State of Tennessee v. Frank D. Grundy
M2003-02775-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

The trial court found that Defendant, Frank D. Grundy, violated the terms of his eight-year community corrections sentence. It ordered him to serve one year "day for day" in the county jail before serving the remainder of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court's imposition of "day for day" sentencing was improper. We conclude the trial court imposed an illegal sentence and remand for entry of an appropriate amended order.

John Jay Hooker v. Bill Purcell
M2003-03107-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

Plaintiff appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(3) motion by which he sought to be relieved from a final judgment that dismissed his complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff argues that the order dismissing his action was "void" because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss his action. We affirm.

Michael Neely v. Ricky Bell, Warden
M2004-01012-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court imposed a sentence which was illegal and void because it was ex post facto; that trial counsel was ineffective; and that his pleas of guilty were not voluntary and knowing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

Jackson Energy Authority v. William T. Diamond, Jr.
W2004-01090-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

This case involves the timeliness of an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff utility company sued the defendant building owner in General Sessions Court for past due utility payments. On July 28, 2003, the General Sessions Court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On August 1, 2003, the defendant filed a petition to rehear, seeking to have the judgment set aside. On August 6, 2003, the General Sessions Court denied the petition to rehear. On August 18, 2003, the defendant filed a notice of appeal for a de novo review in Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that it was not filed within ten days of the final General Sessions judgment entered on July 28, 2003. The defendant now appeals that decision, arguing that the ten-day time limitation was tolled by his General Sessions petition to rehear. We affirm, concluding that the time limitation for filing an appeal to Circuit Court is not tolled by a petition to rehear filed in General Sessions, because no statute grants the General Sessions Court authority to hear such a petition to rehear.
 

Michael Underwood v. Tennessee Department of Correction
W2004-01630-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Steven Stafford

This is a petition for certiorari seeking review of the department’s disciplinary proceedings. The
petitioner, a prisoner, was disciplined for abuse of his telephone privileges. He appealed the
disciplinary charges against him through the administrative process, with no success. He then filed the petition for certiorari in the trial court below, seeking review of the adverse administrative
decisions against him. The trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari, because it was not verified and it did not allege that it was the first application for the writ as required under T.C.A. § 27-8-106. The petitioner now appeals that decision. We affirm.
 

State of Tennessee, ex Relation of Darron Clayton v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2004-00001-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The Petitioner, Darron Clayton, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to show either that his sentence has expired or that the trial court was without jurisdiction, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Amy Butterworth, et al. v. John Butterworth, et al.
W2003-00983-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the doctrine of parental immunity bars recovery when a son is injured at his father’s place of employment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in creating a bright-line rule prohibiting the application of the doctrine of parental immunity when the injury resulted from employment-related activities. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we hold that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted by the trial court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this respect and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In re: Estate of Roy W. Barnett, Deceased
W2003-02530-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

This appeal arises out of a claim filed against Decedent’s estate by the Bureau of TennCare.
Decedent’s estate filed an exception to the claim arguing that such claim was barred because
Decedent was not provided with notice of the State of Tennessee’s recovery provisions as required by section 71-5-118(l) of the Tennessee Code. The trial court found that the Bureau of TennCare’s claim was barred on the basis that no written notice of the State’s recovery provisions was provided to Decedent or his family members. The Bureau of TennCare brought the instant appeal to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we reverse.
 

State of Tennessee v. Detrick Cole
W2002-01254-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The defendant, Detrick Cole, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death upon finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been previously convicted of “one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person,” and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant appealed, challenging his conviction and sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The case was docketed in this Court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1). After considering the briefs and the record, this Court entered an order requesting that the parties address at oral argument the following four issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court required the defendant to submit to fingerprinting in the presence of the jury; (3) whether, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the jury rather than the judge must determine whether the statutory elements of prior convictions used to support the (i)(2)aggravating circumstance involve the use of violence to the person; and (4) whether the factors for mandatory review in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 (c)(1) require reversal of the sentence of death. After carefully and thoroughly considering the issues in light of the record and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

State of Tennessee v. Detrick Cole - Concurring and Dissenting
W2002-01254-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

Jerry C. Harlan v. Carol L. Soloman
M2003-01396-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Donald P. Harris

This appeal comes to the court from the trial court's approval of a special master's report. The case was referred to a special master following a jury trial after which appellee Harlan was awarded 16.79% ownership in certain real property which appellant Soloman had purchased. The report did not consider depreciation and other deductions which Harlan had claimed in connection with his alleged ownership of the property. After the court adopted the report Soloman moved to amend the order, arguing that she was entitled to an 83.21% share of those deductions, and that the trial court should amend the report to conform with the motion. The trial court refused. Soloman appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Joel Knight
M2003-01751-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lillie Ann Sells

On appeal, the defendant asserts a breach of due process based on the absence of the violation warrant from the record at the time of his probation violation hearing. After careful review, we conclude that a copy of the warrant was admissible, under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 1003, to prove the defendant had notice of the claimed violations and the evidence against him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert Gentry Galbreath v. State of Tennessee
M2003-02807-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

The Petitioner, Robert Gentry Galbreath, was convicted by a jury of twelve counts of obtaining a prescription drug by fraud. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to thirty-six years, as a career offender at sixty percent. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred because: (1) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective; (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective; and (4) his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Because we have concluded that the Petitioner's counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal, for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of facilitation and failing to appeal the jury instruction issue; we reverse the post-conviction court's dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief, reverse the original convictions, and remand for a new trial.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Edward Thomason
M2003-03072-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge George C. Sexton

The defendant, Michael Edward Thomason, was convicted by a Cheatham County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a timely appeal to this court, he argues that the trial court erred in its instructions on self-defense; the evidence was insufficient to show a premeditated murder; and the prosecutor made an improper comment in his closing arguments to the jury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Shawn Rafael Bough
E2004-02928-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

This case presents an appeal to this Court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The appellant, Shawn Rafael Bough, was convicted by a Knox County Jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The original opinion of this Court in this matter was released on January 12, 2004, and the appellant filed an application for permission to appeal. See State v. Shawn Rafael Bough, No. E2002-00717-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 50798 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 12, 2004), affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by State v. Bough, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2004 WL 2481367. The supreme court granted the permission to appeal on May 24, 2004. In our original opinion, we determined that (1) because the appellant's first motion for new trial was not timely filed in regards to the felony murder conviction and an untimely notice of appeal resulted, the appellant waived all issues except for sufficiency of the evidence in regards to the felony murder conviction; (2) because the appellant's amended motion for new trial and second amended motion for new trial were likewise deemed untimely by this Court, the only other issues remaining were those raised in the initial motion for new trial that relate to the conviction for especially aggravated robbery. As a result of the procedural determinations, we addressed the following issues in regards to the conviction for especially aggravated robbery on direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to comment on the appellant's failure to produce a witness; (2) whether the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the corroboration of accomplice testimony and out-of-court confessions. As a result, we concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Further, we could find no error requiring reversal of the judgments of the trial court. The supreme court determined on appeal that the original motion for new trial, as well as the two amended motions for new trial, were timely filed as to both convictions, effectively affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case to this Court for consideration of the issues that were pretermitted by our procedural rulings in the original opinion. See State v. Bough, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2004 WL 2481367 (Tenn. 2004). The following issues were not addressed by this Court due to our determination that the motion for new trial was untimely as to the appellant's felony-murder conviction and thus must be addressed on remand: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to comment on the appellant's failure to produce a witness; and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the corroboration of accomplice testimony and out-of-court confessions. The following issues were pretermitted on direct appeal by our conclusion that the amended motion for new trial was untimely: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting the 911 tape of the victim; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing jurors to take notes and ordered the notes to be destroyed prior to deliberation; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to exhibit the appellant and the co-defendant to the jury shortly before the 911 tape was played; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to infer criminal conduct of the appellant due to his association with known criminals and drug dealers. After consideration of these remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Riverside Surgery Center, LLC., et al. v. Methodist Health Systems Inc.
W2004-01195-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

This case presents the interpretation of a transfer restriction clause in an LLC operating agreement.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment requesting a declaration that the defendant, by negotiating for the sale of its interest in the LLC and granting a third-party buyer an option to purchase defendant’s interest, had triggered the plaintiffs’ preemptive purchase rights under the operating agreement. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that the transfer restriction clause in the operating agreement was triggered only by written notice of the intent to sell, which was never given. The trial court found that, under the language of the operating agreement, the plaintiffs’ preemptive purchase rights were triggered by the“desire or wish” of the selling member to transfer its interest and that the defendant had the desire or wish to transfer its membership interest in the LLC. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

John Doe 1 ex rel. Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, et al.
M2001-01780-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

In two separate civil actions, the plaintiffs, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 2 brought claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress against the defendant, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville. The lawsuits were consolidated for certain pretrial purposes and also for purposes of appellate review. The trial court denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel the defendant to provide answers to discovery and ultimately granted the defendant summary judgment as to all plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, holding that reckless infliction of emotional distress must be based on conduct that was directed at the plaintiff, affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. The Court of Appeals also declined to consider the plaintiffs' appeal of the partial denial of their motion to compel, regarding the issue as moot. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal. After carefully considering the relevant authority, we hold that to be actionable, reckless infliction of emotional distress need not be based upon conduct that was directed at a specific person or that occurred in the presence of the plaintiff. Applying this holding, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment. Furthermore, in light of our holding, we vacate the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion to compel. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including reconsideration of the plaintiffs' discovery requests.

Annette Marie Thompson Bulick v. Richard Lee Thompson, Jr.
W2004-00816-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge D'Army Bailey

Father/Appellant filed a Petition in Opposition to Mother’s Relocation with the Minor Child.
Trial court found that parents did not exercise substantially equal parenting time under the Parental Relocation Statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-108, and allowed Mother/Appellee to move with the minor child. Father appeals. We affirm.
 

Annette Marie Thompson Bulick v. Richard Lee Thompson, Jr. - Concurring
W2004-00816-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge D'Army Bailey

I agree with the result reached by the majority and generally with the reasoning, but write
separately only on the issue of how the amount of time each parent spends with the child is
calculated, both by the majority and by the trial court. The trial court here looked only at the number
of overnight stays the child had with each parent, and indeed that is typically accurate and easily
ascertained. In some cases, however, it can be misleading, and I believe this is such a case. Here, the child would regularly spend the entire day, through the evening meal, with Father and would be returned to Mother in time for bed. In such a case, the trial court should look at the totality of the circumstances in comparing each parent’s time with their child. I concur in the result reached by the majority because, in this case, I do not believe that looking at the totality of the circumstances would affect the outcome. But where, as here, an involved, dedicated father will have his relationship with his daughter deeply affected by the mother’s relocation, the time each parent spends with the child should be measured as accurately as can reasonably be done.
In all other respects, I concur fully with the majority opinion.

Bobby L. Byrge v. Zurich Services Corp., et al.
E2004-00624-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Roger E. Thayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 55 percent permanent partial disability for the loss of one arm and one leg, a combined scheduled injury, without separately computing each scheduled injury award.  Defendants insist it was error to award benefits in this manner. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Torian Benson a.k.a. Marcus Terry a.k.a. Marcus Benson v. State of Tennessee - Order
W2002-02756-SC-R11-CO
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker

The petitioner, Torian Benson, has filed a pro se petition to rehear in this case. We note that the petitioner is represented by counsel and pro se petitions are not permitted in such cases. Nevertheless, having considered the merits of the petition to rehear, it is respectfully denied.

Angela D. (Fezell) Taylor v. Douglas Fezell
E2002-02937-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge J. S. Steve Daniel
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II

We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the retained earnings of an S corporation should be treated as income to the sole or majority shareholder of the corporation for the purpose of calculating child support in accordance with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. We conclude that absent a showing that the retained earnings are excessive or that an obligor is actually manipulating his or her income, the retained earnings of an S corporation should not be imputed as income to the sole or majority shareholder in calculating a child support obligation. Because there was no showing in this case that the retained earnings were excessive or that the obligor-father manipulated the funds of the S corporation to reduce his child support obligation, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by imputing to him as income the company's retained earnings. Further, we hold that the lower courts erred by failing to include the economic value of the obligor-father's company car in its calculation of income. Finally, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by not granting the obligee-mother's petition to have the obligor pay her attorney's fees in this cause. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for a determination of child support that is consistent with this opinion and for a determination of attorney's fees.

Donald M. Taylor v. City of Chattanooga, Police Department
E2004-00701-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

Plaintiff brought a replevin action against defendant to recover his motor vehicle which had been seized by the defendant. The action was initiated in Sessions Court, but transferred by agreement of the parties to Circuit Court. The trial court entered Judgment on behalf of the plaintiff for $8,500.00, having found that the defendant had sold plaintiff's vehicle. We affirm.

Barabbas A. Brown v. State of Tennessee
E2004-01487-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

The appellant, Barabbas A. Brown, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his motion to correct pre-trial jail credits. The appellant argues that the trial court erred by not enforcing its order of judgment granting him pre-trial jail credits. Finding no merit to the appellant's contentions, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Dwayne Cook v. State of Tennessee
E2004-00572-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The petitioner, Dwayne Cook, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reconsider the denial of his request to set aside his guilty plea and his alternative petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The trial court properly denied relief as the pleadings were untimely filed and without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.