of one count of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in upholding the State's use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of voluntary manslaughter; and (3) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to certain portions of the State's closing argument. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darius L. Brown
The Defendant-Appellant, Darius L. Brown, entered eleven guilty pleas in five different cases in the Sullivan County Criminal Court. He received an effective nine-year sentence at thirty percent pursuant to his plea agreement, with the manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt
This is the second appeal in a divorce action. Husband appeals the division of marital property and the award of alimony in solido to Wife. In the 2005 Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court determined that the husband's shares of stock in the family business, which his parents gifted to him, were his separate property; however, the appreciation of that stock during the marriage, $1.7 million, was held to be marital property. The court awarded the wife 37.5 percent of the marital estate and alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month for the first year and $2,500 per month thereafter. This court affirmed the division of marital property but modified the award of alimony, holding that she was entitled to eight years of rehabilitative alimony but not alimony in futuro. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of the husband's stock was his separate property, not marital property, and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the division of the marital estate and to reconsider the award of alimony due to the substantial reduction of the marital estate. On remand, the trial court awarded the wife 64 percent of the substantially reduced marital estate and granted her alimony in solido in the amount of $478,000. In this second appeal by the husband, we affirm the division of marital property, finding it is not inequitable under the circumstances, and we affirm the award of alimony in solido to Wife, finding that the award was based on the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i). |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ross Jackson
The defendant, Kenneth Ross Jackson, appeals the denial of judicial diversion from the Hamilton County Criminal Court. He entered pleas of guilty to theft of property in excess of $1000, a Class D felony; filing a false report to a law enforcement officer, a Class D felony; and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of two years, suspended to supervised probation for both Class D felony convictions. He was sentenced to a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days on unsupervised probation for the Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the defendant contends that he was improperly denied judicial diversion. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph W. Haskins Individually and as the Executor of The Estate of Drew E. Haskins, Jr., Deceased v. Drew E. Haskins, III
This case in on appeal for the second time after remand for determination of the defendant's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's award. After reviewing the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cleo Snapp
Anne Dowd and Ferrell Ervin filed a motion to intervene and to stay the distribution of the estate of Cleo M. Snapp, claiming they were heirs of the estate. Ms. Dowd asserted that she was the non-marital child of Thomas Ervin, a brother of Ms. Snapp, and Mr. Ervin asserted that his father, Ben Ervin, was the non-marital child of Thomas Ervin. The executrix of the estate responded by filing a motion to deny their claims. After a hearing, the trial court granted the executrix's motion to deny the claims because they were untimely. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Higdon vs. Regions Bank
This appeal concerns a primary lien holder's security interest in certain real property following a foreclosure sale and the obligation of a third-party purchaser of the foreclosed property to remit to the lien holder rents collected after notice of mortgage acceleration. The plaintiff contended that the defendant bank was not entitled to claim priority for any additional indebtedness above the original principal amount stipulated in the Deed of Trust, plus interest and attorney's fees. The plaintiff further alleged that the bank's payment in full of the first mortgage holder's loan constituted a release of this loan and not an assignment. The defendant bank claimed that the plaintiff was liable to it for rent collected by the plaintiff on the property after notice of the mortgage acceleration. The trial court ordered that the defendant bank was not required to release its lien on the property until all of the funds due were paid and that the plaintiff must pay the defendant bank $6,300 in rent payments. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Author Ray Turner v. David Mills, Warden and the State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Author Ray Turner, claims that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for writ for habeas corpus relief. The petition claims that his sentence is illegal because his release eligibility of 30 percent violates statutory law requiring that he served 100 percent of his sentence as a "multiple rapist." See T.C.A. _ 39-13-523 (Supp.1994). We agree that the defendant's aggravated rape sentences are illegal and that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his claim. We remand to the Morgan County Circuit Court for appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine the proper remedy. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve Fredrick Rickett
The Defendant, Steve Fredrick Rickett, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court for second degree murder for which he was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant contends the following: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in allowing expert witness testimony because the Defendant received inadequate notice of the scope of the expert's testimony and in not granting a continuance, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the county medical examiner to testify to the effects of alcohol and narcotics on the victim, (4) the trial court erred in failing to grant the Defendant's motion for a continuance to allow a defense expert additional time to test the shirt the victim was wearing when she was shot, (5) the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the Defendant's statements to police, (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the toxicology report during the trial, and (7) the trial court erred in failing to respond properly to the jury's questions requesting a definition of heat of passion and whether "voluntary intoxication" constituted "heat of passion." We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Todd v. Mtd Consumer Group et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell from a platform at work. The injury was accepted by his employer as compensable. After a period of medical treatment, the authorized physicians released the employee to return to work with no permanent impairment or restrictions. The employee sought medical treatment on his own. Ultimately, he had surgery on his back and neck. He filed suit against his employer. Employee had two previous workers’ compensation awards. Several months later, he amended his complaint to add the Second Injury Fund as a defendant. After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury which resulted in an 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court apportioned the award according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(b). It then dismissed all claims against the Second Injury Fund, based upon the statute of limitations. It awarded some medical expenses claimed by the employee, but denied others. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing the claim against the Fund, by incorrectly determining the percentage of disability represented by his earlier settlements, and by declining to award all requested medical expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Lauderdale | Workers Compensation Panel | |
City of Brentwood v. George M. Cawthon
This is a condemnation case in which the City of Brentwood acquired 0.72 acres of land by eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a 2.5 million gallon water tank. Following a trial, the jury awarded $43,200 for the value of the land taken and $194,850 for the incidental damages to the remainder of the property. The City's ability to take the land and the amount awarded for the value of the land taken is not in question; rather, the City appeals the amount of incidental damages awarded. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ross Jackson
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Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ket T. Voun
The Defendant, Ket T. Voun, a Cambodian native, was convicted, upon his guilty pleas, of aggravated robbery and facilitation of second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the Davidson County Criminal Court ordered him to serve his eight-year sentence for facilitation of second degree murder in total confinement. He now appeals, arguing that, due to his likely deportation for these crimes, a probationary sentence was warranted. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Williams
The Defendant, Charles Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to consecutive sentences of life and fifteen years for the felony murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions, respectively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the constructive amendment of the indictment in his case; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Vincent Elmore
The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Gary Vincent Elmore, for one count of statutory rape. Appellant entered a best interest plea to the offense as charged with the provision that he would serve a sentence of one year on probation and that the trial court would hold a hearing to consider his eligibility for judicial diversion. At the hearing, Appellant testified that he had previously been convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") in Kentucky. His testimony was the only evidence regarding this conviction. Appellant argued that the DUI conviction would be considered a Class C misdemeanor, while the State argued that it should be considered a Class A misdemeanor. A previous Class A misdemeanor would disqualify Appellant from being eligible for judicial diversion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that he was not eligible for judicial diversion because the prior DUI conviction from Kentucky would be considered a Class A misdemeanor in Tennessee. Appellant now appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion. We conclude that Appellant's testimony regarding the prior DUI conviction was sufficient proof and that the trial court correctly based its determination of the classification of the Kentucky offense on the elements of the offense as opposed to the accompanying sentence. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of judicial diversion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |