State of Tennessee v. Charles Lincoln Falkner
The Defendant, Charles Lincoln Faulkner, was convicted of selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000' of school property and delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000' of school property. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty years in prison and a fine. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred by: (1) failing to dismiss the charges because of a material variance between the presentment and evidence at trial; (2) failing to exclude evidence of prior bad acts; (3) failing to exclude expert testimony; (4) instructing the jury in error; (5) failing to bifurcate the trial; and (6) sentencing the Defendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bradford Thurman v. State of Tennessee
In 2004 the petitioner, Bradford Thurman, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. No direct appeal was taken from this conviction. In 2005 he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently made and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.In 2004 the petitioner, Bradford Thurman, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. No direct appeal was taken from this conviction. In 2005 he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently made and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James B. Thomas, Jr., ex rel., Karen G. Thomas v. Elizabeth Oldfield, M.D., et al.
The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the hospital is vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of an emergency room physician. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the hospital finding that it was not vicariously liable for the conduct of the emergency room physician because he was neither its actual or apparent agent. We find the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the hospital on the issue of actual agency because there are no material facts in dispute and the hospital is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of actual agency as a matter of law. We, however, find that material facts are in dispute concerning whether the hospital held itself out to the public as providing medical services; whether the plaintiff looked to the hospital rather than to the individual physician to perform those services; whether the patient accepted those services in the reasonable belief that the services were provided by the hospital or a hospital employee; and, if so, whether the hospital provided meaningful notice to the plaintiff at the time of admission that the emergency room physician was not its agent. Accordingly, we have determined the hospital was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of apparent agency. Therefore, we remand to the trial court the issue of apparent agency for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Khalfani Marion
The defendant, Khalfani Marion, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. The trial court merged the four aggravated robbery counts into two convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and nine years for each aggravated robbery conviction, ordering all sentences to be served consecutively on the basis that the defendant was a dangerous offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and alleges numerous sentencing errors by the trial court. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobbie Foland Peters v. White County Community Hospital
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee received medical treatment for low back pain in March 2004. She was pushed to the floor by a patient in April 2004. She had back surgery in July 2004 and returned to work in September 2004. She continued to have symptoms. In February 2005, she was involved in a serious automobile accident, unrelated to her employment. She had a another surgery in July 2005 and did not return to work thereafter. She filed suit, contending that both surgeries were caused by the April 2004 incident. The Employer denied liability, contending that the first surgery was the result of her preexisting condition and the second surgery was the result of the motor vehicle accident. The trial court found both surgeries to be compensable and awarded 45% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The Employer has appealed. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding concerning the first surgery but does preponderate against its finding concerning the second surgery. We also find that Employee had a meaningful return to work after the first surgery, and we therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part and remand to the trial court for recalculation of the Employee’s permanent partial disability. |
White | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Dominic Lamar Blair
The defendant, Dominic Lamar Blair, pled guilty to attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of twelve years and five years, for an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by not applying certain mitigating factors and by ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Douglas Duke
The Defendant, John Douglas Duke, pled guilty to statutory rape. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Defendant accepted a sentence of eighteen months, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of sentence. After the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant an alternative sentence and ordered him to serve his sentence in the workhouse. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James C. Murray v. James Fortner, Warden
The Petitioner, James C. Murray, was convicted in 1994 by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life in prison on the murder conviction and twenty-two years on the conspiracy conviction. The court ordered the sentences to be run consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. In this habeas corpus petition, the Petitioner argues that the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is thus void. After a thorough review of the issue and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Brad Ramsey
The Defendant, Michael Brad Ramsey, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. He was sentenced to serve forty-five days and granted work release under Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-128(c). Following a motion by the Defendant, the Maury County Circuit Court granted the Defendant permission to leave confinement to attend an educational institution. The State now appeals from the release order. After review, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that it was authorized to grant release for educational purposes to a DUI second offender. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Odis Kayaunce Hantz
The defendant, Odis Kayaunce Hantz, appeals his Chester County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated robbery, alleging insufficiency of the evidence. We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stacy Cagle Davis v. Robert F. Davis
After more than eighteen years of marriage, Stacy Cagle Davis (“Wife”) sued Robert F. Davis (“Husband”) for divorce. The case was tried and the Trial Court entered a Final Decree declaring the parties divorced, approving the parenting plan submitted with regard to the parties’ minor child, ordering Husband to pay child support, dividing the marital property and marital debts, and denying Husband’s request for alimony. Husband appeals the denial of his request for alimony to this Court. We reverse the denial of alimony to Husband, award Husband rehabilitative alimony of $800 per month for 36 months, award Husband attorneys’ fees at trial and on appeal, and remand to the Trial Court for a determination of the proper amount of attorneys’ fees. The remainder of the Trial Court’s Final Decree is affirmed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Phillips v. Tenneseee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal involves the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari. The appellant prisoner was denied a hearing in front of the appellee board of probation and parole. The prisoner thereafter filed a petition with the chancery court, seeking review of the board’s decision. The chancery court entered an order stating that, in order to avoid dismissal of his petition, the prisoner was required to file, among other documents, a summons for each defendant, with a copy of the petition for each summons to be issued. The prisoner failed to file the summonses, and the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice. The prisoner appeals the dismissal, alleging numerous federal constitutional violations. We affirm, finding that the chancery court properly dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to file a summons. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Ruron Saine
The State of Tennessee has filed a petition requesting this Court to rehear in the opinion filed on April 4, 2008. In its petition, the State requests that we reconsider our holding that the affidavit did not contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe that drugs would be found inside the Defendant’s residence. The State argues that this Court’s opinion is in conflict with a prior decision of our supreme court and overlooks or misapprehends material facts established by the evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Shane Poole
The Defendant, Christopher Shane Poole, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to two counts of misdemeanor theft. Under the plea agreement, he received consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days, and his sentence was probated. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $1400.00 to the bank where he made the fraudulent withdrawals of funds. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the bank is not a “victim” for the purposes of the restitution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304. After a review of the record, we uphold the order of restitution to the bank. We remand for entry of corrected judgments. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Shane Poole - Concurring
I fully concur in the excellent majority opinion. I would simply add that Tennessee commercial law supports the majority’s conclusion that the payor bank held a valid claim against the defendant. Generally, “an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of a person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.” T.C.A § 47-3-403(a) (2001). |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Ann Harley v. Geary Falk
A former husband appeals issuance of a restraining order in a proceeding on a petition for a protective order arguing that the trial court awarded unrequested relief. The appellant failed to provide a record of the hearing before the trial court. Absent a record, since we must assume the record would support the trial court, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph P. Rusnak, et al. v. Gail Phebus
The daughter of a nursing home resident used a power of attorney granted by her mother to sell the mother a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in a condominium the daughter owned, with the intention of spending down the mother’s liquid assets so she could qualify for Medicaid. A conservator was subsequently appointed to protect the mother’s interests, and he filed suit for the partition and sale of the condominium property. The mother died shortly thereafter. The court granted the request for partition, but stayed the sale of the property pending this interlocutory appeal. The daughter argues on appeal that Tennessee should follow the general rule which provides that the death of a joint tenant with right of survivorship extinguishes a pending suit for partition. We agree, and we reverse the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joey Conner v. Carmen Conner
This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding wherein the minor child’s mother, contending that there had been a material change in circumstances, sought a change of custody. After several days of hearings, the trial court transferred custody from the father to the mother. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and also find that the final hearing below was prematurely terminated. We therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrie Engler, et al. v. Karnes Legal Services
This appeal involves the Tennessee saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The plaintiffs’ lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute when their attorney failed to appear at a hearing. Three months after the dismissal, the plaintiffs’ attorney filed a motion seeking relief from the order of dismissal, citing the saving statute, along with an amended complaint. The trial court considered the motion under Rule 60 but did not address the applicability of the saving statute. The court refused to set aside the order of dismissal upon finding that the attorney’s failure to attend the hearing did not constitute excusable neglect. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Cotton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the majority opinion that the evidence presented in this case does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mr. Cotton was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury he sustained while working at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. In order to find that this injury rendered Mr. Cotton permanently and totally disabled, however, it is necessary to find that he sustained the shoulder injury and that the injury and subsequent treatment aggravated his pre-existing diabetes. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jeffrey Cotton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee was a diabetic. He suffered a compensable shoulder injury, which required two surgeries and another procedure to correct. He returned to work on light duty status. Some time later, he fell into a diabetic coma. He subsequently developed renal failure and required dialysis thereafter. The trial court found Employee to be permanently and totally disabled, found that the shoulder injury alone had caused a 30% permanent partial disability, and apportioned the award between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding benefits for permanent total disability. Employee contends that the trial court erred in attributing only 30% disability to the shoulder injury, and in apportioning the award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(a). We affirm the judgment and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the Suggestion of Death upon the Record filed in this matter. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Brim Holding Company, Inc. v. Province Healthcare Company
The issue on appeal in this contract dispute is whether the defendant breached its indemnification obligations under the terms of a stock purchase agreement. The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for payment of a claim specifically identified under the indemnification provisions of a stock purchase agreement. Significantly, the trial court found that the indemnity provisions in the stock purchase agreement anticipate the specific loss and assure that it will be paid by the defendant. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has already received reimbursement for that payment through the post-closing working capital adjustment and the plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to reimbursement under the indemnification provisions. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
George Campbell, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, George Campbell, Jr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trevor Ford
Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of second degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence used to convict him was insufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense greater than voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tarkis Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tarkis Jones, sought post-conviction relief after pleading guilty to charges of second degree murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, and assault. The Shelby County Criminal Court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |