Felix Luis Torres, et al. v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC., et al.
Mexican car crash victims filed this lawsuit in Tennessee against the manufacturer of the subject vehicle and the manufacturer of its tires. The original lawsuit was dismissed by this Court in 2003 under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A separate lawsuit was filed in Mexico but ultimately dismissed. The plaintiffs then filed this action in Tennessee. As the case progressed, the parties disputed whether Tennessee law or Mexican law applies to the substantive issues in this case. The trial court ruled that Mexican law applies. The plaintiffs were granted an interlocutory appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Tennessee law should apply to the substantive issues in this case because it has the most significant relationship to the litigation. The defendants argue that the choice-of-law issue was resolved in our 2003 opinion and should not be reconsidered due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Alternatively, they argue that Mexico has the most significant relationship to the litigation, and therefore, its law should apply. For the following reasons, we conclude that this Court’s determination in our 2003 decision regarding the applicable choice-of-law is entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, as we concluded in 2003, Mexican law will govern the substantive issues in this case. The trial court’s order is affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Jones
The defendant, Willie Jones, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony and by excluding other witness testimony, by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and by limiting his cross-examination of certain witnesses. In addition, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing, and that the cumulative effect of these errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Mullins
The Defendant, Michael Mullins, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a three-year sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015). The trial court granted the Defendant's request for judicial diversion and ordered him to pay more than $8000 in restitution. After a probation violation report and warrant were filed with the trial court, the court determined that the Defendant violated the conditions of his release, revoked the Defendant's judicial diversion, and sentenced him to three years' enhanced probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) because the parties had a plea agreement regarding the disposition of the probation violation, the trial court erred by allowing the State to rescind the agreement and by not providing the Defendant the opportunity to choose between requiring the State to specifically perform the agreement and withdrawing his guilty plea to the probation violation, (2) the trial court's failure to consider his corrective actions during the two years the probation violation proceedings were pending violated his right to a speedy trial, (3) the court erred by holding a judicial diversion revocation proceeding before holding a probation violation proceeding, and (4) the court erred during its restitution determinations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the Defendant's appeal relative to restitution pursuant to the mootness doctrine. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Williams
Pro se petitioner, Michael Williams, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. Owners of Property With Delinquent Demolition Liens Filed With The Register of Deed's Office In Davidson County, Tennessee, et al
This appeal arises from a dispute over the meaning of the term “owner” as it relates to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-103, part of the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Act (“the Act”). The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) sued various defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) to recover costs associated with the demolition of certain property in Nashville. Regions Bank (“Regions”), the mortgagee of record and a defendant in the case, argues that while it is an owner under other sections of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-103, it is not an owner under the statute as relates to demolition costs and thus is not liable for Metro’s demolition costs. The Trial Court granted Regions’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, thereby dismissing Metro’s lawsuit. Metro appeals to this Court. We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-101, “owner” is defined explicitly to include mortgagees of record, that the language is unambiguous, and that the Trial Court erred in dismissing Metro’s lawsuit. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. Owners of Property With Delinquent Demolition Liens Filed With The Register of Deed's Office In Davidson County, Tennessee, et al - Dissenting
Because I conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-21-103(6) (2011) does not permit assessments of costs or actions for costs against a mortgagee, I respectfully dissent from the reversal. Relying on the definition of the word “owner” found in the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Act (the “Act”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-101(4) (2011), the majority concludes that a mortgagee may be assessed the cost of removal or demolition of a structure unfit for human occupation or use. As required when called on to construe a statute, the majority begins by looking to the words of the Act. See Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn. 2008). In my view, however, the majority then fails “to construe the[] words in the context in which they appear in the statute and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elvis Bogle Ex Rel. Minnie Lucille Bogle v. Nighthawk Radiology Services, LLC et al.
Plaintiff appeals from a defense verdict in a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff alleged that the one of the defendants, a general radiologist, deviated from the standard of care by failing to diagnose and report that a pacemaker lead had perforated the decedent’s heart. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Plaintiff’s motion to strike the testimony of the defendants’ expert witness who testified that the defendant radiologist complied with the standard of care. Plaintiff insists that the expert did not know the applicable standard of care; therefore, his testimony should have been stricken. The defendants insist the expert witness was qualified to provide standard of care opinions for a general radiologist and that the trial court correctly instructed the jury to weigh his testimony along with that of other expert witnesses who testified. Finding no error with the trial court denying Plaintiff’s motion to strike, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gerry Tallant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gerry Tallant, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his premeditated first degree murder conviction. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to argue in the motion to suppress that: (1) he was arrested on the murder charge although the officers lacked probable cause; (2) he was detained for a custodial interrogation although the officers lacked probable cause; and (3) he was seized without reasonable suspicion. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patricia Tarver
Appellant, Patricia Tarver, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her original sentence in confinement. Because there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated the terms and conditions of her probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s probation and executing the underlying sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Casey Bryant
The defendant, Jonathan Casey Bryant, pleaded guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, reserving as a certified question of law whether the evidence obtained following a traffic stop should have been suppressed because it arose from his illegal detention. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall Charles Harrell v. Chassity Necole Harrell
This appeal concerns a post-divorce modification of child custody. Randall Charles Harrell (“Father”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Chassity Necole Harrell (“Mother”) in the General Sessions Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor children. Father sought to be designated primary residential parent based, in part, upon Mother’s alleged drug abuse and instability. After a hearing, the Trial Court found a material change in circumstances, designated Father the primary residential parent, and entered a new parenting plan accordingly. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in finding a material change of circumstances and in considering the unsworn testimony of the children. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric D. Crenshaw
The Defendant, Eric D. Crenshaw, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, evading arrest, a Class E felony, theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft), 39-16-603 (2014) (evading arrest), 39-17-425 (2014) (unlawful drug paraphernalia), 55-50-504 (2012) (driving on a revoked license). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant would receive concurrent sentences as a Range I, standard offender, with the length and the manner of service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve six years for the felony theft conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft conviction, eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying him alternative sentencing and (2) imposing excessive fines for his felony theft and evading arrest convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shawn Christopher Sales v. Shawn Phillips, Warden
The Petitioner, Shawn Christopher Sales, pleaded guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to serve fifteen years with release eligibility at 60%. The trial court ordered that the Petitioner serve 163 days in confinement and the remainder of his sentence on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the Petitioner’s community corrections sentence and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. This Court affirmed the revocation on appeal. State v. Shawn C. Sales, M2013-01510-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 806316 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 28, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his judgment is void because his sentence is illegal. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition finding that the Petitioner had failed to satisfy the procedural requirements and had failed to prove he was entitled to habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre Davis v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Andre Davis, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter by a Shelby County jury and sentenced to fourteen and one-half years in incarceration. His first appeal was denied. State v. Andre Davis, No. W2007-01442-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4831230, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief which led to the grant of a delayed appeal based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial. Petitioner was permitted to file a motion for new trial. The motion was denied, and Petitioner was again denied relief on appeal. Andre Davis v. State, No. W2011-00373-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5970932, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief again. After a hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's denial of relief. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Tiger
The Defendant, Mark Tiger, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the Defendant's conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Patterson
The Defendant, James Patterson, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated rape, a Class B felony, and two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502 (2014) (aggravated rape), 39-12-101 (2014) (attempt), 39-13-101 (2010) (amended 2013) (assault). The trial court merged the assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of ten years for attempted aggravated rape and eleven months, twenty-nine days for assault, all to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted aggravated rape conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric O'Neil Turner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Eric O’Neil Turner, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, with an agreed sentence of nine years for each count with one conviction to be served consecutively to the others for an effective eighteen-year sentence as a persistent offender. The sentence was suspended with time served, and Petitioner was immediately released on probation. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather Renee McCollum
Appellant, Heather Renee McCollum, stands convicted of first degree premeditated murder and arson, for which she received consecutive sentences of life in prison and five years, respectively. Challenging her convictions and sentence alignment, she raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions; (2) whether her arson conviction should be set aside based upon the “physical facts” rule; and (3) whether the trial court erred in aligning her sentences consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sherrie L. Durham v. Bill Haslam, et al
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Governor, all state appellate court judges, the Tennessee Republican Party, and the Tennessee Democratic Party in which she alleges, inter alia, that the Tennessee Plan and statutes providing for the appointment of special and senior judges violate her state and federal constitutional rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
SecurAmerica Business Credit v. Southland Transportation Co., LLC, et al.
This is the third appeal involving liability on personal guaranties securing the debt of a transportation company. On remand after our second opinion, the trial court found that the transportation company and the lender, through the actions of its president, entered into a conspiracy to violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing, thereby relieving the guarantors of their liability under the continuing guaranties. Specifically, the trial court found that the guarantors were “consumers” under the TCPA, that the guarantors suffered an ascertainable loss due to the transportation company's deceptive acts, and that a violation of the TCPA can be a predicate tort for a civil conspiracy claim. Now, we reverse the trial court's finding that the transportation company's acts affected trade or commerce within the meaning of the TCPA. Accordingly, we also reverse the trial court's determination that the guarantors should be released from their guaranties. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Joseph F., et. al.
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Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Traveno Cox, Jr.
Appellant, Marcus Traveno Cox, Jr., stands convicted (after merger of duplicate counts) of possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, possession of a Schedule III controlled substance (Lortab), possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the indictment and jury instructions for the possession of a firearm charge were fatally deficient and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Crawford, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry Crawford, Jr., of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, and this Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. See State v. Jerry Crawford, Jr., No. W2012-02729-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 296014, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 28, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Thomas Mayers v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Thomas Mayers, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Davidson County Criminal Court, alleging that his counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Pillow
A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Brian Pillow, of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by requiring the Appellant to expose his tattooed arms to the jury and by admitting photographs of his tattoos into evidence. Additionally, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals |