State of Tennessee v. Sean Mitchell aka Antwon Rainer
Defendant, Sean Mitchell A.K.A. Antwon Rainer, was indicted for rape and aggravated kidnapping, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant, pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute, to two life sentences without the possibility of parole and ran the sentences consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, (2) that the chain of custody for Defendant’s penile swabs was not properly established, (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re K.W.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that three grounds for termination existed and that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. We vacate one ground for termination relied upon by the trial court due to the application of an incorrect standard in the court’s order, but we affirm the court’s reliance on the remaining grounds for termination and its best interests determination. The trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights is accordingly affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Shahnaz Poursaied v. State of Tennessee
The claimant has appealed from the dismissal of her claims against the State of Tennessee. Because the claimant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of this Court within the time permitted byTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Katherine D. Morgan v. Kenneth F. Morgan, Jr.
In this divorce case, Kenneth F. Morgan, Jr. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s judgment adopting a permanent parenting plan that designates Katherine D. Ward2 (“Mother”) as primary residential parent of the parties’ child and grants Father parenting time of every other weekend. Father also argues that the trial court erred in (1) allowing the expert psychologist tasked with a parental assessment to testify in the manner in which he did; (2) declining Father’s request to remove the child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for alleged bias; (3) ordering Father to pay two-thirds of the GAL fees awarded by the court; and (4) awarding Mother attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester Lee Doyle
The Benton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Lester Lee Doyle, for second offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”) (Count One), violation of the implied consent law (Count Two), failure to illuminate the registration plate of his vehicle at all times when the headlights are illuminated (Count Three), and failure to maintain his vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane of a roadway divided into two or more lanes for traffic (Count Four). Following trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of DUI in Count One and not guilty of the traffic offenses in Counts Three and Four. On appeal, Defendant argues that because the jury found Defendant not guilty on Counts Three and Four, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore Defendant is entitled to a new trial or a reversal of the DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Farrell Wells v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kevin Farrell Wells, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court applied the incorrect burden of proof in evaluating his claims, erroneously denied him relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and entered its order beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline. After hearing oral arguments and following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christapher Baumgartner
The Appellee, Christapher Baumgartner, was charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court with vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He filed a motion to suppress his blood test results, arguing that he did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion, and the State appeals. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Perry Brent Lanham v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Perry Brent Lanham, pleaded guilty to burglary and theft of property valued $2,500 or more, and he received an effective eight-year sentence on probation supervised by community corrections. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Rosebrough v. Karen Caldwell f/k/a Karen Rosebrough
In this post-divorce case, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify the permanent parenting plan to designate her as the Child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tim Gilbert
The defendant, Tim Gilbert, appeals his Giles County Circuit Court Jury convictions of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and resisting arrest, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the rulings of the trial court permitting the State to amend the indictment and to admit the pretrial statement of a State’s witness as substantive evidence in violation of the rule against hearsay. The defendant also argues that permitting both the grand and petit juries to deliberate in a room in the Giles County Courthouse maintained by the United Daughters of the Confederacy (“U.D.C.”) and adorned with various mementos of the Confederacy exposed the jury to extraneous prejudicial information and violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial conducted by an impartial jury, due process, and equal protection under the law. The trial court did not err by permitting the State to amend the indictment because the amendment did not allege a new or different offense. The court did err, however, by admitting the challenged witness statement, and that error cannot be classified as harmless. Further, we conclude that the Confederate memorabilia in the jury room was extraneous information and that the State failed to rebut the presumption that the petit jury’s exposure to that extraneous information was prejudicial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
A.B. Normal, LLC v. State of Tennessee
A property owner whose property was destroyed by a lightning-induced fire filed suit against the State on the theory of negligence. The Claims Commission dismissed the case after concluding that any negligence on the part of the State was not the proximate cause of the property owner’s injury. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Carl Dwayne Prince
The defendant, Carl Dwayne Prince, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court Jury conviction of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel and permitting him to proceed pro se, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence violated due process principles as announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Because the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry to support a finding that the defendant effectuated a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault but sufficient to support a conviction of simple assault, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on alternative counts of assault involving bodily injury and assault by offensive touching. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Boyd
Defendant, Eric Boyd, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated rape. For his convictions, Defendant received an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences for the felony murder convictions and an additional 90 years for the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals his convictions, asserting that: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue, or in the alternative, a special jury venire; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce transcripts of a witness’s testimony from a federal court proceeding as substantive evidence against Defendant; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and 4) he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the record, we determine no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. G'Wayne Williams
A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, G’Wayne Williams, of numerous sexual offenses. State v. G’wayne Kennedy Williams a/k/a Kenney Williams, No. W2018- 00924-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 211546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Jan. 14, 2020). The trial court imposed a sixty-four-year sentence. Id. On appeal, this court vacated and dismissed fifteen of the Defendant’s convictions and concluded that the trial court had improperly merged a number of the Defendant’s convictions. We remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments and resentencing where applicable and affirmed the Defendant’s remaining convictions. Id. On remand, the trial court dismissed the relevant convictions, merged the additional relevant convictions, and resentenced the Defendant on twelve of the convictions. The trial court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction as to the Defendant’s remaining convictions affirmed on appeal. On this second appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding it had lost jurisdiction on the convictions affirmed by this court. He further contends his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith Lamont Brown v. State of Tennessee
A Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Keith Lamont Brown, of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Keith Lamont Brown a.k.a. “Kee Kee”, No. W2018-00731-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2158103, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 16, 2019), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Markus E.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s rights and one statutory ground for the termination of the father’s parental rights. The trial court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in their child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Jerome Edward Douglas
This appeal arises from the grant of an emergency conservatorship. Specifically, the appellant, as the wife of the individual at issue, contends that the trial court improperly granted the emergency conservatorship, alleging that there existed no legal basis to do so. She further contends that the assessment of attorney’s fees against her was improper. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James G. Akers v. Gregory Funding, LLC et al.
A homeowner sued to stop a foreclosure on his home. Most of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court orally granted. But before written orders of dismissal could be entered, the homeowner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The court then entered an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, as well as the orders of dismissal with prejudice. Claiming that the orders were inconsistent, the homeowner filed a post-judgment motion for reconciliation of conflicting orders. The court clarified that the order granting the voluntary dismissal without prejudice only applied to claims against defendants that did not file motions to dismiss. But the dismissals with prejudice applied to claims against defendants that did file such motions. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Magay James Green
The Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug offenses stemming from a 2006 arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to a fifteen-year sentence. The Defendant appealed, it was denied, and he filed multiple motions challenging his convictions. Most recently, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence or correct a clerical error, contending that he had not received 128 days of pretrial jail credits. The trial court denied the motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to amend his sentence and that any alleged error in calculating time should be directed to the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from that judgment that the Defendant now appeals. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Bailey J. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her twins. The juvenile court terminated on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. The court also determined that termination was in her children’s best interest. Mother argues that she lacked notice of the grounds and consequences of abandonment and the procedures for terminating her rights. She also argues that the evidence of the grounds for terminating her parental rights and of her children’s best interests was less than clear and convincing. We conclude Mother waived her notice argument. And while we agree that the evidence of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was less than clear and convincing, clear and convincing evidence does support the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and the court’s best interest determination. So we affirm termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Magay James Green - concurring opinion
I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the issue raised on appeal by the Defendant. The majority, concluding that the Defendant’s contention is unclear, addresses the issue as one of pretrial jail credits or day-for-day service. I believe that, on the contrary, the Defendant asserts that his sentence is illegal or contains a clerical error because he was denied 128 days of sentence reduction credits which he earned prior to the imposition of his sentence. Because this type of claim must be addressed via the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, I would affirm the denial of relief on this basis. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Park Place Boat Dock Association, Inc. Et Al. v. Gary Phillips Construction, LLC Et AL.
This appeal concerns easement rights. The Park Place Community Association, Inc. (“the PPCA”) and the Park Place Boat Dock Association, Inc. (“the PPBDA”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) filed suit in the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) against Gary Phillips Construction, LLC and Gary Phillips (“Phillips”). Plaintiffs sought access to a certain boat dock and sun deck on Boone Lake over a strip of land previously owned by the community’s developer that Phillips bought at a bankruptcy auction. After a trial, the Trial Court found Plaintiffs had proven the elements of an easement by implication and an easement by necessity over the property at issue. Phillips appeals raising a number of issues, including whether Plaintiffs have standing. We find, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. We further find that lake access has been, and is, essential for Plaintiffs’ use and beneficial enjoyment of Park Place, in some instances representing the exclusive reason why people bought their homes in the community. Plaintiffs have proven the elements of an easement by implication and an easement by necessity. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Reynolds
Jeremy Reynolds was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder at the conclusion of a jury trial in which the State was permitted to introduce evidence related to gang membership. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence of premeditation was legally insufficient and reversed the conviction. The intermediate appellate court noted that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, but it nevertheless remanded for a new trial based on its determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting certain pieces of evidence related to gang membership. We accepted the State’s appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. We further conclude that there was no reversible error on the part of the trial court in admitting evidence related to gang membership. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate Reynolds’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon
The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Gevedon, pleaded guilty to two counts of driving under the influence and to one count each of leaving the scene of an accident, violation of the financial responsibility law, and simple possession of marijuana. He agreed to serve an effective sentence of three consecutive terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety-six hours in confinement and the remainder on probation. He also agreed to a special condition that a restitution hearing would be held at a later time. A violation of probation warrant was issued before the restitution hearing was held, and following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement and to pay $30,490.76 as restitution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to serve his sentence in confinement and its restitution order. After review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon (Dissent)
John Everett Williams, P.J., dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal because no final judgment has been entered. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) provides that a criminal defendant has “a right to appeal when the trial court has entered a final judgment of conviction.” State v. Comer, 278 S.W.3d 758, 760-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). However, “‘Rule 3 appeals … may be taken only from final judgments.’” State v. William Chandler Daniels, No. E2009-02172-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5343776, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010) (quoting State v. Maddox, 603 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)). A judgment is considered final “‘when it decides and disposes of the whole merits of the case leaving nothing for the further judgment of the court.’” State v. David Allan Bohanon, No. M2012-02366-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5777254, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2013) (quoting Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 460 (Tenn. 1995)). |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals |