Linda Riggan Wood, et al. v. Terry Riggan Lowery, et al.
Appellant challenges the trial court's judgment dismissing Appellant's claims against the Executrix of her father's estate and enforcing the agreement made by the Appellant with her siblings to share equally in the net assets of her father's estate. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Janet A. Rhoady v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the appellant employer asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award to the employee of a 39% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, asserting that the impairment resulted from a preexisting condition. The appellant also contests the lump-sum award to the employee of $85,000.00, asserting that the appellant employer has a companion disability program. We conclude that the findings of the trial judge should be affirmed. |
Warren | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael Shane Bost v. Stan McNabb Chevrolet-Olds-Cadillac Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee Michael Shane Bost argues that the trial court erred in denying him benefits based on his failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201 (Supp. 2003). We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for entry of a judgment awarding the benefits due employee. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jennifer Dunn, Individually and as the natural mother and next of kin to Jeremias Dunn, Deceased v. Amelia Davis
This appeal arises from a wrongful death action tried by a jury. The jury allocated 51% fault to Defendant and assessed total damages in the amount of $1,250,000. The trial court denied Defendant’s motions for new trial, remittitur, and judgment in accordance with motion for directed verdict; entered judgment against Defendant in the amount of $637,500; and awarded Plaintiff discretionary costs. Defendant appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with suggestion of remittitur. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Dye v. Witco Corp. A/K/A Witco Corporation et.al.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer in this workers’ compensation case, finding that the statute of limitations bars the employee’s claim and that the savings statute provides no relief to the employee. We hold that the employee’s complaint for workers’ compensation benefits is barred by the statute of limitations. We further hold that the employee failed to file his complaint within the time allowed by the savings statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. et al., v. Richard Epperson, et al.
In denying a request for attorneys’ fees in an action involving the enforcement of a declaration of easements and restrictions, the trial court found the phrase “costs and expenses” in that declaration does not include recovery of attorneys’ fees. The trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Clay Bohanan, Jr.
The Appellant, William Clay Bohanan, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony escape and vandalism of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, Bohanan raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defenses of duress and necessity; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Following review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven A. Edwards, et al. v. Nancy Allen, et al.
The Plaintiffs, who own property adjacent to a shooting range, sought declaratory relief from the Defendant property owners and leaseholders of the range. Rutherford County, whose board of commission had passed a resolution to reclassify the property in 1992 to permit usage as a range, was joined as a Defendant. The chancellor ruled that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and granted motions to dismiss filed by each of the Defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the county resolution reclassifying the property was void. We granted this appeal to consider whether the reclassification qualified as a rezoning amendment; if so, whether the deviation by the Rutherford County legislative body from the issue considered by its planning commission subjected the ordinance to a declaration of void ab initio; and, finally, whether the record establishes circumstances which might preclude the Plaintiffs from a remedy. Because the reclassification qualified as a zoning amendment, the deviation by the county from the proposal before the planning commission was substantial, and because there are no circumstances in the record which might preclude the Plaintiffs relief, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the chancery court. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
City of Memphis, a Municipal Corporation v. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis et. al.
After an internal administrative hearing, the appellee, the City of Memphis (“the City”), discharged Police Officer Jack Vincent (“Vincent”), the appellant. The Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”) heard Vincent’s appeal, ruled that the termination was not reasonable, and ordered reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. Subsequently, the City filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the Commission. The Chancery Court reviewed the record and affirmed the Commission. On direct appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Vincent was lawfully terminated. We granted an application for permission to appeal to ascertain whether substantial or material evidence supported the decisions of the Commission and the Chancery Court. Because it is our view that there was no substantial or material evidence supporting the reinstatement of Vincent, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Carolyn Goss v. TENNALUM, a division of Kaiser Aluminum
The Employer has appealed the determination by the trial court awarding compensation to the Employee. After consideration of the evidence, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel finds that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court with regard to causation of the Employee's respiratory injury or the amount of vocational disability determined by the trial court. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mike Curran v. New Generations, Inc., et al.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. New Generations, Inc. ("the Employer") has appealed the action of the trial court, which determined that Mike Curran ("the Employee") suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder on March 19, 21, and then suffered an aggravation of that pre- existing injury on January 24, 22. The trial court found that the Employee suffered 36% permanent vocational disability to the body as a whole as a result of the first injury and 3% permanent vocational disability to the body as a whole as a result of the second injury. We have considered the evidence and conclude that the proof does not preponderate against the holding of the trial court as to the liability of the Employer. We therefore affirm the findings of the trial court with regard to these issues. |
Carroll | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. James Riels
In this case, we granted permission to appeal to determine whether a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in a federal correctional institution may attack his state convictions pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in this state. We hold that the petitioner, who is incarcerated in a federal correctional institution serving concurrent state and federal sentences, is not barred from challenging his state convictions by a state writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to attach the requisite documentation in support of his claim that his sentences are illegal, however, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition but do so on different grounds than either the trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003), this Court entered an order specifying four issues for oral argument:3 (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant regarding the circumstances of the offenses and, if it did, was the error harmful; (2) whether the sentence was invalid under any of the mandatory issues for review set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2003); (3) whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that aggravated robbery is a felony whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. After a careful review of the record and relevant legal authority, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant and that the error was reversible. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new capital sentencing hearing. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
George Haskel Stewart V. Demple L. Sewell et al.
We granted this appeal to clarify the applicability of the rule of ademption by extinction and of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 concerning the sale of specifically devised property. In August 1994, the decedent Clara Stewart executed her last will and testament in which she left a parcel of real estate to her stepson, the plaintiff in this matter. In November 1994, the decedent executed a durable power of attorney to her natural children, defendants Sewell and Judkins. In January 1997, the decedent’s health had so far deteriorated that she required placement in a nursing home. In February 1997, Sewell and Judkins sold a portion of the devised real estate in order to fund the decedent’s nursing home expenses. After their mother’s death, Sewell and Judkins inherited the remaining proceeds of the sale; the plaintiff inherited that portion of the real estate which had not been sold. Plaintiff sued Sewell and Judkins as well as the purchasers of the real estate, alleging fraud. After a trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Sewell and Judkins had acted improperly and granted the plaintiff relief. We granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal and hold that the specific devise of the real property was adeemed by extinction and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 and in imposing a constructive trust in order to avoid that result. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s case. |
Franklin | Supreme Court | |
Christin M. Johnson, LPN v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
A formerly licensed practical nurse appeals a default judgment revoking her license by the Board of Nursing and claims, inter alia, that the Board failed to comply with applicable notice requirements. Because the administrative record does not reflect consideration of the rule governing proceedings by default, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Edward Hogue
Before the court is petitioner Thomas Edward Hogue’s appeal from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his October 2005 “Petition to Set Aside Guilty Plea and to Issue a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.” Based upon an untimely filing of the petition, we affirm the order of dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Edward Hogue - Order
This cause came before the court upon the State of Tennessee’s petition for a rehearing, wherein the State posited that the court’s opinion in this cause incorrectly referred to the statutory provision for the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases when a reference to the statute governing criminal cases should have been used. We agree. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Eugene Bradford
The Appellant, Daniel Eugene Bradford, appeals the sentencing decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Bradford pled guilty to aggravated assault and misdemeanor assault, receiving concurrent sentences of three years for the felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction. The manner and service of the sentences were to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Bradford challenges the trial court’s denial of probation. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anna Lou Williams, Plantation Gardens, D/B/A Tobacco Plantation and Beer Barn D/B/A Jim's Flea Market v. Gerald F. Nicely
This is a declaratory judgment action against the State regarding the use of an easement. The plaintiffs own a parcel of land next to a highway. By deed, the plaintiffs' predecessor in title granted a perpetual easement for “highway purposes” to the State for the Department of Transportation in the strip of land immediately next to the highway. Prior to this litigation, the Department of Transportation asked the plaintiffs to remove advertising signs posted on the land next to the highway because the signs encroached on the State's highway “right-of-way.” In response, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the State, seeking a declaration that the easement for “highway purposes” did not constitute a “highway right-of-way,” and that the State had no authority to require removal of the signs. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the deed conveyed to the State only an easement of ingress and egress and did not grant the right to use the land as a “highway right-of-way.” The defendant now appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Derek Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
This appeal involves a writ of certiorari. The plaintiff, a former deputy sheriff for the County, was discharged. After a hearing, the County administrative board upheld the County’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the petition to add claims. The trial court never ruled on the motion to amend. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court affirmed the decision of the board. The plaintiff deputy sheriff appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that there is not a final judgment over which this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Snow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
The Employee claimed an injury to his respiratory system, which the employer denied. The trial court dismissed the action finding that the evidence did not preponderate in favor of a causal connection between the respiratory condition and the employment. After consideration of the evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Panel concludes that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court affirms the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Alan Hale v. U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the employer had actual notice of his injury on a timely basis. The employee also contends that he sustained a gradually occurring injury and that timely notice of injury was given. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. v. SCR Electric, Inc.
Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued SCR Electric, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeking, in part, payment for work Plaintiff had done pursuant to an alleged agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff and Defendant did not have an enforceable agreement, but that Plaintiff was entitled to recover $3,613.50, from Defendant in quantum meruit. Plaintiff appeals to this Court claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding that the reasonable value of the work performed was only $3,613.50. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden
The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the habeas court, we reverse the judgment and dismiss the habeas corpus petition. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Gilliam
The Defendant, Michael D. Gilliam, appeals from the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his probation and ordering that his eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. In December of 2003, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and received an eight-year sentence. The sentence was suspended following service of twenty days in the county workhouse, and the Defendant was placed on probation. On June 23, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Fleming
The Defendant, Calvin Fleming, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence because the State failed to authenticate them; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree murder because there was no proof of premeditation; and (3) his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault violate constitutional principles of double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the attempted murder, but we reverse the judgment as to the aggravated assault because the aggravated assault should have been merged into the attempted murder. Thus, we remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals |