Thomas Anderson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
M2000-01737-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for theft of property valued less than $1000 but greater than $500, a Class E felony, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jon Hall v. Bill McLesky, et al.
M2000-01857-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
A death row inmate filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, claiming that employees of the Department of Correction had caused his attorney's phone number to be removed from an approved calling list, and had refused to restore the number to the list in a timely way. The inmate named seven employees of the Department and a private telephone company as defendants, and demanded monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the action, because the petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Because we do not believe the petitioner was entitled to relief under any of the theories he advanced, we affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Lonnie Jones
W2001-00741-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following his guilty plea to second degree murder for which he received a sentence of 15 years. He contends his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state contends the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. We conclude the petition was barred by the statute of limitations and is otherwise without merit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tony Williams
W2001-00788-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

The defendant, Tony Williams, appeals the trial court's denial of pretrial diversion after a petition for certiorari from the decision of the district attorney. In this discretionary appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the single issue presented for review is whether the denial of pretrial diversion qualified as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. The judgment denying relief is affirmed.

State vs. Florence Harrell
E2001-01710-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Union County the Petitioner/Appellant, the State of Tennessee ex rel. Thomas J. Harrell, contends that the Chancery Court erred in denying the State a judgment against the Respondent/Appellee, Florence E. Harrell, for retroactive child support and for reimbursement of AFDC benefits paid by the State on behalf of Mr. Harrell and his and Ms. Harrell's two minor children. We affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Joe Rittenberry
E2000-02722-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

The defendant was convicted by a jury on one count of sale of marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the sale of marijuana conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted rebuttal testimony regarding an undisclosed, out-of-court statement made by the defendant; and (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on simple possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude (1) the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) the failure of the state to disclose the out-of-court statement made during the defendant's interrogation violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A); and (3) the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on simple possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense. The conviction for sale of marijuana is reversed; the conviction for possession of cocaine is affirmed; and this matter is remanded for a new trial on the sale of marijuana.

Charles Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
E2000-03153-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The petitioner, Charles Mitchell, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting sentence of life without parole. First, he contends that his mental condition prevented him from knowingly and intelligently entering his guilty plea. Second, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorneys (1) did not seek to suppress statements that the petitioner gave to police soon after he murdered his wife; (2) did not use diminished mental capacity in his defense; (3) induced him to plead guilty by telling him that the state had filed a notice to seek the death penalty when no such notice had been filed; and (4) failed to request a more detailed mental evaluation of him. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

Diane Crawford v. Crotty-Tenn, Inc
M2001-00715-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Gayden, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. K. Smith, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer in this case had two insurance carriers. The employer had one insurer at the time the employee first reported her gradual injury and temporarily left work due to her carpal tunnel syndrome. The employer then changed insurance carriers and the second insurer's coverage extended through the time the employee continued to work and permanently ended her employment. The trial court held the first insurer liable for permanent partial disability benefits due to the fact that the employee's first report of work injury constituted a definite date at which the employee knew the nature and the cause of her injury. The first insurer appeals and argues that the second insurer should be liable because the employee continued to work during the second insurer's coverage. As discussed below, the Panel affirms the result of the trial court, but on different grounds. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. GAYDEN, Sp. J., in which Drowota, J., and Loser, Sp. J., joined. Hal W. Wilkins, Leitner, Williams, Dooley & Napolitan, Nashville, TN for the defendant- appellant Crotty-Tenn, Inc. (AIG). Robert R. Davies, Davies, Humphreys & Evans, Nashville, TN for the defendant- appellee Crotty-Tenn, Inc. (EBI). William E. Halfacre, III, Madewell, Jared, Halfacre & Williams, Cookeville, TN for the plaintiff-appellee Diane Crawford. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION On January 2, 1995, the employee/appellee Diane Crawford began to work as a riveter for Crotty-Tenn, Inc.. As a riveter, Ms. Crawford held boards together while forcing metal clips through them to make automotive sun-visors. Her job involved continuous gripping and squeezing with her hands. In the summer of 1996, Ms. Crawford began to feel pain and numbness in her wrists and hands radiating up her arms and into her shoulders and neck. On August 7, 1996, Ms. Crawford's symptoms worsened to the point at which she was forced to seek medical treatment. Ms. Crawford filed a first report of work injury with Crotty-Tenn and saw Dr. Nancy Blevins, who prescribed medication for Ms. Crawford and suspended her from work for six weeks. AIG, the defendant-appellant in this action and Crotty-Tenn's workers' compensation carrier at the time, paid for Ms. Crawford's temporary total disability benefits. After her six weeks of leave, Ms. Crawford returned to work. Ms. Crawford subsequently saw Dr. Anthony Carter and Dr. Sam Barnes in November and December of 1996 and Dr. Jim Talmage in June of 1997. Ms. Crawford was moved to a light-duty job in November of 1996. Ms. Crawford also saw various other doctors regarding her injury including Dr. David Gaw. Ms. Crawford reported feeling increasing pain and was placed on permanent restrictions. Dr. Talmage stated that the most effective treatment would be for Ms. Crawford to change vocations. However, Ms. Crawford did not stop her work due to her injury until she left her employment with Crotty-Tenn two years later in 1998. On April 1, 1997, Crotty-Tenn changed its workers' compensation carrier from AIG to EBI. On August 26, 1998, after Crotty-Tenn lost a major contract, Ms. Crawford volunteered to be laid off due in part to her injury and has not since returned to work at Crotty-Tenn. On May 4, 2, Dr. Gaw testified that the additional squeezing and gripping from her continued work after 1996 could have aggravated Ms. Crawford's injury based on an independent medical evaluation that he performed on Ms. Crawford on April 14, 1998. However, Dr. Gaw could not testify that Ms. Crawford experienced an anatomical change from her continued work. The trial court found the defendant/appellant AIG, the employer's first insurer, liable for benefits to Ms. Crawford because Ms. Crawford had filed her first report of injury during its coverage. The trial court stated that when the employee knew the nature and cause of the injury on a definite date, the liability of an insurance carrier would depend on that date. The trial court awarded Ms. Crawford permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $22,8.96 based on a vocational disability rating of 36% to the body as a whole. Review on appeal is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence 2

Lisa Annette Barlar v. Johnson Control
M2000-02423-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Gayden, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Stella L. Hargrove, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In determining whether the employee's asthma was an occupational disease, the trial court considered conflicting medical testimony, the employee's workplace conditions, and the employee's history of smoking. The employer contends the trial court erred (1) when it held that the plaintiff's asthma arose out of and in the scope of her employment, (2) in finding that the plaintiff's asthma is permanent, and (3) in awarding the employee 45% permanent partial disability to the whole body. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed. GAYDEN, SP. J., in which DROWOTA, J., and LOSER, SP. J. joined. Joseph Ward Henry, Jr., Henry, Henry & Speer, Pulaski, TN, for the appellant, Johnson Control. Richard Thomas Matthews, Matthews & Tisher, Columbia, TN, for the appellee, Lisa Annette Barlar. MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee/appellee, Lisa Annette Barlar, was employed with Johnson Control, from 1991 until February 21. Ms. Barlar is thirty-five years old, has a ninth grade education, has not obtained a GED, and has no special training or skills. She also smoked approximately a pack and a half of cigarettes a day from the ages of fifteen to thirty-two, quitting in November 1998. Her positions with Johnson Control involved various aspects of the production of foam automobile seats and headrests, which exposed her to foam dust, chemicals, and fumes. Ms. Barlar began experiencing respiratory problems in 1994 while using a "hot knife" to cut through 1 fabric covering the seats. In that process, black smoke was emitted making it difficult for her to breathe and causing her heart to race. Ms. Barlar was hospitalized for approximately one week and missed work for about three months due to this incident. After 1994, she continually experienced difficulty breathing while exposed to the foam dust, chemicals, and fumes at work and was hospitalized on three other occasions; the last hospitalization leading to her decision to stop working. The trial court found that Ms. Barlar had a compensable occupational disease with a forty-five percent permanent partial disability. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court but there is a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-31, an occupational disease is a disease that "arises out of and in the course of employment." The causation of a disease must be established by expert medical testimony in all but the most obvious cases. Thomas v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tenn. 1991). In this case, however, there is conflicting medical testimony about the existence and cause of the employee's disease. Prior to her employment, Ms. Barlar was in good health with no respiratory or pulmonary problems. She began visiting Drs. Haney and Heflin for her respiratory problems in 1994 after her first hospitalization. In 1998, Dr. Heflin prescribed medications and an inhaler for a diagnosis of "asthmatic bronchitis secondary to smoking and pollution exposure." He stated that her condition probably had multiple causes including her workplace and her smoking. In 1999, Dr. Haney formally diagnosed occupational asthma and opined that her condition "more probably than not" arose out of her employment. He gave her permanent restrictions of working in a clean air environment. In 2, however, Ms. Barlar saw Dr. Bluhm at the request of Johnson Control. Dr. Bluhm examined Ms. Barlar, reviewed her medical records, and stated that she had no evidence of lung disease and did not have occupational asthma even though she may have some form of asthma. Trial judges have discretion in the weight in which they consider conflicting medical testimony. Orman v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1996). In doing so, the judge is to consider the "qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information by other experts." Id. Absolute medical certainty is not required for an employee to establish medical causation. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987). Additionally, any reasonable doubt as to causation is to be construed in favor of the employee. Hall v. Auburntown Indus., 684 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tenn. 1985). In this case, the trial judge gave more weight to the testimony of Dr. Heflin, which is supported by the fact that he examined the employee on several occasions and had knowledge of the chemicals and pollutants present in the production of foam seats. Furthermore, the Material Safety Data Sheets indicate that Ms. Barlar was exposed to substances during her employment, such as Aromatic Isocyanate, that can cause asthma. In light of these reasons and in the presumption of correctness of the trial court, we affirm the finding that the employee's disease is compensable. The Panel also affirms the trial court's finding of forty-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Although, as the employer indicates, Ms. Barlar's condition 2

State of Tennessee v. Scott Bradley Price
E2000-00441-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The Appellant, Scott Bradley Price, was convicted of child rape, a class A felony, following a Knox County jury trial. The trial court sentenced Price, as a range I offender, to twenty-one (21) years in the Department of Correction. In his sole issue on appeal, Price argues that the trial court erred in the length of sentence because the mitigating factors outweighed the enhancement factors and, therefore, his sentence should have been reduced below the midpoint range of twenty (20) years. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

Billy Joe Henderson v. State of Tennessee
E2001-00438-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The Appellant, Billy Joe Henderson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Henderson is currently serving a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction pursuant to his 1998 conviction for first degree murder. Following a review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. Because Henderson in part states a "colorable claim," the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

Ricky W. Mcelhaney v. Howard B. Barnwell
E2000-02748-COA-F3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

Ricky McElhaney vs. Howard Barnwell
E2000-02748-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

Kathie King v. Billy King
M2001-00275-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
This is an appeal of a divorce proceeding presented to the trial court in an unusual manner, by agreement of all parties and all attorneys. Husband appeals the final judgment, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.

J.D. Landers v. State of Tennessee
M2001-00319-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

J.D. Landers appeals from the Perry County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He seeks to set aside his conviction and guilty plea because he was not provided the effective assistance of counsel and did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently enter his guilty plea. Because the trial court properly dismissed the petition, we affirm.

Oudon Panyananouvong v. State of Tennessee
M2000-03152-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. S. Daniel

The petitioner, Oudon Panyanouvong, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After the appointment of post-conviction counsel,the petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney and ultimately refused to proceed with the evidentiary hearing. The issue is whether the trial court's summary dismissal was erroneous. Because the petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to proceed pro se and was not specifically admonished of the perils of pro se representation, the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Bobby Vincent Blackmon
M2000-03149-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

In May of 1993, the Appellant, Bobby Vincent Blackmon, was indicted by a Sumner County grand jury for one count of class A felony possession of cocaine over 300 grams stemming from his involvement in a "reverse sting" drug operation. He was subsequently convicted in February of 1995. In 1998, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Blackmon a new trial. See State v. Bobby Vincent Blackmon, 984 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1998).

In November of 1999, Blackmon was re-tried and again convicted of the offense of possession with the intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing on May 17, 2000, the trial court sentenced Blackmon to thirty-eight years as a Range II offender and ordered his sentence be served consecutive to a prior first-degree murder conviction.

On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether Blackmon was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Blackmon to assert an "outrageous government conduct" defense, an entrapment defense and/or an impossibility defense; (3) whether the indictment in this case was fatally defective; and (4) whether the sentence was excessive. After review, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Oscar Gomez
M2001-00130-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The Defendant, Oscar Gomez, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and theft under five hundred dollars. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to a concurrent term of six months for the theft. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence of premeditated murder is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Johnny Lewis
M2000-02809-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles D. Haston, Sr.

The defendant appeals his conviction of violating the motor vehicle habitual offender law. Because we find that his motor vehicle offender status was terminated before he was discovered driving a motor vehicle, we conclude that the convicting evidence was insufficient. We reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

Oudon Panyananouvong v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
M2000-03152-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. S. Daniel

I concur in the majority opinion, except I question whether a post-conviction petitioner has a right to self-representation at his or her will. In this respect, I view this court’s statements in Cole v. State, 798 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), regarding a common law right to self-representation as dicta; self-representation was certainly not an issue in the appeal.

Sharon Kaye Outten v. Russell Campbell
M2001-00490-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

In the Matter of: C.J.S.
M2000-02836-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ben Hall Mcfarlin
A.E.S. is the mother of C.J.S., who has been in foster care for four of his five years. At the State's petition, the trial court terminated these rights based upon A.E.S.'s mental incapacities. A.E.S. appealed this decision arguing that the grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Bryan Hanley v. State of Tennessee
M2000-02182-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The petitioner, Bryan Hanley, was convicted by a jury in the Hickman County Circuit Court of one count of first degree murder and one count of theft of property over $1000. The petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and to three years incarceration for the theft conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Michael T.Meghreblian
M2000-02444-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

The defendant, Michael T. Meghreblian, is serving a seven and one-half year sentence in the Department of Correction as a result of his Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated assault. On appeal, he complains that the trial court erred (1) in determining the length of his Range II sentence and (2) in denying any form of alternative sentence. Because the record supports the trial court's determinations, we affirm.

Dept. of Children's Svcs. vs. Jeri Layne
M2001-00652-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Earlene Y. Speer
This is a termination of parental rights case involving four small children. The parental rights of the biological father, Carl Edward Layne, were terminated after default judgment was entered against him and such termination has not been appealed. The parental rights of the biological mother, Jeri Fay Layne, were terminated by the Juvenile Court of Grundy County after a hearing based upon statutory grounds of abandonment, failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan and persistent, unremedied conditions. Mrs. Layne timely appealed and we affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.