David Stupp, et al. v. Phillips Auto Body, LLC and First American Insurance Company, et al.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the plaintiff sustained a 25% vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The defendant asserts that: 1) the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof of permanent injury; 2) the trial court erred in finding plaintiff had an operative disk lesion which necessitated surgery; 3) the trial court erred in not granting defendant's motion for additional facts or to amend judgement; and 4) the trial court erred in finding that Dr. Anthony Segal's charges were reasonable and necessary and in granting plaintiff's motion for discretionary costs. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded plaintiff a 25% disability impairment to the body as a whole, urging that the award should have been higher. We agree with the position of the plaintiff, and for the reasons set forth below, we modify the judgment of the trial court to award a forty-five percent (45%) vocational disability to the body as a whole. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Rhonda Elaine Bolick v. Ronald Dale Bolick
Husband appeals property settlement award to wife in divorce action. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald W. Streck
The state appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's order granting Donald W. Streck's motion to receive jail credits toward his Tennessee sentence for time that he spent in federal custody serving federal sentences. Because the lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion, we reverse. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeannette Cutrer Day Siniard v. Mark Alan Siniard
In this post-divorce case, Jeannette Cutrer Day Siniard ("Mother") sought to modify the parties' residential schedule pertaining to their children. That schedule provided that Caroline Siniard and Wesley Siniard (collectively "the children") would alternate weeks between Mother's home and the home of their father, Mark Alan Siniard ("Father"). The trial court granted Mother's request in part by designating her as the primary residential parent of Caroline. In a subsequent order granting Mother child support, the trial court went further and designated Mother as the primary residential parent of both children. Father appeals, contending, among other things, that Mother failed to show a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of the residential schedule. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason D. Love
The defendant, Jason D. Love, appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentences. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jody Lee Turner
Following his guilty plea to two counts of theft, the defendant, Jody Lee Turner, was sentenced in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to an effective four-year term to be served on probation, supervised by a community corrections program agency. A few weeks later, the court revoked the community placement and ordered the defendant to serve his four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgments below. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latasha Whittington-Barrett v. Charles Sprinkle
The Chancery Court transferred this action to Circuit Court and plaintiff has appealed the transfer. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy D. Simpson Kries, v. Tomothy Maurice Kries
The Trial Court awarded child support from birth of the child to marriage of the parties, subsequent to their divorce. The father appealed. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Mechelle R. Elosiebo v. State of Tennessee
The Commissioner found defendant's physician breached the standard of care in the treatment of plaintiff, but refused to award damages. On appeal, we affirm Commissioner's finding of breach, but award damages and remand to enter Judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jerry Bales v. Dialysis Clinic, Inc.
Action alleged retaliatory discharge for filing workers compensation claim. Employer defended termination on grounds employee was unable to perform his job due to disability. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Simmons Trucking, Inc., v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, and its successors in interest, Hartford Fire Insurance, Co.
In this breach of contract action based on a policy of insurance, the Trial Court determined defendant had breached the contract and awarded compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse in part, affirm in part, vacate and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William Eugene Jessup v. Marcia J. Tague
In this dispute between attorney and client, a jury awarded the client damages against the attorney which award was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ellen Hopson Bell v. William Hall Bell
The matter now before us finds its genesis in a divorce action brought by Ellen Hopson Bell ("Wife") against her husband, William Hall Bell ("Husband"). In her complaint for divorce, Wife sought, inter alia, reasonable attorney's fees. She renewed her request for fees at the conclusion of the divorce trial. Without conducting a hearing, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,000, representing one half of her reasonable legal expenses incurred in the divorce. Husband appealed. We subsequently vacated the trial court's judgment, remanding the matter to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of Wife's entitlement to a fee award. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,250 as an allowance on her legal expenses. Husband appeals. We affirm and hold that Wife is entitled to her fees and expenses incurred on appeal. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Cates
The defendant, Roger Dale Cates, was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with one hundred twenty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. The defendant's driver's license was revoked for a period of three years. Because the trial court properly instructed the jury as to whether the defendant was in control of the vehicle, the judgment is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Monty Earl Picklesimer
The defendant, Monty Earl Pickelsimer, entered negotiated pleas of guilt to theft of property having a value of more than $10,000.00 or more but less than $60,000.00 and theft of property having a value of more than $1000.00 more but less than $10,000.00. The plea agreement included concurrent Range I sentences of three years on each offense and certified a question of law for appeal as to whether the defendant was denied a speedy trial under the state and federal constitutions. Because the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, the judgment is reversed, the conviction is set aside, and the cause is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Godsby, Jr. v. Rickey Bell, and the State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contends that: (1) the State cannot maintain convictions on both murder and robbery when the murder was committed in the act of robbery; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because he did not plead to the charge of attempted second degree murder; and (3) the court erred in dismissing his petition without first appointing him counsel. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan Simmons, et al., v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al.
Homeowner’s insurance policyholders filed a complaint against an insurance carrier seeking benefits under policy and a declaratory judgment that policy language was ambiguous. Homeowners filed a motion seeking certification as a class action. The insurance carrier filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff Beckwith’s claim for benefits was time barred and plaintiff Simmons’s claim was non-justiciable. The insurance carrier filed separate motions to stay discovery and defer the class certification hearing until after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court granted the insurance carrier summary judgment against all plaintiffs, thereby disposing of the class certification issue. Homeowners appeal from the order granting summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Maria MacLin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Maria Maclin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and a ten thousand dollar fine was imposed. Following an unsuccessful appeal of her conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Ken Kinney, III
The defendant, Allen Ken Kinney, III, entered pleas of guilt to two counts of sale of a controlled substance, .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Schedule II drug. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(A)(3). The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I, eight-year sentences on each of the two Class B felonies, requiring twelve months in jail, less thirty-nine days of pretrial jail credit, with the balance to be served on probation.1 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with a sentence imposed in Kentucky. In this appeal, the defendant complains that the term of incarceration was excessive. The judgments are affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earice Roberts
The defendant, Earice Roberts, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of heroin with the intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of heroin with the intent to deliver, a Class B felony; and two counts of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. After merging the possession of heroin with intent to sell conviction with the possession of heroin with the intent to deliver conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for possession of heroin with the intent to deliver; eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of marijuana; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each assault. The trial court ordered that the marijuana sentence be served concurrently to the heroin sentence, but that the sentences for assault be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the twelve-year sentence for possession of heroin, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in admitting the heroin into evidence because of the State’s alleged failure to establish a proper chain of custody. However, while the case was still pending, the defendant filed a motion requesting that we consider an additional issue on appeal; namely, the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s recently released Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___,124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), opinion on the enhanced heroin sentence imposed as well as on the consecutive sentencing ordered in the case. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the heroin into evidence; that three of the four enhancement factors were inappropriately applied under Blakely, but that the remaining applicable enhancement factor, to which the trial court assigned heavy weight, justifies an enhanced sentence of ten years, six months; and that Blakely does not affect the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we modify the defendant’s sentence for possession of heroin with the intent to deliver from twelve years to ten years, six months, but in all other respects affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Nicholas Griffith v. Jessica Lynn Griffith
The sole issue before the court in this protracted domestic relations litigation is the finding by the trial court that Appellant was in criminal contempt for failure to make mortgage and tax payments on the marital residence. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court did not set a specific deadline for payment and that the uncontested proof shows that Appellant lacked the ability to pay when the debt became due. We reverse the trial court action finding that the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the ability to pay. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur Southern
The Defendant, Arthur Southern, pled guilty to two counts of sale of a schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years and three months on each count and ordered that the sentences run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eighty years and six months. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The Defendant then filed a motion for a new sentencing hearing or a sentence reduction, which the trial court denied. On appeal the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) ordered that his sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael K. Massengill
The defendant, Michael K. Massengill, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to place him back on intensive probation or in the community corrections program after he violated his probation. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James D.L. Perry v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, James D. L. Perry, appeals pro se from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner attacks his two convictions for possession with intent to sell one-half or more grams of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school for which he received concurrent twenty-year terms. He contends that the first cocaine conviction is void because he was entrapped, that the second cocaine conviction is void because he was convicted of a crime for which he was not indicted, and that both convictions are void because he was convicted under a statute which he claims was inapplicable. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Ross - Concurring and Dissenting
I write separately because, in my view, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), precludes the application of enhancement factor (5). While I agree with the majority that the jury's verdict in count two necessarily includes a finding that the victim is mentally defective, the verdict does not include a finding that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of his mental disability, which is required by the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5) (2003). Our supreme court has held that factor (5) may be used only "if the circumstances show that the victim, because of his age or physical ormental condition, was in fact 'particularly vulnerable,' i.e., incapable of resisting, summoning help, or testifying against the perpetrator." State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993). In my view, the verdict of the jury does not necessarily reflect that fact. In consequence, factor (5) would not be applicable under the rule established in Blakely. Because only one enhancement factor remains, I would have modified the sentence to twenty-one years, one year above the presumptive sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |