In Re Estate of David R. Leath
Decedent’s will could not be located after his death, and decedent’s widow and stepdaughters |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Club Leconte v. Caroline Swann
In the Trial Court, at the conclusion of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for the entry of an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2), and before the Trial Judge ruled on that Motion plaintiff moved for a voluntary dismissal which the Trial Court denied, and granted defendant’s Motion for an involuntary dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff’s Motion for a voluntary dismissal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Claude Sharkey v. State of Tennessee, Cherry Lindamood, Warden
The petitioner, Claude Sharkey, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He claims that his indictments were deficient and that his sentences were improper. After review, we conclude his judgments are facially valid with no jurisdictional defect or illegal sentences. The summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shundell L. Dickerson
The defendant, Shundell L. Dickerson, was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder (Class A felony) and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years in prison. He appeals his conviction and sentence. He argues the trial court erred in: (1) precluding him from entering into evidence an anonymous letter mailed to the police in which other persons were named as responsible for the crime; (2) limiting the questioning of a witness regarding his expectations of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to make improper remarks during closing argument. Finally, the defendant argues enhancement factors were improperly applied to increase his sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Judge Brooks
This case involves the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception. We hold that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requires a showing that a defendant’s actions were intended, at least in part, to prevent a witness from testifying. The prosecution in this case failed to prove that a motive for the murder was to make the victim unavailable as a witness. Admission of her hearsay statements, therefore, violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). We further conclude that the error affected the result of the trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas M. Sullivan
The defendant, Thomas M. Sullivan, was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. He requested judicial diversion or probation, but the court denied those motions and imposed a sentence of two years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion or alternative sentencing. After careful review, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Analiza P. Burnett v. David Mark Burnett
This is a divorce case. When the parties met in 1995, the husband was in the Philippines working for an American corporation. The wife was a resident and citizen of the Philippines and the husband was a U. S. citizen. After a brief relationship, the wife learned that she was pregnant. The husband moved back to the United States, but made periodic trips to the Philippines to see their child. In 1998, the wife obtained a marriage visa, and she and the child moved to California to live with the husband. After signing a prenuptial agreement in California, the parties were married in Las Vegas. Two more children were born of the marriage. In 2003, both parties filed for divorce. After a trial, the parties were divorced and the husband was ordered to pay child support, alimony in futuro, and all of the parties’ marital debt. The husband was also ordered to pay for the wife’s medical insurance and uninsured medical expenses as additional spousal support. The wife was designated as the children’s primary residential parent. The parties were ordered to hold the marital home as tenants in common; the husband would pay the mortgage and the wife would live in the home with the parties’ children. The husband appeals. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s adoption of the Wife’s parenting plan except insofar as it awards the federal income tax exemptions to the wife, but vacate the child support award and remand for a recalculation of the husband’s income and his child support obligation. We also vacate the trial court’s order regarding spousal support and remand for recalculation of the husband’s income and re-evaluation of the wife’s need and the husband’s ability to pay support. We affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anntionette Griggs v. Hardeman County Community Health Center, Inc.
The trial court awarded Defendant/Employer summary judgment in this wrongful discharge action. We affirm the judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamont Christopher Brown
The Appellant, Lamont Christopher Brown,1 appeals the order of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In January 2006, in two separate cases, Brown entered guilty pleas to misdemeanor possession of cocaine, misdemeanor possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, Class C felony sale of cocaine, and two counts of Class B sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The sentences were suspended, and Brown was placed on supervised probation. In September 2006, a probation violation warrant was filed, in both cases, alleging numerous violations of the terms of Brown’s probation. Following a hearing, Brown’s probation was revoked, resulting in the reinstatement of his original sentences, which were ordered to be served in confinement. On appeal, Brown argues that “the trial court erred in revoking [Brown’s] probation and ordering that [Brown] serve his sentence.” Finding no abuse of discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert T. Logan, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis, et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of a police officer for violation of the department’s deadly force policy. While in the apartment of his girlfriend’s mother, the off-duty officer shot the unarmed husband of his girlfriend in the back and paralyzed him from the waist down. The officer was attempting to stop the enraged husband from entering a room where the girlfriend, her mother, and a young child were located. He did not warn the husband that he might use deadly force prior to doing so. The police department and the civil service commission concluded that, for various reasons, the officer’s use of deadly force was not authorized. The officer appealed his termination to chancery court, primarily arguing that the department had failed to consider a parallel burglary investigation report in the pre-termination hearing. Although the civil service commission had concluded that consideration of that file would not have altered the outcome, the chancellor remanded the case back to the commission for consideration of the entire report. On remand, the commission reviewed the entire report but declined to hear further testimony. It re-affirmed its original decision. The officer sought review in chancery court and, after an unfavorable result there, appealed the case to this Court. We conclude that, even if the officer’s assertions are correct, there still exists substantial and material evidence to support the decisions below. If there was error below, it was harmless. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Maurice Lashaun Nash v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Maurice Lashaun Nash, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Poe
A Marion County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Edward Poe, of one count of manufacturing a controlled substance, one count of attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and one count of felony possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he alleges that a directed verdict should have been granted based on the insufficiency of evidence as a whole, as well as based on insufficient evidence for the paraphernalia charge because there was no proof of intent to deliver the paraphernalia. He also alleges that the convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance and felony possession of drug paraphernalia were inconsistent and that the court should not have excluded testimony from a court clerk regarding the filing of the January 23, 2002 search warrant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments as modified. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tabatha Pamperin v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., et al.
This appeal involves an attempt to pierce a corporate veil. The plaintiff purchased a hot tub from a corporation, paying $3,000 by check and agreeing to finance the balance of $1,178. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the two sole shareholders of the corporation had been deadlocked and involved in litigation for almost two years. After the corporation accepted the plaintiff’s $3,000 check, but before it delivered the hot tub, the litigation ended. A jury determined that one of the shareholders held a perfected security interest in practically all of the corporation’s assets, and the judge entered an order recognizing that shareholder’s right to foreclose on the collateral if necessary. Both shareholders filed post-trial motions, then submitted a proposed “agreed amended final order” that was approved by the trial judge. The agreed order provided that, “in lieu of foreclosure,” the secured party-shareholder would be awarded all the assets of the corporation outright. The corporation was left with no assets and ceased to operate. The plaintiff never received her hot tub or a refund of the $3,000 she paid to the corporation. Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit seeking a judgment against the corporation and against the two shareholders individually. The trial court entered a total judgment against the corporation of $17,663.52, which included treble damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. However, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on the individual shareholders. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alec Joseph Mesot Concurring/Dissenting
THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses the convictions for rape of a child and dismisses those five counts of the indictment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stateof Tennessee v. Alec Joseph Mesot
The Appellant, Alec Joseph Mesot, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of five counts of rape of a child and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Mesot challenges only his convictions for rape of a child, asserting: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because: (a) the State failed to sufficiently corroborate his confessions in order to independently establish the corpus delicti of the offenses and (b) the State failed to prove the element of penetration; and (2) that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte provide a limiting instruction with regard to the introduction of pornographic images recovered from Mesot’s computer. Following review of the record, we conclude that the State has failed to produce independent evidence to corroborate Mesot’s confessions, which alone support the corpus delicti of the crimes of rape of a child. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient with regard to those convictions. As such, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the five convictions for rape of a child are dismissed. Mesot’s remaining issues are without merit. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melba B. Homra, et al. v. Harold Elliott Nelson
This case arises from a dispute over an antenuptial agreement. Appellant Husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement, whereby Husband was obligated to pay for daily necessities. Wife executed a durable power-of-attorney, naming her adult Children, the Appellees herein, as her attorneys-in-fact. When Wife became unable to care for herself because of advancing Alzheimer’s, a dispute arose between Husband Appellant and Children Appellees as to who would be responsible for the costs associated with wife’s care. The trial court held that, under the antenuptial agreement, Husband Appellant was responsible for these expenses. Husband Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Melba B. Homra, et al. v. Harold Elliott Nelson - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by the majority. It is undisputed that Mrs. Nelson’s medical condition, Alzheimer’s Disease, required that she be placed in a skilled nursing facility. Mr. and Mrs. Nelson, having executed an “Antenuptial Agreement” prior to marriage, the question presented is who is responsible for the payment of the skilled nursing care. The majority concludes the responsibility lies with Mr. Nelson, looking to paragraph three of the “Antenuptial Agreement and interpreting the phrase “other daily necessities.” The majority opines it is unfortunate that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Nelson thought that either would need long-term care and such was not provided for in the Antenuptial Agreement. I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority. It is clear from reading the Antenuptial Agreement that Mr. and Mrs. Nelson were desirous of keeping their property separate as each had children of another marriage and, to the extent possible, neither wished to burden the other with debts. As I view the entire Antenuptial Agreement, the phrase used by the majority to impose responsibility upon Mr. Nelson I would read it to obligate Mr. Nelson to provide such items as toothpaste, deodorant, toiletries, and other such items, but not extraordinary medical expenses. I do not read the phrase to clearly state it is Mr. Nelson’s responsibility to provide, in essence, hospital care or nursing care for Mrs. Nelson. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Jessie Davis, et al. v. Ford Motor Company
This case involves a claim for breach of warranty. The plaintiff purchased a used Ford from a GMC dealership. The truck came with Ford’s bumper to bumper limited warranty. The warranty specifically excluded from coverage any damage caused by after-market components and/or non- |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Dawn Green, et al. v. Vicki Renee Johnson, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether an uninsured motorist carrier may reduce amounts owed under an uninsured motorist provision by the amount of settlement proceeds an insured receives from a non-motorist defendant. Because the uninsured motorist statutes, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 56-7-1201 to -1206, unambiguously allow an uninsured motorist carrier to limit its liability by “the sum of the limits collectible under all liability and/or primary uninsured motorist insurance polices, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death of the insured,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(d), and to receive an offset or credit for “the total amount of damages collected by the insured from all parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death of the insured,” id. §1206(i), we conclude that the uninsured motorist carrier in this case is entitled to an offset for the monies the insured received from the non-motorist defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Rebecca Woody v. A.W. Chesterton Company, et al.
An insulator and his wife sued multiple corporate defendants for damages related to his development of mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. Most of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment based upon a release agreement signed by the plaintiffs in 1980 in settlement of another lawsuit concerning asbestos exposure. The trial court denied the motions for summary judgment. We have concluded that, except as to any claims arising from post-release asbestos exposure, the trial court erred in denying the motions for summary judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Terry C. Clemons v. Chuck's Marine, et al.
The trial court determined Defendant orally agreed to assume outstanding debt on personal property offered for consignment sales. The trial court further determined Defendant was equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Mae Harber as Trustee of Trust a for the Estate of Edwin Erwin, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.
This is an action for breach of contract against a bank. Plaintiff Trustee sued bank for breach of the terms of a certificate of deposit (CD) by allowing her husband, who was neither the depositor nor her authorized agent, to redeem the CD held in trust for a $100,000 cashier’s check payable to Plaintiff as trustee. The Plaintiff Trustee appeals the trial court’s award of partial summary judgment to Defendant bank. Despite the bank’s breach of contract, Plaintiff Trustee was unable to maintain a suit founded upon her husband’s lack of authority to redeem the CD. The trial court found she ratified the redemption by previously filing suit against a different bank that had accepted the unendorsed cashier’s check for deposit, opened a checking account in Plaintiff’s name as trustee, and paid out the proceeds over Plaintiff’s forged signatures. The trial court concluded that by asserting ownership in the cashier’s check and the unauthorized checking account in the previous suit, the Plaintiff Trustee had manifested a clear intent to affirm her husband’s redemption of the CD. We agree. Even though Plaintiff Trustee pled alternative, inconsistent claims in the first suit, which is still pending, each claim was necessarily premised upon her husband’s authorized redemption of the CD. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Frank Webb
The defendant, Ronald Frank Webb, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, for which the court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in jail at seventy-five percent release eligibility. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in giving lengthy and confusing instructions to the jury and in commenting that the instructions were confusing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gwinn Fayne And Alfred Fayne v. Teresa Vincent And David Vincent
In this dispute over the sale of a home, the Trial Court initially granted purchasers a rescission of the sale, but purchasers appealed to this Court. We ruled that the Trial Court had failed to put the purchasers in the position they would have occupied had the sale never occurred, and remanded the issues of various costs, pre-judgment interest and the fair rental of the property to take into consideration in placing the parties in a pre-contract status quo position. Also, remanded was the issue of attorney’s fees and whether the sellers had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. On remand, the Trial Court ruled that sellers had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and awarded attorney’s fees and pre-judgment interest, as well as adjusting the Judgment to place the parties in status quo upon rescission. The appeal ensued by the sellers, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, as well as an award of attorney’s fees to the purchasers for their representation on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Kathy D. Flores v. Lawrence Ralph
The State filed a petition for contempt against a man who had fallen far behind in his child support obligation, in part because he was incarcerated for a large portion of the time. The trial court reduced the arrearage to judgment in the amount of $28,632, found the father in contempt for failing to pay while he was not in jail, and sentenced him to serve 90 days in jail. Because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the father had the ability to pay child support during the periods in question, we vacate the sentence for criminal contempt. We also vacate the arrearage judgment and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of arrearage. |
Warren | Court of Appeals |