Opinions
Christopher Terrell Shipp v. State of Tennessee
Christopher Terrell Shipp, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of criminally negligent homicide, one count of felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder after a jury trial. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life in prison. On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims in the home invasion. State v. Shipp, No. M2016-01397-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 4457595, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. An amended petition filed after counsel was appointed raised additional claims, including a Brady claim based on the State’s withholding of a witness statement before the preliminary hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner sought removal of his appointed counsel. This Court denied Petitioner’s application for an extraordinary appeal and the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Eventually, Petitioner was allowed to proceed pro se on appeal. Because Petitioner has either waived his issues or failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Genash, LLC v. Rose Legacy, LLC as successor in interest to Agnoletti Properties, LLC
In this commercial lease dispute, the tenant sued the landlord for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement, and the landlord counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, concluding that the landlord breached the lease. The matter then proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict on a list of issues, including damages on the tenant’s breach of contract claim, the landlord’s defenses to the breach of contract claim, the tenant’s fraudulent inducement claim, and the landlord’s breach of contract claim against the tenant. The jury found in favor of the tenant on both of its claims against the landlord but only awarded damages on the breach of contract claim. The jury concluded that the landlord had not proven its breach of contract claim. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AZALAYA J.
This action involves the termination of the parents’ parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination as applied to each parent. The court found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KANIEL Y.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish at least one statutory ground of termination. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio K. Champion
Movant, Antonio K. Champion, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence related to his guilty-pleaded convictions in Madison County Circuit Court case numbers 22-488 and 22-489. 1 On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion because he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender based upon several prior convictions, which he asserts also involved “illegal” sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Markus E.
In this dependency and neglect action, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected in 2015 and found that the child was the victim of severe child abuse perpetrated by one or both of his parents. The parents appealed that decision to the circuit court. Because a termination petition was filed shortly thereafter, the circuit court stayed the dependency and neglect appeal pending the outcome of the termination action. Both parents’ parental rights were terminated pursuant to the severe child abuse ground in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed that determination. The dependency and neglect appeal then resumed in the circuit court, and the Department of Children’s Services filed an amended dependency and neglect petition alleging new facts. The mother filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition, and she filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in the termination case barred all claims in the dependency and neglect case under the doctrine of res judicata. The circuit court denied both motions but permitted the parties to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the circuit court’s determination that the severe child abuse claim was not precluded, but we affirm the court in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Helena Agri Enterprises, LLC v. Ted Rains d/b/a AG Services
Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant over a contract dispute, and Appellant failed to timely file a responsive pleading. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant filed a motion for the trial court to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied that motion. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the default judgment by failing to properly consider all relevant factors and by disregarding an issue related to venue. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Patrick Odom
The Defendant, Jason Patrick Odom, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; burglary of a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; and vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property); 39- 14-105 (2018) (grading of theft); 39-13-1002 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (burglary); 39-14-408 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (vandalism). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twelve years for theft, six years for burglary, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for vandalism. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph into evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Allen Hessmer v. State of Tennessee
In two separate criminal proceedings, one in Smith County and one in Wilson County, the Petitioner, John Allen Hessmer, was convicted of two felony offenses and two misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Approximately one year later, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Wilson County, alleging that his Smith County convictions were void. He also asserted that he had not received proper credit for time served in pretrial detention. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the convictions from a different county and that the application otherwise failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Petitioner appealed, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly dismissed the application. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Petitioner and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
JESSICA GARVIN v. MARIAH SHELTON
On remand from this Court, Appellant filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the trial court. As the basis for her motion, Appellant relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119 (contemplating an award of attorney’s fees to a party on grant of his or her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss), and on this Court’s mandate from the first appeal, wherein we remanded the case to the trial court for, inter alia, “collection of costs.” The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan Manuel Mejia Nunez
A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Juan Manuel Mejia Nunez, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) permitting several of the State’s witnesses to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial; (2) admitting testimony that referenced and described the victims’ forensic interviews; (3) admitting testimony from a police investigator about the behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims; and (4) limiting testimony from the victims’ mother regarding the circumstances of her divorce. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi et al. v. Jill Fitcheard et al.
In this declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, the trial court allowed the Tennessee Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the State of Tennessee (“the State”). However, instead of allowing intervention for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality, the trial court ordered that the State be made a party defendant in the action, thereby invoking the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-18-101(a) that a three-judge panel be appointed. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24, we vacate the trial court’s order directing the State’s intervention as a party defendant. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether the State is a necessary party or whether the State should be allowed to intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Rogers
Travis Rogers, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof. After the State rested, Defendant put on proof. Because Defendant waived his challenge to the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof by putting on proof, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi et al. v. Jill Fitcheard et al. (Dissenting)
Appellants Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi and Horwitz Law, PLLC challenge the constitutionality of a provision of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312 and a provision of the Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The question presented by this appeal is whether the State of Tennessee must be a party to the Appellants’ declaratory judgment action. The majority concludes that the State may intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute consistent with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24; yet it remands for a determination of whether the State is a necessary party. Because the State is not a necessary party, I would reverse the trial court with instructions to permit the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter to intervene on behalf of the State for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JEFF HURST v. CITY OF MORRISTOWN
This is a Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., alleging negligent operation of a street sweeper by a city employee. The trial court denied the city’s claims of immunity and entered judgment after a nonjury trial, apportioning 51 percent fault to the city’s employee who was driving the street sweeper and 49 percent fault to the driver of the pickup truck that was involved in a collision with the sweeper. The city appealed. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE WALTER G. ET AL.
Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of their three younger children. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother and Father committed severe abuse against a child and that the children’s best interests are served by termination, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Simmons v. State of Tennessee
In 2008, a Lincoln County jury convicted the Petitioner, Shawn Simmons, of first degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Sixteen years later, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asserting that a trial witness had since revealed previously undisclosed information related to the offense. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition without a hearing, concluding that the petition was untimely and that due process principles did not toll the one-year statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the summary dismissal was erroneous. Upon review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Tennessee Bonding Company, Inc., d/b/a Action Bail Bonding
Tennessee Bonding Company, Inc., d/b/a Action Bail Bonding (“the Bonding Company”), appeals from the trial court’s denial of its petitions to obtain bonding privileges in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. The Bonding Company contends that (1) the trial court improperly held a hearing without counsel present, (2) the trial court erroneously considered certain evidence without the required necessary authentication or identification in violation of the Rules of Evidence, and (3) the evidence did not support the trial court’s denial of approval to write bonds. After review, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandi Michelli Adams
The Defendant, Brandi Michelle Adams,1 pled guilty to the offense of second degree murder as a Range II, multiple offender and received a sentence of forty years. She later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that she was a Range I, standard offender and did not agree to be sentenced in an enhanced range. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appealed, asserting three issues: (1) that she could not legally be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender; (2) that her plea was involuntary; and (3) that the trial court exhibited bias in denying her Rule 36.1 motion. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
RENEGADE MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY CLUB, INC. v. MOY TOY, LLC
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. After carefully reviewing the limited record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Gabriel Enriques Turcios v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gabriel Enriques Turcios, was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. More specifically, he alleged that his trial counsel (1) failed to timely and adequately raise an insanity defense; (2) failed to challenge the aggravating circumstance for sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(5); and (3) failed to seek suppression of messages exchanged between the Petitioner and the victim. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Bassett
Brandon Bassett, Defendant, was indicted for and convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal he argues that the State’s failure to elect an offense in Count 5 resulted in a jury verdict that was not unanimous and requires reversal. Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing by failing to place findings on the record to show that the overall length of the sentence comported with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Because we determine that the proof at trial necessitated an election on Count 5, we reverse the conviction in Count 5 and remand for a new trial. However, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
SETH DOWNING v. KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS ET AL.
This appeal arises out of a local planning commission’s approval of a development plan application. The Plaintiff sought to appeal the planning commission’s approval of the application to the local board of zoning appeals; however, a local zoning ordinance permitted the plan applicant to opt out of the appeal before the board of zoning appeals, which he did. The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court, challenging the planning commission’s approval of the application and the dismissal of his appeal by the board of zoning appeals. The plaintiff claimed that the opt-out provision violates his constitutional right; thus, by applying the opt-out provision, the board of zoning appeals acted illegally. The circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff impermissibly combined an original action with a petition for certiorari review. The circuit court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim regarding the planning commission’s actions because the plaintiff did not sufficiently verify his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charlene Dreaden v. White & Rhodes, P.C.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nancy Abbie Tallent
The Defendant, Nancy Abbie Tallent, was convicted by an Anderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of third-offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2024). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served at 75%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case, (2) no probable cause existed for her arrest, (3) the trial court erred by failing to strike the testimony of witnesses who offered allegedly perjured testimony, (4) a police officer committed willful misconduct because he “overcharged” her in order to obtain a higher bond and obtain leverage for a plea agreement, (5) the trial court erred by not suppressing the blood sample evidence based upon the use of an allegedly outdated consent form, (6) the police violated the Defendant’s HIPAA rights and violated State law by requesting her medical records and by fabricating the alcohol toxicology report used at trial, (7) the police violated State law by altering video evidence used at trial, (8) she was denied due process of law due to various defects in the conviction proceedings, (9) she was denied an additional blood sample for defense testing, (10) police officers perjured themselves and suborned perjury, (11) the chain of custody for the blood evidence was not established, and (12) the State unjustifiably made a plea offer after the jury returned the guilty verdict in order to avoid an allegedly meritorious appeal following “an abusive performance” during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals |