State of Tennessee vs. Mark Crites
01C01-9711-CR-00512
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge L. T. Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

Mark Crites appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He challenges both the propriety of that revocation and his resentencing, arguing that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence; (2) the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors and that his sentences are, therefore, excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. After careful review of the record and arguments of counsel, we conclude the trial court relied upon improper evidence in revoking the community corrections sentence. We remand for another revocation hearing.

Sumner Court of Criminal Appeals

Daniel B. Taylor v. State of Tennessee, John Doe, State Coordinator of Elections, Ms. Bobbie White, Shelby County Registrar of Voters; and Charles W. Burson, Atty General
01A01-9707-CH-00338
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The only question presented in this complaint is whether a law making all felonies infamous crimes can, upon conviction, be applied to crimes committed before the date of the act. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment. We affirm.
 

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Roy D. Nelson, Jr.
03C01-9710-CR-00454
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The defendant, Roy D. Nelson, stands convicted of burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson and possession of marijuana as a result of his efforts to blow up his ex-wife's home. Nelson received his convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Washington County Criminal Court. A Range III offender, Nelson is presently serving an effective 62-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crimes.1 In this direct appeal, Nelson claims he was improperly convicted of aggravated arson because he, rather than another person, suffered the serious bodily injury relied upon to elevate the offense from arson to aggravated arson. Having reviewed the appellate record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Washington Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Roy D. Nelson, Jr.
03C01-9710-CR-00454
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The defendant, Roy D. Nelson, stands convicted of burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson and possession of marijuana as a result of his efforts to blow up his ex-wife's home. Nelson received his convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Washington County Criminal Court. A Range III offender, Nelson is presently serving an effective 62-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crimes. In this direct appeal, Nelson claims he was improperly convicted of aggravated arson because he, rather than another person, suffered the serious bodily injury relied upon to elevate the offense from arson to aggravated arson. Having reviewed the appellate record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Washington Court of Criminal Appeals

William H. Lance, Emma Lee Lance v. Larry H. Street, D/B/A Street Construction
01A01-9802-CV-00072
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

Cheatham Court of Appeals

Peggy Wilson v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Ohio, et al
02S01-9807-CV-00064
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John R. Mccarroll, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff, Peggy Wilson, sustained an injury resulting in a 16 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court also ruled all medical bills and charges associated with the treatment of Dr. Rizk be paid by the defendants and that the plaintiff was entitled to temporary total benefits from September 25, 1997 to November 24, 1997, which had not been paid by the defendants. The defendants present issues attacking the judgment of the trial court on these three findings. We will first summarize the evidence. The plaintiff testified she was 51 years of age at the time of trial. She attended high school, but did not graduate and did not obtain a GED. Her employment history prior to working for United Parcel Service was manual, unskilled labor. She had worked for United Parcel Service as a package delivery driver for the past 22 years. Her employment requires her to lift packages weighing up to 7 pounds. The plaintiff testified that on July 23, 1997, when she lifted a 62-pound box, her left arm and hand went numb, causing her to lose grip. This jerked her back, causing pain in the back. She testified the pain in her back worsened and she notified her employer. She was told to go to Med Emergency where she saw Dr. Zanone. Dr. Zanone sent her to Dr. Varner, an orthopedic surgeon. She testified Dr. Varner ordered a nerve block which was done by Dr. Kraus. This helped her for a few days, but within one and one-half weeks the pain was as severe as ever. Dr. Varner sent her back to work on September 8, 1997, but the pain in her back was so severe she was not able to do the work. Her employer returned her to Dr. Varner who told her there was nothing else he could do for her. He advised her to go back to work or get another job. Since she was unable to do the work, she contacted the employer's insurance carrier who told her to see Dr. Kellett, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Kellett gave her liquid cortisone 2

Wilson Workers Compensation Panel

Robert S. Lipman v. First National Bank of Boston, and Alexander H. McNeil, J. Virginia McNeil, R. & J. Knoxville - Concurring
01A01-9803-CH-00139
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The trial court granted the motion of defendant First National Bank of Boston (“First National”) for summary judgment, which the plaintiff (“Lipman”] appeals, insisting that there are genuine issues of material fact.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Glenda Wright Benning v. James Russell Benning
01A01-9805-CV-00238
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta Shipley

In this divorce case, Glenda Benning (wife) challenges the trial court's award of permanent alimony to James Benning (husband). After the file filed for divorce and the parties separated, the hisband moved into the same apartment with one Jaylene Deen. On appeal, the wife argues that the tril court erred in finding that the statutory presumption fond at  T.C .A . § 36 - 5 - 10 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) had been rebutted by the evidence presented by the husband. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

James Prince, D/B/A/ Big Jim, Inc., v. Charles Campbell, Individually and D/B/A Limosines by K.C.
01A01-9806-CV-00276
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a judgment. Defendant/cross-plaintiff,Charles Campbell (Campbell), appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding money damages to The day of trial, Prince filed a motion to amend the complaint to reduce the amount requested as damages from $97,000 to $77,000. There is no record as to the trial court’s action plaintiff/cross-defendant, James Prince (Prince). This case arose from a contract entered into between the parties in April 1995 in which Campbell agreed to transfer a limousine from his business to Prince in exchange for the opportunity to run Prince’s “World Famous Stagecoach Lounge.” Prince filed suit against Campbell for breach of contract and fraud in August 1995 alleging that Campbell failed to make lease payments on the property and refused to transfer the limousine agreed upon in the contract. Campbell’s answer denied the material allegations and asserted a counterclaim for conversion, fraud, and breach of contract.

Marshall Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens Services v. Tamra Leann Viar and John Fitzgeral Gross, In the Matter of Katlyn Nicole Viar
01A01-9806-JV-00275
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Melton, III

We have reviewed the Petition to Rehear filed on behalf of the Attorney General and conclude that the Petition should be denied for the following reasons.

Cannon Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Doug Sizemore, Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance for the State of Tennessee, v. United Physicians Insurance Risk Retention Group - Concurring
01A01-9706-CH-00253
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch

I concur with the court’s opinion. Insurance companies have the right to assume that the risk they undertake will not later be enlarged by the courts. See Schultz v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 465, 474, 404 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1966). Accordingly, the courts are not at liberty to rewrite policies of insurance to provide coverage where no coverage was intended. See Spears v. Commercial Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 544, 548(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Dr. Johnson did not contract for prior acts coverage when he purchased his UPI insurance policy. Accordingly, UPI never provided coverage for claims such as Blendora Ann Echols.

Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, Commissioner Doug Sizemore, Commerce and Insurance v. United Physicians Insurance, Risk Retention Group State ex rel Doug Sizemore vs. United Physicians Ins.
01A01-9706-CH-00253
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Walter W. Bussart
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

This is an appeal from a memorandum and order of the chancellor affirming and adopting the Special Master's report pursuant to Rule 53 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue is whether the lower court erred in this action. Our review is de novo upon the record accompanied by a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact by the chancellor. Tenn.R.App.P.13(d).

Davidson Court of Appeals

Gary June Caughron v. State of Tennessee
03C01-9707-CC-00301
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge John K. Byers

The petitioner, Gary June Caughron, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief as to the guilt phase of his trial. He was convicted in 1990 for the first degree murder of Ann Robertson Jones and received the death penalty. He was also convicted of first degree burglary and assault with the intent to commit rape for which he received consecutive ten-year sentences. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 475 (1993).

Sevier Court of Criminal Appeals

Rayford Martin vs. State of Tennessee
03C01-9707-CR-00286
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard Baumgartner

This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief from convictions based upon guilty pleas. The Defendant entered guilty pleas, with sentencing left to the discretion of the trial judge, to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and four counts of armed robbery. At the sentencing hearing conducted on April 3, 1989, he received a total effective sentence of 150 years. This Court affirmed his sentences on direct appeal.1 The Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in December of 1991; and following appointment of counsel, he filed a supplemental petition in June of 1997. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied the petition in July of 1997. The Defendant now appeals the trial court’s ruling. We affirm, but we grant D efendant relie f in the form of a delayed appeal.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Melissa (Buckley) Hatchell, v. Jerry Buckley
02A01-9801-CV-0008
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. J. Alissandratos

These parties were divorced in Arkansas on April 17, 1996. A Property Settlement Agreement was incorporated in the judgment which awarded custody of two children to Mother.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Chris Hill Construction Company, v. State of Tennessee
02A01-9803-BC-
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge William H. Inman

Court of Appeals

Larry Aubrey Henson v. Elizabeth Ellen Sorrell
02A01-9805-JV-00135
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman

The child of these parties, who were never married to each other, was born March 11, 1996. The paternity issue was determined in June, 1996 by the Juvenile Court, which also directed the payment of child support. The appellant questioned his liability for support because the child was conceived without his consent. He did not prevail.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Linda Chaney v. Robert Dickinson
03A01-9803-JV-00107
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Bailey

Robert Lee Dickinson, Jr., appeals the ruling of the Juvenile Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee at Chattanooga, insisting that the Juvenile Court erred in its determination of Mr. Dickinson’s Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from child support payments based upon evidence that he is not the father of the child he has been supporting. The Juvenile Court ruled that Mr. Dickinson’s motion was barred by res judicata; therefore, Mr. Dickinson is still obligated to pay current and past due child support payments.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Timmy Beavers
01C01-9709-CC-00394
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles Lee

Following the denial of his mo tion to suppress evidence, the Defendant, Timmy Beavers, entered a best-interest plea to second degree murder, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. An agreed upon sentence of thirty (30) years was entered by the trial court.

Lincoln Court of Criminal Appeals

Todd Frederick Brooks v. Linda Faye Carter
02A01-9709-CV-00225
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

Defendant Todd Frederick Brooks (Father) appeals, and Plaintiff Linda Faye Carter (Mother) cross-appeals, the final divorce decree entered by the trial court which awarded the parties joint custody of their three minor children, designated the Father as the primary custodial parent, ordered the Father to pay child support to the Mother, and distributed the parties’ property. We affirm the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, with one modification, but we reverse the court’s custody decision and we remand for the court to recalculate the Father’s child support obligation pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines.
 

Shelby Court of Appeals

Antonio Sweatt v. Billy Compton, et al.
02A01-9710-CV-00252
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

This is a medical malpractice case brought by an inmate at a state correctional facility. The
plaintiff brought the lawsuit against various prison officials and the prison doctor alleging federal
constitutional violations as well as medical malpractice. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and remand for further
discovery. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remainder of the claims.

Lake Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Kimberly Norfleet v. Tommy Dobbs, Jr.
01A01-9805-CV-00228
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal involves a parent’s efforts to avoid paying child support for her two children. Approximately two years after the Circuit Court for Davidson County awarded custody of the parties’ two children to their father, the children’s mother, with the assistance of a lawyer furnished by the IV-D contractor for Davidson County, filed a petition to eliminate her child support obligation because she was unemployed and her only income was Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments. Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the mother’s petition on the ground that she was voluntarily unemployed. The mother asserts on this appeal that the trial court’s order conflicts with the child support guidelines because she will be required to use her SSI payments to pay her child support. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the mother is voluntarily unemployed and that the trial court’s order is consistent with the child support guidelines. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Loyal Miller vs. Tennessee Board of Paroles - Concurring
01A01-9806-CH-00293
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves the fundamental fairness of the procedures used by the Tennessee Board of Paroles to revoke the parole of a person accused of committing child sexual abuse. The Board revoked the parole based solely on hearsay testimony concerning statements made by his alleged victim. The parolee filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision-making process. After the trial court denied the petition, the parolee appealed to this court. We have determined that the Board’s hearing officer acted arbitrarily and illegally by applying an incorrect standard to determine whether good cause existed for not allowing the parolee to confront or to cross-examine his only accuser.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the parolee’s petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order directing the Board either to conduct a proper parole revocation hearing forthwith or to return the parolee to parole status.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Robert Leland Bryant, and wife Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant, Sandry Lynn Todd Bryant, v. James Ashley Bryant
01A01-9806-CV-00337
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Petitioners-Appellants, Robert 1 Sandra Lynn Todd Bryant, wife of Respondent and mother of the minor children involved, joined the Petitioners in the petition to terminate the Respondent’s parental rights. In the petition, she consents to the termination of her parental rights. 2 Respondent’s wife subsequently left the couple’s home in Colorado to pursue job training in Florida. Upon completion of the two month job training course in Florida, she moved to Utah while Respondent continued his military career in Colorado. 2 Leland Bryant and Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant,1 appeal the trial court’s order denying their petition to terminate the parental rights of Respondent-Appellee, James Ashley Bryant, with respect to his minor children, Megan Rae Bryant, born December 13, 1991, and Devon Michael Bryant, born December 30, 1993.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Margaret McCormick, v. Donald McCormick
01A01-9801-CH-00019
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

This case concerns a dispute over the division of marital property, alimony, and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Donald F. McCormick (Husband), appeals from the Final Decree of Divorce that, inter alia, awarded Appellee, Margaret Ann McCormick (Wife), proceeds from a 1 Husband’s W-2 form from the Frigidaire Company reveals that his wages for 1996 were $94,063.26. 2 In 1996, Wife’s gross annual earnings were approximately $9,000.00. 2 401K account, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney’s fees.

Sumner Court of Appeals