In the Matter of D.L.B., A Minor
W2001-02245-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Kenny W. Armstrong

This appeal involves an action to terminate parental rights filed by the prospective adoptive parents of a child. The child’s father asserts that the chancery court erred in terminating his parental rights on the basis that he abandoned his child for the four-month period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To compute the four-month period, the chancery court used the date on which the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights. CASA’s petition was later dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court’s termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and found an additional ground for abandonment as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) specifies that parental rights may be terminated if the father “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child.” We granted permission to appeal. We hold that the commencement of the four-month period of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is properly computed from the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed in chancery court, not from the filing date of the earlier juvenile court petition. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in terminating the father’s parental rights based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Mona Ray Cloud alias Mona R. Headrick, alias Mona R. Cloud, alias Mona Headrick
E2002-03002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Mona Ray Cloud, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act, a Class E felony; and criminal impersonation, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received four-year, one-year, and six-month sentences, respectively, with the one-year and six-month sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the four-year sentence for an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that she should have received alternative sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Paul Pettibone
M2002-03021-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The appellant, Paul Edward Pettibone, Jr., pled guilty to the offense of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C Felony. He was sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial judge ordered the appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration, but asserted that if the appellant successfully completed an addiction treatment program known as Lifeline Therapeutic Community, he could apply to the court to suspend the rest of his sentence.¹ In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant either an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement. After a review of this case, we conclude that the evidence did not support the grant of an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bobby Joe Carter v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02802-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The appellant, serving an effective twenty-year sentence on three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Barry Inman
M2002-02463-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The appellant, Barry Inman, was convicted by a jury in the Williamson County Circuit Court of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of Alprazolam with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and speeding. Additionally, the appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgments of acquittal and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Myra Pate vs. State
E2003-00297-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Myra Pate ("Plaintiff") filed a claim with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration after she slipped and fell on her way to class at Pellissippi State Technical Community College ("PSTCC"). When her claim was denied, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Tennessee Claims Commission ("Commission") against the State of Tennessee ("the State"). The State filed a motion for summary judgment claiming Plaintiff had filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and failed to disclose the existence of her claim against the State. The State argued Plaintiff was judicially estopped from pursuing this lawsuit and also that she lacked standing. When Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the motion for summary judgment, the Commission granted the motion solely because no response had been filed. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Willie Ira Poteat, Jr.
E2003-00314-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The Defendant, Willie Ira Poteat, Jr., was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine for resale and criminal conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence taken during the execution of a search warrant, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges against him, reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law regarding the trial court's ruling on the suppression issue. We now address the Defendant's appeal based upon this certified question of law.

Louis Laurent vs. Suntrust Bank
E2003-01408-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Louis A. Laurent and Barbara Laurent ("Plaintiffs") sued SunTrust Bank ("Defendant") for alleged defamatory statements made by Defendant's attorney in a separate lawsuit. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Arthur Creech vs. Robert R. Addington
E2003-00842-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
The plaintiffs leased land in Mississippi from D.C. Parker and Richard B. Flowers ("Defendants") for the purpose of building motels on the land. Plaintiffs claim they were told by Defendants' agent that financing was in place to build immediately and that this representation induced them to enter into the leases. Financing never materialized and the motels never were built. Plaintiffs sued Defendants, the parties expected to provide financing, and others. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate and remand.

In Re: Estate of Gloria Eleanor Franklin vs. W. Jess Waltman
E2003-00926-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
The Trial Court following an evidentiary hearing, held decedent's holographic will to be conditional and inoperative. On appeal, we reverse.

Hitchock Metal Sources vs. John D. Mulford
E2003-00738-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Diane Hitchcock ("Mrs. Hitchcock") and Hitchcock Metal Sources, Inc. ("HMS") sued John D. Mulford, Jr. ("Mulford") and Mulford Enterprises, Inc. ("the defendant corporation") for breach of an oral contract between Mulford and Mrs. Hitchcock's deceased husband, James H. Hitchcock ("Mr. Hitchcock"). Mulford and the defendant corporation responded by filing a counterclaim against Mrs. Hitchcock and HMS, asserting, inter alia, breach of contract. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court found in favor of Mrs. Hitchcock, awarding her damages of $87,896.74 jointly and severally against Mulford and the defendant corporation, and an additional amount of $8,855.93 against the defendant corporation. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim of Mulford and the defendant corporation, as well as the original claim of HMS. Mulford and the defendant corporation appeal the trial court's dual determinations that the parties' oral agreement did not prohibit either party from pursuing other business opportunities and that the defendant corporation converted Mrs. Hitchcock's steel by selling it without her knowledge or consent. In addition, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to reform the parties' contract and in its calculation of damages. By way of a separate issue, Mrs. Hitchcock asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court's judgment in toto.

Mary Ann Gurganus Eure v. Barry Lynn Eure
E2003-00745-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
This is a post-divorce modification case involving the custody of, and support for, the parties' minor child, Matthew Chandler Eure (DOB: July 22, 1996) ("the child"). Mary Ann Gurganus Eure ("Mother") filed a complaint seeking custody of the child. Barry Lynn Eure ("Father"), the child's custodian, answered and filed a counterclaim seeking an increase in Mother's weekly child support obligation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mother's complaint. The court subsequently increased Mother's support obligation to $113 per week. Mother appeals, arguing, in so many words, that the evidence preponderates against both of the trial court's rulings. We affirm.

Monte Bounds vs. Zella Cupp
E2003-00692-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
The appellees filed suit against the appellant, alleging that the appellees, Lawrence R. Bozeman and wife, Imogene Bozeman ("the appellees Bozeman"), owned a 12-foot wide easement accross the property of the appellant. The appellant filed an answer, relying upon "the affirmative defense of abandonment plus adverse possession by the [appellant]." Following a plenary trial, the court below found that the appellees Bozeman had an express easement across the property of the appellant and that they "ha[d] not taken action of clear and unmistakable character indicating an abandonment of the easement." The appellant contends on this appeal that the trial court erred in failing to find abandonment of the easement. Since there is no transcript or statement of the evidence in the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

E2003-00501-COA-R3-JV
E2003-00501-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey

Children's Services, vs. SJMW, In The Matter of: DJL
E2003-00519-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey
The mother's parental rights were terminated by the Trial Judge. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

Ronald Loines vs. Kimberly Loines
E2003-00526-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
In this divorce case, the trial court awarded Ronald Keith Loines, Jr. ("Husband") a divorce from Kimberly Loines ("Wife") by judgment entered January 14, 2003. Wife filed her notice of appeal on February 25, 2003. Because the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment of divorce, we are without jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Wife. Accordingly, Wife's appeal is dismissed.

Page J. Farnsworth v. Sidney W. Farnsworth, Iii
W2002-01536-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Shayle Israel Hirschman v. Suanne Goldstein Hirschman
W2003-00008-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

W2003-00983-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00983-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Lee Moore

Louis Ernest Cunningham v. Cheryl Lynne Cheatham
W2002-02296-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris

State of Tennessee v. Charles Lawuary
W2002-02739-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

Defendant, Charles Lawuary, appeals from the trial court's order revoking Defendant's community corrections sentence and requiring him to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Geraldrick Jones
W2002-00747-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

This direct appeal of right for first degree murder for which the defendant received a sentence of life without parole raises five issues of alleged error: (1) sufficiency of evidence; (2) failure to suppress the defendant's statements; (3) improper admission of photographs; (4) improper testimony of experts at the penalty phase of trial; and (5) improper admission of evidence concerning a prior conviction of the defendant. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction. The issue concerning admissibility of the defendant's statement is waived by the defendant's failure to include the suppression hearing in the appellate record. We conclude that the remaining issues were properly decided by the trial court, and we, therefore, affirm the conviction.

W2002-02529-COA-R3-CV
W2002-02529-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

John Haws Burrell v. Howard Carlton, Warden
E2002-01613-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The petitioner, John Haws Burrell, has been convicted of twelve counts of sexual battery, three counts of rape, and two counts of coercion of a witness for which he is serving an effective twenty-four-year sentence. See State v. John Haws Burrell, No. 03C01-9404-CR-00157, 1997 WL 53455 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 11, 1997). The petitioner brings the instant appeal of the lower court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We find that the lower court properly summarily dismissed the petition because several of the alleged bases for relief in the petition are not proper grounds for habeas relief and the remaining allegations lack merit.

State of Tennessee v. Angelee Prater
E2002-01774-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The appellant, Angelee Prater, was convicted by a jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony and fined $25,000. As a result of the conviction, the trial court sentenced her to twenty-one years and six months incarceration as a Range I, standard offender and classified her release eligibility at 100% as a violent offender. After the trial court denied the appellant's motion for a new trial, she appealed. The appellant argues on appeal that the aggravated child abuse statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-15-401 and -402 are unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct and that the evidence was not sufficient to support a verdict of guilt. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the statutes in question are constitutional and that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of guilt. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.