State vs. Chastain
03C01-9706-CR-00205

Polk Court of Criminal Appeals

Godfrey vs. Godfrey
03A01-9708-CH-00319
Trial Court Judge: Frederick D. Mcdonald

Knox Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Donald Gene Brooks
01C01-9703-CC-00099
Authoring Judge: Judge Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

The defendant, Donald Gene Brooks, stands convicted of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, theft of property valued over $1,000, and setting fire to personal property, all related to the robbery and killing of Joseph J. Wisniewski. He received his convictions following a jury trial in the Montgomery County Criminal Court. Brooks is incarcerated in the Department of Correction serving his effective sentence of life plus 27 years. In this direct appeal, Brooks challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of sentence imposed. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Devon Welles
01C01-9706-CC-00230
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The Defendant, Devon Wells, appeals his convictions of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substan ce following a jury trial in the Lincoln County Circu it Court. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II Multiple Offender to two consecutive sentences of nine (9) and seven (7) years. He was also fined a total of $100,000 for the two convictions. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the sentence imposed was excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lincoln Court of Criminal Appeals

Clayton Homes, Inc. v. Albert D. Bowling
03S01-9708-CH-00120
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Chester S. Rainwater, Jr.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has resulted from a ruling of the trial court that the employee's attorney was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees from medical expenses recovered in the case. At the trial below, the claim for compensation benefits was contested on all issues except for a stipulation regarding the employee's compensation rate and an agreement that the sum of $582.25 had been paid in temporary total disability benefits. The employer denied the herniated cervical discs were caused by the employee's work activities and contended if there were an injury, it was of a minor nature. After a contested hearing, the trial court found against the employer, Clayton Homes, Inc., on these issues. The Chancellor announced his decision on March 11, 1997 at a hearing where he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 8, 1997, the employee filed a motion to be awarded discretionary costs and a separate motion seeking a 2% award of attorney's fees on the amount of medical expenses allowed in the case. A final judgment was entered on May 13, 1997, which provided for (1) an award of 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, (2) an award of $6,77.6 for additional temporary total disability benefits, (3) directing all accrued permanent partial benefits in the sum of $17,2.8 be paid in a lump sum, and (4) directing the employee to pay all necessary and reasonable medical expenses. In connection with the payment of medical expenses, the judgment stated: "That this sum shall be paid in the registry of the Court and after it has been determined as to the amount, that the attorney for the defendant is awarded a lien of the recovery herein for his attorney's fees of 2% for the recovery of this disputed medical." claytonh.wc 2

Clay Workers Compensation Panel

George Elliott v. City of Clarksville
01S01-9710-CV-00222
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Montgomery Workers Compensation Panel

Randall Wayne Myers v. Royal Insurance Co.
01S01-9710-CH-00227
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor

Wayne Workers Compensation Panel

Linda Shank v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc .
01S01-9709-CH-00189
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant Wal-Mart, alleging she was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of a back injury and sinus injury sustained in the course of her employment. The trial court found the plaintiff's sinus injury was not compensable1 but the plaintiff's back injury was compensable, awarding her 38 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, temporary total disability benefits, and unpaid medical benefits for the services of Dr. Rex Arendall. The defendant appeals and presents the following issues: "I. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-12(a)(5) and the facts of this case, the proof at trial preponderates against the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's back injury was causally related to the accident she reported of April 26, 1994. II. The trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff's back injury was subject to the six (6) times multiplier in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b) rather than the two and one-half (2 _) times multiplier in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(1). III. The medical care of Dr. Rex Arendall was unauthorized and should not have been awarded by the trial court. IV. The trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence release from work slips provided to defendant by the plaintiff and which were included in and became a part of her personnel file." We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 The plaintiff did not appeal the decision of the trial court with respect to her sinus injury. Therefore, the sinus injury will only be discussed for a clear understanding of her back injury. 2

Rutherford Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee vs. Anthony P. Geanes
02C01-9709-CC-00373
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The Defendant, Anthony P. Geanes, appeals as of right from his conviction in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of delivery of a Schedule II con trolled substance. He was sentenced to serve fifteen (15) years as a Range II Offender. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficien cy of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

Hardeman Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Amanda Treece
02C01-9711-CC-00438
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Franklin Murchison

Following an evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court of Chester County entered an order which revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve her original sentence of four (4) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant, Amanda Treece, appeals from that action of the trial court. W hile Defendant does not challenge the revocation of probation, she argues in her sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred by requiring her to serve her entire sentence by incarceration in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Chester Court of Criminal Appeals

Judith Ann Warren Taylor, v. Michael Raymond Taylor
02A01-9706-CV-00112
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Janice M. Holder

Judith Ann Taylor (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Michael Raymond Taylor (“Husband”) and also sought an injunction prohibiting Husband from dissipating marital assets. Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted Wife the divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded her rehabilitative alimony, partial attorney fees, and 60% of the marital assets. Husband appeals and raises the following issues:whether the trial court erred (1) in awarding Wife rehabilitative alimony of $1,300 per month for 60 months; (2) in ordering Husband to pay $20,000 as alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney fees; (3) in ordering Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s health insurance coverage; (4) in requiring Husband to maintain a life insurance policy which exceeds the total amount of child support owed; and (5) in dividing the marital property of the parties. Wife submits the additional issue of whether she is due attorney fees on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we find no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Shelby Court of Appeals

General Electric Company v. Process Control Company
01S01-9707-FD-00148
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge James D. Todd

This case comes to us on a certified question of law. The plaintiff, General Electric Company ("G.E."), filed this action for contribution against Process Control Company ("Process Control"). Process Control filed a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment arguing that Tennessee law does not permit a right of contribution in this case. The district court entered an order requesting this Court to address the following certified question of law: In actions that accrue after the decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, under what circumstances is a claim for contribution appropriate under Tennessee Law? We accepted certification of the question. We hold that under the facts as certified an action for contribution may be viable.

Davidson Supreme Court

Villages of Brentwood Homeowners' Association, Inc., v. Steven J. Westermann and wife Maria A. Westermann
01A01-9708-CH-00388
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This appeal involves the enforcement of the restrictive covenants in a Nashville subdivision. After two residents began to construct improvements on their property without first obtaining approval of the subdivision’s architectural committee, the homeowners association filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking injunctive relief to enforce the architectural control provisions in the subdivision’s restrictive covenants. The trial court heard the case without a jury and issued an injunction directing the residents to cease the construction and to restore their property to a condition consistent with the subdivision covenants. The residents have appealed. Since neither party has filed a verbatim transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence, we have reviewed the papers filed in the trial court and have determined that they contain no basis for reversing the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Holland D. Lane and wife, Cynthia Lane; Bobby Jo Knight and Kay Grimes, v. Willie Lee Barr and wife Dorothy Sue Barr, et al.
01A01-9708-CH-00449
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Allen W. Wallace

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Holland D. Lane, Cynthia Lane, Bobby Joe Knight, and Kay 2 Grimes, appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing their complaint, finding that appellants lacked standing to bring an action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(a)(2) and that the use of their land by defendants/appellees, Willie and Dorothy Barr, as a tire landfill was a prior non-conforming use. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Cheatham Court of Appeals

Michael A. Thompson v. Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
01A01-9710-CH-00572
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Michael A. Thompson, a prisoner in the custody of Tennessee Department of Correction has appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his petition for certiorari for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Board of Paroles denying parole.

Davidson Court of Appeals

William Michael Anderton vs. Evelyn Adele Morgan Anderton - Concurring
01A01-9701-CH-00013
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

This is the second appeal concerning a husband’s support obligations following the dissolution of a 23-year marriage. The Chancery Court for Williamson County originally directed the husband to pay $1,731 per month in child support and $5,500 per month in spousal support for five years and then $5,000 per month thereafter. On the first appeal, this court remanded the case to the trial court to revisit the child support and spousal support awards. Even though the trial court concluded that the husband’s income had decreased significantly, it increased the husband’s child support to $2,000 per month and left its original spousal support order unchanged. It also awarded the wife judgments for a sizeable spousal support arrearage and a nominal child support arrearage. On this appeal, the husband again takes issue with the amount of his spousal support and child support obligations and also insists that he is entitled to retroactive relief on his spousal support arrearage and to the lifting of the injunction with regard to his 401k plan. We vacate the child support and spousal support awards and remand them to the trial court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Norman Mayes, et ux., v. Claude Yow, et ux., and William Scarboro, et ux.
03A01-9706-CV-00203
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

This appeal results from a suit brought by Normal Mayes and his wife, Ruth Mayes, against Claude Yow and his wife, Frances Yow, Willard Scarbro and his wife, Cleo Scarbro, who was added as a party Defendant subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, and Partners & Associates, Inc.

Knox Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Eric Florence
02C01-9709-CC-00366
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The defendant, Eric M. Florence, entered pleas of guilt in the General Sessions Court of Benton County to possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of alcohol. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail; all but two days were suspended on each count. The sentences were to be concurrently served. The defendant incurred additional charges and his probation was revoked. He served a portion of his general sessions sentence and then moved the court to suspend the remainder. The general sessions court denied the motion. The defendant appealed to the circuit court. That court affirmed the decision of the general sessions court.

Benton Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Lemont E. Blair
03C01-9705-CR-00176
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The appellant, Lemont E. Blair, appeals as of right the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. William Waylon Jackson, a.k.a. Bill Jackson
02C01-9707-CC-00267
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, William Waylon Jackson, was convicted by a Decatur County jury of three (3) counts of the sale of marijuana over one-half (½) ounce, Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of three (3) years for each count and denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment as it violated the mandatory joinder provision of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a). He further argues that the trial court imposed excessive sentences and improperly denied alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Decatur Court of Criminal Appeals

Sylvia Hudson v. Dave Shorter, Jr.
02A01-9709-CV-00232
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Swearengen

This is an automobile personal injury case. The defendant, David Shorter, Jr., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court in a bench trial awarding plaintiff, Sylvia Hudson, $9,000.00
damages. Shorter’s responsibility for the accident was stipulated, and the trial concerned only
the issue of damages.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of Estate of Charles D. Hand, Deceased, v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
03A01-9704-CV-00123
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert M. Summitt

This is a suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It was brought by Plaintiff Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Charles D. Hand, against his employer, Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $3,250,000. The Defendant appeals, raising nine separate issues. Although many do not merit a protracted discussion, others raise substantial questions.

 

Knox Court of Appeals

Raymond Mitchell v. Camelot Utility District for Hawkins County, Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00394
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson

Plaintiff  Raymond Mitchell sues Defendant Camelot Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee. He alleges that Camelot, in acquiring a quit claim deed from him conveying two tracts of land, one that contains an artesian well and the other equipment in connection with distribution of water to the adjacent area.  He contends that as a consideration for the quit claim deed, John Valetta, President of Camelot, represented to him that Camelot would provide water taps for two of his lots free of charge and, upon acquisition of an alternate water source, would re-convey the quit claimed lots to him.

 

Hawkins Court of Appeals

Greg Swafford,M.D., v. Memphis Individual Practive Association, Southern Health Plan, Inc., The Apple Plan, et al.
02A01-9612-CV-00311
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

This is a libel suit brought by a physician against a health maintenance organization and related health insurance entities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the statute of limitations. The lawsuit involves allegedly false information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. In an issue of first impression, we hold that each dissemination of the allegedly defamatory information by the Data Bank gives rise to a separate cause of action. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Win Myint and wife Patti KI. Myint v. Allstate Insurance Company
01S01-9612-CH-00238
Authoring Judge: Justice Aldolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Christina Norris

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation
of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

Davidson Supreme Court