Ivy Joe Clark, et al. v. Joyce Ann Shoaf, et al.
Husband sued for personal injury damages and Wife claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded Wife damages in an amount greater than damages awarded to Husband for the underlying personal injury claim. Appellant asserts the award to Wife is inconsistent and unsupportable as a matter of law. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Clifford Leon Farra v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Clifford Leon Farra, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by proceeding with an evidentiary hearing even though the state had failed to file an answer to his original pro se petition. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Gordon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of rape of a child on May 1, 2002. On October 7, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition on May 19, 2005. The petitioner appeals to this Court. After a review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Welister L. White v. David Mills, Warden
The petitioner, Welister L. White, pled guilty to one count of felony murder in 1979 in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In August of 2005, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief on the basis that his sentence was illegal given the holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carey B. Haynes, Jr.
The appellant, Carey Haynes, Jr., was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine and one count of selling more than .5 grams of cocaine. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted on both counts. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years for the conviction for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and twelve years for the conviction for the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to several sentences for which the appellant was on probation at the time he committed the present offenses. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant sought an appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Ward And Rosanne K. Ward
The Benton County Grand Jury indicted the defendants, Jerry and Roseanne K. Ward, for crimes against revenue officers and tampering with governmental records. The defendants and the District Attorney General agreed to pretrial diversion. When the trial court refused to approve the agreement for pretrial diversion, the defendants filed an application for an appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the trial court erred in withholding its approval of the pretrial diversion agreement. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Nixon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marcus Nixon, was convicted in Lauderdale County of rape of a child and sentenced to serve twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition seeking a DNA analysis. The trial court initially granted an order requiring the petitioner to submit a blood sample to be compared to DNA collected at the scene. After a response from the State, the trial court entered a second order requiring the petitioner to provide a biological specimen for inclusion in the DNA database compiled by the State, but denying the petitioner’s request for DNA analysis because no “exculpatory results” would come from the analysis. The petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus requiring the State to comply with the trial court’s second order, and also filed a motion seeking permission to file an interlocutory appeal to appeal the trial court’s denial of his petition requesting DNA analysis. The petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion “that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and diligence, and are entitled to a refund of their earnest money.” I agree fully with everything in the majority’s opinion except this final conclusion. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston
Plaintiffs sued to recover earnest money tendered with a contract to purchase realty. Defendant counter-sued for breach of contract and damages. The Trial Court Ordered the return of the earnest money to plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Riels
The appellant, James Riels, appeals his sentences of death imposed by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. On September 18, 2003, a Shelby County Grand Jury charged the appellant with one count of first degree felony murder for the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, one count of first degree felony murder for the death of Franchion Pollack, one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Franchion Pollack, one count of especially aggravated robbery of Franchion Pollack, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery of Mary Jane Cruchon, and one count of aggravated burglary of the habitation of Mary Jane Cruchon. On August 9, 2004, the appellant entered guilty pleas to all seven counts. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions with the premeditated murder convictions, resulting in two convictions for first degree murder. A jury was impaneled for the sentencing phase, and on August 13, 2004, the jury imposed the death penalty for the murder of each victim. In the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances. In the death of Franchion Pollack, the jury unanimously found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances. The jury further determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-five-year sentence for the remaining noncapital convictions. The appellant appeals, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress, (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine him regarding the circumstances of the offenses, (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting the introduction of a post-mortem photograph of one of the victims, (4) whether the trial court’s instruction that the appellant’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution, (5) whether the trial court’s instruction on victim impact evidence constituted a coercive jury instruction, and (6) whether Tennessee’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the appellant’s sentences of death. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael W. Belcher
The defendant, Michael W. Belcher, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of two counts of aggravated assault by reckless conduct, for which he received an effective 24-year sentence as a career offender. Aggrieved of his convictions, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and accordingly affirm the judgments of the lower court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Eugene Gilmore v. Kenneth Locke, Warden
The petitioner, Ronald Eugene Gilmore, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that (1) his judgment of conviction for assault with intent to commit murder is void because the indictment was defective; (2) the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) the trial court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury; and (4) the trial court erred by not appointing counsel. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cornelius Marshall v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cornelius Marshall, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of facilitation to commit aggravated arson, and resulting effective twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karam Hanna v. Gaylord Entertainment Company
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a workers' compensation claim for failure to prosecute and to abide by the orders of the trial court with regard to setting the case for hearing. The employee filed a motion to alter or amend the dismissal order which was denied by the trial court. The employee appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion on part of the trial court, we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Lee Franklin Grace v. Kehe Food Distributors, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff seventy-five (75) percent permanent, partial vocational disability to the left leg. On appeal, the employer contends that the employee's injury was not work related and therefore not compensable. The employer also contends that benefits should be denied because the Plaintiff failed to provide the requisite notice of injury to the employer and that the action was not timely filed within the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Workers Compensation Panel | |
John Jay Hooker v. Bettye L. Nixon, et al.
Plaintiff filed this action to challenge the constitutionality of the Charter provision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County, Tennessee that imposes term limits on certain elected offices. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending the plaintiff did not have standing to maintain the action because he had not sustained a private injury distinct from other voters. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Lee Brown v. Kelly Sue Brown
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding child support and related issues. The trial court awarded Wife/Appellee all of her attorney’s fees and expenses, and couched one-half of that award as additional child support pursuant to T.C.A. §36-5-103(c)(2005). Husband/Appellant appeals asserting that the trial court erred in categorizing the attorney’s fees as child support and on the ground that the attorney’s fees are excessive. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al.
In this expedited appeal, this Court is asked to decide two questions of first impression. The first question is whether a term limit provision contained in a county charter is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4). Like the lower courts, we answer this question in the affirmative. The second question before this Court is whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4) violates Article VII, section 1, of Tennessee’s constitution to the extent that the statute authorizes a county with a charter form of government to impose term limits upon members of its legislative body. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we answer this question in the negative. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the chancery court is reinstated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Clarice Perkins
This is an appeal from the order of the trial court denying the Defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty pleas and motion to dismiss all charges. The Defendant, Clarice Perkins, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault pursuant to entry of guilty pleas. She received an effective eight-year sentence to be served on probation. After sentencing, but before the judgments became final, the Defendant filed pro se motions to withdraw her guilty pleas and to dismiss all charges. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: the trial court erred in denying (1) the Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, and (2) the Defendant’s motion to dismiss all charges. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joseph Jackson, appeals the ShelbyCounty Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and resulting twenty-year concurrent sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims that his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy provision of the federal constitution, that his indictments were constitutionally defective, and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Michael Harris v. Susan Taylor
This appeal stems from a suit to partition real estate. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the chancery court erred when it granted summary judgment and a judgment on the merits based on stipulated facts, evenly splitting the proceeds of the sale of property between joint tenants with rights of survivorship where one joint tenant paid more than her equitable share of the purchase money. Specifically, the appellant contends that she was entitled to contribution from the appellee for the excess of the purchase price paid by her and that she did not make a gift of the excess. In addition, Appellant requests that she was entitled to a credit of $2,000 pursuant to an interim consent order disposing of numerous issues between the parties. The appellee has requested attorney’s fees incurred as a result of this appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the appellee. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Medearis v. Bonnie Baumgardner (Stoloff)
The mother sued to enforce Agreement with the father to pay college expenses for adult child of the parties. The Trial Court refused to enforce the terms of the Agreement on the equitable grounds of unclean hands and the lack of cooperation and fair dealings by the mother. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Marian L. Crull v. Donald R. Crull
This declaratory judgment action was filed by Donald R. Crull (“Husband”) on November 4, 2003. It seeks primarily a declaration as to the rights of Husband’s former spouse, Marian L. Crull (“Wife”), in and to Husband’s United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) retirement benefits, a subject addressed in the parties’ judgment of divorce entered in the trial court some 14 years and 3 months earlier, i.e., on July 11, 1989. In addition, Husband’s complaint seeks to terminate his alimony obligation effective when he retires at some unspecified time in the future. The trial court – interpreting the language of the judgment of divorce – held that the language mandates that Wife is entitled, without limitation, to one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits. The court, in its judgment, did not grant or deny Husband’s request for termination of his alimony obligation; but, in the incorporated memorandum opinion, the court did opine that Husband’s retirement, when it happens, would constitute a change in circumstances. Husband appeals, arguing that Wife’s entitlement with respect to the retirement benefits should be limited to a share of the benefits that accrued before the divorce. Wife, by way of a separate issue, contends that the trial court erred in stating that a retirement, which has not yet occurred, would constitute a change in circumstances when it takes place. We vacate this latter observation by the trial court but otherwise affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Javier Soto-Hurtado v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Javier Soto-Hurtado, has filed a pro se appeal of the post-conviction court's refusal to reopen an earlier post-conviction petition which had been dismissed. He claims that he is entitled to relief based upon the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The judgment is affirmed and the appeal dismissed. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
C. Noelle Chaffin v. Marcus Ellis
This is a divorce and child custody case. The husband and the wife were married in February 1998. Throughout the marriage, they lived together with the husband’s mother. The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate soon after the wedding. The wife felt that the husband and his mother were controlling and oppressive, while the husband felt that the wife was unfit. One child was born of the marriage. In October 2000, the wife filed the instant petition for divorce. After a nine-day trial, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, and designated the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. The trial court also awarded the wife a portion of her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. From that decision, the husband now appeals. We vacate a portion of the award of costs, and affirm as to the remaining issues, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s opinion in all other respects. The cause is remanded for reconsideration of a portion of the award of costs for expert fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |