Donna G. Blanton v. CVS Tennessee Distribution, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Janis Sue Watson and Albert Eugene Brooks
Janis Sue Watson and Albert Eugene Brooks, the co-defendants, were convicted of first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony. Each co-defendant received concurrent sentences of life in prison and twenty years, respectively. The co-defendants’ consolidated appeals address both the convictions and sentences. Having found no reversible error, the convictions and sentences of both co-defendants are affirmed. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James L. Williams, et al. v. Jordan Lee Fox
James L. Williams, Brenda G. Williams, Charles Roberson, and Marjorie Roberson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Jordan Lee Fox (“Defendant”) claiming, in part, that Defendant was constructing a mobile home/modular home in the Oma Lee Williams subdivision in violation of the subdivision restrictions. Plaintiffs sought, among other things, a restraining order prohibiting Defendant from constructing and completing the mobile home/modular home. The case proceeded to trial. The Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the structure in question is a modular home and that under existing case law Defendant was in violation of the subdivision restrictions. The Trial Court awarded Plaintiffs a permanent injunction and ordered Defendant to remove the structure. Defendant appeals to this Court claiming, in part, that the existing case law upon which the Trial Court based its decision dealt with double wide or manufactured homes, not modular homes. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Ronald Gifford
This is not the first time this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the chancery court erred when it found that an insured individual was made whole by a settlement agreement with a third party tortfeasor so as to require the insured to reimburse his insurer. Specifically, Appellant contends that the chancery court erred in finding that the insured was not made whole because it failed to use the formula method used by federal courts for determining whether an insured is made whole and failed to engage in an analysis of the dollar amounts of the insured’s recovery and losses. We reverse and find that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the insured. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company v. Linda S. Rose, et al. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment. I would reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company v. Linda S. Rose, et al.
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) brought this interpleader action seeking judicial guidance as to the person or persons entitled to receive benefits under a policy of insurance insuring the life of Brenda Gail Langley (“the deceased”). The deceased designated three of her four children and a grandchild as the beneficiaries of the policy; however, prior to the deceased’s death, her sister, Linda Sue Rose, acting under her authority as attorney in fact for the deceased, changed the beneficiary of the policy to herself. After the death of the deceased, Ms. Rose, the three children, and the deceased’s grandchild, Ethan E. Langley, all asserted rights to the proceeds of the subject policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the deceased’s children and grandchild, finding that they were entitled to the proceeds because – as found by the trial court – Ms. Rose did not have the authority under the deceased’s power of attorney to change the beneficiary on the policy. Ms. Rose appeals. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert Jones
The defendant, Albert Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction and the trial court erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction on the State’s burden of proof. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Dana Monique Smith v. John Newton Ford
The trial court awarded Petitioner child support for one child in accordance with the child support guidelines. Respondent appeals, asserting the trial court erred by failing to deviate from the child support guidelines. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wade Davis - Dissenting
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wade Davis
We granted the defendant permission to appeal to consider whether the exact copy requirement of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)1 applies to an affidavit that has been incorporated by reference into a search warrant. Upon consideration, we hold that the exact copy requirement expressly applies to search warrants only and does not apply to incorporated affidavits. The record supports the trial court’s finding that the defendant a copy of the search warrant was “identical in every respect” to the original search warrant. Furthermore, even if the exact copy requirement expressly applied to affidavits, we would conclude, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the insignificant differences between the original affidavit and the defendant’s copy of the affidavit do not warrant suppression of the evidence. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lynn Norwood, Alias
This state appeal, initially filed as a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 appeal, is deemed by this court an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The state seeks review of the Knox County Criminal Court’s determination that, in the on-going driving under the influence (DUI) prosecution of the defendant, Ricky Lynn Norwood, a 1997 DUI conviction may not be used to enhance punishment. Because the record and the applicable law support the trial court’s ruling, we affirm the order. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Rollins - Concurring and Dissenting
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Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Rollins
The defendant, Steven James Rollins, was convicted of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial judge merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated first degree murder conviction. Upon conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt the following five aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (4) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any robbery; and (5) the victim of the murder was seventy (70) years of age or older. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6), (7), (14) (1999). After further finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury imposed a sentence of death. The defendant appealed, challenging both his conviction and sentence of death.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The case was automatically docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1). Thereafter, this Court entered an order specifically requesting that the parties address the following three issues at oral argument:2 (1) whether the interrogation of the defendant by the sheriff’s officers after his arrest violated the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to counsel such that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the defendant’s statements; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to call his codefendant, Greg Fleenor, to the witness stand to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in the jury’s presence; and (3) whether the mandatory review provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) require reversal of the defendant’s death sentence.3 Upon thoroughly considering these and all issues raised by the defendant, the record on appeal, and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Teresa A. Carpenter v. Timothy P. Klepper, et al.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against doctor and his employer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed the admission into evidence of expert testimony offered by two physicians under the locality rule and the award of certain discretionary costs. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Donna J. Overman v. Altama Delta Corporation - Dissenting
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Henderson | Supreme Court | |
Donna J. Overman v. Altama Delta Corporation
We accepted this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the enforceability of the employee’s prospective waiver of her reconsideration rights in a workers’ compensation settlement agreement. We conclude that the waiver provision is contrary to both the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(a) and public policy and, therefore, is unenforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jon A. Engle
Defendant, Jon A. Engle, was convicted of DUI and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but ten days suspended, and a fine of $1,500 and costs. He appealed, arguing that the arresting officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. However, Defendant filed neither a motion to suppress the stop in the trial court nor a motion for new trial. Accordingly, we conclude that this issue is waived and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shon Maurice Pierce v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shon Maurice Pierce, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief for second degree murder and resulting twenty-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney allowed him to plead guilty before the trial court held a hearing on his motion to suppress his confession. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John W. Brewer, III v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John W. Brewer, III, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he received a nineteen-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald E. Wade
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Ronald E. Wade, was convicted of one count of facilitation of possession of over twenty-six (26) grams of cocaine for sale, a Class C felony, one count of facilitation of possession of over one and one-half ounces of marijuana for sale, a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of facilitation of possession of a weapon in commission of an offense, also a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant received a sentence of four years for the felony conviction, suspended after thirty days incarceration, with four years of probation, and a one thousand dollar fine. He received a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation, for each misdemeanor conviction. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of his house. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Lynn Hugueley
Defendant, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (3) Defendant committed the murder while he was in a place of lawful confinement; and (4) the victim was a corrections employee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (8), (9) (Supp. 1999). Additionally, the jury determined that the evidence of these aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at (g)(1). The jury thereupon sentenced Defendant to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the death sentence. After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying several issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the 1 trial court did not commit reversible error in concluding that Defendant failed to establish purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in its exercise of peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to dismiss prospective juror Watkins for cause; and (3) the death sentence is valid under this Court’s mandatory review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2003). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Lynn Hugueley - Concurring and Dissenting
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Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
Patrick Thurmond v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Patrick Thurmond, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated burglary and effective sentence of fifty years. He contends he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to remove prospective jurors from the jury panel, failed to exclude physical evidence, failed to object to hearsay testimony, failed to call an alibi witness, and advised the petitioner not to testify. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Wayne Jenkins and Tareaun D. Griffin
This is a direct appeal as of right by Defendant Tareaun D. Griffin from convictions entered on a jury verdict of especially aggravated robbery and attempted second degree murder, and an appeal by Defendant Bobby Wayne Jenkins from his conviction entered on a jury verdict of especially aggravated robbery. Defendant Jenkins was sentenced to twenty years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. Defendant Griffin was sentenced to twenty years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction and eleven years for his attempted second degree murder conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively for an effective thirty-one year sentence. On appeal, Defendant Griffin raises two issues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury with instructions on self-defense, and (2) the court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Defendant Jenkins raises two separate issues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of an expert witness, and (2) the court erred in failing to impose a mitigated sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michelle Allen & Mark Allen v. State of Tennessee
The Robertson County Grand Jury indicted Mark Allen with one count of exhibition of materials harmful to a minor, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, and one count of rape of a child. Michelle Allen was indicted with three counts of rape of a child. Following a jury trial, Mr. Allen was convicted of all three counts, and Mrs. Allen was convicted for two counts of rape of a child. The third count was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Mr. Allen to an effective sentence of twenty-four years and Mrs. Allen to an effective sentence of twenty-one years. The defendants appeal the judgments of the trial court. They argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing them. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals |