Estate of Martha Harrison Bane v. John Bane Et Al.
Martha Harrison Bane conveyed an approximately eight-acre tract of land to her son and daughter-in-law in 2003. Several years later, Ms. Bane sought to have the deed set aside on the basis of undue influence. A default judgment was entered against the defendants and the land was re-conveyed back to Ms. Bane by a Clerk and Master’s deed. Several years after that, the defendants had the default judgment set aside. The trial court then held a hearing on the original petition to have the deed set aside in February of 2018 and determined that the deed was valid. Ms. Bane’s estate appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Eugene Franklin v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Eugene Franklin, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions upon his guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received consecutive eight-year sentences resulting in an effective |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jayme Holland v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
The police seized a vehicle and commenced a forfeiture proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security notified the vehicle owner that a forfeiture warrant for the vehicle had been issued. And the owner filed a written claim and request for a hearing. But before the hearing could take place, the administrative law judge granted the Department’s request for a voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding. In a subsequent order, the administrative law judge awarded attorney’s fees to the owner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325(a). The Department petitioned for judicial review of the fee award. The owner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the administrative decision was not final because the order did not address her request for attorney’s fees under a federal statute. After denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that the fee award violated the state statute. So it vacated the administrative decision. On appeal, the owner argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and in ruling that the fee award violated the state statute. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Walker, et al. v. Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner's Association, Inc., et al.
This is a premises liability case arising from injuries sustained by Appellant Anthony Walker when he attempted to mow a section of ground within the common area controlled by Appellee, Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner’s Association. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jessie Dotson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jessie Dotson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his postconviction petition, in which he challenged his six convictions for first degree premeditated murder and three convictions for attempted first degree murder and his resulting sentences of death for each of the first degree murder convictions plus 120 years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) and the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court improperly vacated the post-conviction court’s orders granting the Petitioner’s request for funding of experts; (3) the convictions and death sentences were the result of juror misconduct; (4) the State and the trial court committed various errors; (5) the Petitioner’s convictions and death sentences and Tennessee’s execution method are unconstitutional; and (6) cumulative error warrants relief. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Franklin Monroe McMillan
Defendant, Franklin Monroe McMillan, was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child and was sentenced by the trial court to a total effective sentence of eighty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the forensic interview of the child victim was erroneously admitted, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to exclude DNA evidence, and that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing rebuttal argument. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a binding judicial interpretation of a contract executed by the three defendants. Plaintiffs were not parties to the contract, nor did their complaint allege that they were third-party beneficiaries of it. The three defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Malik Yelder v. State of Tennessee
Malik Yelder, Petitioner, pled guilty to failure to appear, carjacking, and two counts of aggravated robbery. As a result, he received an effective nine-year sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence in which he argued that trial counsel was ineffective. The postconviction court treated the pleading as a petition for post-conviction relief, appointed counsel, and held a hearing. The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Oscar Smith v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Oscar Smith, a death row inmate, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition requesting analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021. Based upon our review of the record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery T. Siler
The pro se Defendant, Jeffrey T. Siler, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his motion to correct a clerical error. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Allen Harris
The Defendant, Corey Allen Harris, was convicted after a jury trial of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial asserting that the evidence was insufficient and that the prosecutor’s argument was so improper as to constitute plain error. On appeal, the Defendant renews the challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the prosecutor’s closing argument, and he asks for relief based on the omission from the jury instructions of the statutory definition of attempt. Because the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of the offense of attempted second degree murder, we reverse the convictions for attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of attempted second degree murder, and we remand for further proceedings. The aggravated assault conviction is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marlon Jermaine Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marlon Jermaine Johnson, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(2)(A) and for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(1). On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court entered his judgment incorrectly, resulting in errors on the face of the judgment. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Allen
The Shelby County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging Defendant, Stanley Allen, with aggravated statutory rape, solicitation of a minor, and sexual battery. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of solicitation of a minor and sexual battery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of aggravated statutory rape. Defendant later entered a no contest plea to a lesser-included offense of assault by offensive touching on this charge. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective one-year sentence suspended to three years of supervised probation, and the court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for sexual battery and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teli White v. Shelby County Board of Education
Appellee, a tenured high school teacher, petitioned for judicial review of Appellant Shelby County Board of Education’s decision to terminate his employment. Without making findings to explain its reasoning, the trial court remanded the case to the school board for a second hearing. From our review, neither party argued that the school board’s initial hearing was procedurally deficient. As such, the trial court’s decision to remand the case to the school board, without findings to support such decision, was error. Vacated and Remanded |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tavares Dewayne Buchanan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marlon Sontay v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marlon Sontay, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray Hogan
The Defendant, Michael Ray Hogan, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his four-year sentence based upon his committing new offenses, failing to report his arrests to his probation officer, and for failing to report to his probation officer. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) finding that the Defendant violated his probation because the firearm and suspected marijuana were seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) considering proof that occurred after the violation warrant was filed; (3) and requiring the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sonya Nale
The Defendant, Sonya Nale, is charged by indictment with bribery of a public servant, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-102 (2018). After the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to disqualify the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney’s office, we granted the State’s application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 to review the trial court’s order. We reverse the trial court’s order disqualifying the district attorney general’s office from prosecuting the case. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sonya Nale - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney General’s office. As noted by the majority, a trial court’s decision to disqualify a prosecutor or an entire district attorney general’s office is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001); State v . Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tenn. 2000). A court abuses its discretion by “apply[ing] an incorrect legal standard, or reach[ing] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999); see Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 182. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martina Smith, et al. v. Donna Jean Walker, et al.
Appellants purchased a home from Appellee that was contaminated with mold. Appellants therefore filed suit against Appellee. The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., we vacate and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tristan H.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding. As to the mother of the child at issue, we vacate the trial court’s termination of her parental rights due to procedural concerns that are acknowledged by the Department of Children’s Services. With respect to the father of the child, however, we conclude that one ground for termination was properly established. We further conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jo C. Borden
Jo C. Borden, Defendant, pled guilty in an open plea in case number 19-360-3 to two counts of retaliation for past action and, in case number 19-361-3, to one count of vehicular assault; three counts of reckless aggravated assault; one count of reckless endangerment with a vehicle; and three counts of driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of five years in case number 19-360-3 and to an effective sentence of ten years in case number 19-361-3, and it aligned the sentences in the two cases consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender, that it erred by imposing a sentence of confinement, and that it abused its discretion by aligning his sentences consecutively. After a thorough review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences or by denying alternative sentencing but that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gehlen Liebetreu v. Sandra Liebetreu
Father appeals the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time and an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Specifically, Father argues that Mother is a high risk for abduction of the parties’ children and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her unsupervised visitation. We affirm the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time to Mother, but we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayce D. et al.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that seven grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (4) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Additionally, the juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to visit. We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part, affirming the ultimate termination of parental rights. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dashun Shackleford
The Defendant-Appellant, Dashun Shackleford, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury as charged in a twenty-count indictment; four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into four counts and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration to be served at 85 percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his gang enhancement convictions; and (2) the gang enhancement counts violate his constitutional rights to due process and expressive association. Upon our review, we conclude that the State failed to sufficiently prove the gang enhancement counts and failed to comply with the notice requirements mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35- 121(g). Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the judgments in Counts 13 through 16, and remand for resentencing as to those counts. Because the gang enhancements are no longer applicable to the Defendant’s case, we decline to address the constitutional questions raised in this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |