Jonathan Garrett Grace et al. v. Elizabeth Ann Baker Grace
This is a post-divorce parent relocation dispute. After the mother relocated out of state with the child without notice, the father filed a petition objecting to her relocation, a petition for criminal contempt on multiple grounds, and a petition to modify the parenting plan. The mother then filed a petition to approve her relocation and a petition challenging the child support calculations in the court’s November 6, 2023 order. After conducting a best-interest analysis, the court adopted the mother’s proposed parenting plan with modifications that removed the father’s supervision requirement, required the mother to bear transportation costs, and required the mother to give the father notice of the child’s school and extracurricular activities, among other modifications. The trial court also granted the father’s first amended petition for three counts of criminal contempt, imposing a sentence of 30 days, with 10 days suspended, “based upon Mother’s full and complete compliance, during the next five (5) years, with the terms set forth within this judgment.” Father appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by applying an improper legal standard in respect to the notice requirements of the parent relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting a best-interest analysis, affirm the trial court’s determination that the relocation was in the best interest of the child, and affirm the trial court’s adoption of the mother’s parenting plan with modifications. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Elmore v. Travis L. Mills, CRNA, ET Al.
Lonnie Elmore (“Decedent”) died on July 5, 2020, a few weeks after being treated by Angelo J. Sorce, M.D., (“Sorce”), an employee of Tennessee Valley Orthopaedics, LLC (“TVO”), (collectively “Defendants”) and Travis Mills, CRNA, (“Mills”) an employee of Lakeway Regional Anesthesia Services, PLLC (“Lakeway”). On July 2, 2021, Robert Elmore, as Executor of the Estate of Lonnie Elmore, (“Plaintiff”) sent pre-suit notice to Defendants. Relying on the 120-day extension provided for by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 121(c), Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging wrongful death on November 1, 2021, in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), claiming that the accrual of Plaintiff’s cause of action arose no later than June 21, 2020, meaning Plaintiff provided pre-suit notice past the one-year statute of limitations, rendering his complaint untimely. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). The Trial Court disagreed and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed. We reverse. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Christopher L. Wiesmueller v. Corrine Nichole Oliver
A mother and father filed competing petitions to modify their parenting plan. The Father also sought to modify his child support obligation. In furtherance of these goals, he asked the court to admit evidence of events occurring before the denial of his previous petition to modify the parenting plan. He also moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem and for an order requiring his past Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 examinations to be destroyed. The court denied each of Father’s pretrial requests. It found that no material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the parenting plan was not in the children’s best interests. Because the trial court erred in its application of the child support guidelines, we vacate part of the child support award and remand for recalculation of Father’s obligation. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Prince v. A&W Construction and Property Management, LLC et al.
A property owner filed a complaint against her neighbor and the municipality seeking to enforce a local zoning ordinance. The trial court dismissed the property owner’s claims against the municipality. Among other things, the court ruled that mandamus was not available because the property owner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. It also determined that the municipality retained immunity for the tortious acts alleged in the complaint. On appeal, the property owner argues that (1) Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-208(a)(2) authorized her to bring a mandamus action to abate the zoning violation without exercising administrative remedies and (2) the complaint contained sufficient allegations of negligent supervision to withstand a motion to dismiss. Upon review, we affirm the dismissal. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Tebeau v. Millerwood Investments, LLC ET AL.
This is a premises liability case. While attending a gathering at the appellees’ apartment, the appellant fell from a second-floor balcony, sustaining multiple injuries. The appellant sued the owner of the apartment and each of the tenants/appellees for negligence. This appeal concerns the tenants/appellees only. The appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that they did not owe the appellant a duty of care because: (1) the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious and the appellant’s accident was not reasonably foreseeable; (2) the appellees did not have superior control over the apartment such that they could remedy the allegedly dangerous condition; and (3) in his deposition, the appellant was unable to articulate what steps the appellees could have taken to prevent his injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment on its conclusion that: (1) the tenants had no control over the apartment to remedy the allegedly dangerous condition; and (2) the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious. We affirm, although on different grounds. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Clifford Moore, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Paul Clifford Moore, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “Motion for Plain Error Review in an Alternative Petition for Extraordinary Writ.” He argues that the trial court’s sequential jury instructions were improper and prevented the jury from returning a verdict of voluntary manslaughter rather than second degree murder. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner does not have an appeal as of right under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure; accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott Alan Haynes, Jr.
The Defendant, Scott Alan Haynes, Jr., was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of second degree murder and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon and received consecutive eighteen- and two-year sentences, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction and that his eighteen-year sentence for the conviction is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lavonta Laver Churchwell v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Lavonta Laver Churchwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Joseph Van Arsdale
Defendant, Aaron Joseph Van Arsdale, appeals his Maury County convictions for vehicular assault, driving under the influence (second offense), simple possession of cocaine, and failure to exercise due care. He contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of blood alcohol concentration testing; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for vehicular assault; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering restitution. Upon review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions, affirm the restitution order in part, vacate the restitution order in part, and remand for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Christopher Simonds
An Anderson County jury convicted Defendant, Michael Christopher Simonds, of attempted aggravated rape. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the State made improper comments in its closing argument. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee
In this appeal, we hold that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable against governmental entities, not private parties, and that it cannot be the basis for a “public policy” exception to the employment-at-will doctrine as against private employers. Here, the plaintiff at-will employee emailed members of the Tennessee General Assembly expressing grievances about the COVID-19 vaccination mandate implemented by her employer, a private organization. After the employer told the plaintiff that the email violated the employer’s policies, the employee sent a second similar email to legislators. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff sued the defendant private employer for retaliatory discharge, asserting her employment was terminated for exercising the right to petition in Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, our review shows that, for hundreds of years dating back to early England, the constitutional right to petition has been considered a bulwark against government oppression, not a constraint on private parties. No state in the nation has held that the right to petition applies to limit the ability of private employers to terminate the employment of at-will employees, and the language in Article I, Section 23 does not mandate such a holding. We hold that Article I, Section 23 is enforceable only against the government, not against private actors; consequently, private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition. Thus, at-will employees may not base claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers on the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (Concurring)
I join in full the majority’s opinion holding that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution cannot provide the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim against private employers. I write separately to suggest that, in an appropriate case, we should reconsider whether the Court is the correct entity to create public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Mandi Gregory, et al. v. Peachtree Settlement a/k/a Settlement Funding, LLC, et al.
In this conservatorship action, we address whether subject-matter jurisdiction over the ward’s assets remains with the court appointing the conservator. Here, the conservatorship was opened in Madison County. Appellee and the ward’s conservator agreed to transfer some of the ward’s rights to payments from a structured settlement, the ward’s sole asset, to Appellee. Appellee filed a petition for approval of the transfer in Anderson County, where none of the parties resided, and the Anderson County court approved the transfer. A second conservator was appointed for the limited purpose of challenging the Anderson County order, and the instant lawsuit was filed to set aside the Anderson County order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court initially held that Anderson County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but on Appellee’s motion to alter or amend, reversed itself. Appellant appeals. Because subject-matter jurisdiction over the ward and her property remained with the conservatorship court, Anderson County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its order allowing the transfer of the asset was void ab initio. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders finding otherwise and affirm and reinstate its initial order finding no subject-jurisdiction in Anderson County. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Diana Sofia Acevedo v. Daniel Jose Acevedo
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because the order denying recusal conflicts with the trial court’s previously entered standing order of recusal regarding all cases involving Appellant’s attorney, we vacate the trial court’s order denying recusal and remand for resolution of the conflicting orders. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gemeyal Strowder v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gemeyal Strowder, was charged with aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and theft of property valued at one thousand dollars ($1000) or less. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery, and the remaining charges were dismissed with the sentence and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Jacob J.
After this Court dismissed the appellant’s first appeal as untimely, he filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Raidyn C.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide support and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination decision. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John Byron Mejia v. Jenna Michelle Leone
This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child. The trial court named the father the primary residential parent, entered a parenting plan awarding the father the majority of parenting time during the school year, and gave the father authority over the child’s education. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Isaih Tatum v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Isaih Tatum, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Jordan, II
The Defendant, Charles Jordan, II, pled guilty in the Dyer County Circuit Court to possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was to receive an effective ten-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacquet Moore v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jacquet Moore, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of aggravated rape and resulting sentence of sixty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Petitioner claims, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred by denying his amended petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief as to one of the Petitioner’s grounds for relief but that the case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his remaining grounds. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor (now Tipper) v. Joseph Daniel Taylor
This post-divorce appeal arises from competing petitions to modify a parenting plan and a petition for criminal contempt. At the time of the divorce, Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor2 (“Mother”) and Joseph Daniel Taylor (“Father”) adopted a parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father visitation. The child was four years old at the time of the divorce. Five years later, the then nine-year-old child purportedly began refusing to visit Father. Thereafter, Mother petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, stop all visitation with Father. Father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, name him the primary residential parent. Father also filed a contempt petition alleging, in relevant part, that Mother intentionally and repeatedly obstructed his visitation and coached the child to refuse to visit Father. After a two-day hearing in which the trial court found Father was a credible witness and Mother was not credible, the court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s severe alienation of the child from Father and that a drastic modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The court’s modifications of the parenting plan included designating Father as the primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority, reducing Mother’s parenting time to what Father had been awarded in the previous order, and restricting Mother to supervised visitation pending a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 psychological evaluation. In a separate order, the court found Mother guilty of seventy-one counts of criminal contempt for willfully violating the parties’ visitation schedule and sentenced Mother to serve concurrent ten-day terms in jail for six of the seventy-one acts of contempt but suspended the sixty-day sentence except for the service of three weekends on the condition that Mother strictly adhere to the court’s orders going forward. Mother appeals the modification of the parenting plan and the trial court’s seventy-one criminal contempt findings. Both parties challenge the sentence imposed for Mother’s criminal contempt. We affirm. Father also requests his attorney’s fees on appeal. We find Father’s request to be well taken and remand for a determination of Father’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmie Martin v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jimmie Martin, of second degree murder of Martha J. Bownes, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty years. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. State v. Martin, No. W2013-00889-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2566490, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2014), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had a conflict of interest at the time he represented the Petitioner and because Counsel failed to call an eye witness, Christopher Martin, to testify at his trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Luis Mendoza-Sanchez
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Luis Mendoza-Sanchez, of multiple offenses against two victims, a child and her mother, including aggravated assault of the mother, rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual assault of the child. He was additionally convicted of violating the Child Protection Act. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifty-nine years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the trials for charges against the victim and her mother; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to ask leading questions of their own witness; (3) the trial court erred when it limited the Defendant’s cross-examination of an expert about the victim’s sexual orientation; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors entitled him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
First South Financial Credit Union v. Collierville 385 Motors, LLC
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |