D'Angelo Marquez Jenkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, D’Angelo Marquez Jenkins, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to facilitation of aggravated robbery and being a felon in possession of a handgun. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a total effective sentence of nine years and six months. Thereafter, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, the petitioner complained that trial counsel failed to interview or subpoena witnesses on the petitioner’s behalf or pursue DNA evidence. The petitioner also contended that his guilty pleas were the result of counsel’s ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Ray Adkins et al v. Bluegrass Estates, Inc. et al
The purchasers of lots in a “subdivision known as Timberlake Estates, Phase One” – described in a plat and restrictive covenants as a twenty-lot subdivision – acquired with their deeds the right to use a boat ramp and parking area to be located in a common area within the subdivision. When they learned that additional lots – not located within the combined acreage of the twenty lots – were being advertised for sale along with the right to use the same boat ramp and parking area, they filed this action against their predecessor in interest.1 After a trial on the merits, the court held that only the purchasers of lots in “Phase One” were entitled to use the boat ramp and parking area. The defendants appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Alfie Tucker v. Tabitha Finch
In this legal malpractice case, Alfie Tucker filed suit against his attorney, Tabitha Finch, alleging that she had negligently represented him in his lawsuit against his former employer by failing to timely file his claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission (“TCC”). Ms. Finch filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the applicable statute of limitations had passed. The trial court granted Ms. Finch’s motion and dismissed the case. Mr. Tucker appeals. We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carol D. Davis v. Kolo Lynn Davis, et al
In this post-divorce case, Kolo Lynn Davis (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s classification of an agreement to maintain health insurance through his company, Cleveland Building Materials (“CBM”), as alimony in futuro. Husband and Carol D. Davis (“Wife”) were married in 1964 and divorced in 1995. Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties, Wife was given the option of maintaining health insurance through CBM. In furtherance of this agreement, Wife was given a paid position as a non-voting member of CBM’s board of directors, which allowed her to maintain health insurance through CBM. Wife was tasked with reimbursing CBM for all costs associated with the health insurance coverage. Husband later sold CBM to Kolo Lynn Davis, II (“Son”). Son, through CBM, continued to pay Wife for her services as a board member. In 2005, CBM discontinued its group health insurance, thereby removing Wife from the plan and ceased paying Wife for her services as a board member. Wife filed suit, naming Husband and CBM as parties. Following a hearing, the trial court classified the payments from CBM as alimony in futuro, held Husband personally liable for CBM’s non-payment, and instructed Husband to continue with future payments pursuant to the agreement. Husband appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin B. Smith, et al v. Gary Hankins, et al
This appeal involves a boundary line dispute raised by the plaintiff, Melvin B. Smith and his wife, Charlotte E. Smith (“the Smiths”) and a request for an easement by the defendants, Gary Hankins and Stanley Hankins (“the Hankinses”). After a trial, the court entered rulings in favor of the Hankinses as to both the establishment of the boundary line and the easement. The Smiths appeal. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Tri Am Construction, Inc. et al v. J & V Development, Inc. et al
This interlocutory appeal stems from a lien enforcement action. Tri Am Construction, Inc. (“Tri Am”) filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Rhea County (“the Trial Court”) against J & V Development, Inc. (“J & V”), Randall E. Vick, Brenda B. Jung, and Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) to enforce a lien. BB&T moved to dismiss Tri Am’s complaint, citing alleged fatal procedural defects. The Trial Court denied BB&T’s motion to dismiss and allowed Tri Am to amend its complaint to cure the procedural defects. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in liberally construing the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes to permit Tri Am to amend its complaint in order to cure the procedural defects. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in declining to hold that BB&T’s rights would be retroactively impaired by the liberal application of the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property ( Martin Goss)
A show cause order was entered in this case on July 15, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time specified. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3 a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy O'Neal
On October 1,2007, Appellant, Jeremy O’Neal, pled guilty in Blount County to one count of felony robbery. He was originally placed on judicial diversion. On April 5, 2010, the trial court set aside Appellant’s judicial diversion for violating the terms thereof. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six years with split confinement of thirty-five days with the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant’s probation officer subsequently filed a violation of probation report in September 2010. After conducting a probation revocation hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation and revoked Appellant’s probation. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the balance of his six year sentence in incarceration. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration. We conclude that there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Appellant’s probation and to order him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of probation and the order that Appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Tate, a/k/a James Moore, a/k/a Larry Moore
Appellant, Billy Tate, a/k/a James Moore, a/k/a Larry Moore, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for burglary of a business and theft of property. Appellant was convicted of burglary of a business and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration as a Career Offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. On appeal, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial; and the trial court erred in admitting testimony about “bootprints” left at the scene of the crime. Because Appellant has failed to provide an adequate record for review on appeal, these issues are waived, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Ronell Jones
The appellant, Ricky Ronell Jones, pled guilty to rape, incest, and two counts of sexual battery relating to his eldest daughter and was convicted at trial of rape of a child and incest relating to his youngest daughter. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latasha Reid
The appellant, Latasha Reid, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to nine counts of identity theft and one count of felony theft. She received an effective four-year probation sentence for the identity theft convictions and a two-year probation sentence for the felony theft conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of six years. Almost six years later, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered her to serve her entire sentence anew. On appeal, the appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her effective six-year sentence anew because part of the sentence had expired. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s expired four-year probation sentence. The trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s two-year probation sentence is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Roger Washington Bouldin
Daughter of decedent filed claim against estate. The probate court dismissed the daughter’s claim on the ground that it was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. v. Ralph McNabb
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ralph McNabb (“Employee”) sustained a right rotator cuff tear as the result of a motor vehicle collision while employed as a truck driver by Everhart Transportation (“Employer”). Employer was insured for workers’ compensation by Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. (“Insurer”). Employee underwent surgical repair of his right rotator cuff and was returned by Employer to a different, part- ime position. Employee suffered a recurrent rotator cuff tear and thereafter retired. It is undisputed that Employee was not returned to employment at the same or greater wage than prior to his injury. Employee’s treating physician and his evaluating physician both assigned him an anatomical impairment rating of 10% to the body as a whole, but with different restrictions. The trial court awarded 60% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. Insurer has appealed, asserting that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment. |
Greene | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Edward Braxton and Leonard Cardell Harris
The Defendants, Frederick Edward Braxton and Leonard Cardell Harris, were indicted for attempted premeditated first degree murder. Additionally, Defendant Braxton was charged with possession of marijuana, which was severed as unrelated. Following a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of attempted second degree murder. Defendant Braxton was sentenced to serve nineteen years in confinement as a Range II offender, and Defendant Harris was sentenced to serve eleven years in confinement as a Range I offender. On appeal, both Defendants argue that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgments of acquittal; (2) the trial court erred in precluding Defendants from questioning the victim about being previously shot in a home burglary and about the victim’s prior arrest sixteen months before the shooting; (3) their sentences are excessive; and (4) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request a juryinstruction on the lesser-included offense of reckless endangerment. Defendant Braxton argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jail custodian of records to testify in rebuttal concerning Defendant Braxton’s period of confinement in the Davidson County jail; (b) trial counsel was ineffective for (i) failing to object to the sentence or request a continuance when the State did not provide proper notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment or provide certified copies of the convictions; (ii) failing to amend the original notice of alibi, filed by previous counsel, to include an additional witness; (iii) failing to investigate possible defenses and alibi witnesses; (i.v.) failure to adequately meet with Defendant Braxton and prepare for trial. Defendant Harris argues that trial counsel was ineffective for asking the victim about a prior altercation with Defendant Harris which opened the door to the victim’s testimony about an earlier attempt by Defendant Harris to harm or kill the victim. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kerry Douglas Calahan
A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Kerry Douglas Calahan, of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal trespass, simple assault, two counts of theft of property valued less than five hundred dollars, and resisting arrest. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of six years, six months to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction foraggravated assaultand thathissentence foraggravated assaultis excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karen Ann Matthews
Following her Davidson County General Sessions Court conviction of criminal contempt based upon the violation of an order of protection, the defendant, Karen Ann Matthews, was charged via an indictment returned by the Davidson County grand jury with violating an order of protection, see T.C.A. § 39-13-113 (2006). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment as violative of double jeopardy principles. In this State appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment because convictions for criminal contempt and violating an order of protection do not violate double jeopardy principles. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
SecurAmerica Business Credit v. Karl Schledwitz and Terry Lynch
This is a guaranty case. Appellants personally guaranteed a line of credit for their trucking company. Later, Appellants sold the trucking company to two employees, but were not released by the Appellee lender from their guaranties. Under new ownership, the company falsified borrowing documents so that more money was extended on the line of credit than was collateralized per the loan agreement. This was done with the complicity of the lender, but without the knowledge of the guarantors. The debtor trucking company defaulted, and the lender sought repayment of the loan from the guarantors. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellants liable for their personal guaranties, but denied prejudgment interest and punitive damages due to what the court characterized as the fraudulent actions of Appellee. In an apparent clerical mistake, on the same date that the trial court entered its final judgment, it also entered an order voluntarily dismissing all claims against Appellants. More than a year later, the trial court entered an order clarifying its prior order of dismissal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that: (1) the trial court properly afforded Appellee relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 to clarify its prior order of dismissal; and (2) the trial court made incomplete and contradictory findings of fact and conclusions of law, such that further appellate review is precluded. Consequently, we vacate and remand for additional findings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ezra Taylor Shelton
Defendant, Ezra Taylor Shelton, was charged with first degree premeditated murder and felony murder. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court merged the offenses and imposed a sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction for the resulting conviction of second degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; and (2) the trial court failed to “properly address an improper statement made by the prosecution during closing arguments.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sara Ann (Spencer) Wangerin v. Shawn Allen Wangerin
In an action for divorce and custody, Father appeals the trial court’s decision to declare Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. Because Father failed to file a transcript or statement of the evidence pertaining to a portion of the trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
K.B.J. v. T.J.
This is a contested divorce case involving two minor children. K.B.J. (“Husband”) was the first to file a complaint for divorce. T.J. (“Wife”) answered his complaint and coupled a counterclaim with her answer. The trial court found that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife a divorce, but made Husband the primary residential parent of the minor children with final authority on certain parental decisions. The court ordered equal parenting time on an alternating week basis. It also denied Wife’s request for spousal support and allocated to her approximately $32,350 of the marital debt. Wife appeals. We reverse that part of the judgment making Husband the primary residential parent with final decision-making authority and modify the parenting schedule. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emory Leslie Letson
In a three-count indictment returned by the Hamilton County Grand Jury, Defendant, Emory Leslie Letson, was charged in Count 1 with attempted first degree murder of Jason Kellogg, and in Counts 2 and 3, with reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, with each count involving a different named victim. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Count 1 was amended to a charge of aggravated assault to which Defendant pled guilty. He also pled guilty to Count 2 as charged (which involved a minor as the victim), and Count 3 was dismissed. Pursuant to the agreement, the length and manner of service of sentences for the convictions was determined by the trial court. Defendant was sentenced to serve six years as a Range I standard offender for the aggravated assault conviction, and to serve two years as a Range I standard offender for the reckless endangerment conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, and all forms of alternative sentencing were denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that the sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred by denying full probation or some other form of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Maddox B.S., et al
Lyndsey S. (“Mother”) and Trey S. (“Father”) are the biological parents (“Parents”) of Maddox B.S. and Rylie M.S. (“Children”). Veronda S. and James S. (“Grandparents”) are the paternal grandparents of Children. Mother, acknowledging that her consent would result in the termination of her parental rights, sought to consent to the adoption of Children by Grandparents. Grandparents and Mother petitioned the trial court to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights and allow Grandparents to adopt Children. The court accepted Mother’s consent and terminated her parental rights. The court terminated Father’s parental rights in a default judgment, citing abandonment as the ground for the termination of Father’s rights. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved the court to set aside the final order of adoption, citing fraud and duress as grounds. Father also moved the court to set aside the termination of his parental rights and the order of adoption, citing fraud and misrepresentation as grounds. Mother and Father subsequently alleged that the court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Children. The trial court found that it had failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and set aside the final order of adoption. Mother then sought to revoke her consent. The trial court allowed the revocation, finding that the final order of adoption that had been set aside was the only document in which Mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights and subsequent adoption. Grandparents appeal the court’s action of setting aside the order, the allowance of Mother’s revocation of consent, and the dismissal of the case. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Grooms, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the Hawkins County Circuit Court’s determination that the Department of Safety could not suspend James W. Grooms, Jr.’s handgun permit because the permit had been confiscated previously by a police officer, and Mr. Grooms, therefore, was unable to surrender the permit. We reverse. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
John D. Glass v. SunTrust Bank, Trustee of The Ann Haskins Whitson Glass Trust; SunTrust Bank, Executor of the Estate of Ann Haskins Whitson Glass; and William Glass
This is an appeal from an action originally filed in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, seeking damages for Appellees’ alleged breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, mismanagement, negligence, and breach of duty to diversify in its roles as executor of Decedent’s estate and Decedent’s successor trustee. Decedent’s son, the Appellant herein, filed his original suit in the Probate Court of Shelby County, seeking return of administrative costs and fees charged by Appellee. The probate court affirmed the fees, and Appellant filed a subsequent complaint in the chancery court. The chancery court complaint was eventually transferred to the probate court, where it was dismissed on grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Appellant appeals. We conclude that there was no final order in the first probate proceeding and, consequently, the criteria for both collateral estoppel and res judicata are not met. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shaun Alexander Hodge v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, was convicted of first degree murder in 2001 and sentenced to life in prison. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. The petitioner appeals, claiming constitutional violations arising from the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and the State’s failure to disclose certain exculpatory evidence. The petitioner also seeks relief based on newly discovered evidence. After careful review of the record and the arguments of both parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |