State of Tennessee v. Valerie Garrett
Defendant, Valerie Garrett, was convicted following a bench trial of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and failure to maintain lane of travel. Defendant claims that the deputy who arrested her lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
HG Jones, LLC v. Jordan Howell et al.
At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Glenn Clark
A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Christopher Glenn Clark, of first-degree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1); first-degree murder in perpetration of a felony, id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); burglary of a building other than a habitation, id. § 39-13-1002(a)(1); theft under $1000, id. § 39-14-103; unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior violent felony, id. § 39-17- 1307(b)(1)(A); and unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior felony drug offense, id. § 39-13-1307(b)(1)(B). After a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, murder in perpetration of a felony, and burglary. Additionally, he contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we also conclude the trial court failed to make the required findings in support of its sentencing determinations, and therefore, vacate the defendant’s consecutive terms and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing to determine the appropriateness of consecutive terms. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jay Walker
The Defendant, Jay Walker, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury during their deliberations. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Dyquanne Cross
The defendant, Gary Dyquanne Cross, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jeremiah Devon Cohill
Defendant, Jeremiah Devon Cohill, was convicted by a jury of carjacking (count one), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and conspiracy to commit carjacking (count four). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years as a Range I offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instruction for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) his sentence is excessive; and (4) the judgment for count one contains a clerical error. Following our review of the entire record, the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we reverse, vacate and dismiss Defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two). In all other aspects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE EMORY S.
In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, Emory S. The trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ferguson Enterprises, LLC v. Norris Bros. Excavating, LLC et al.
A contractor purchased construction materials from a supplier and then failed to pay for the materials. The supplier brought suit to recover payment and later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the supplier’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm and remand the matter to calculate the supplier’s appellate attorney’s fees. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tristan Weatherspoon
The defendant, Tristan Weatherspoon, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christ M. Christopher
A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Christ M. Christopher, guilty of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences imposed. He argues that the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors and imposed an effective sentence greater than necessary to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Dejuan Perkins
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcus Dejuan Perkins, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying an enhancement factor and denying an alternative sentence to incarceration. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tondre Dupress Ragland
A Haywood County jury convicted the Defendant, Tondre Dupress Ragland, of attempted second degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Defendant’s convictions, but we reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Wilkerson factors. State v. Ragland, W2022-01303-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3947501, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 12, 2023), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On remand, the trial court found that the Defendant was a dangerous offender and again imposed consecutive sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found that he was a dangerous offender for purposes of consecutive sentencing. After conducting a de novo review, we conclude that the Defendant’s sentences should be served concurrently, rather than consecutively. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tobarus Burton
The Defendant, Tobarus Burton, pleaded guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. He received an agreed eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f), which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE, EX. REL. STACY PAZ v. BRET PROCISE
The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, brought suit against Father for retroactive and prospective child support. The trial court deviated from the Child Support Guidelines in setting Father’s retroactive child support, and he appeals. Because the trial court failed to make necessary findings of facts and conclusions of law to support its deviation from the guidelines, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. The trial court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Donald James Robinson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald James Robinson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Woodie Jeanette Arendall v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Woodie Jeanette Arendall, pled guilty to one count of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve fifteen years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the plea process. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Rinyah J.
In the Juvenile Court for Shelby County ("the Juvenile Court"), the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Rickey J. ("Father") and Anionetta J. ("Mother") to their child, Rinyah J. ("the Child"), who was born drug-exposed. After trial, the Juvenile Court found that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody 9f the Child and that Mother had committed severe child abuse. It further found that termination of their parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Mother and Father appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie E. Spencer
Defendant, Willie E. Spencer, appeals as of right from his guilty-pleaded convictions for three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a maximum in-range sentence. Following our review, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Lynn Sanders
The Defendant, Jeffery Lynn Sanders, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, he alleges that (1) various procedural errors attended his revocation hearing, (2) no substantial evidence existed to support the finding of a violation of probation, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.1 After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Norman Forte
The Defendant, Billy Norman Forte, appeals from his jury conviction for second degree murder and his resulting twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s Ferguson remedy due to the State’s destruction of the recording of the Defendant’s 911 call; (2) the trial court’s ruling allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s 1996 conviction for domestic assault against his ex-wife because the Defendant had opened the door to such evidence during his direct examination testimony; and (3) the trial court’s ruling prohibiting the Defendant from introducing certain evidence of the victim’s criminal history. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dustin Keith Gamble v. Madison Darlene Gamble
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The mother appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory best interest factors when making its parenting plan determination. Because of the lack of findings in the final decree, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel H. Rader IV ex rel. Estate of Christine Joy Koczwara v. John Beasley
This is an action for abuse or neglect, exploitation, or theft of money or property of Christine Joy Koczwara during her life, as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 71- 6-120(b) of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The complaint seeks to recover assets as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant failed to file a timely responsive pleading to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability. Prior to the trial on damages, the defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. The claimed excuse was based on the contention that the defendant was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a purported 2020 will. The trial court rejected that argument because there was no pending will contest and the defendant had not filed a petition to admit the purported will to probate. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside upon the finding that the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading was willful. After a trial on damages, the court invalidated a quitclaim deed, ordered the return of personal property, and awarded $48,500 in compensatory damages and $97,000 in punitive damages against the defendant. The court also ordered the sale of the decedent’s real property. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
EMILY ELIZABETH BUCKNER v. COMPLETE WELLNESS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER ET AL.
I write separately to concur with and in support of the majority opinion of the Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
EMILY ELIZABETH BUCKNER v. COMPLETE WELLNESS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER ET AL.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's reversal of the trial court's judgment dismissing Ms. Buckner's health care liability claims. Ms. Buckner failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) because she filed noncompliant medical authorizations and failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the defendants were not prejudiced thereby. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
EMILY ELIZABETH BUCKNER v. COMPLETE WELLNESS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER ET AL.
This healthcare liability case comes before the court on appeal from the trial court’s granting of a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, part of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that unsigned medical authorizations attached to the complaint were sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements of section 29-26-121 and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |