Bonnie Turner v. Homecrest Corporation, et al.
In this workers’ compensation case we granted the motion for review1 filed by the employee, Bonnie Turner (“Turner”), in order to evaluate the correctness of the trial court’s decision to award benefits to Turner against the Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund. The award was predicated upon the court’s determination that Turner had sustained a 60% permanent partial disability due to a work-related bilateral carpal tunnel injury and a resulting condition of hypertension. The trial court’s award in this case was made subsequent to that court’s decision to award Turner permanent total disability benefits against her employer as a result of a prior injury. We hold that an employee who is permanently and totally disabled as provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) is barred from receiving additional vocational disability benefits unless the employee can establish rehabilitation from the injury which caused the permanent and total disability. This principle applies even though the employee temporarily returns to work following the first injury and suffers a subsequent work-related injury close in time. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s award against the Second Injury Fund. |
Anderson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Tevias Bledsoe
The Defendant, Tevias Bledsoe, was charged with premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a felony, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, all in connection with the shooting death of Nathan Maroney. Apparently accepting the Defendant’s theory that the shooting was accidental, the jury acquitted him of all charges except felonious possession of a handgun. On direct appeal, the Defendant challenged for the first time the trial court’s jury instructions, claiming that the court should have charged the jury on the defense of duress. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress was plain error and granted the Defendant a new trial. The State sought, and we granted, permission to appeal. We hold that the Defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Joseph W. Wilson v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted the petitioner, Joseph W. Wilson, of three counts of aggravated rape and one count each of attempted second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and misdemeanor vandalism committed in 1999. He was sentenced to 71-years’ confinement. In 2005, he filed a post-conviction petition requesting DNA testing pursuant to the Post Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The court denied the petitioner's post-conviction petition, and on appeal he contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the lower court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Melinda Robinson v. Jessie Glenn, Jr.
Appellant challenges trial court’s rescission of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (“VAP”) and termination of child support. We reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Lee Rogers v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Matthew Lee Rogers, appeals the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we note that this Petitioner was recently granted a new trial on direct appeal, and his grounds for habeas corpus relief are now moot. Thus, we find no error in the judgment of the habeas court and affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re J.C.J. and J.E.J.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of E.S.J. (“Father”) with respect to his minor children, J.C.J. (DOB: April 30, 2003) and J.E.J. (DOB: May 4, 2002) (collectively “the children”), upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination existed and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The court awarded the maternal grandparents temporary custody of the children. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Edward Harrison
The defendant, Charles E. Harrison, waived his right to a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. The trial court found the defendant guilty of theft of property over $1000 (Class D felony), Driving Under the Influence (D.U.I.) fourth offense (Class E felony), driving on a revoked license (Class A misdemeanor), and violation of the implied consent law (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seven years and six months. The defendant received six years and six months as a Range II offender for the theft conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for the D.U.I. conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction; and five days for violation of the implied consent law. The misdemeanor sentences were imposed concurrently with each other but consecutively to the felony conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the D.U.I. fourth offense conviction was amended to D.U.I. third offense (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the theft conviction, contending that the State failed to prove the defendant intended to deprive the owner of his property. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the theft conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger A. Weaver, Jr.
The Appellant, Roger A. Weaver, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the Lauderdale County |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Hooper v. Steven Dotson, Warden
The petitioner, Michael Hooper, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Clark v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald Clark, who was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, sought postconviction relief from the Shelby County Criminal Court, which denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Mary Gertrude Ralph, deceased. Patricia Butler, Co-Executor of the Estate of Mary Gertrude Ralph v. Wayne Ralph
This is a will contest. The decedent was an 89-year-old woman with eight grown children. In May 2004, the decedent was diagnosed with senile dementia. Shortly thereafter, the trial court established a conservatorship for the decedent. On August 2, 2004, the decedent executed a will that divided her estate equally among her children. After the decedent died in 2005, the will was submitted for probate. One of the decedent’s sons contested the August 2004 will, asserting that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity when it was executed, and submitted for probate an earlier will whose terms favored him and disinherited three of the children. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the decedent had the mental capacity to execute the August 2, 2004 will and admitted it for probate. The will contestant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in placing the burden of proving testamentary capacity on him instead of placing it on the will’s proponent, and that the trial court also erred in finding that the decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the August 2, 2004 will. We affirm, finding that the issue turns primarily on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that the decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the August 2, 2004 will. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Greg Goff
Probation for the defendant, Greg Goff, was revoked after he tested positive for cocaine and admitted he had possessed and sold cocaine while on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and that his sentence is excessive in light of the circumstances surrounding his violation and past criminal history. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation. Further, we conclude that our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation and not the length of the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. The Civil Service Commission of The City of Memphis and Richard Lindsey
This appeal involves the termination of a police officer’s employment with the Memphis Police Department. The officer appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis (“the Commission”). The Commission found that the City of Memphis (“the City”) had not shown that termination was reasonable, and it ordered that Officer Lindsey be reinstated with full back pay and benefits. The chancery court affirmed the Commission’s decision. For the following reasons, we reverse and uphold the City’s decision to terminate the officer. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Thornton v. Thyssen Krupp Elevator Mfg., Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee suffered an injury to his leg when his knee buckled while he walked across the floor of the Employer’s warehouse. The trial court dismissed his cause of action, finding that the injury was idiopathic and not compensable because the Employee had not proven any hazard incident to the employment that caused or exacerbated his injury. The Employee appealed. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Kenneth B. White v. William Bacon, M.D., et al.
Inmate filed medical malpractice action against hospital for the allegedly negligent performance of his surgery and the failure to order appropriate post-operative treatment instructions. Hospital filed motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was an improper party to the suit because it was not a legal entity capable of being sued. The trial court granted the motion and inmate appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that (1) hospital is not a legal entity capable of being sued; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing hospital to reset its motion for summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight K. Pritchard v. State of Tennessee
This appeal is before this Court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner, Dwight K. Pritchard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the guilty pleas he entered were not knowing and voluntary because the sentences imposed by the trial court were illegal. A recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court compels our conclusion that summary dismissal was proper. The judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing the petition is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Jarrett
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Dennis Jarrett, was convicted of driving after being declared a |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Gene Russom
The Appellant, Roy Gene Russom, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and was subsequently sentenced, as a Range II offender, to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Russom raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mathis Lamar Meadows
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Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Andrew Long
The Defendant, William Andrew Long, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Campbell County Circuit Court. In February of 2006, the Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping and robbery. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, the sentencing decision is affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Ladon Mason
The defendant, Alonzo Ladon Mason, appeals from his Bedford County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. He claims that the trial court erred in admitting a 9-1-1 tape recording into evidence and that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Albert Pippin
The Defendant, James Albert Pippin, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of seven counts of aggravated assault and one count of resisting arrest. On appeal, he alleges the trial court improperly denied him judicial diversion at sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Crystal Capitol, LLC v. Katharine McManus Barber - Dissenting
I regret that I cannot concur with the court’s opinion in this case. Based on the law, I cannot conclude, as the court has done, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ms. McManus’s tardy Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside the properly granted default judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Klein Adlei Rawlins
The Defendant, Klein Adlei Rawlins, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder. On appeal, he alleges that: (1) his right to counsel was violated during police questioning in jail; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed autopsy photographs of the victim into evidence; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed an unqualified witness to give expert testimony; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Because we conclude that no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Crystal Capitol, LLC v. Katharine McManus Barber
The trial court refused to set aside a default judgment based upon the defendant’s delay in filing a motion to set aside. Because the defendant promptly notified the court that she had a meritorious defense, because the only evidence in the record shows the defendant did not willfully ignore the action against her, because the plaintiff has failed to allege or show any prejudice that would result from setting aside the judgment, and because relief should be granted where there is any reasonable doubt that the judgment by default should be set aside, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |