Linda F. Seals v. H & F, Inc., et al
The defendants, a funeral home and a crematory operator, arranged for and conducted a cremation at the joint request of the decedent’s fiancée and his fourteen-year-old son. The decedent’s mother, who claims the entitlement to have directed the disposal of his body, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee contending wrongful cremation and seeking damages under a variety of theories in tort. Three certified questions of state law have been presented to this Court for consideration. Our responses are as follows: (1) where decedent did not make a pre-mortem election for the method of disposal of his remains, a parent has a right of control superior to that of a fiancée or minor child; (2) while a minor may be an “heir” under the safe harbor provisions for crematory operators under our statute, reliance on the instructions of a minor may qualify as so reckless as to subject the operator to liability; and (3) a funeral home that merely makes arrangements for a cremation and contracts for another party to perform the cremation is not the operator of a crematory facility for purposes of the statutory safe harbor. |
Supreme Court | ||
Linda F. Seals v. H & F, Inc., et al - Dissenting
This Court has accepted three questions certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in accordance with Tenn. S. Ct. R. 23 that require us to determine how existing Tennessee law addresses certain questions involving the cremation of human remains. I regret that I am able to concur with the Court’s answers to only the second and third questions. I cannot concur with the Court’s answer to the first question because it overlooks that, by virtue of the definitive actions of the Tennessee General Assembly in 2000, the common-law right of sepulchre, recognized by this Court over eighty years ago, provides the basis for answering the question. |
Supreme Court | ||
Derek T. Payne v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Derek T. Payne, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, and he received an effective sentence of thirty-seven years. On appeal, he argues that the denial of his petition was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal. Specifically, he contends that counsel failed to raise or challenge certain jury instruction issues, failed to fulfill promises made during the opening statement, failed to introduce evidence of the victim’s past conduct to show that the victim was the first aggressor, and failed to object to the State’s improper closing argument. Additionally, he contends that his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abby L. Mills
This case is before the court upon the Tennessee Supreme Court’s remand for further consideration in light of its opinion in State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199 (Tenn. 2009). The defendant, Abby L. Mills, was indicted by the Lauderdale County Grand Jury for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to deliver; possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, Hydrocodone, with the intent to deliver; and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, with the intent to deliver over .5 ounces. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of items found in the defendant’s home. On appeal, the state asserted that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of a valid search warrant. This court initially affirmed the trial court’s suppression of evidence based on lack of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. Upon review, we hold that the warrant to search the defendant’s home was supported by probable cause. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Louis Young
A Decatur County jury found the defendant, Stephen Louis Young, guilty of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for rape of a child to be served concurrently with twelve years for aggravated sexual battery at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the district attorney’s comments during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant; and (3) the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant’s confession was voluntary. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Decatur | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Tyrone A. Byrd, D/B/A A Alpha Bail Bond Agency v. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Tyrone A. Byrd, acting pro se, appeals from an order revoking his right to issue bail bonds in the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in suspending his right to issue bonds. After careful review, we affirm the order from the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Harris v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that Mr. Harris is not entitled to coram nobis relief with regard to either of his newly discovered evidence claims. Her conclusion that the claim based on the evidence regarding the “Bill” letters is time-barred is correct. I cannot, however, concur in her conclusion that the claim based on the evidence regarding the alibi witness is likewise time-barred because Mr. Harris has made out a prima facie case for equitable tolling with regard to that claim. Apart from the question of the timeliness of these claims, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of coram nobis relief on both claims because of fatal substantive deficiencies in Mr. Harris’s petition for coram nobis relief. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
Ricky Harris v. State of Tennessee
We granted the State’s appeal to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis and remanding for a determination of whether due process requires tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. We conclude that the delay in seeking coram nobis relief is unreasonable as a matter of law under the circumstances of this case, and therefore due process considerations do not preclude application of the statute of limitations to bar the petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Gene Reynolds a.k.a Randy Reynolds
The Appellant-Defendant, Randall Gene Reynolds, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Lake County to flagrant nonsupport of a minor child, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to five years of probation and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $13,440. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, Reynolds reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. Reynolds contends the order setting child support was invalid, and therefore his failure to comply with the order cannot form the basis of prosecution. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of this case, and thus we lack jurisdiction to review this appeal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chris Yousif, d/b/a Quality Motors vs. Notrial Clark and The Circuit Court of Knox County - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. Based upon the factual history present in this case, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the writ. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Yousif, d/b/a Quality Motors vs. Notrial Clark and The Circuit Court of Knox County
Petitioner filed for a writ of certiorari after his bank accounts were attached for a |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Asata D. Lowe v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Asata D. Lowe, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The State of Tennessee, ex rel. The Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
The City of Memphis and the Memphis City Council appeal the trial court’s writ of mandamus ordering the City to restore funding to the Memphis City Schools for the 2008-09 |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Angelo Coleman v. State of Tennessee
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Lee McKinney
The Defendant-Appellant, Jamie Lee McKinney, appeals the revocation of his probation. He pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Henry County to attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to six years supervised probation after nine months of confinement. On appeal, he claims: (1) the probation condition prohibiting marriage to someone with a minor child is unconstitutional; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by revoking McKinney’s probation because he left Henry County without his probation officer’s permission. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Betty Brasfield v. Raymond C. Dyer, et al.
Betty Brasfield (“Plaintiff”) sued a former co-worker, Raymond Dyer, and a former boyfriend, Conley Dockery, claiming both defendants had defamed her and intentionally interfered with her employment contract with the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”). The Trial Court dismissed the intentional interference with contract claims before trial. At the end of a lengthy trial on the defamation claims, the jury returned a verdict against Dyer for $250,000, and against Dockery for $100,000. Both Dyer and Dockery (“Defendants”) filed a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. The Trial Court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff appeals raising numerous issues. We conclude that Plaintiff presented no material evidence that her reputation was damaged by Defendants’ alleged defamatory statements and, even if her reputation was damaged, that it was Defendants who were responsible for that damage. Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court’s granting Defendants’ motion or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We further conclude that there was no breach of contract and, therefore, the Trial Court properly dismissed before trial Plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with contract.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Holmes
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether the trial court erred in ruling that an indigent defendant forfeited his right to counsel at trial by telling his appointed lawyer, “I know how to get rid of you,” and, at a subsequent meeting, physically assaulting his lawyer by striking the lawyer’s eyeglasses with his finger. The defendant was tried by a jury pro se and convicted of aggravated rape. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court committed reversible error in ruling that the defendant had forfeited his right to appointed counsel at trial. While the defendant’s physical attack on his lawyer was serious misconduct, it did not rise to the level of “extremely serious misconduct” sufficient to warrant an immediate forfeiture. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 548 (Tenn. 2000). Because the defendant was erroneously denied his fundamental constitutional right to counsel, we must reverse his conviction and remand this matter for appointment of new counsel and a new trial. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tallie Riley
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Tallie Riley, of aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass. On appeal, the defendant avers that the trial court erred in permitting the assistant district attorney general to question the defendant about inadmissible prior bad acts, see Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), and in denying his motion for mistrial. Further, the defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Alan Deakins
The defendant, Mark Alan Deakins, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the State failed to establish a probation violation by substantial evidence. Because the record establishes that the defendant violated the terms of his probationary sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bob Fannon v. City of Lafollette
In this action for declaratory judgment against the City of LaFollette, the City Council, and three City Councilmen, the trial court awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees, costs and discretionary costs. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding the plaintiff as the “prevailing party” in the litigation and that the trial court’s award was unwarranted and erroneous. We hold that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party, and therefore, the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs on that basis. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Tyreese Davis v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Eric Tyreese Davis, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of trial counsel in connection with the entry of his pleas of guilty, and that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review we affirm |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corey Greene v. Yaseen Titi d/b/a Crush Night Club, et al. - Concur/Dissent
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Trial Court granting summary judgment to Tennessee Protection Agency (“T.P.A.”). I, however, do not concur with the majority’s determination that the T.P.A. owed no duty to the Plaintiff other than to refrain from gross negligence or willful misconduct. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Greene v. Yaseen Titi d/b/a Crush Night Club, et al.
This negligence action arose from a gunshot injury suffered by the plaintiff, Mr. Greene, when he was a customer at the co-defendant’s night club in Nashville. The shooter was never identified. Mr. Greene filed suit against the night club and the agency providing security at the club, claiming that the security agency was negligent in allowing an individual into the club with a weapon.1 The defendant security agency moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant security agency, holding that the agency affirmatively negated an element of Mr. Greene’s claim by refuting his allegation that a security guard accepted a bribe and by showing that the agency did not breach any duty to Mr. Greene. The plaintiffs timely appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deborah Jo Orr
The Defendant, Deborah Jo Orr, was charged with one count of driving under the influence (fourth offense), one count of driving on a revoked license (first offense), one count of violating the implied consent law, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a jury trial, she was convicted as charged. In this direct appeal, she contends that the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her of driving under the influence. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Ferrell
After a jury trial, the Defendant, Richard Ferrell, was convicted of driving on a suspended license. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to a term of six months, with sixty days of the sentence to be served in the county jail followed by supervised probation. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve sixty days in incarceration. Following a review of the sparse record presented on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals |