State of Tennessee v. Bryant K. Pride
The Defendant, Bryant K. Pride, pled nolo contendere to one count of felony possession of 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone, one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one count of felony conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone. The Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments due to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Northwest Tennessee Motorsports Park, LLC v. Tennessee Asphalt Company
This is a breach of contract case. Appellants contracted with Appellees to pave their existing drag strip. Because the soil under the drag strip contained too much moisture, the paving project failed and other parts of the drag strip not included in the contract were damaged. The trial court awarded damages for the Appellant, but later reduced the damages by the amount over and above the original contract. Appellant appeals. Because the Appellant failed to present any evidence that Appellee breached the contract, we reverse and remand. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre Blake
The defendant, Deandre Blake, appeals his two Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, claiming that the convicting evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence, and that the court erred by overruling his pretrial motion to suppress his written statement to the police. We affirm both the conviction in count one of felony murder predicated upon aggravated child abuse and the conviction in count two of felony murder predicated upon aggravated child neglect. On remand, the judgment in count one must be amended, and the trial court should effectuate merger, in part, by vacating the judgment in count two. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre Blake - Concurring
I concur with the conclusion in the majority opinion that sufficient evidence supports the conviction in count one. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction in count two and agree that the two felony murder convictions should have been merged into a single judgment. I write separately, however, to address a conflict between the language in the first degree murder statute and the language of the child abuse and child neglect statutes that the majority does not mention. I also note that the trial court erred by giving an incomplete instruction for count two, murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, although I conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Alexander Herrera
A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted unlawful photographing, a Class B misdemeanor; sexual battery, a Class E felony; attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful photographing, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction. The court sentenced him to six months at 75% in the county jail for the Class B misdemeanor conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75% for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing because the victim was in a public place where she had no expectation of privacy and (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance to give his attorney an opportunity to obtain the defendant’s medical records. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing. We affirm the defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Oliver v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Antonio Oliver, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and motion to toll limitations period alleging that he was deprived of second-tier review of his conviction by the Tennessee Supreme Court based on various misrepresentations by appellate counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that appellate counsel failed to notify him of this court’s opinion on direct appeal, which caused him to be “unaware” that a Rule 11 application needed to be filed or that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief had expired. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner was denied second-tier review of his conviction through no fault of his own. In reversing the judgment of the post-conviction court, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal and stay further proceedings on his remaining claims of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Scott Flynn
On August 6, 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 92306 to theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant was released on December 20, 2009, and placed on supervised probation. On March 12, 2010, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 91245 to theft over $10,000, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court suspended the defendant’s sentence in 91245 and placed the defendant on probation. On November 8, 2010, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation, alleging that the record does not demonstrate that the defendant was in violation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Amos v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentences were illegal. The habeas corpus court denied the petition. The petitioner now appeals, challenging the habeas corpus court’s ruling and the constitutionality of the 2009 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy F. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
In 2000, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Billy F. Johnson,of felony murder, first degree murder, and theft, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus two years. In 2010, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition,concluding that his petition was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was mentally incompetent and unable to timely proceed with his petition, and, as a result, the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy McMillon
Appellant, Jeremy McMillon, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for first degree murder and felony murder. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder. As a result, he was sentenced to life in prison. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant appealed, presenting the following issues for our review: (1) whether the testimony of accomplice Cory Haden was sufficiently corroborated; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the introduction of testimony about a bullet found during the autopsy into evidence; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; and (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we determine: (1) that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) that if the jury determined Mr. Haden was an accomplice, his testimony was sufficiently corroborated; (3) that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony about a bullet found during the autopsy into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule; and (4) that the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Prince Adams
The defendant, Prince Adams, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first degree murder and subsequently sentenced to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals his conviction, presenting five issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court properly allowed into evidence photographs of the victim (a) while she was alive and (b) of her body at the crime scene; (3) whether the court properly denied the defendant’s motion in limine with regard to the admission of his prior domestic violence charge; (4) whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial because an alternate juror left a note expressing his position with regard to the defendant’s guilt, which was found by the jury foreperson prior to jury deliberations; and (5) whether the court correctly denied the defendant’s request for a special jury instruction on diminished capacity. Following review of the record, we find no issue that would entitle the defendant to relief. As such, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Hobson
The Defendant, Frederick Hobson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of selling cocaine, three counts of possessing cocaine with the intent to sell, and three counts of possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. 39-17-417(a) (2010). The trial court merged the convictions for possession with the intent to sell and possession with the intent to deliver and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years’ confinement for two of the sale convictions and two of the possession convictions and to six years’ confinement for the remaining sale and possession convictions. The ten-year sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to the six-year sentences, for an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for four convictions and by imposing partially consecutive sentences. We affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into three convictions for sale of a controlled substance. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marilyn Sesler
The Defendant, Marilyn Sesler, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of making a false report, a Class D felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-16-502(a) (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to consider and make appropriate findings when rejecting judicial diversion. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction, but we remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edith Nell Allen Shaw v. Jerry Emerson Shaw
Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, and Father was ordered to pay child support for the parties’ adult disabled son. In 2010, the divorce court increased Father’s child support obligation for the adult disabled son. We vacate both orders to the extent that they required Father to pay child support for the adult disabled son because the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order such support. We also remand this matter for such further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Jessica Elaine Dillard v. Jeremy Williamson Blanks
Mother of the parties’ three-year-old child appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent. Mother, who was temporarily named the primary residential parent while the action was pending, contends the initial order by which she was appointed was not a temporary order, but a final order and, thus, res judicata applies. The trial court disagreed and entered a final order naming Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Malone F. Pitts, et al. v. Villas of Frangista Owners' Association, Inc., et al.
The question presented is whether the trial court erred in dismissing this lawsuit based upon a pending lawsuit in another state. Because the out-of-state lawsuit is not an exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of prior suit pending. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Lancaster v. Ferrell Paving, Inc., et al. v. Everest Indemnity Insurance Company
This appeal involves a dispute over whether the appellant was provided with coverage under an additional insured endorsement to an insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding no coverage. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jess R. Ogg, Jr. v. Campbell County Board of Education
In this age discrimination and breach of contract case, Jess R. Ogg, Jr. (“Employee”) filed suit against his former employer, Campbell County Board of Education (“Employer”), alleging that Employer had violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act by terminating him because of his age and replacing him with a younger, less-qualified teacher. Employer argued that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Employee and hiring a suitable replacement. Following a bench trial, the court found that Employer had engaged in age discrimination and breached its contract and that Employee was entitled to recover his lost salary. Employer appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
James Edward Bostic, Jr., a.k.a. James Edward Dalton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Edward Bostic, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The record reflects that on February 7, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Davidson County to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of seven years and six months as a Range II offender pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served in community corrections, and judgment was entered June 26, 2007. On August 7, 2009, the trial court entered an order which revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered the original sentence of seven years and six months to be served by incarceration. Petitioner filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 30, 2009. The petition alleged as grounds for relief that the conviction was based on an unlawfully induced guilty plea and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The factual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel pertained to representation atthe communitycorrections revocationproceedings. On January 5, 2010, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel, on the basis that the petition was barred by the one year statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). In light of, and based upon the court’s holding in Carpenter v. State, 136 S.W.3d 608 (Tenn. 2004)and AnthonyL.Grant,Jr.v.State,No.M2007-00052-CCA-R3-PC,2008 WL 4169985 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2008), no perm. app. filed, we affirm the trial court’s order insofar as it dismissed the post-conviction petition as to the original conviction. However, as to the petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the communitycorrections revocation proceedings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald R. Jett v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Donald R. Jett, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his 2006 guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated sexual battery for which he received a sentence of 12 years’ incarceration to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the petitioner argues that due process concerns require the tolling of the statute of limitations and that the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing to address his claims. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karen E. Carpenter
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Karen E. Carpenter, was convicted of facilitation of the anufacture of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and facilitation of felony possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See §§ 39-11-403, -17417, -17-425. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by failing to, sua sponte, declare a mistrial after a witness mentioned the Defendant’s prior criminal charges; (2) that the jury instruction given by the trial court regarding the witness’ testimony was not “adequate;” and (3) that prosecutorial misconduct during the opening and closing statements denied her a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Grainger | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anna M. Steward
The defendant, Anna M. Steward, pleaded guilty as a Range II, multiple offender to robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2006). The plea agreement called for a six-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of full confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bob J. Spivey and Misty Buckner
The State appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s dismissal of two indictments charging the Defendant-Appellees, Bob J. Spivey and Misty Buckner, with possession with intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class B felony. Both defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained during a police search of the Buckner home. The trial court granted these motions upon finding that the search warrant inadequately described the property to be searched, and the charges against Spivey and Buckner were dismissed. In this appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred by granting the motions to suppress. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anna M. Steward - Concurring
I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I would affirm the trial court because of the Defendant’s failure to include the guilty plea hearing transcript in the record and the attendant presumption that the trial court’s determinations were correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (holding trial court’s ruling presumed correct in the absence of an adequate record on appeal). |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Dale Ownby
A Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Shawn Dale Ownby, of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and violation of the implied consent law, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail and revoked his licence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals |