William Keith Eddlemon v. Tecumseh Products Company 02S01-9811-CH-00108
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff received a workers' compensation lump sum award and, upon his motion, the trial court awarded post-judgment interest for a period of 32 days. He appeals and argues that he is entitled to post-judgment interest for 99 days, from the date the lump sum award was approved by the trial court until the date he received payment. The defendant contends the plaintiff is not entitled to payment on the award until 31 days after the entry of the judgment - the time period during which a Notice of Appeal could have been filed - and therefore only 32 days of post-judgment interest is due. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 entitles the plaintiff to an additional 3 days of post-judgment interest and modify the judgment of the trial court accordingly.1 On June 1, 1998, the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim was heard in the Chancery Court for Gibson County and the trial court made an award of permanent partial disability, which was to be paid in a lump sum. On July 7, 1998, the trial court's judgment was entered. On September 8, 1998, the plaintiff received payment of the judgment from the defendant. In Woodall v. Hamlett, 872 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1996), the Supreme Court held that judgments involving the Workers' Compensation Act are controlled by Tenn. Code Ann. 1The Supreme Court in Woodall v. Hamlett, 872 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1996), held the statute was applicable on this issue.
Gibson
Workers Compensation Panel
Charles D. Scott v. The Travelers Insurance Co., et al 02S01-9810-CH-00097
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton,
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Charles D. Scott, brought this suit against Travelers Insurance Company, the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Kraus Model Cleaners (Kraus Cleaners), and the Second Injury Fund. After hearing the evidence, the chancellor found that the plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his back injury was caused or aggravated out of or in the course of his employment for Kraus Cleaners and entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff has presented two issues for review: 1. Did the trial court err in finding that there is not sufficient evidence to show that plaintiff's lower back problems arose out of and were incurred in the course of his employment and that defendants are not liable under the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Law? 2. Whether plaintiff's claim is barred by wilful misrepresentation and fraud in his employment application? In considering these issues, we must be mindful of certain well established principles. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of evidence lies. Thomas v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tenn. 1991). In making such determination, this Court must give considerable deference to the trial judges's findings regarding the weight and credibility of any oral testimony received. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992); Thomas, 812 S.W.2d at 283. However, this court may draw its own conclusions about the weight, credibility, and significance of deposition testimony. Seiber v. Greenbrier Indus. Inc., 96 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff in a worker's compensation case has the burden of proving causation and permanency of his injury by the preponderance of the evidence using expert medical testimony. See Thomas, 812 S.W.2d at 283; Roark v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 793 S.W.2d 2
Scott
Workers Compensation Panel
Virginia Mcconnell v. The Travelers Insurance Co. 02S01-9810-CH-00098
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Charles Mcpherson
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arises from a back injury that plaintiff sustained on the job. The court found that plaintiff made a meaningful return to work and gave her the maximum award of six (6) times the anatomical rating (6 percent vocational disability to the body as a whole) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b), rather than limiting the award to the two and one-half (2_) times cap found in _ 5-6-241(a). The defendant appealed to this Court on three issues: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's finding that Anderson Hickey did not return the plaintiff to her employment at wage equal to or greater than the wage plaintiff was receiving at the time of the injury as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b); (2) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that plaintiff sustained a 6 percent vocational impairment rating; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 241(c) when awarding plaintiff a vocational impairment rating of six (6) times the anatomical rating? We find that plaintiff's award is not limited by the two and one-half (2_) times cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a); however, plaintiff's award is reduced to four (4) times the medical impairment rating pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b) and (c). We, therefore, modify and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Our standard of review on appeal in workers' compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness of the trial court's findings, unless the evidence presented preponderates otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (Supp. 1998); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard of review, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Lauderdale
Workers Compensation Panel
McKinley Brown vs. TN Dept. of Correction, et al M1999-02519-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute between an inmate and the Department of Correction regarding the Department's calculation of the inmate's sentence reduction credits. The inmate claims that when the Class X Felony Act was repealed in 1989, prior sentence reduction credit schemes were revived, and he became retroactively eligible for those credits. The inmate appeals the dismissal of his complaint seeking declaratory relief and damages. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of his case.
State vs. Ricky Aaron M2002-02288-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
On October 28, 1999, the defendant, Ricky Grover Aaron, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a jury trial in June of 2001, the defendant was convicted of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and false imprisonment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven years for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and eleven months, twenty-nine days for false imprisonment. The sentences were to run concurrently to each other and consecutively to a federal sentence the defendant was serving at the time of trial. The defendant argues eight issues on appeal:(1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss due to unnecessary delay; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress his alleged admissions to police because the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation without having been given Miranda warnings; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress a handgun seized by police from his vehicle; (4) whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support a finding by a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and false imprisonment; (5) whether the trial court erred in admitting alleged hearsay testimony related to the alleged victim's mother's response to her daughter's characterization of the defendant as a "pervert"; (6) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that another person had been convicted of a sexual offense involving the alleged victim in an unrelated case; (7) whether the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when the prosecutor, in direct violation of the trial court's pretrial ruling, elicited testimony from a police detective that the defendant admitted having child pornography on his computer; and (8) whether the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence for the defendant's conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and did the court further err in ordering that the sentences in this case be served consecutively to the defendant's federal sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
