Alexa Williams EL v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Alexa Williams El, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of her three pro se petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed on January 20, 21, and 29, 2015, in which she alleged a number of statutory and procedural violations with regard to the requirements for notifying state officials of a driving infraction after the judgment had issued. She also asserted that the arrest warrants were insufficient with respect to her convictions for driving a motor vehicle while the privilege to drive was suspended, driving an unregistered vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle without evidence of financial responsibility. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Greg Grant v. The Commercial Appeal, et al.
Plaintiff brought action for defamation and false light invasion of privacy based on an allegedly defamatory newspaper article published by defendant newspaper, reporter, editor, and publisher. Defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that liability was precluded based on the fair report privilege. Defendants also asserted that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted because the article‘s statements were not capable of being defamatory. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the article was not capable of defamation and that the fair report privilege applied. We reverse in part as to the determination that the fair report privilege applied; affirm in part as to the dismissal of the defamation and false light claims; and reverse in part as to the defamation by implication claims. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Fitz v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Fitz, pleaded guilty to first degree murder, attempted rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued over $1,000 but under $10,000. He received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later withdrew. More than four years after his guilty plea, petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely and alternatively as a failed motion to re-open post-conviction proceedings. Following our review, we conclude that petitioner’s notice of appeal was not timely and dismiss his appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville
In this appeal, the claimant seeks to toll the statute of limitations on his claim against a municipality based on two statutes: (1) Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-1-119, the 90-day “window” in Tennessee’s comparative fault statute to name a non-party defendant as a comparative tortfeasor, and (2) Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-402(b), the tolling provision in the Tennessee Claims Commission Act that states that the filing of written notice of a claim against the State tolls all statutes of limitations as to other persons potentially liable to the claimant. The trial court dismissed the claimant’s complaint against the municipality. It held that, because the antecedent complaint against the State of Tennessee was filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission after expiration of the one-year limitations period, the 90-day window under Section 20-1-119 to file the lawsuit against the municipality, as a comparative tortfeasor, was never triggered. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the claimant’s written notice of his claim against the State, filed with the Division of Claims Administration before the one-year limitations period elapsed, was an “original complaint” within the meaning of Section 20-1-119, so the lawsuit against the municipality was timely. The municipality appeals. We hold that the complaint, not the written notice of a claim, is the “original complaint” under Section 20-1-119, so the 90-day window to name a non-party defendant as a comparative tortfeasor was never triggered in this case. We also hold that Section 9-8-402(b), the tolling provision in the Claims Commission Act, is not applicable to toll the statute of limitations for a claim against a municipality filed under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Therefore, this action is time-barred. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville - Dissenting
As early as 1799, the Superior Court of Law and Equity of Tennessee adopted the principle that the courts of this state should interpret the law in a manner that elevates “the justice of the case” over “technical formality.” Glasgow’s Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 151 (1799). It is equally well established that “Tennessee law strongly favors the resolution of all disputes on their merits,” and that remedial statutes must “be given a broad and liberal construction in order to achieve this goal.” Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tenn. 1996). This case involves a claim brought pursuant to the Claims Commission Act and hinges on the construction of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20 1 119, a remedial statute intended to provide plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to add a non-party when a defendant alleges that the non-party was comparatively at fault for a plaintiff’s injury. Becker v. Ford Motor Co., 431 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. 2014). The majority has concluded that in this instance Richard Moreno (the “Plaintiff”) cannot invoke section 20 1 119 because it applies only when the defendant alleging comparative fault is named in a pleading described as a “complaint” rather than a “notice of claim,” the latter being the statutory term used to describe the pleading that commences an action under the Claims Commission Act. In my view, the majority’s interpretation of section 20 1 119 is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, elevates form over substance, and violates the principle that claims should be decided on the merits whenever possible. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
In re: Estate of Teffany Teresa Love
This case involves a dispute over the name inscribed on the decedent's headstone. The decedents surviving husband and her two adult children had the decedent's headstone inscribed to include her alleged biological father's surname. Appellant, the decedent's adoptive father, brought a petition to replace the headstone selected by the appellees. The appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court concluded that the appellant did not have standing to challenge the name on the decedent's headstone selected by the surviving spouse and granted the appellees' motion. We interpret Tennessee Code Annotated Section 62-5-703 to grant the decedent's surviving spouse the right to control the inscription on the decedent's headstone as part of the right of disposition. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Luis Jorge Diaz
Appellant, Luis Jorge Diaz, was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years for each conviction and aligned two of the convictions consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. Appellant now challenges his convictions, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use leading questions during the State’s direct examination of the victim; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jameson Ross Owen
The defendant, Jameson Ross Owen, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred by admitting Rule 404(b) evidence of his alleged history of stalking the victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Anthony Sanders
Appellant, Randy Anthony Sanders, was convicted of theft valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the indictment was improperly aggregated into one count and that because of the aggregation, the State should have made an election of facts; (3) the State improperly asked the jury to view the crime from the victim’s perspective during closing argument; (4) the State improperly argued facts that were not in the record during closing argument; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors requires a new trial. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Bockelman,et al v. GGNSC Gallatin
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement signed by a patient’s health care agent in conjunction with the patient’s admission to a nursing home. Within a few months of having been declared to lack capacity, the patient was placed in a nursing home. The agent completed all admission forms and contracts, including an optional, stand-alone arbitration agreement, on the patient’s behalf. After the patient’s death, the agent sued the nursing home for negligence, violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act, breach of contractual duties, and alternatively, medical malpractice. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal from the order compelling arbitration, the agent claims she lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement because, at the time of admission, the patient was competent to make her own decisions. Even if the patient lacked capacity, the agent argues that the decision to enter into the arbitration agreement was not a “health care decision.” The agent also argues that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. We affirm the order compelling arbitration. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Rivera L. Peoples v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Rivera L. Peoples, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing thathe received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Athanasios Diakos Edmonston
The defendant, Athanasios Diakos Edmonston, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and assault, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Andrew Bell
The defendant, Thomas Andrew Bell, appeals the six-year sentence imposed for his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a public park, possession of drug paraphernalia, simple possession, and possession with intent to sell cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LeDarren Hawkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ledarren Hawkins, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, he argues that due process grounds warrant a tolling of the statute of limitations. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LeSergio Wilson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, LeSergio Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bill Bivens v. Randy Dwaine White et al.
This appeal involves an incumbent candidate's attempt to challenge the election for the office of Sheriff of Monroe County based upon the ineligibility of the other candidate. The incumbent candidate sought to claim the office or void the election. The trial court voided the election following a bench trial. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Edward Daniel
The defendant, Donald Edward Daniel, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court bench conviction of violating an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113, contending that the trial court’s interpretation of the order of protection was overly broad and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Forrest David Agostinho v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Forrest David Agostinho, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2012 convictions of 14 counts of aggravated sexual battery, five counts of Class B felony sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of Class D felony sexual exploitation of a minor. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing on his post-conviction petition and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Thomas Umfleet
The defendant, William Thomas Umfleet, appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angel Manuel Rivera
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Angel Manuel Rivera, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. After merging the murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus five years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial court’s permitting witness testimony about the appellant’s character, and the trial court’s failure to allow counsel to withdraw prior to trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlton C. Holder v. Victor P. Serodino, III, et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over an easement for a private airstrip. The original owner of the land sub-divided it into six tracts, with the plan of selling them to buyers interested in purchasing property with access to the airstrip. Three of the tracts were sold to Appellant and one was purchased by Appellee. After unsuccessful efforts to sell portions of their land holdings, the original owner and Appellant executed and recorded a purported abandonment of the easement. Upon discovering that the purchasers of the final two tracts sold by the original owner were building fences across the airstrip, Appellee brought suit seeking to assert his easement rights, among other claims. The trial court found that an express and, in the alternative, implied easement for the airstrip had been created. However, because the purchasers of the two tracts had been informed that the easement was abandoned, the court terminated the easement where it crossed those two tracts. In addition, the trial court found that the original owner and Appellant had committed the tort of libel of title in executing and recording an abandonment of easement without joining Appellee as a party to the agreement. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Free Service Tire Company v. Mae Reynolds et al
The trial court awarded death benefits based on the statutory maximum benefit of the State’s average weekly wage, rather than basing the maximum on the decedent’s weekly wages. It also awarded lump sum benefits to some of the decedent’s dependents. The employer has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mindy Dodd v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mindy Dodd, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition to reopen her petition for post-conviction relief, seeking DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Ladell Grandberry
The Defendant, Kevin Ladell Grandberry, appeals from his convictions for burglary, theft over $10,000, vandalism over $1,000, and felon in possession of a handgun. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Defendant to be shackled during trial and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Swaner v. G4S Youth Services, LLC, And New Hampshire Insurance Company
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a teacher who was hurt on the job after being terminated but while she was still working under a temporary extension of her contract, can claim that she did not get a meaningful return to work after she reached maximum medical improvement. The trial court held that the statutory cap of one and one-half her medical impairment rating did apply because the employee had a meaningful return to work. This appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the one and one-half times the medical impairment rating applies and adopt the court’s alternative finding that the employee sustained a fifty percent permanent partial disability. We affirm the lower court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel |