Thomas L. Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Thomas L. Jackson, was convicted of possessing drugs in a penal facility, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. This conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos C. Beasley v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes. This court affirmed the judgments on direct appeal. See State v. Carlos C. Beasley, No. W1999-00426-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 527715 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 2, 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for postconviction relief on the ground that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie R. Roedel v. Kevin M. Roedel
The trial court denied the parties a divorce upon finding the Wife failed to prove inappropriate marital conduct. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Ray Sanlin
The defendant, Billy Ray Sanlin, was convicted by jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal he contends that: (1) he was substantially prejudiced when the trial court improperly allowed the State to call his codefendant to testify after the codefendant previously indicated his unwillingness to testify; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow his defense counsel to argue the difficulties inherent in cross-racial identification in closing argument; and (3) the evidence relating to the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator of the offenses was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we determine that reversible error occurred in the State’s direct examination of the codefendant as a witness, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie Alton Moss
The defendant, Freddie Alton Moss, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the probation based upon charges for driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Keith Matthews
This is a direct appeal as of right from a bench trial conviction of first degree premeditated murder. The Defendant, William Keith Matthews, was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant argues four issues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and in the alternative, the defense of insanity was established; (2) the trial court erred in not granting the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the Defendant was not competent to stand trial; and (4) the Tennessee statute providing for the insanity defense is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Ray Meeks v. Charles Traughber, et al.
The appellant claims, inter alia, that the Board of Parole, as constituted in 2002 not only denied him parole, but unconstitutionally ordered no further review for fifteen (15) years. The policy of Board was later changed. We affirm, as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vick R. Nichols, Jr.
The Appellant, Vick R. Nichols, Jr., appeals his convictions by a Lewis County jury finding him guilty of two counts of felony reckless endangerment as lesser included offenses of the indicted charges of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, Nichols was granted judicial diversion. On appeal, Nichols raises five issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault; (2) whether the trial court violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(c) by failing to reduce supplemental jury instructions to writing; (3) whether the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury with regard to certain hunting rules and regulations contained in Title 70, Tennessee Code Annotated; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the defense of third parties; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. The State concedes that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as indicted. We agree. Notwithstanding reversible error, we conclude that no appeal of right, as provided by Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P., lies, as the Appellant was granted judicial diversion and no judgment of conviction has been entered. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John D. Cooke, III v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
The plaintiff sought a common law writ of certiorari to review the action of a prison disciplinary board. The Circuit Court held that the correction of the Board's decision was not subject to judicial review. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Isaac Hall v. Shirley A. Hall
The plaintiff left the defendant's residence through her kitchen which opened into a carport, three steps lower. The defendant had left a pair of shoes on the steps which the plaintiff did not see owing to darkness because he failed to turn on the light. The undisputed evidence reveals evidence of negligence on the part of each party, but under McIntyre, the negligence of each should be compared. Summary judgment for the defendant is reversed. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re L.C.B
M.B. and P.B. were husband and wife with four children born during the marriage. L.C.B., the fourth of these children, was born in 1997, nine years after M.B. had undergone a vasectomy. P.B. had engaged in an extramarital affair with R.D. and subsequent to the divorce of M.B. and P.B., the relationship between R.D. and P.B. ripened into marriage with P.B. becoming P.D. In the case at bar, R.D. and P.D. sued to establish R.D. as the biological father of L.C.B. and to terminate the parental rights of M.B. An answer and counterclaim was filed by M.B. denying the allegations of the complaint and seeking to terminate the parental rights of R.D. Holding that the claim of R.D. was barred by laches, the trial court dismissed the complaint. We hold that the complaint of R.D. is not barred by laches but affirm the action of the trial court. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Wilson
The defendant, Robert Wilson, was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of six years and twenty-five years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to support the finding of the indictment; (3) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to adequately respond to the motion for a bill of particulars; (4) that the state elicited and failed to correct false testimony in violation of his due process rights; (5) that the trial court failed to exercise its role as the thirteenth juror; and (6) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of conviction are affirmed. The sentences are modified to four years and twenty-three years, respectively, and are to be served consecutively. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abel Torres
A Warren County jury convicted the defendant, Abel Torres, of one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted second degree murder, Class B felonies, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years for each conviction, to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Department of Correction (DOC). On appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions but modified the length of his sentences from twelve years to ten and remanded the case for a determination by the trial court of the reasons justifying the imposition of consecutive sentencing. State v. Abel Caberra Torres, No. M2001-01412-CCA-R3-CD, Warren County (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2003). On remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentencing and the defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred under both state law and the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The state contends the trial court properly sentenced the defendant. We affirm the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing but conclude that Blakely requires us to modify the defendant's sentences from ten years to eight for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children Services v. Diane Yvonne Sangster, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The parents appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Lauderdale County, terminating their parental rights. Specifically, Appellants assert that the grounds of abandonment for failure to support and severe child abuse cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and that termination of their parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Diane Hargrove Mangrum v. Reynaldo Collazo-Torres
This appeal involves a protracted dispute over the payment of child support. Following a job-related injury, the father requested the Circuit Court for Davidson County to reduce his child support obligation, but then unilaterally reduced his child support payments. After the trial court dismissed the father's petition for failure to prosecute, the mother filed a petition seeking a judgment for the child support arrearage. The husband responded by renewing his request to reduce his child support obligation. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded the mother a $13,472 judgment against the father without considering his request for a reduction in his child support payments. We have determined that the order dismissing the father's petition for failure to prosecute was not properly entered. Therefore, the trial court erred by awarding the mother a judgment for the child support arrearage without considering the father's petition to reduce his child support. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ludmilla Lambright, et al., v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
All parties sought declaratory judgment as to whether or not driver Michael George Eberly was an omnibus insured under the permissive user provisions of his employer's policy of insurance at the time of the accident in issue. The Chancellor in non-jury trial found that Eberly had only engaged in a "minor deviation" from employer restrictions on his permissive use of the vehicle, and required National Union Fire Insurance Company to protect Eberly as an omnibus insured under the policy. We reverse the action of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Robert L. Levertte v. James A. Bowlen, Warden
In 1996, the petitioner, Robert L. Leverette, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Bedford County to four counts of rape, Class B felonies, and to one count of incest, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to ten years for each rape and to five years for the incest to be served in the Department of Correction. The trial court classified him as a Range I, standard offender with a release eligibility at thirty percent of his sentence and ordered two of the rape convictions to run concurrently. The Department of Correction, however, classified him as a multiple rapist pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523, which requires that multiple rapists serve one hundred percent of a sentence. As a result, the petitioner filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The trial court granted partial relief and vacated three of his four rape sentences. On appeal, the petitioner claims that his entire sentence should be vacated and the case remanded. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Mullins
The Appellant, Gregory Mullins, appeals the decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In March 2003, Mullins pled guilty to three counts of burglary, three counts of theft under $500, two counts of theft over $1000, evading arrest, and speeding. Mullins' effective eight-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. On October 1, 2003, and October 10, 2003, probation violation warrants were filed against Mullins. After a revocation hearing was held on the October 10th warrant, he was found to be in violation of his probation, and his original sentences to the Department of Correction were reinstated. On appeal, Mullins does not contest the trial court's findings that he violated the terms of his probation. Rather, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering confinement rather than reinstating his probation with more restrictive conditions. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Aaron York
The defendant, Phillip Aaron York, was convicted of eight counts of child rape. Sentences of twenty-five years were imposed for each conviction. Two convictions were ordered to run consecutively, with the remaining convictions to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of fifty years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions for rape of a child, but that pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), enhancement factors (2) and (16) cannot be applied. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but modify the sentence imposed from a fifty-year effective sentence to a forty-year effective sentence. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie Pugh v. State of Tennessee
In 2003, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee for medical malpractice. In 2001, the prisoner underwent surgery to install a colostomy due to the alleged negligence of the prison medical staff in improperly diagnosing his condition. The Commissioner granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, finding the statute of limitations barred the prisoner’s claim. Since the prisoner was aware that the State’s negligence caused his injury at the time of his surgery, the discovery rule does not toll the running of the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Alica Fay Smiley, et al., v. Robert Steven Smiley, et al.
Husband appeals a trial court judgment awarding permanent alimony to the Wife, asserting in the appeal that the evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sweetwater Hospital Association v. Anita Carter Carpenter
Sweetwater Hospital Association ("the Hospital") entered into a contract with its then-employee, Anita Houser Carpenter ("the defendant"), by the terms of which the Hospital agreed to provide tuition assistance to enable the defendant to attend school. The contract further provides that if the defendant works for the Hospital for a period of five years following the completion of her studies, her loan would be forgiven. At the conclusion of a course of studies to become a nurse anesthetist, the defendant sought employment elsewhere because it appeared to her that there were no nurse anesthetist positions available at the Hospital. The Hospital brought this action for breach of contract, seeking repayment for the monies furnished to the defendant under the contract. The defendant responded that the Hospital breached the contract by failing to offer her a position as a nurse anesthetist. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment for the Hospital. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Neeraj Chopra v. U.S. Professionals, L.L.C., et al.
Defendants U. S. Professionals, LLC and Satya B. Shaw and Rajashree S. Shaw, individually, appeal the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff Neeraj Chopra compensatory and punitive damages for breach of contract and intentional misrepresentation. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lillian Clayton Salvatore, Guardian of Lois G. Clayton, et al., v. Frederick Paul Clayton, Jr., Conservator for Lois G. Clayton, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute over the conservatorship of an elderly woman suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease. The woman’s son moved his mother to Tennessee against the wishes of his stepsister who had been appointed guardian in Florida, and filed an action in the Rutherford County Probate Court to be named conservator. The stepdaughter objected to her stepbrother’s petition and demanded an accounting of her stepmother’s property. The probate court dismissed the son’s petition and ordered an accounting. The son asserts on this appeal that the probate court had jurisdiction over his petition. We have determined that the probate court properly dismissed the son’s petition for the appointment of a conservator and properly ordered the son to account for his use of his mother’s assets. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Ramsey Duncan
Following a jury trial, Defendant, John Ramsey Duncan, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years for each rape of a child conviction, and ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentence for his rape of a child conviction in count two to run consecutively to his sentence for his rape of a child conviction in count one, and all other sentences to run concurrently to count one, for an effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in ruling certain out-of-court statements made by the victim to witnesses Lisa Dupree and Julie Carter as admissible. In addition, since the filing of the briefs, Defendant has also asked us to consider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) on the length of his sentences and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. We modify under Blakely each of Defendant's sentences for rape of a child to twenty years, and each of his sentences for aggravated sexual battery to eight years. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |