Miller High v. Gf Office Furniture, Ltd.
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Sumner | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Patricia Jones v. Rosewood Manor, Inc.
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Maury | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Walden v. New Life Ministries
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Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel, and the briefs and argument of counsel; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset against the worker’s compensation award in this case. |
Wayne | Supreme Court | |
Billy R. Phillips v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act. |
Supreme Court | ||
Billy R. Phillips v. State of Tennessee v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Baptist Hospital, et al., v. Tennessee Department of Health and Department of Finance and Administration
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Baptist Hospital v. Tennessee Departments of Health and Finance and Administration
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Edmund George Zagorski v. State of Tennessee
We granted this post-conviction appeal to determine whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel where, at the express instruction of a competent and fully informed defendant, defense counsel does not investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that there is not. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis T. Crouse v. Charlane Allen Crouse
This dispute concerns an award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Dennis T. Crouse (Husband), appeals from the trial court’s order granting alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Appellee, Charlane Allen Crouse (Wife). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Chase Cavett Services, Inc., v. Brandon Apparel Group, Inc.
Plaintiff Chase Cavett Services, Inc. (Chase) appeals an order of the chancery court granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. (Brandon). Because we find that the chancery court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Brandon, we reverse the ruling of the chancellor. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzo Pfeifer
This appeal involves a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Appellant, Lorenzo Carlos Pfeifer, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court in Obion County which found him a delinquent child because he was guilty of the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00. Appellant was committed to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services for an indeterminate term. The only issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pfeifer committed the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen P. Kopels v. Katherine Annette Bryant
This is a domestic relations case. The appellant complains of the award of the residence to the appellee, and the award of the attorney’s fees. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d); Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material fact, the question on appeal is one of law, and the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying a chancellor's conclusions of law. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1993). |
Court of Appeals | ||
Gehl Corporation, v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Gehl Corporation filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to contest an assessment by the Commissioner of Revenue of the "Amusement Tax" imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-212(a)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Makris v. Bob Kapos
Steve Makris appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim for accrued and unpaid salaries in this partnership accounting and dissolution case. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Flowers and Amy Flowers v. Charles R. Horner and Reba M. Horner - Concurring
This controversy may, perhaps, be described as a boundary dispute. The development of Riverview Estates Subdivision began in 1971 with the recordation of a plat which provided for a cul-de-sac fifty feet in width centered on the West boundary of Lot 23. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee , Department of Children's Services, v. Tamra Leeann Viar, and John Fitzgerald Gross, the unknown father of Katelyn Nicole Viar, In the Matter Of: Katelyn Nicole Viarelyn Nicole Viar
The parental relationship between Tamra Viar and her daughter, Katelyn, was terminated by the Juvenile Court, the propriety of which she presents for review. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Ann S. Wing v. James E. Wing - Concurring
This is a domestic relations dispute involving money only. The trial court held that a certificate of deposit and one investment account were the separate property of Husband and declined to award Wife alimony or the total amount of her attorney fees. She appeals and presents these issues for review. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Troy R. Walls
A Rutherford County grand jury indicted defendant for aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and rape of a child for incidents involving his young female cousin. A negotiated plea agreement allowed defendant to plead to one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of incest, a Class C felony. The agreed upon sentences were eight years for rape and three years for incest to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. However, plain error dictates that the convictions be VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings. The defendant pled guilty to incest which is neither a lesser included nor a lesser grade of child rape; nor do the acts of the defendant constitute the crime of incest. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE: Estate of Louise C. Davis, Deceased; Sarah Foster Kelley v. Sarah Hill Martin - Concurring
This appeal involves the validity of certain transactions entered into by the holder of a power of attorney. The trial court set aside the transactions finding that the attorney in fact had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence which arose in light of these self-benefitting transactions. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Lorean Johnson v. James Larry Johnson
This is a divorce case. In the original divorce, years ago, the wife was awarded shares of stock from the husband’s p ension fund. Subs equently, the pension fund was distributed to the husband, with no monies going to the wife. In this action, the trial court awarded the wife a judgment for the value o f the stock at the time of the trial co urt’s order. The husband appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Todd Harmon v. Janet Harmon
Megan Harmon (“Megan” or “Appellant”), minor child born during the marriage of Plaintiff/Appellee, Todd Harmon (“Mr. Harmon” or “Appellee”) and Defendant Janet Harmon (“Mrs. Harmon”), by and through her Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.), appeals the decision of the trial court which found that Appellee was not the biological father of Appellant, and incorporated into the decree of divorce the marital dissolution agreement in which the parties agreed Appellee would have no further obligation to the child. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Mary M. Pawlakos v. Laurie Watson Pawlakos
Respondent Laurie Watson Pawlakos (the Wife) appeals the trial court’s order requiring her to return certain funds to the estate of her deceased husband, John T. Pawlakos (the Decedent). For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
Allen E. Hasty, Judy Darlene Hasty v. Thomas R. Throneberry, Ind., D/B/A Throneberry Properties and Sharon Clutter
Defendant Thomas R. Throneberry appeals the trial court’s judgment in the amount of $6,000 entered in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Allen E. Hasty after a jury trial. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |