State of Tennessee v. Rickey Benson
In 2020, the Defendant, Rickey Benson, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmie Liddell
The Defendant, Jimmie Liddell, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; and one count of solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2018) (solicitation of a person under eighteen years of age). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 110 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevion McDonald
Kevion McDonald, Defendant, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both counts as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-one years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Defendant initiated this appeal, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly admitted a photographic lineup into evidence; (2) committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of premeditation; and (3) improperly sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years in incarceration for attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with the definition of premeditation, an element of the offense of attempted first degree murder. However, we find the error harmless because the proof of premeditation was overwhelming. As a result, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Damon Johnson
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Damon Johnson, of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, argues the trial court improperly commented on his right not to testify, and asserts the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Javier Alexander Rivas and Hayden S. Fryer
Javier Alexander Rivas (“Defendant Rivas”) and Hayden S. Fryer (“Defendant Fryer”) (or collectively “the Defendants”) were each convicted by a Davidson County jury for first degree felony murder, first degree premediated murder, attempted aggravated burglary, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, burglary of an automobile, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, for which the trial court sentenced both Defendant Rivas and Defendant Fryer to a total effective sentence of life plus fifty-two years. On appeal, Defendant Rivas argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of offenses; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Fryer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted aggravated burglary. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Honaker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronald Honaker, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Alleigh B.
A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. She challenges the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Toryiana Louisa Soto, Et Al. v. Presidential Properties, LLC, Et Al.
This case involves claims brought under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, along with other related claims. After a two-day trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them treble damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants appealed. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Moates v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Adam Moates, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lafaris Brown
Defendant, Lafaris Brown, was charged in two separate indictments with one count each of unlawful possession of a firearm and criminal gang offense enhancement. Case No. 114910, offense date January 6, 2019, was tried by jury on September 16, 2019, and Case No. 115023, offense date October 24, 2018, was tried in a bench trial on October 17, 2019. In both cases, which are consolidated on appeal, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. He was acquitted of the criminal gang offense enhancement count in Case No. 114910, and the trial court dismissed the criminal gang offense enhancement count in Case No. 115023. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) in Case No. 115023, that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress; (2) in Case No. 114910, (a) that the trial court erred by denying a jury instruction on a necessity defense, and (b) improper prosecutorial argument; and (3) in both cases, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in Case No. 11490; however, we determine that, in Case No. 115023, law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Thus, we reverse the judgment of conviction in Case No. 115023. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Affordable Construction Services, Inc. Et Al. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Et Al.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-111 provides that when an insured property owner’s home or other structure sustains more than $1,000 in damages, the property or casualty insurance company shall name the general contractor of an uncompleted construction contract as a payee when issuing payment to the owner for the loss. Here, an insurance company issued a check to the insured owner but did not name the general contractor as a payee. The general contractor sued the insurance company, alleging noncompliance with section 56-7-111. We accepted three certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, one of which requires us to determine whether a general contractor has a private right of action against an insurance company for violating section 56-7-111. We hold that section 56-7-111 does not expressly grant a private right of action to the general contractor, and the general contractor failed to prove that the legislature intended to imply a private right of action. Thus, the general contractor has no right to sue the insurance company for noncompliance with section 56-7-111. |
Supreme Court | ||
Jarod Marges Phillips v State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jarod Marges Phillips, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because his claim was based on a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that established a new rule of constitutional law. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Javarius DeShawn Baugh
The Defendant, Javarius Deshawn Baugh, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Ann Crouch v. Calvin Conway Crouch
In post-divorce proceedings, a former husband petitioned to reduce or terminate his alimony in futuro payments to his former wife. The trial court denied the former husband’s request, ruling that he failed to show that a substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred since the alimony was awarded. The former husband appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Alan Shannon v. Genera Garandang Shannon
The trial court granted a wife’s motion to alter or amend a final decree of divorce. The ruling modified the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. On appeal, the husband contends that there was no basis for setting aside an agreement that the parties entered into voluntarily and knowingly. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government Of Nashville & Davidson County v. Layton Jones
A local government cited a property owner for operating his property as a short-term rental without a permit. A general sessions court found the property owner violated the shortterm rental ordinance and enjoined him from committing further violations. The government later brought two criminal contempt actions against the property owner, claiming that he violated the court’s injunction by continuing to run a short-term rental without a permit. The first time, the property owner acknowledged his violations, and the general sessions court entered an agreed order. The second time, the court found the property owner guilty of contempt after a hearing. The property owner appealed that finding to the circuit court. The circuit court found that the property owner was in contempt of the general sessions court’s order on eighteen occasions. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Shelton D. Ramey
This appeal concerns a residual beneficiary’s objection to an estate administrator receiving any fees based upon the latter’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. David Ramey (“Ramey”) is a beneficiary under his late father’s will. However, Ramey was in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy at the time of his father’s death, and Ramey’s inheritance became part of the bankruptcy estate. Dustin Crouse (“Crouse”) was appointed administrator of the probate estate. Michael Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatrick”) is the Chapter 7 Trustee. Ramey filed an objection alleging Crouse breached his fiduciary duty by selling the estate’s primary asset, a house, below market value in a private sale. The General Sessions Court for Loudon County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”) ruled against Ramey, although it found he had standing to bring his claims. Ramey appeals, objecting to fees paid to Crouse. We hold that Ramey lacks standing as any such claims of his to the probate estate belong to the Chapter 7 Trustee rather than him. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court, although on different grounds. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed as modified. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jason S.
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(A)(ii); (3) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Lindsey Beth Honea v. John William Honea
A mother and father of three children were divorced in 2018, and both parties filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan later that year. Both parties also asked the trial court to hold the other party in contempt for violating the parenting plan and engaging in other objectionable conduct. The trial court found the father guilty of two counts of contempt and the mother guilty of three counts of contempt, and it ordered them to spend two days in jail for each count. The court granted the husband’s petition to modify the parenting plan and changed the designation of the primary residential parent from the mother to the father. The mother appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Jonathan Michael Bass
The Defendant, Jonathan Michael Bass, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more, but less than $10,000, two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $2,500, one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, three counts of “doctor shopping,” and three counts of prescription drug fraud. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of eight years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering partial consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jaleen Genard Allen
The Defendant, Jaleen Genard Allen, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (firearm violation). The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and to six years for the firearm violation. The court ordered consecutive service, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney Allison West v. Phillip Ryan Chase Byrd
The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Courtney Allison West, stated that appellant was appealing the judgment entered on January 7, 2021. As the parenting plan entered on January 7, 2021 does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Amber Lyn Rogers v. Joshua Michael Rogers, Sr.
A wife obtained an ex parte order of protection from her estranged husband. After a hearing, the trial court found that the wife had proven the allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. So the court extended the order of protection for one year. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s abuse finding, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Maurice DeBerry
A jury convicted the Defendant, Marvin Maurice DeBerry, of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”) and of three misdemeanor offenses not presented for appellate review. After his conviction but prior to his sentencing, an amendment to the statute that was the basis of his MVHO conviction went into effect, so that the Defendant’s conduct was no longer criminalized and, concomitantly, triggered no penalty. The trial court, after initially sentencing the Defendant to serve five years, modified the Defendant’s judgment to reflect that he was to be subjected to no penalty. On appeal, we are called to determine whether the Defendant may benefit from the savings statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112. We hold that the savings statute applies because Legislature’s act of removing punishment for the offense constitutes a lesser penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment reducing the Defendant’s sentence. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Gerard Smith v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Stephen Gerard Smith, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and three counts of domestic assault for offenses committed against his wife, and he received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. He sought and was denied post-conviction relief based on numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel: (1) gave deficient advice regarding a plea offer; (2) failed to challenge a prospective juror; (3) argued in closing argument that the Petitioner was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses; (4) failed to object to testimony referring to the Petitioner’s prior incarceration; (5) failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment on the victim’s credibility; (6) failed to call witnesses; and (7) failed to interview witnesses. Because we conclude that the Petitioner has not established either deficiency or prejudice for each claim, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals |