State of Tennessee v. Rickie Sipes
The defendant, Rickie Sipes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Michael Wise
The defendant, James Michael Wise, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of solicitation to commit rape, thirteen counts of rape, and thirteen counts of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective forty-eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentences imposed. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to impose the minimum sentences within the range and in its application of consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter of Keely A.J.
The appellant contends that the trial court made several serious errors, by inter alia, dismissing her claim for child support arrearages, reducing the father’s child support obligation, and denying her numerous motions to alter the agreed order after its entry, etc. The problem with these allegations is that they are wholly unfounded because the appellant agreed to settle and/or voluntarily dismiss all of her claims following the third day of trial, prior to the end of the trial. As for her claim that the trial court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney’s fees against her, we find this argument is also frivolous for she was discharged of this specific obligation in bankruptcy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects. Further, upon the finding this appeal is frivolous, we remand with instructions for the trial court to award the appellee his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs against the appellant. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. Mitchell B. Lanphere
The petitioner for an order of protection appeals the trial court’s decision dismissing her petition. While we reject most of the assignments of error identified by the petitioner, we agree that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as now required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, et al.
The plaintiff, Mike Settle, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed a complaint on April 22, 2010, in which he sought injunctive relief in the form of a transfer from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). The defendants, MTMHI and former Chief Executive Officer, Lynn McDonald, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki L. Hutchings v. Jobe, Hastings & Associates
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract of employment for a term of three years, wherein plaintiff would prepare tax returns for defendant tax firm. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment before the three year term had expired and plaintiff appealed to this Court to reverse the Trial Court's finding of breach of contract and award her damages for the breach. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that the employer had just cause to terminate plaintiff. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John Ambler Widener v. Stephanie Elizabeth Widener
Defendant Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment naming Plaintiff Father primary residential parent, the award of child support, and assignment of debt. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Elizabeth Schwartz Brock v. Jeffery Brock
In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. The husband claims his inability to pay outweighs the wife’s need for spousal support. After reviewing the record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to award spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. Therefore, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Thomas, Jr., d/b/a Thomas Investments, A Tennessee Sole Proprietorship v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff’s action was filed beyond the limitations period. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm summary judgment on the basis of standing and ripeness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquis Devereaux Hall
Appellant, Marquis Devereaux Hall, pled guilty to aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, possession of cocaine, simple possession and casual exchange of marijuana, and theft under $500. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years on community corrections. After his arrest for possession of a weapon,felon carrying a firearm, and theft, his supervisor filed a violation warrant. The trial court held a hearing and concluded that Appellant had violated the conditions of his community corrections sentence. The trial court imposed Appellant’s sentence of ten years. Appellant appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Appellant’s community corrections sentence. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Williamson
A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Derek Williamson, of first-degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by commenting on possible sentencing options during voir dire, that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial based on prejudicial testimony from a witness, that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the responding police officer about the appearance of evidence found at the scene, that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two autopsy photographs, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court improperly denied his request for a self-defense instruction, and that he is entitled to a new trial because of cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Jennings v. City of Smithville, et al.
The Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Smithville suspended and ultimately terminated the chief of police because they were unhappy with his efforts to combat the drug and crime problems in the City. The police chief filed a writ of certiorari and asked the trial court to order the City to reinstate him because he was terminated without cause. The trial court concluded there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify the City’s decision and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The police chief appealed, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Roger William Byrd, D.C. v. Tennessee Board of Chiropractic Examiners
This appeal arises out of disciplinary proceedings against a chiropractor before the Tennessee Board of Chiropractic Examiners. The allegations originally involved a single incident of solicitation that occurred in 2000, in which Dr. Byrd telephoned a car accident victim just two days after her accident in violation of the Board’s rule governing telemarketing or solicitation. The notice of charges was later amended to include additional allegations regarding Dr. Byrd’s use of an office in Florida to telemarket Tennessee accident victims in violation of the aforementioned rule. Dr. Byrd admitted that telemarketing was being conducted by the Florida employees. However, he claimed that a corporation was responsible for conducting the telemarketing, rather than himself, and he argued that the corporation was not subject to the Board’s telemarketing rules. The Board found Dr. Byrd guilty of several violations and revoked his chiropractic license. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc.
BSG, LLC introduced CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers. In 2005, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into an agreement whereby CheckVelocity provided check collection services. BSG, in accordance with its agreement with CheckVelocity, was to receive compensation for its introduction of CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers in the form of residual fees during the time of the CheckVelocity - Weight Watchers agreement and any renewal agreements. In 2008, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into a new agreement in which credit card collection services were added and the check collection services were continued unchanged. CheckVelocitystopped paying the residual fees because it considered the Weight Watchers agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal of the old one. BSG sued. The trial court considered the 2008 agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal, and ruled for CheckVelocity. BSG appealed. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams - Concurring/Dissenting
We originally granted the application for permission to appeal in this case to address a question regarding summary judgments in medical malpractice cases that was left unanswered in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). That question is whether a defendant in a medical malpractice case who does not present evidence that his or her conduct complied with the applicable standard of care is entitled to a summary judgment when he or she demonstrates that the expert witness or witnesses the plaintiff plans to present at trial do not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (Supp. 2010). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to address the dissenting opinion’s assertion that the “sky is falling.” The majority opinion has not substantially altered “the standard of review of summary judgments based on the inadmissibility of evidence relating to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case.” Despite Justice Koch’s statements to the contrary, after the release of this opinion, appellate courts will continue to review evidentiary determinations using an abuse of discretion standard. Stating otherwise does not advance this discussion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams
In medical malpractice actions, Tennessee adheres to a locality rule for expert medical witnesses. Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical provider practices or a similar community. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2010). Since the locality rule was enacted in 1975, Tennessee courts have reached different conclusions in interpreting it. The rule does not define "similar community," nor does it provide guidance as to how a community is determined to be "similar" to the defendant’s community. In this case, we address and clarify the applicable standards that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court’s exclusion of the claimant’s two proffered medical experts under the locality rule was error. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Krystal Dawn (Walton) Cantrell v. Patricia Tolley
This case arises from the circuit court’s execution of judgment. Following dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from the general sessions court, the circuit court specifically affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court, issued execution thereon, and denied Appellant’s motion to quash the execution upon its finding that the ten year time period for collection of judgments, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-110, ran from the date of the circuit court’s order. Upon review, we conclude that, by affirming the general sessions court’s judgment, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to execute the judgment, and that the ten year time period for collection of the judgment ran from the date of the circuit court’s order and was not expired when levy was made. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Kenneth Boldus
The defendant, Justin Kenneth Boldus, pleaded guilty in Dickson County Circuit Court to one count of vehicular homicide by recklessness, see T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(1) (2006), and one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death, see id. § 55-10-101. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years and one year to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and by denying alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glenn Cupp et al. v. Bill Heath et al.
In late 2007, the defendant Bill Heath built a fence on a line running generally east and west, said line having been established by surveyor Bill Parsons in 1990 and then re-staked in 2007 by surveyor Dennis Fultz. The plaintiff Glenn Cupp, an adjoining landowner to the south of Heath, hired surveyor Mark Comparoni to establish his northern line because Cupp believed Heath had built the fence much too far to the south. Marjorie Keck, who joins Heath on her northern boundary and Cupp on her western boundary, also commissioned Comparoni to survey her land. Comparoni’s survey confirmed that Heath’s new fence incorrectly encompassed approximately 35 acres of Cupp’s land and approximately 6 acres of Keck’s land. Cupp and Keck filed this action against Heath in 2008 to establish their northern boundary with Heath and the Cupp/Keck common boundary as surveyed by Comparoni. The trial court found that the Comparoni survey correctly established the boundary lines of all the parties. Heath appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Alicia D. Howell v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.
The issue presented in this workers’ compensation case is whether the employee made a meaningful return to work. Upon being released by her physician to return to work, she resigned her employment after her employer told her that she would have to return to a production line job that, based on her work experience and personal knowledge of the work conditions and her physical abilities and limitations, she did not believe she could perform. The trial court awarded her additional benefits, ruling that she did not have a meaningful return to work and was eligible for reconsideration of her earlier settlement for workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241 (Supp. 2010). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. We hold that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work following her injuries and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trialcourt’s award of increased permanent partial disability benefits. The judgment of the Appeals Panel is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. |
Moore | Supreme Court | |
In Re: A.M.K.
This appeal concerns the changing of a minor child’s surname. Tyler Weseman (“Father”) and Amanda King (“Mother”) are, respectively, the father and mother of the minor child A.M.K.(“the Child”). Father filed a petition to establish parentage and co-parenting time. Father sought to have the Child bear his surname. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) changed the Child’s surname from King to King-Weseman. Mother appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding that changing the Child’s surname to King-Weseman is in the Child’s best interest. We further hold that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney’s fees to Mother. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Billie Seay, Nationwide Insurance v. Betty Walsh et al.
On or about May 28, 2005, Billie Seay was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Thomas E. Walsh (“the Driver”), which vehicle was owned by the defendant Betty Walsh (“the Owner”). Seay’s insurance company, Nationwide Insurance Company, settled her claim and filed this subrogation action in Seay’s name for the use and benefit of Nationwide against the Driver and the Owner. The Driver and the Owner filed separate pro se answers. The Owner appeared at trial, but the Driver did not appear. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants. Two and a half years later, the Driver filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It was denied. He then filed a series of similar unsuccessful post-judgment motions. The Driver appeals from the last order denying post judgment relief. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth James Watkins
The Defendant, Kenneth James Watkins, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress identification, (3) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding his nickname, and (4) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding threats against a witness and witnesses’ fear of reprisal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Craig Abston
Appellant, Craig Abston, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years for second degree murder, and twelve years and eight years for each attempted second degree murder conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentence and twelve-year sentence to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the eight-year sentence for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On appeal, this Court reduced the twelve-year sentence to eight years, and remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing regarding the consecutive sentences. State v. Craig Abston, No. W2007-00019-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2030432, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 10, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). On remand, the trial court ordered the one eight-year sentence to be served concurrently with the twenty-year sentence and the other eight-year sentence to be served consecutively to the twenty-year sentence. Therefore, Appellant’s effective sentence is twenty-eight years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |