Stevie W. Caldwell v. Virginia Lewis, Warden
The petitioner, Stevie W. Caldwell, was convicted in 1995 in the White County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to life, nineteen years, and six months, to be served concurrently. In a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the indictment was defective, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard D. Vatt, et al. v. A.L. James d/b/a A.L. James Construction Company
This case involves the alleged breach of a real estate sales contract. The plaintiffs argue that the defendant home builder is in breach of contract because he refused to sell them the house contracted for unless, in addition to the price stated in the contract, they paid him for costs attributed to changes in construction. None of these changes were implemented pursuant to written change orders as required under the contract. The builder countersued arguing that the changes for which he sought payment were agreed to orally after the contract was executed, that the written change order requirement of the contract was waived, and that the plaintiffs breached the contract by refusing to pay him the original contract price, plus the amount attributed to the changes. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Christa A. Avenell v. James Allen Gibson
Christa A. Avenell,1 sometimes referred to herein as “the plaintiff,” brought this action against James Allen Gibson (“the creditor”), seeking to recover funds taken out of the Avenells’ two joint accounts by their bank in response to a levy of execution. The trial court held that the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 (2000) changed the law with respect to bank accounts held by individuals as tenants by the entirety; that Mrs. Avenell failed to prove she was entitled to the levied upon funds; and that the creditor was entitled to retain the funds paid into court by the Avenells’ bank. The plaintiff and her husband appeal. We reverse. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Christa A. Avenell vs. James Allen Gibson - Dissenting
I agree with the majority opinion’s analysis until it undertakes consideration of the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a). As quoted in the majority opinion, the amendment states: Any balance so created, including, without limitation, any balance held by spouses, shall be subject to assignment by, or the claim of any creditor of, either depositor, as if such depositor were the sole owner of the funds; provided that is such creditor realizes its claim by any means other than enforcement of an assignment, pledge, or the grant of a security interest made by any one (1) of such depositors, any other depositor not indebted to the creditor may, by commencing a separate action against the creditor, establish such rights as that depositor may have in the funds. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Faron Douglas Pierce v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and request for a delayed appeal. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to allow him to testify at his sentencing hearing, and in failing to file a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After review of the record, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal, and we stay further proceedings on his remaining post-conviction claim. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Billy F. Hawk, Jr.
This case involves a petition filed by the co-executors of the Estate of Billy F. Hawk, Jr. to approve a sale of real estate partially owned by the Estate. The issue presented is whether the trial court should have approved the private sale. The trial court held that the proposed sale was not in the best interest of all the beneficiaries of the Estate. The proposed buyer appeals. We hold that the trial court’s decision was not contrary to the preponderance of evidence, nor was it arbitrary or capricious, and therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Kay Parker Hoxit Ohme v. Frderick Herman Ohme, IV
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Deborah Kay Parker Hoxit Ohme ("Wife") a divorce from Frederick Herman Ohme, IV ("Husband"), divided the parties' marital property and debts, and awarded Wife transitional alimony of $500 per month. In addition, the court approved Wife's parenting plan, in which she was designated as the primary residential parent of the parties' child, and ordered Husband to pay child support of $854 per month. Husband appeals the granting of the divorce to Wife, the division of debt, the award of alimony, and the trial court's decree regarding responsibility for transporting the parties' child to and from visitation. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phyllis E. Hathaway
The petitioner, Phyllis Hathaway, appeals from the trial court’s order modifying her probation and setting her restitution. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in (1) imposing consecutive sentences and probation on December 7, 1989 because the judgments had become final; and (2) in determining restitution fourteen (14) years after the sentencing hearing. Following review, we conclude that the judgment expiration issue is without merit. In addition, we affirm the trial court’s modification of the petitioner’s probation. However, after review of the record, we conclude that the trial court failed to follow the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304 when setting restitution. Therefore, regarding the issue of restitution, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Holman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Holman, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and sentence of twenty years. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction. See State v. Michael Andrae Holman, M2002-01471-CCA-R3-CD, Marshall County (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2003). The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed (1) to interview and subpoena witnesses adequately; (2) to obtain phone records and motel documents; (3) to contact witnesses who could provide the petitioner with an alibi defense; (4) to cross-examine the informant and co-defendant thoroughly; (5) to argue sufficiently that the petitioner could not have been in constructive possession of the drugs found; and (6) to prepare adequately for trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve Skinner
The defendant, Steven Skinner, was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because there is no proof connecting him to the crimes other than uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to two consecutive life sentences. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul K. Flannigan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Paul K. Flannigan, appeals pro se from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his judgments, indictments, and jury |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Harris
The defendant, Patrick Harris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder. In this appeal, he insists that he acted in self-defense and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Finding that the evidence is sufficient and that it entitled the jury to reject the defendant’s claim of self-defense, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Sawyer
The defendant, Charles Sawyer, was arrested by the police for aggravated sexual battery. Following his arrest, Sawyer made an oral statement to the police after an officer read to Sawyer an affidavit supporting the arrest warrant but before the officer advised Sawyer of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Sawyer filed a motion to suppress his oral statement. Based upon the nature of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting the issuance of the arrest warrant and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention, we conclude the statement resulted from an unconstitutional custodial interrogation and therefore should be suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Marshall | Supreme Court | |
Allstate Insurance Company v. Robert E. Watson
Allstate Insurance Company paid a fire loss to the landlord then brought an action against the tenant asserting subrogation rights. The trial court held the tenant to be blameless as to the fire but found him liable under the terms of the lease, which provided that the tenant would be "responsible for all damages to the apartment, intentional or non intentional". Since we find the tenant to be an additional insured under the Allstate policy, no subrogation rights exist, and we reverse the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Margie Marie Lynn, et. al. v. Expediters Express, Inc., et. al.
Plaintiff sued her employer for misrepresentation relating to health insurance coverage and sought to recover amounts incurred by her husband for medical bills. The trial court found for plaintiff awarding her treble and punitive damages. We reverse the trial court's finding of treble and punitive damages and affirm the trial court's award of a refund to plaintiff for amounts contributed as premiums. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.R.G.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of A.R.G., DOB 12-26-2000. Only Mother, C.S., appeals. Grounds for termination were substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and failure to remedy conditions in her life permitting the child's return in the near future. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: B.L.R. (D/O/B 7/18/98) and J.F.R. (D/O/B 7/18/98)
This is a termination of parental rights case wherein J.R.R., who is neither the biological father of the twins nor the husband of the mother of the twins, resists the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated his parental rights, and we affirm the judgment. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.O.
This appeal involves the termination of a biological father's parental rights with regard to his nine-year-old daughter. After determining that the child had been sexually abused by her father, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Grundy County seeking to terminate the father's parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the father had committed severe child abuse and that his daughter's interests would be best served by terminating his parental rights. The father asserts on this appeal that the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he had committed severe child abuse. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the father committed severe child abuse and that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter's best interests. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Deshaun Fly Smith v. State of Tennessee
On appeal, the petitioner avers that the post-conviction court erred in: (1) failing to rule on post-conviction counsel's motion to withdraw prior to ruling on the post-conviction petition; (2) dismissing the petition summarily; and (3) dismissing the post-conviction petition in an untimely manner. Upon review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing and that the delay in the disposition of the petition did not prejudice the petitioner. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Gale Owens And Jordan Blake Owens v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Upon entering guilty pleas, the two Defendants were convicted of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder respectively, and received sentences of fifteen and ten years’ incarceration. The Defendants filed petitions for post-conviction relief, and after a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief to both Defendants. The Defendants now appeal to this Court raising the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin K. McCrary v. City of Memphis
City of Memphis challenges judgment of trial court finding the city liable, under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, for negligence of a police officer that proximately caused injuries to a criminal suspect who was being placed under arrest. City contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the statement of police officer taken during a police department internal investigation; in finding that the officer’s actions were negligent instead of intentional; and in failing to apply properly the correct standard of care. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Joseph Reece
Ronald Joseph Reece pleaded guilty to statutory rape for which he received a two-year probationary sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to grant judicial diversion, he now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence imposed by the lower court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Dance
The defendant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences, based on the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Blakely v. Washington. Our courts have previously held that neither Apprendi nor Blakely affect the trial court’s ability to impose consecutive sentences. Furthermore, upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences based on the defendant’s extensive record, consisting of twenty prior convictions. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Shorter v. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services, et al.
A grandmother, who lost custody of her grandchildren in Juvenile Court proceedings, sued the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") and its employee in Circuit Court alleging defamation. The trial court dismissed the suit based upon immunity. We affirm the dismissal of DCS and affirm the employee's dismissal on alternative grounds. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Wassom vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Denise Wassom ("Plaintiff") loaned her car to her ex-boyfriend who then had a single-car accident while making a beer run. Plaintiff's vehicle was a total loss. Fearing that her ex-boyfriend might be arrested for DUI, Plaintiff reported to the police that her car had been stolen. Plaintiff's vehicle was insured through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Plaintiff also reported to State Farm that her car had been stolen. Approximately two weeks into State Farm's investigation, an adjustor for State Farm interviewed the witnesses whom Plaintiff claimed to have been with at the time her vehicle was stolen. Immediately after these interviews, Plaintiff "came clean" and told State Farm the truth. State Farm denied Plaintiff's claim and Plaintiff filed suit claiming State Farm was in breach of contract. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Plaintiff had made material misrepresentations with the intent to deceive. The Trial Court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |