In Re Remington G.
2021-00680-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

A father filed a petition to establish parentage of the parties’ child. At the trial on the petition, the trial court limited the evidence to events since a hearing on pendente lite parenting time that took place 47 days before the final hearing. We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the evidence in this way. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order in its entirety and remand for a new trial.

State of Tennessee v. Luke Jackson
E2023-01617-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry A. Steelman

Defendant, Luke Jackson, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
voluntary manslaughter, for which he is serving a fifteen-year sentence as a Range III
offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) he did not fully understand the details of his plea
agreement and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts that he was
unaware that he would be sentenced outside of his range and that he entered the plea out
of fear and lack of medical treatment while incarcerated. Following our review of the entire
record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Keion Hayes
M2024-00352-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

The Defendant, Keion Hayes, pleaded guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211 (2018) (subsequently amended) (voluntary manslaughter); 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery).  The Defendant received an agreed-upon, eighteen-year sentence.  The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

James Henry Whitaker, II v. Viktoria Moor
M2022-01721-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J.B. Cox

Following their divorce, a mother informed her children’s father of her desire to move to Germany with the children. The father filed a petition opposing the move. The court found that the relocation was in the children’s best interest and modified the permanent parenting plan accordingly. On appeal, Father contends the evidence preponderates against some of the factual findings and that the court erred in weighing the statutory best-interest factors. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that relocation was in the children’s best interest, we affirm.

Preston Garner Et Al. v. Southern Baptist Convention Et Al.
E2024-00100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge David R. Duggan

The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James W. Grubb Et Al. v. Joe D. Grubb Et Al.
E2023-01358-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

This appeal concerns the end of a business relationship between two brothers, Joe D. Grubb (“Joe”) and James W. Grubb (“Jim”).2 After many years of working together in the cash advance and rent-to-own businesses, Jim sued Joe in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”), asserting breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable relief under the LLC dissolution statute. Joe sued Jim in turn. One of the chief issues concerned Jim’s claim to equal compensation from the brothers’ businesses based on an alleged express oral agreement with Joe. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Jim, awarding him damages based on multiple grounds. Centrally, the Trial Court found that an express oral agreement between Jim and Joe provided for equal compensation, even though Jim testified that the alleged agreement was “unspoken” and “just the way it’s been.” Joe appeals. We hold, inter alia, that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in favor of Jim, what Jim testified to did not constitute an express oral agreement or any other kind of contract as a matter of law. Jim’s alternative theories for relief are unavailing as well. We reverse.

Robert L. Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP et al.
M2021-01511-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Michael W. Binkley

This appeal arises from a slip-and-fall incident at an apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee. On a rainy morning at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex, owned and operated by Mid-America Apartments, LP, Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the way back to his apartment. Mr. Trentham sustained serious injuries and filed a premises-liability lawsuit alleging that MAA had been negligent in maintaining the pedestrian bridge. Mr. Trentham asserted that his slip-and-fall was caused by a microbial growth on the bridge that MAA should have known about and should have addressed. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Trentham, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. MAA disputes the holding of the lower courts that it was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. We hold that, because the microbial growth on the pedestrian bridge amounts to a “general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition’s existence,” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tenn. 2004), MAA was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the bridge at the time of Mr. Trentham’s fall. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Robert L. Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP et al. (dissenting)
M2021-01511-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Michael W. Binkley

SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.
Premises owners “are not insurers of their patrons’ safety.” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). That refrain has been part of Tennessee’s tort law for nearly a century. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Nichols, 118 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn. 1938). Accordingly, to impose a duty on a premises owner to remedy or warn against unsafe conditions created by others, a plaintiff must establish that the premises owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition. Until today, constructive knowledge required proof either that (1) the unsafe condition had existed long enough for a reasonable premises owner to discover it, or (2) a similar condition had occurred in the past, making it reasonably foreseeable that it would occur again. See Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 765–66. The majority opinion creates a third category that has no footing in our existing precedents. It holds that premises owners also owe entrants a duty to protect against an unsafe condition on the property when it is “reasonably foreseeable that an unsafe condition [will] arise” on the premises “without proper maintenance.” The majority’s holding is contrary to Blair and other binding precedents, creates confusion for premises owners and lower courts, and exposes premises owners to expansive new liability. I respectfully dissent.

Bobby Junior Lovin v. State of Tennessee
E2024-00234-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Zachary R. Walden

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Junior Lovin, of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial lawyers were ineffective by failing to (1) advise him on the range of punishment he could receive if convicted; (2) investigate the case and present witnesses at trial; (3) advise him so he could make an informed decision regarding a guilty plea; and (4) advise him of his right to testify, which deprived him of the ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision whether to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Ryan Reese Leath
M2024-00441-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The Defendant, Ryan Reese Leath, pleaded guilty to Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), third offense with the trial court to sentence him.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after the service of six months in confinement.  The trial court ordered that the DUI sentence be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for theft of property valued over $10,000.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Rusty L. Patterson
E2023-01736-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The Defendant, Rusty L. Patterson, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of
theft of property valued $2,500 or more, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the
trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years in confinement
with sixty percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court
committed plain error by refusing to instruct the jury on attempted theft, that the evidence
is insufficient to show the value of the stolen property, and that the unavailability of the
community corrections program in Knox County violated his constitutional rights at
sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Waddle
E2024-00132-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stacy L. Street

The Defendant, Bobby Joe Waddle, was convicted in the Washington County Criminal
Court of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of
violence and was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to thirty years in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to bifurcate his trial. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr.
W2022-00814-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr. (“Defendant”) sought this Court’s review of his 2022
conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony
crime of violence. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307, unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a Class E felony; however, if the prior
conviction is for a felony crime of violence, the punishment is increased to a Class B felony.
At Defendant’s trial in the present case, the State introduced a certified judgment of
conviction for Defendant’s 2017 conviction for robbery, and the trial judge instructed the
jury that robbery is a crime of violence. Robbery, however, is not included in the statutory
definition of crimes of violence set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-
1301(3). Defendant was convicted and received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal,
Defendant argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction because the State failed to establish that the predicate felony of robbery was a
crime of violence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that robbery is a
crime of violence despite its absence from the statutory definition of the term. We granted
Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether robbery is
encompassed within the statutory definition of “crime of violence” and to determine
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. After
review, we agree with the lower courts that robbery can be a “crime of violence” within the
definition contained in section 39-17-1301(3). However, we conclude that whether robbery
is a “crime of violence” in a particular unlawful possession of a firearm case is a question
for a properly instructed jury, not the trial judge. Because the State did not present sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s prior robbery was
a crime of violence, we reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and
vacate the judgment of the trial court on Count 1. The case is remanded to the trial court
for entry of a new judgment reducing the conviction in Count 1 to a Class E felony and for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Terrance K. Martin
M2024-00480-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Parkes

Defendant, Terrance K. Martin, was charged in a three-count indictment with two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine.  A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years’ incarceration.  Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the State presented insufficient proof that he knowingly sold the drugs.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Allen Keyt
E2024-00046-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sandra Donaghy

Defendant, Christopher Allen Keyt, was convicted by a Monroe County jury of possession
with the intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine (count one) and
possession of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count two). The
trial court sentenced Defendant to thirteen years for count one and four years for count two,
to run consecutively. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying a
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in qualifying a detective as
an expert in the methamphetamine trade in Monroe County, and that the trial court erred
by restricting Defendant’s questioning of the detective. Upon review of the entire record,
the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

In Re Austynn F.
E2023-01707-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard B. Armstrong, Jr.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The court found one ground for termination: abandonment by failure to visit. Because the trial court’s order fails to resolve conflicting testimony concerning the father’s visitation with the child, we vacate the judgment and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Craig William Joel v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund
E2024-00681-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Corderro Avant v. State of Tennessee
W2023-01409-CCA-R3-ECN
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

In 2014, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Corderro Avant, and a codefendant, of several charges against several victims of a shooting, including one count of first degree premeditated murder; one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury; nine counts of attempted first degree murder; and eleven counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence plus twenty-one years. The Petitioner appealed and this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Avant, No. W2018-01154-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3072131, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2020). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied the petition after a hearing on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely and should have been granted based on newly discovered evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Joseph Ray Daniels
M2023-00158-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge David D. Wolfe

The Defendant, Joseph Ray Daniels, confessed to the beating death of his five-year-old son, Joseph Clyde Daniels III, and was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, making a false police report, and tampering with evidence.  He subsequently received an effective sentence of life imprisonment.   In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession (1) because the State failed to corroborate his extrajudicial confession under the modified trustworthiness standard outlined in State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2014), and (2) because his post-polygraph video recorded statement was obtained by law enforcement through coercive interrogation techniques including an express promise of leniency.  The Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude as hearsay utterances by the victim’s three-year-old brother, “Joe dead, Joe dead, Joe dead,” and the response of his aunt, “Yes baby, Joe dead;” and in failing to exclude as not relevant and unfairly prejudicial Facebook messages his wife exchanged with a paramour leading up to the victim’s death.  We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Keiresha Majors
M2023-01182-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jennifer Smith

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Keiresha Majors, guilty of one count of second degree murder, for which she was sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the admission of recordings of a Facebook Live broadcast she recorded shortly after the victim’s murder, the restriction of cross-examination of a witness, and the length of her sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Ladon Relliford v. Jerry Burks, et al.
W2022-00997-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Gadson W. Perry

The plaintiff took his car to a body shop for repair. The owner of the body shop, who had obtained title of the vehicle through an unknown means, sold the car to the defendant, CarMax. The plaintiff brought suit against the owner of the body shop and CarMax, seeking the return of his car. The trial court granted summary judgment to CarMax, finding it held valid title as a good faith purchaser for value. Because we find that the undisputed facts do not support a conclusion that CarMax is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Zyqiius Quade' Barnes
M2024-00016-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Zyqiius Quade’ Barnes, of one count of second degree murder and one count of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of seventeen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it included a “defense of a third person” instruction in its jury charge and when it enhanced his sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Jason Collins v. State of Tennessee
W2023-01580-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

Petitioner, Jason Collins, was convicted of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court merged the two methamphetamine convictions and sentenced Petitioner to serve a total effective sentence of twenty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for new trial, in failing to seek suppression of drugs and other evidence seized from his home, and in failing to conduct a “complete and accurate” investigation of a defense witness. After review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Sandra Easley v. City of Memphis
W2023-00437-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Damita J. Dandridge

Plaintiff was injured after attempting to cross a street outside of a crosswalk and being struck by a city-owned vehicle driven by a city employee. The trial court found that the city was vicariously liable for the employee-driver’s negligence and directly liable for its negligent hiring and retaining of the employee-driver. The trial court ultimately found the plaintiff 10% at fault for her injuries. The city appealed, and this Court reversed, finding that there was no proof of negligent hiring and that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s allocation of fault. Instead, this Court concluded that the plaintiff was at least 50% at fault, barring recovery. The Tennessee Supreme Court vacated the judgment as failing to afford the trial court’s findings of fact appropriate deference, but acknowledged the plaintiff’s failure to appeal the conclusion that the negligent hiring finding was unsupported. On remand, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the trial court for the re-allocation of fault and calculation of damages.

Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
E2024-01719-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of two motions to recuse the trial judge. After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of both motions.