Lester G. Murphy, Sr. v. State of Tennessee Child Support Services
A mother and father were divorced in 1993, and the mother was granted custody of the two children born of the marriage; the father was ordered to pay child support for their two children in the amount of $50 per week. In 1997 the children came into the custody of their maternal grandfather, and in 2007, the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Division filed a petition to set child support against the father. After a hearing in February 2008 that the father did not attend, the trial court entered an order in March that increased his monthly support obligation and declared that he owed more than $31,000 in arrearages. Thereafter the father filed a pro se petition to modify the support order, asserting that the March 2008 order was defective; his petition was dismissed. On appeal to this court we held that the father was entitled to relief and vacated the order. The father thereafter filed a Motion for Further Relief in the trial court seeking reimbursement of child support payments he made pursuant to the March 2008 order; after a hearing on the motion, the court entered an order in accordance with the Court of Appeals’ opinion and denied father’s motion for further relief. Father appeals; finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Avery Place, LLC, et al v. Highways, Inc.
Subdivision developer brought a breach of contract action against the contractor who had been engaged nine years previously to pave the roads in the subdivision after the contractor refused to complete the second phase of paving for the roads at the price specified in the contract. The contractor moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the provision in the contract relating to the second phase of paving was a separate offer which had not been accepted by the developer and that the action was barred by laches and the statute of limitations. Developer also moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to developer and denied summary judgment to contractor. Contractor appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Bernard Howard v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Eric Bernard Howard, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged various constitutional violations concerning his convictions and seventeen-year sentence for two counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without a hearing and that his convictions are void because of his diminished mental capacity at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deborah M. Nowakowski
The Defendant-Appellant, Deborah Nowakowski, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving on a revoked license. At a subsequent bench trial, the trial court found that Nowakowski had five previous DUI convictions and one previous conviction for driving on a revoked license. She was therefore convicted of DUI, sixth offense, and violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act (MVHOA). She received a total effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in holding harmless the erroneous admission of a statement referencing Nowakowski’s prior DUI convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Southeast Bank and Trust v. Joseph Caldarera, et al.
In this declaratory judgment action, one of the co-defendants filed an answer and counterclaim that was dismissed by the trial court upon motion of the plaintiff. Nearly two years later, the co-defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.02, seeking relief from the order dismissing his counterclaim. Said co-defendant asserted that he was never served with the motion to dismiss or the order of dismissal, despite the representation of service by mail pursuant to the certificates of service contained within those pleadings. The trial court conducted a hearing on the co-defendant's motion for relief from the earlier order, allowing the co-defendant to present evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service based on the certificates of service. The court subsequently denied the co-defendant's motion for relief from the earlier order, determining that he had not presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service. The co-defendant has timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aurelio Garcia Sanchez - Concurring
First, I concur in Judge Holloway’s separate opinion, and with the results reached in the lead opinion. Second, I write to remind both the State and the defense bar that under binding precedent from our supreme court that “[s]imply stated, polygraph evidence is inadmissible.” State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 409 (Tenn. 2012). The results of polygraph examinations are inherently unreliable, they are thus not probative, and they lack relevance. A defendant’s willingness or refusal to take a polygraph test is not admissible. Id. The trial court should have sua sponte ruled that all evidence of the polygraph examination in this case must be excluded. I know of no exception to the rule of inadmissibility of such evidence. Whether the threat or use of a polygraph examination might someday be argued by a defendant as evidence of an involuntary statement or as evidence of coercion, and thus be an exception to the rule of inadmissibility, is not raised in this case. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aurelio Garcia Sanchez - Concurring
Although I concur with lead opinion’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing, I write separately to express my opinion that the imposition of a 125-year sentence to be served at 100% pushes to the limit the presumption of reasonableness underState v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851 (Tenn. 2013) and State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). Without diminishing the seriousness of the offense of rape of a child, I would note that the 125-year sentence is over twice as long as a life sentence for first degree murder, 60 years. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Reed Hildebrand v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Tony Reed Hildebrand, filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, alleged that he was “falsely accused,” and insisted that a “court order [was] not honored.” The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition without a hearing. After our review, we conclude that the petition alleged a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and Petitioner was entitled to appointed counsel, if found to be indigent, and to an opportunity to amend his petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas L. Lyle, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Douglas L. Lyle, Sr., appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for relief from his aggravated sexual battery conviction, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aurelio Garcia Sanchez
A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Aurelio Garcia Sanchez, of five counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve consecutive twenty-five year sentences for each conviction, for an effective sentence of 125 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Sungkook Chong v. Tennessee Board of Law Examiners
The petitioner appeals from a decision of the Board of Law Examiners denying his application to take the Tennessee bar examination. The denial was based on Mr. Chong’s noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 7, section 7.01. We affirm the judgment of the Board of Law Examiners. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cameo Bobo v. City of Jackson, Tennessee
Appellant filed suit against the City of Jackson after her home was demolished, asserting causes of action for trespass and inverse condemnation. The City of Jackson filed an answer denying any liability and later moved for summary judgment on all claims. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the trespass claim should be dismissed due to governmental immunity. Moreover, the trial court concluded that Appellant had failed to timely assert her inverse condemnation claim. Appellant appeals only the dismissal of her inverse condemnation claim. Having reviewed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on that issue, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jamell Faulkner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jamell Faulkner, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of second degree murder and especially aggravated burglary and the accompanying effective sentence of fifteen years. The Petitioner alleged that his lead counsel and his co-counsel were ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tavarus Detterio Griffin
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Tavarus Detterio Griffin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the entire jury pool was tainted when, during voir dire, a juror mentioned that she had been called for jury service at the Defendant’s first trial on these charges; (3) the jury foreman’s comment, prior to the beginning of deliberations, that he knew the Defendant was guilty constituted juror misconduct; and (4) the prosecutor’s use of testimony from the Defendant’s allocution at his first trial to impeach him with a prior inconsistent statement constituted reversible error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Dwayne Mitchell
Following his arrest at a sobriety checkpoint on October 7, 2011, the Defendant, Kenneth Dwayne Mitchell, was indicted for driving under the influence (“DUI”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of .08% or greater (“DUI per se”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-425 & 39-17-425. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of DUI per se and acquitted of the remaining charges. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that his seizure at the sobriety checkpoint was unreasonable because adequate notice of the roadblock was not provided. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Bray v. Radwan R. Khuri, MD
This is a health care liability action arising from decedent's death. Appellant filed this action against Dr. Radwan Khuri. Dr. Khuri moved to dismiss this action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 et seq. Specifically, Dr. Khuri challenged whether the medical release provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). The trial court agreed with Dr. Khuri and dismissed the action with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kermit Penley
The petitioner, Kermit Penley, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. He argues that he received a sentence of “life with the possibility of parole” with his parole eligibility occurring after service of eighty-five percent of his sentence, and he contends that this sentence is not authorized by statute. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment and that his sentence is not illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Kirkpatrick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Kirkpatrick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction from his convictions for burglary and theft of property over $1,000, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corey McKinnie v. State of Tennessee
Appellant appeals the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal of his healthcare liability claim against the Appellee, State of Tennessee. Appellant failed to include a certificate of good faith with his complaint, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122. Accordingly, the State filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Byrge
Defendant, Christopher Lee Byrge, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and received a nine-year sentence. He appeals his conviction, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his admissions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the specific date on which the alleged offense occurred; (3) the trial court erred by giving a sequential jury instruction; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's request for a special jury instruction on corroboration of admissions against interest; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a careful review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul J. Walwyn v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility (the “Hearing Panel”) found that an attorney’s handling of three separate criminal appeals violated certain ethical rules. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a), (d). The Hearing Panel suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months and ordered him to serve thirty days’ active suspension and five months’ probation. The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s judgment. On appeal to this Court, the attorney contends that the Hearing Panel abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Additionally, the attorney argues that the attorney disciplinary process in Tennessee is unconstitutional. After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding the Hearing Panel’s decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cayetano Flores v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cayetano Flores, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by operating under a conflict of interest, inadequately discussing various aspects of the case and the details of the plea agreement, and failing to file a motion to sever. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the prost-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Wooden
We granted this appeal to determine whether a party filing a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) states a colorable claim for relief for correction of an illegal sentence by alleging that the trial court increased his sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the increase. Answering this question requires us to determine the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—“colorable claim” and “illegal sentence.” We hold that the definition of “colorable claim” in Rule 28, section 2(H) of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court applies to the term “colorable claim” in Rule 36.1. Additionally, we conclude that the definition of “illegal sentence” in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and actually mirrors, the definition this Court has applied to the term for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. Compare Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a), with Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011). Taking the allegations of the Rule 36.1 motion in this case as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the moving party, we conclude that the moving party has failed to allege a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian R. Brown
We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) permits parties to seek correction of expired illegal sentences. We hold that Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief available for illegal sentence claims and therefore does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences. We also conclude that a Rule 36.1 motion alleging that a trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit is insufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence. Applying these holdings, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Messmaker v. Heather L. Messmaker
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Timothy Messmaker ("Former Husband") in the parties' post-dissolution modification proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals |