Walter Allen Gault v. Jano Janoyan et al.
This case concerns a boundary line dispute. Walter Allen Gault (“Plaintiff”) sued Jano Janoyan and Pinnacle Bank (“Defendants”) seeking a declaratory judgment 1 that, by way of adverse possession, he is the rightful owner of a triangle-shaped piece of land, 41.59 feet at its base and approximately 302 feet on each of its two sides. The disputed area is within the deed boundaries of the property owned by Janoyan, the Plaintiff’s next door neighbor. (See attached exhibit.) The parties’ properties are in Forest View, a residential subdivision in Knoxville. Defendants filed an answer and a counterclaim for ejectment and quiet title to the property. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Ellen Pierre v. Edward Joseph Pierre
In this post-divorce case, Edward Joseph Pierre (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s decision refusing to grant him relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Husband argues that the trial court’s divorce judgment based upon irreconcilable differences should be set aside and the case reopened because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”), which was duly approved by the trial court and incorporated into the judgment, allegedly fails to equitably divide the marital estate. Husband voluntarily signed the MDA before a notary public but declined to read it before he signed it. Finding no grounds for Rule 60.02 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Theodore James Nugent v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Theodore James Nugent, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his timely petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 guilty-pleaded convictions of domestic assault and aggravated stalking on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Because the record supports the decision of the post-conviction court, we affirm that court’s order. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sherry Harper v. Bradley County, Tennessee
The issue presented on this appeal is whether a plaintiff who brings a health care liability action against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) is entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c)(Supp. 2014) under the current version of the Health Care Liability Act (“the HCLA”). This inquiry focuses on the effect of the 2011 amendment to the HCLA that expressly includes “claims against the state or a political subdivision thereof” within the definition of “health care liability action.” Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), we hold that the 2011 amendment demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to allow the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations to be extended by 120 days in cases where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of the HCLA. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant Bradley County’s motion to dismiss. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Wayne Robertson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jeffery Wayne Robertson, was convicted in 1998 of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Robertson, 130 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, one of the issues raised being that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging “expert testimony about the results of a Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (‘CBLA’) performed on evidence gathered by law enforcement.” Jeffrey Wayne Robertson v. State, No. M2007-01378-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 277073, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). Unsuccessful with that argument, he then raised a similar claim in a petition for writ of error coram nobis, the denial of which is the basis for this appeal. In that petition, he again focused on the CBLA evidence at his trial, pointing this time to the “newly discovered evidence” that the FBI “suspended performing ‘bullet lead analysis’ in 2004 and ceased entirely performing such examinations and providing such testimony in 2005.” The coram nobis court denied the petition, concluding that the CBLA evidence issue had previously been argued and the only newly discovered evidence was the fact that the FBI was no longer using the test. Following our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamayl Stoudemire
Defendant, Jamayl Stoudemire, was charged by indictment with three counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder (Counts One through Three), three counts of aggravated assault (Counts Four through Six), and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count Seven). Defendant entered a best interest plea of guilty to three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, as charged in Counts Four, Five, and Six. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. The parties agreed that the three counts would run concurrently with the trial court to determine length and manner of service. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five years for each conviction of aggravated assault to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. The trial court also denied Defendant’s request to be placed on judicial diversion. Defendant raises two issues on appeal. He argues that his five-year sentence is excessive and that the trial court should have ordered judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jim Ferguson v. Middle Tennessee State University
A jury found that an employer retaliated against an employee in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) and awarded the employee compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the award, holding that the employee had failed to prove that his supervisor had knowledge of his protected activity when she took adverse action against him. We hold that the jury’s verdict is supported by material evidence from which the jury could infer that the supervisor knew that the employee had filed a lawsuit for discrimination when she engaged in retaliatory conduct. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the jury verdict, and remand to the Court of Appeals for a review of the award of damages. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Ray Ramsey
A Cocke County Jury convicted Defendant, Randy Ray Ramsey, of second-degree murder. He received a sentence of twenty-five years to be served concurrently with a federal sentence for drug-related convictions. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Parker
The defendant, Eric Parker, was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated domestic assault by reckless conduct, a Class D felony, and he was sentenced by the trial court to four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the proof at trial constituted a variance from or constructive amendment to the indictment; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motions related to a continuance to allow for expert testimony; (4) the trial court erred in not giving a corrective instruction regarding improper prosecutorial argument; (5) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at sentencing; and (6) the trial court misapplied enhancement and mitigating factors and improperly refused alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nelson V. Plana v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Nelson V. Plana, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the petitioner’s 2004 Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to post-conviction relief based upon the allegedly ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael J. Shipp v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael J. Shipp, stands convicted of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated robbery and is serving an effective life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his post-conviction petition, petitioner claimed that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney failed to seek suppression of his statement to the police. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quinisha Renee Brabson
The defendant, Quinisha Renee Brabson, was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, a Class A felony. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the defendant should either have been acquitted as acting in selfdefense or convicted only of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian R. Brown
The appellant, Adrian R. Brown, was convicted in 1995 of three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and one count of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. The appellant was given concurrent sentences of eight years’ imprisonment for the Class B felony and six years’ imprisonment for each Class C felony. The appellant entered the community corrections program, and he was recommended for a transfer to probation one year later. In October 2003, shortly before his eight-year sentence was set to expire, a violation of probation affidavit was completed. However, the petition for revocation of the appellant’s probation was dismissed in 2005. The appellant now challenges his sentences as illegal, asserting that he did not receive the pretrial jail credits to which he was entitled. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the issue is moot, and accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s motion to correct his sentence. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert A. Bass
The Defendant, Robert A. Bass, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(2) (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding self-defense. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dannaer Beard
A Shelby County jury found Appellant Dannaer Beard guilty of criminal attempt: second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twelve years' imprisonment. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for criminal attempt: second degree murder. Appellant also argues that the trial judge erred in not merging the two aggravated assault convictions. Because a jury could find that Appellant’s stabbing of the victim was a substantial step in a knowing attempt to kill Mr. Moore, we affirm the criminal attempt conviction. Additionally, we find that the two aggravated assault charges arose from a single incident, and we remand the case for entry of a single judgment noting merger of the two offenses in counts 2 and 3. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dana Keith Woods
The Petitioner, Dana Keith Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions for first degree premeditated murder and felony murder and also merged the convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. For his convictions, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus fifty years. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca A. Dixon Tatum v. Don Baron Tatum
This appeal arises from a divorce action. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded a divorce to both parties on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court also awarded transitional alimony to Wife. Wife appeals the court’s finding that she engaged in inappropriate marital conduct, while Husband appeals the court’s award of alimony to Wife. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jacob H.
Mother of the parties’ only child filed this action to establish an arrearage judgment for child support owed by Father. At issue is the amount of unpaid child support for the period from April 1998 to September 2012. Mother claims she was entitled to an arrearage judgment in excess of $35,000; Father insists he paid the child support in full, although it is undisputed that he did not pay his support obligation as directed in the 1998 order to the juvenile court clerk. Father initially tendered payments to the clerk; however, at Mother’s request, which is undisputed, subsequent payments were mailed directly to Mother, some of which were remitted by Father’s mother during periods of financial hardship, and most of which were remitted by Father’s wife on a joint checking account with Father. The trial court gave Father credit for all payments remitted directly to Mother, whether remitted by his mother or his wife, for which there was documentary evidence, which totaled $23,742.91, but declined to give him credit for other claimed credits and awarded Mother an arrearage judgment in the amount of $17,337. The trial court, however, did not award prejudgment interest on the arrearage. The court also awarded Mother a portion of the attorney’s fees she had requested. On appeal, Mother contends, inter alia, the trial court erred by giving Father credit for payments that were not remitted through the clerk’s office and for payments remitted by his mother and his wife, for not awarding prejudgment interest on the arrearage, and for not awarding her all of her attorney’s fees. For his part, Father contends the trial court erred in not awarding him additional credit for child support payments made via one substantial money order and two income tax intercepts. We affirm the trial court in all respects with the exception of prejudgment interest, finding that awarding interest on a child support arrearage is not discretionary under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1). On remand, the trial court is instructed to award prejudgment interest on the child support arrearage judgment as mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1). |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Modena Ray v. Roger Lee Ray
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The parties were married thirteen years and started a successful business during that time. The husband became disabled during the marriage and was no longer able to work. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court valued the parties’ marital assets, including the business, and attempted to divide the marital property equally. The court ordered the wife to pay the husband $2,100 per month in alimony in solido for five years. It declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On appeal, the wife raises several issues regarding the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property, and both parties challenge the alimony award. The husband also seeks an award of attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. Specifically, we affirm the trial court’s division of marital property, and we vacate and remand for additional findings on the issues of alimony and attorney’s fees. We deny the request for attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Andrew O.
Grandparents filed this petition to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights and to adopt the child. Mother surrendered her parental rights, and the trial court found that Father abandoned the child by willful failure to visit and failure to support. The trial court also found termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Father abandoned the child by willful failure to visit, but the record does not clearly and convincingly establish that Father’s failure to support the child was willful. We also find that termination is in the child’s best interests; therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Bo Heath v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Bo Heath, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder and three counts of tampering with or fabricating evidence and his effective twenty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Racris Thomas
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Racris Thomas, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of seventy years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by refusing to declare a mistrial after the jury instructions revealed that the felony underlying the charge for being a felon in possession of a handgun was a prior aggravated robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John J. Kratochvil v. James M. Holloway, Warden
The petitioner, John J. Kratochvil, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction of second degree murder. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey M. Willis
The defendant, Corey M. Willis, was charged with various driving under the influence (DUI) offenses. He filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the traffic stop. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Broderick Devonte Fayne
The defendant and an accomplice were indicted for aggravated burglary and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At the trial of the defendant, the court denied a request by the defense for a special jury instruction on the definition of actual and constructive possession as an element of employment of a firearm. The jury convicted the defendant on both charges, and the trial court imposed an effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for the special jury instruction and by failing to instruct the jury on the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felonyas a lesser included offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court. We hold that possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony qualifies as a lesser included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In this instance, however, the defendant waived the issue, and he is not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. We further hold that the trial court did not err by refusing the defendant’s request for a special instruction on the definition of possession. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Tipton | Supreme Court |