State of Tennessee v. Randy Lee Meeks, et al.
This appeal involves the warrantless search of a motel room containing an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory. After the occupants of the room were indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine and for possessing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, they filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Coffee County seeking to suppress the evidence found in the motel room. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence and vacated the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-01385- CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to address more fully the principles applicable to warrantless searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the State asserts that the officers were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to themselves or others. Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, we have determined that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress and by dismissing the indictment. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jack E. Thompson
The defendant, Jack E. Thompson, in this consolidated appeal, appeals from one judgment revoking his probation and another judgment sentencing him to three years to be served consecutively to the sentence for which his probation was revoked. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence to three years on his plea of guilty to burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony. After review, we affirm both judgments from the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: FLBH, FJH, JR., FH, FLHH, and FEH
This is a termination of parental rights case. By final order entered in April 2008, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Respondent/Appellant Betsy Hawkins (Mother)2 to her five children, F.L.B.H.; F.J.H., Jr.; F.H.; F.L.H.H.; and F.E.H., based on persistence of conditions. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Sometime prior to the transmission of the record to this Court, nine exhibits were misplaced in the trial court.3 Petitioner/Appellee State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“the State”) and Mother agree that the missing exhibits cannot be recreated for the purpose of review on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel Didena Summers v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy Louis Shaw
The defendant, Guy Louis Shaw, pleaded guilty to one count of driving on a revoked license (fourth offense), violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the motor vehicle light law. Subsequently, he was ordered to serve a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail for his conviction for driving on a revoked license. It is this sentence from which the defendant appeals. On appeal, the defendant argues that he should have been sentenced to probation rather than incarceration. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
Appellant, Shawn Hatcher, was involved in a shooting which resulted in the death of one victim and the serious injury of two other victims. As a result of the incident, Appellant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant immediately to a mandatory life sentence for the first degree murder convictions. Appellant filed a motion for new trial. The trial court held a joint sentencing hearing and hearing on the motion for new trial. The trial court merged the two convictions for first degree murder and sentenced Appellant to fifteen years for each attempted murder conviction to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court ordered the life sentence to be served consecutively to the fifteen-year sentence. The trial court also denied the motion for new trial and appointed new counsel at the conclusion of the hearing for sentencing and the motion for new trial. Newly-appointed counsel filed an amended motion for new trial more than thirty days after the trial court denied the original motion for new trial. The trial court held a hearing on the amended motion for new trial and denied the motion. Appellant appealed. On appeal, the State argues that this appeal is not properly before this Court. We have determined that the issues presented in the amended motion for new trial are not properly before this Court because it was not filed with thirty days from the trial court’s denial of the original motion for new trial. We have waived the timely-filing of the notice of appeal with regard to the original motion for new trial and address those issues on appeal. Therefore, the issues presented on appeal are that the evidence was insufficient to support the Appellant’s convictions, the trial court erred in allowing in photographs of the murder victim into evidence, the trial court erred in not allowing Appellant to present medical evidence of his injuries to support his theory of defense, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the special instructions Appellant presented. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Ronald Vengrin v. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Daniel Ronald Vengrin, pled guilty to vandalism in an amount greater than $500, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the appellant to one year and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered that the appellant have no contact with the victim and pay restitution. Subsequently, the appellant was found guilty of twenty-one counts of criminal contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the no-contact order that was a condition of his plea agreement. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of 210 days for his contempt convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction “to modify or otherwise enforce the terms and conditions of the [j]udgment in [the appellant’s] case.” Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Howard Jefferson Atkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Howard Jefferson Atkins, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because: (1) trial counsel failed to pursue suppression of the petitioner’s statement to police on the basis that police did not have probable cause to effectuate his arrest; and (2) appellate counsel failed to challenge the petitioner’s transfer from juvenile court on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard Ray Fitzgerald
The defendant, Leonard Ray Fitzgerald, was convicted of two counts of sale of over .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent eight-year sentences, with seven years to be served on probation after one year in the Department of Correction. The jury assessed a $100,000 fine in each count, which the trial court imposed. On appeal, the defendant argues that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous, the fines were excessive, and he should have been sentenced as an especially mitigated offender and granted full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Almeko Chiffon Woods
On February 4, 2005, the defendant, Almeko Chiffon Woods, pled guilty to one count of forgery less than $200 and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card between $500 and $1000, both Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years probation for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently. On January 22, 2007, a probation violation report was prepared, alleging that the defendant failed to meet with her probation officer and failed to pay restitution and court costs. However, this report was not filed until February 20, 2007. On January 30, 2007, the trial court issued what the defendant considered a capias and the state considered an arrest warrant in connection with the alleged probation violation. Following a June 28, 2007 hearing, the trial court found the defendant in violation of her probation and extended her probation another year. That same day, an additional probation violation was filed with the trial court, alleging that the defendant violated her probation by being arrested for simple possession of a controlled substance and failing to report this arrest to her probation officer. In August 2007, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve a two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, arguing that because the probation violation report was not filed until February 20, 2007, her probation expired on February 4, 2007. She further argues that because the document issued by the trial court in January 2007 was not an arrest warrant, the limitations period for filing the probation violation was not tolled, and therefore the trial court’s extension and revocation of her probation were nullities because her probation expired on February 4, 2007. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the expiration of the defendant’s probation was properly tolled and that the trial court acted properly in extending and subsequently revoking the defendant’s probation. As such, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Milton Carver v. Tombigbee Trucking Co.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a compensable injury. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment. |
McNairy | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re K.E.D.M. a/k/a/ K.E.D.S
The issue presented in this parental termination case is whether it was shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. After careful review, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the judgmnet of the trial court and dismiss the petition to terminate. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Ervin D. Smith, et al. v. Paul Evans, et al.
Owners of property brought suit to terminate an ingress/egress easement across their land, contending that the necessity for the easement no longer existed. Following a trial, the Chancery Court ruled against the owners, finding that since the easement was reserved in a recorded plat, it was not an easement by necessity; consequently, the easement was not destroyed upon the sale of the dominant estate. On appeal, the owners maintain that the easement was destroyed at the end of the necessity. Finding the easement to be express, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court. Finding the appeal not to be frivolous, no attorney’s fees are awarded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Yates v. State of Tennessee, Tommy Mills, Warden
The Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip Rhoads v. State of Tennessee
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Phillip Rhoads contended that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental injuries sustained in the course of his employment with the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The Claims Commission held that Rhoads’ condition was not compensable because it was the result of gradual occupational stress, rather than a sudden, identifiable event. Rhoads has appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that he had not sustained a compensable injury. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael Hickman v. Dana Corporation
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. The injury was accepted as compensable. Before he reached maximum medical improvement, he was terminated as a result of an argument with a co-worker. He sustained a 5% impairment to each arm as a result of his work injury. The trial court awarded 30% PPD to both arms. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision, and affirm the judgment. |
Hickman | Workers Compensation Panel | |
David Joe Jackson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an aggravation of his pre-existing degenerative back condition while rising from his chair during his lunch break on Employer’s premises. The trial court found the injury was compensable and awarded 15% permanent partial disability benefits. Employer has appealed, contending that the injury did not arise from the employment. We affirm the judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwayne Anthony Dixon
The defendant, Dwayne Anthony Dixon, pleaded guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court in case number S51,198 to one count of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, speeding, and felony evading arrest. In case number S52,716, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to a plea agreement between the parties, the trial court imposed sentences of five years for possession of less than. 5 grams of cocaine, 11 months and 29 days for possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, 30 days for speeding, one year for felony evading arrest, and ten years for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The agreement provided for partially consecutive sentencing, for an effective sentence of 15 years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Blevins
The defendant, Donald Blevins, pleaded guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to a single count of reckless homicide in exchange for a two-year sentence with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing, and the defendant now appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern
We granted this appeal to consider whether the courts below correctly held that Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), does not bar the introduction into evidence of the defendant’s Mirandized2 videotaped confession which occurred after the defendant made an incriminating admission during a prior unwarned custodial interrogation. This Court has not previously interpreted and applied Seibert. After carefully considering the plurality opinion, the concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinions in Seibert, we conclude that the courts below correctly held that Seibert does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped confession. We further hold that this Court’s decision in State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1992), interpreting the right against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped confession. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder but remanded for resentencing. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur with all portions of the majority opinion except Part III(C), which discusses the defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the Tennessee Constitution. I would decline to address that issue as it is not presented by this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Mary Polite v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority Agency
Plaintiff appeals the Rule 12.02(6) dismissal of her petition for a common law writ of certiorari which sought review of her termination from the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency. Plaintiff, an at-will employee of the Agency, was terminated after an administrative hearing officer found that she had violated Agency policy. After the Agency filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the trial court determined the petition failed to state facts sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of a common law writ.ing the facts asserted in the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find the petition failed to state factual allegations sufficient to state a claim that the Board acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, and thus, it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We, therefore, affirm the Rule 12.02(6) dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Dotson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronald Dotson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that this court should remand his case to the trial court for a hearing based upon the holding in State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2007). Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delores Young v. Vanderbilt University
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by basing the employee’s impairment rating on the testimony of the independent medical examiner instead of on the employee’s treating physician. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Linda Coker v. County of Obion
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an injury to her shoulder in April 2005 while working for Employer. When she returned to the office, she made a statement in the presence of her supervisor and others that she had injured her shoulder. The supervisor testified that she did not hear the statement. In the following months, Employee received occasional medical treatment for the injury. In March 2006, her doctor recommended surgery. Employee gave written notice of the injury to her supervisor on the next day. Employer denied the claim based upon Employee’s failure to give notice of her injury within thirty days. The trial court found that Employee had given sufficient notice and awarded 7.5% permanent partial disability. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the claim was not barred by failure to give timely notice. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel |