Dural Alston v. State of Tennessee - Order
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 29, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon in January 1989, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in May 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Dale Brewer v. State of Tennessee - Order
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 12, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on November 15, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count of aggravated rape, one count of incest, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in June 1989, and was convicted of the same in October 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrea Jones v. State of Tennessee - Order
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 13, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on December 3, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping in September 1986, for which the petitioner was subsequently convicted. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508- CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of S. A. W.
The biological father of S.A.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he had no notice of the final hearing. The notice of the hearing was sent in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02 to the address supplied by the biological father. Proof of due mailing creates a presumption of receipt and nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. We affirm. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of F. M. B. P. W.
The biological father of F.M.B.P.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he should have been personally served rather than served by publication and that he had no notice of the final hearing. Because we have determined that the statutory requirements of service by publication were not met, we vacate the order and remand the case to the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Anne Marciante v. William Harold Perry
This appeal involves the classification and division of marital property after a marriage of approximately thirteen years. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of various assets and debts, and the resulting distribution of the marital estate was inequitable. Therefore, we modify the judgment and affirm as modified. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert J. Young Company v. Nashville Hockey Club Limited Partnership
This case arises from a contract dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein, Nashville Hockey Club, entered into a “Sponsorship Agreement” with the Appellee herein, Robert J. Young Company. Subsequently, the parties agreed to change their agreement. As a result, the parties entered into a subsequent “Letter of Agreement.” When a players’ strike occurred, Appellee wished to cancel the contract. Appellant claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and particularly the force majeure clause contained therein, were not superseded by the “Letter of Agreement.” The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellee and, following a hearing on Appellant’s counterclaim, granted judgment in favor of Appellant but did not award damages based upon its finding that Appellant had mitigated all of its damages. Appellant appeals on the issue of damages. Appellee appeals on the issue of what, if any, agreement exists between the parties. Finding that the plain language of the “Letter of Agreement” supports a finding that same supersedes the “Sponsorship Agreement,” we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle H. Brandt et al. v. David H. McCord, M.D. et al.
The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was timely filed. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this medical malpractice action on December 5, 2003, against three healthcare providers for a surgical procedure performed on husband on December 8, 2000. All defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding the plaintiffs had knowledge of enough facts more than one year before filing the lawsuit to put a reasonable person on notice that an injury had been suffered as a result of wrongful conduct by the defendants. The trial court also found that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs appealed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Burd, et al. v. Daeshawn Traughber a/k/a Daeshawn Souza, et al.
Defendants appeal the trial court’s failure to set aside, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the grant of summary judgment in this intentional tort case. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Bennie Jackson, Jr.
A Hamilton County grand jury indicted the defendant, Frank Bennie Jackson, Jr., for possession of cocaine for resale, driving without a license, and failure to stop at a traffic signal. The defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the search of his vehicle incident to a custodial arrest was illegal because he should have received a citation in lieu of arrest for driving without a license and running a red light, both class C misdemeanors. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court agreed and suppressed all evidence seized as a result of the search incident to arrest. It is from this order that the state now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Thomas
The defendant, Brandon D. Thomas, was convicted of one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and three drug offenses including possession with intent to sell a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class B felony; possession with intent to sell a Schedule III controlled substance (dihydrocodeinone), a Class D felony; and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the cocaine offense, eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the other drug offenses and six months for the conviction for resisting arrest, with all the sentences to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his cocaine conviction and that he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we find that the defendant was sentenced improperly but not for the issues on which he appeals. The sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class D felony conviction is illegal because the minimum sentence for a Class D felony is two years. We remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the minimum sentence and affirm the trial court as to the other raised issues. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Polk
The appellant, James Polk, appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery entered in the Circuit Court of Maury County. The appellant contends that the trial court should have ordered a new trial pursuant to Rule 33(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Edward Meeks
The defendant, Charles Edward Meeks, was indicted for first-degree murder. The jury found him guilty as charged and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He has appealed as of right, raising for review the trial court's instructions to the jury and the State's conduct during closing argument. We find the defendant's issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Wayne Otey
The appellant, Richard Wayne Otey, appeals as of right from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Williamson County, finding him guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender, to be served consecutively to a sentence for which the appellant was on parole at the time of the offense at issue in this case. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nina Louise James Bumpus v. Scott Michael Bumpus
This appeal involves a change in child custody and a petition for contempt. When the parties divorced, they agreed upon a parenting plan providing that Mother would have primary custody of their two sons. Less than a year later, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, seeking primary custody. Mother filed a counter-petition, also seeking modification of the parenting plan. She also filed a petition to cite Father in contempt. Since the divorce, Mother had become pregnant by another man, and she did not tell the child’s father that the child was born. Mother also lied to Father and others about the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth. Mother had remained unemployed since the divorce, and her only source of monthly income was child support from Father for his two sons. The parties’ oldest son was doing poorly in school and was frequently tardy or absent. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was in the best interest of the children for Father to have primary custody. The court also found that Father’s actions did not rise to the level of contempt. Mother appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to change custody, its refusal to find Father in contempt, and other procedural issues. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Lashaun Nash
The Appellant, Maurice Lashaun Nash, appeals the sentencing decision of the Tipton County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Nash entered guilty pleas to six felonies and one misdemeanor and received an effective ten-year sentence. The agreement provided that the ten-year sentence would run consecutively to an effective ten-year sentence which Nash was serving at the time of sentencing. The terms of the plea agreement also provided that the manner of service of the ten-year sentence would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Nash’s request for alternative sentencing, which Nash now asserts was error. After review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Lee Ross, Jr.
On February 10, 1994, the appellant was convicted by a jury of his peers of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication.1 Following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to six years incarceration for each count with each sentence to be served consecutively. Much aggrieved by his convictions and resultant sentences, the appellant appeals from the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas H. Aldridge
The appellant, Thomas H. Aldridge, was convicted of driving while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, leaving the scene of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving after having been declared a habitual vehicle offender, a Class E felony, following his pleas of guilty to these offenses. The trial court imposed the following sentences pursuant to the plea bargain agreement: a.) Driving while intoxicated, a fine of $500 and confinement for thirty (30) days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, twenty-eight days of the sentence was suspended; b.) Leaving the scene of an accident, a fine of $500; and c.) Driving after having been declared a habitual vehicle offender, a Range I, standard offender sentence consisting of a $500 fine and confinement for one (1) year in the Shelby County Correctional Center. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie H. Martin
The appellant, Jackie H. Martin, appeals the order entered by the Criminal Court of Shelby County denying his petition for discharge from involuntary commitment.1 On appeal, the appellant presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the appellant is not eligible for mandatory outpatient treatment as an alternative to commitment; and (2) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from this case. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Michael Cauthern
The original trial of this case took place in Montgomery County. Judge John H. Peay presided over the trial of the appellant and his co-defendant, Brett Patterson, which resulted in two convictions for felony murder, one conviction for first degree burglary, and one conviction for aggravated rape for each defendant. The jury sentenced the appellant to death. The appellant’s co-defendant received a life sentence. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant’s convictions were affirmed, but the death penalty was set aside and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Cauthern, 778 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. 1989). On remand, Judge Peay granted the appellant’s motion to transfer the case out of Montgomery |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wallace Butler v. Ricky Bell, Warden
The petitioner was convicted by a jury of five counts of armed robbery, four of which were affirmed and one of which was reversed and dismissed by this Court in an opinion filed on March 6, 1985. Application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied on June 10, 1985. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 24, 1995, which the court below treated as one for post-conviction relief and dismissed without a hearing on the basis that it was time-barred. He contends that this summary dismissal was improper. After reviewing the record, we affirm the lower court’s judgment. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Cole
The Appellant, Bruce Cole, appeals as of right his sentences for five convictions of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. The Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentences and ordered them to be served consecutively. Following a careful review of the record on appeal, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carolyn L. Curry
The defendant was charged in the indictment with theft of property valued between ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and sixty thousand dollars ($60,000). On September 21, 1995, she filed an application for pretrial diversion. The district attorney general denied the application on September 28, 1995. The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the district attorney general’s decision to deny her application. After a hearing, the trial court found that the State had abused its discretion and ordered the defendant placed on pretrial diversion. In this appeal pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9, the State contends the trial court erred in finding that the State had abused its discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carolyn L. Curry - Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion and also with Judge Welles’ concurring |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carolyn L. Curry - Concurring
I concur with Judge Peay’s opinion in this case. I write separately to point out that, in my opinion, a finding by the trial judge that the district attorney general did not consider all relevant factors in denying pretrial diversion does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that pretrial diversion will be granted. Even though the district attorney general may have abused his discretion by failing to consider all relevant factors, the denial may be justified after all relevant factors are considered. If such is the case, in a manner somewhat analogous to a “harmless error” analysis, the denial of pretrial diversion should be upheld. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals |