Niccole A. Naifeh, et al. v. Valley Forge Life Insurance Company, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine (1) whether a life insurance policy purchased by the insured as part of a divorce decree had been terminated before the insured’s death; and (2) whether the insurer or the insurance agent was negligent in failing to prevent the policy from lapsing after the insured issued an oral stop payment order and failed to pay a monthly premium. The Chancery Court concluded that the policy had not been terminated, that the insurer and insurance agent were negligent, and that the proceeds of the policy were to be paid to the beneficiary. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Chancellor’s judgment, concluded that the policy had been backdated by agreement of the parties and had been terminated by the insured before his death. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because their actions were not a proximate cause of the damages. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the life insurance policy remained valid at the time of the insured’s death and that the beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds under the policy. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because there was no evidence that their acts were a proximate cause of the damages. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons stated herein. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Earnest Banks
The defendant, Earnest Banks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Hunter Biggs - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority, and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. In 1978, based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978), that the thirteenth juror rule in Tennessee must be abolished, because it violated principles of double jeopardy. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Hunter Biggs
A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kevin Hunter Biggs, of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years in the Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent as a child rapist.1 The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the successor trial judge was not qualified to act as thirteenth juror; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to include attempted aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense; (3) that the state withheld exculpatory information from the defendant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) and Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (4) that the designated trial judge erred in concluding the defendant’s newly discovered evidence was not likely to change the result of the trial; and (5) that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial character and hearsay testimony. Concluding that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Timothy Taylor
The defendant, James Timothy Taylor, was convicted in a Robertson County bench trial of one count of passing a forged check, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a copy of the original check. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Zillon Felts
Henry Zillon Felts, the defendant, was convicted of attempted first degree murder (Class A felony) and aggravated burglary (Class C felony). The defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years at 100% in the Department of Correction. He now appeals as of right his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry C. Melton
The defendant, Barry C. Melton, was convicted of facilitating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor convictions, for a total effective sentence of two years, with sixty days to be served in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his facilitation conviction and that he should have been granted full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latonya Taylor
The defendant, Latonya Taylor, was convicted by a jury of three counts of premeditated first degree murder and three counts of felony first degree murder. The latter three counts were merged with the premeditated first degree murders. The defendant was also convicted of especially aggravated robbery (Class A felony) and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (Class A felony). An effective sentence of life without parole plus twenty years was imposed. She appeals the convictions. From our review of the record we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, and there being no other reversible errors, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Arnold
The defendant, Antonio Arnold, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and four evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory O. Cherry
The Hardin County grand jury returned two indictments1 against the Defendant, Gregory O. Cherry, charging him with thirteen drug offenses. In separate plea agreements, the Defendant pled guilty to five offenses: (1) possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, (2) simple possession of marijuana, (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, (4) selling a Schedule IV controlled substance, and (5) delivering less than .5 grams of cocaine. The plea agreements provided that the Defendant would receive an effective sentence of ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant’s ten-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the Hardin County Circuit Court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas Martin v. Peggy Sue Martin Moats
Mother appeals finding of contempt for failure to make child support payments and argues that the trial court failed to make the requisite finding regarding her ability to pay. Because there was no evidence introduced to show Mother had the ability to pay, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Warren Kesser v. Peter Hale Kesser
The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement that included both a provision requiring the husband to pay a fixed amount of child support each month and a provision requiring the husband to pay 21% of bonuses and all other income as child support. After careful review, we conclude that the 21% provision is legally enforceable as part of the parties’ agreement and that the 21% provision merged into the final decree of divorce and therefore became subject to modification. Although the trial court found that a modification of both the fixed amount provision and the 21% provision was warranted, the trial court erred in failing to apply the applicable statute and the child support guidelines in effect as of the date of the hearing and in failing to consider the husband’s adoption of three children in modifying the 21% provision. The trial court properly refused to consider the husband’s capital losses in calculating child support due from his capital gains. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David E. Clark v. Lowe's Home Centers, et al.
We granted this appeal to address whether a previous workers’ compensation award can be reconsidered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) if the employee sustains subsequent work-related injuries for which he seeks compensation. Upon review, we hold that reconsideration of a prior award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) is not precluded by a subsequent work-related injury for which the employee seeks compensation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
Carroll D. Haney v. Five Rivers Electronic Innovation, LLC and Lumbermens Underwriting Alliance
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the trial court erred in finding that he made a meaningful return to work requiring the award to be capped at two and one-half times the medical impairment. We modify the award. |
Greene | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael Rodney Smith v. Beazer Homes, Corp, et al.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Tennessee Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff was an independent contractor and dismissed his complaint. The trial court further denied the counter-complaint of Travelers Insurance Company and dismissed Travelers Insurance Company's third party complaint against Joey Helton a/k/a Joey Hilton. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
William B.Thurlby vs. Sevier County, Tennessee, County Executive Manager, Sheriff Montgomery, Chief Seals, Capt. Parton, Lt. Henry, Sgt. Montgomery, Officer "Zeus", Officer Trentham, Officer "John Doe", and Officer Keith
In this action, plaintiff, acting pro se, alleged certain rights were denied to him by the County and several County officials. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment. We affirm. |
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State of Tennessee v. Andre Smith
The defendant, Andre Smith, appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. The defendant pled guilty to theft over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence on supervised probation. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Alan Taylor, by and through his next friend, Kay Taylor Gneiwek v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District, et al.
Defendant Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District (“Defendant”) appeals a judgment awarding damage for malpractice to Plaintiff Kay Gneiwek (“Plaintiff”) as administrator of the estate of Jerry Alan Taylor. Defendant raises issues pertaining to the competency of Plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Douglas Harkrider, M.D., to provide testimony in this case, and further argues that Dr. Harkrider’s testimony failed to establish proximate causation as required under Section 29-26-115 of the Tennessee Code. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of a Male Child, D.P.E.
This is a parental termination case. Before trial, the trial court inquired if the parties wanted a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the minor child. The parties indicated that no guardian ad litem was needed. After a contested hearing, the trial court terminated the parental |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Claudia Henneberry and husband, Scott Henneberry v. John (Randy) Simoneaux and wife, Mrs. John (Randy) Simoneaux
Plaintiffs sued parents of minor child for damages for injuries caused by minor child. The Trial Court granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
George Jerles, et al. v. Margie Phillips, et al.
This case arises from a foreclosure on real property. The Appellants purchased the property from Appellees. Appellees financed the property and the parties executed a promissory note and deed of trust. The Appellants fell behind on their payments and the Appellees accelerated the debt pursuant to the terms of the Note, and ultimately foreclosed on the property. The Appellants filed suit for, inter alia, wrongful foreclosure. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and denied Appellants’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. Upon disposal of all other claims, the Judgment became final. Appellants appeal. We affirm. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Octavian Demetrius Reeves v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Octavian Demetrius Reeves, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to cross-examine witnesses thoroughly and failed to file a motion for a change of venue. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tenica Dickerson
The defendant, Tenica Dickerson, and her sister, Latamia Dickerson, were involved in an argument at a Waffle House in Jackson. She was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. A jury convicted her for the charged offense. The trial court sentenced her to thirty days to be served at seventy-five percent. The defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We have reviewed the record and find that there is sufficient evidence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny L. Fish, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Danny L. Fish, Jr., appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and his resulting sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his no contest plea unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl D. Pirtle v. Humboldt Utilities, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that the employee’s back and arm injuries were causally related to his work The employer also insists the trial court erred in making a single award for separate accidental injuries occurring at different times. As discussed below, the Panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed in part and remanded to the trial court for separate awards for the back and hand injuries. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel |