State of Tennessee v. Abraham Julien Augustin
The Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; three counts of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony; escape, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at $2500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 30-13-210 (second degree murder) (2018), 39-12- 101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-12-103 (criminal conspiracy), 39-13-103(a), (b)(2) (reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon), 39-16-605 (2018) (escape), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14- 105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Braylon W., et al. v. Armie Walker, M.D., et al.
This appeal stems from a dismissal pursuant to Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Suit was filed against Appellant’s treating physician, among other defendants, for health care liability involving Appellant’s birth. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that, because the physician was an employee of a governmental entity at the time of the incident, Appellant was required by statute to name the physician’s employing governmental entity as a party defendant. Because Appellant failed to do so, the lawsuit against the treating physician could not proceed. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Sullivan County et al. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. et al.
Having determined that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded and possible further sanctions remain pending in this action, we further determine that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip Michael Martinez
A Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Phillip Michael Martinez, for attempted aggravated sexual battery in Count 1 and solicitation of a minor in Count 2. Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi for the solicitation of a minor charge. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged of the attempted aggravated sexual battery count. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101; 39-13-504(a)(4). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years’ incarceration at thirty percent release eligibility, sentenced him to community supervision for life, and ordered him to register as a sexual offender for life. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the forensic interviewer to testify as an expert; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s forensic interview as substantive evidence; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; (4) the State made two improper comments during its closing argument; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the proof failed to show that he acted for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Travis Payne v. Jessica Payne
This is an appeal from a dismissal of Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court found that Mother failed to carry her burden of proof in showing a material change of circumstances had occurred. Mother now appeals. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm its denial of Mother’s petition. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Perry Allen Et Al. v. William B. Lee Et Al.
The Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to challenge a series of executive orders issued by the Governor of Tennessee in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Namely, the Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s legal authority to close entertainment and recreational gathering venues, arguing, among other things, that the executive orders were a constitutionally-prohibited implementation of martial law. Although the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, we conclude that the underlying matter is moot given the repeal of the complained of closure requirements. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for dismissal of the complaint in light of its mootness. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miley D.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that two grounds for termination had been established as to Father: abandonment by an incarcerated parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and a sentence for child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court further found the termination of Father’s parental rights to be in the best interests of the two minor children at issue. Although we reverse one ground for termination found by the trial court, we otherwise affirm its order terminating Father’s parental rights. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, TN et al.
This appeal arises from litigation concerning a fatal road accident. Steven W. Lawson (“Decedent”), by and through his wife, Penny Lawson, and on behalf of Corey Lawson, Decedent’s child (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District Board (“ECD-911”), Hawkins County, Tennessee and Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency (“the EMA”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness in Defendants’ response to a road washout that led to Decedent’s death. Plaintiffs specifically alleged nepotism in Defendants’ hiring practices and a failure to train. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, which the Trial Court granted partly on grounds that claims of recklessness could not proceed against the Defendant entities under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Plaintiffs could, in fact, proceed with their claims of recklessness and gross negligence under the GTLA, and the facts pled by Plaintiffs were sufficient to state claims based upon recklessness and gross negligence. We hold further that, based on the facts alleged at this stage, the third special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies so as to remove Defendants’ immunity. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Manning H.
This appeal arises from a mother and a stepfather’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. The mother and father were married and had a son and a daughter. When they divorced, they agreed to a permanent parenting plan allowing the father equal parenting time with their son but no parenting time with their daughter. In the three and a half years preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father’s rights, the father fully exercised his parenting time with their son, but he had no contact with their daughter and did not request a modification of the permanent parenting plan. The petitioners alleged three grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights to his daughter—abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and -113(g)(1), and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The trial court determined that the petitioners proved one of the three grounds, abandonment by failure to visit; however, it found that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the daughter’s best interests to terminate the father’s rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. On appeal, the petitioners contend the trial court erred in denying their petition because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interests. They also contend the trial court erred in finding that they did not prove the father failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume physical custody as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). For his part, the father contends his failure to visit was not willful; therefore, the petitioners failed to prove any ground for termination of his parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the father abandoned his daughter by failure to visit during the requisite period of time as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We affirm its determination that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the essential elements of the ground codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the petitioners failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Winford Paul Wilhoite v. State of Tennessee
In 2017, the Petitioner, Winford Paul Wilhoite, pleaded guilty as charged in case number 25743 to possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, simple possession of Lortab, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal impersonation, and driving on a revoked license (second offense). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-434, 3917-418, 39-17-425, 39-16-301, 55-50-504. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for the Petitioner was appointed, and an amended petition was filed. The postconviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Moorehead Et Al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
In litigation regarding an automobile accident, Appellants Jerry and Debra Moorehead reached a mediation agreement with their uninsured motorist carrier, Appellee Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmers”). Under the mediation agreement, Farmers agreed to pay $50,000 to each of the Mooreheads in full settlement of the dispute. Farmers paid only $25,000 each to Mr. and Mrs. Moorehead, deducting amounts it had previously paid under the policy for medical expenses. The Mooreheads moved the trial court to enforce the agreement, arguing that they were due $50,000 each in “new” money. The trial court held that the mediation agreement was enforceable but that the amount owed to the Mooreheads was properly offset by the previous amounts Farmers paid. On review, we conclude that the plain language of the mediation agreement promised future payment of $50,000 to each of the Mooreheads without reference to or incorporation of either the insurance policy or previous payments made thereunder. Reversed and remanded. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Lebron Vance
The Defendant, Anthony Lebron Vance, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of rape, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018). The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years at 100% and imposed the sentence consecutively to the Defendant’s ten-year sentence in another case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Yangreek Tut Wal v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Yangreek Tut Wal, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of forty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which resulted in his guilty pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin M. Courter
The Defendant-Appellant, Calvin M. Courter, pleaded guilty to reckless aggravated assault, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102, for which he received a three-year probationary sentence, with an additional 30 days to be served on weekends. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Madaryl Dewayne Hampton
The Defendant-Appellant, Madaryl Hampton, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with multiple counts of drug and weapon related offenses, all stemming from a single encounter with the Jackson Police Department (JPD). These counts were severed into two trials, one dealing with the drug related offenses and the other the weapon related offenses. In the first trial, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of simple possession of marijuana. In his second trial, the Defendant was convicted of four counts of being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court merged each of these counts and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years’ imprisonment for the weapon offenses to be served consecutively to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment for the possession of marijuana convictions. While the issues presented in this appeal as of right involve facts from the Defendant’s first trial, the Defendant challenges only the felon in possession of a weapon convictions in arguing that: (1) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to admit evidence that the Defendant was in possession of marijuana, digital scales, and cash; (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to comment on the credibility of the Defendant and the witnesses during closing arguments; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gabriel Buchanon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gabriel Buchanon, was found guilty by a jury of three counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary, and he received an effective twenty-three-year sentence. After this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lamar Hudson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lamar Hudson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea for attempted second degree murder and the resulting ten-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to obtain body camera footage and that the resulting guilty plea was, therefore, entered involuntarily. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Santos Morales
The Defendant, Santos Morales, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B Felony. See T.C.A § 39-13-504 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years at 100% service and ordered the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. See T.C.A § 40-39-201 (2019). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delshun Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Delshun Jones, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Young, Jr.
The defendant, Bobby Joe Young, Jr., appeals the revocation of the sentences of probation imposed for his convictions of aggravated assault, robbery, and escape, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of the total effective sentence in confinement and that the trial court miscalculated the remaining balance of the total effective sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Darrell Adkins v. Rhonda Forlaw Adkins
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Daryl K. Burford v. Tennessee Department of Correction, Et Al.
The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”); TDOC Sentence Management; TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker; and CoreCivic, Inc., Records Officials (“CoreCivic”) (collectively, “Respondents”), miscalculated his release eligibility date and sentence expiration date. The trial court dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioner had failed to comply with the court’s two orders notifying the petitioner that his case would be dismissed if he did not pay the initial partial filing fee required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807, file an affidavit of indigency, and submit copies of his petition and summons for each respondent with the court clerk. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis Keller v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and evading arrest. In this appeal, the petitioner alleges that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager
The issue in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Plaintiff originally filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Shelby County in May 2014. Unbeknownst to the parties, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit for failure to prosecute. Upon learning of the dismissal over ten months later, the Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal. The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s request to set aside the dismissal but, articulating an erroneous reading of Rule 41.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, entered an order that stated the dismissal did not bar the Plaintiff from refiling its lawsuit. When the Plaintiff refiled its lawsuit in August 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res judicata. Despite language to the contrary in its prior order, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, holding that the dismissal of the original lawsuit operated as an adjudication on the merits. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the second lawsuit. We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and reinstate the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ciara Dawn Beaty v. Adam Scott Beaty
This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. In fashioning an initial parenting schedule, the trial court named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and entered a parenting plan awarding 242 days of parenting time to the mother and 123 days to the father. The father appealed. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the residential parenting schedule does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order as to the parenting plan and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Pickett | Court of Appeals |