Eli Mike, an individual, James A. Schrampfer, an individual, and Jane B. Forbes, as Trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of David L. Osborn, et al. v. Po Group, Inc., et. al.
The captioned plaintiffs’ have appealed from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ actions against the corporate defendant for the value of their stock as dissenting minority shareholders and their action against the individual defendants for breach of fiduciary duty as corporate directors. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Car Connection, Inc. v. Auto Buyers, Inc.
This suit was filed in General Sessions Court to collect a dishonored check, but was appealed to the Circuit Court where a complaint was filed stating more details of transactions involving the transfer of ownership of two automobiles, a Honda and a Chevrolet. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: The Estate of Harold L. Jenkins, Deceased, Hugh C. Carden and Donald W. Garis as Co-Executors of the Harold L. Jenkins Estate, v. Joni L. Jenkins and Kathy L. Jenkins
This is yet another chapter in the administration of the estate of Harold L. Jenkins, a popular entertainer whose stage name was “Conway Twitty.” The executors initiated the present proceeding to resolve disputed rights of three devises in respect to the collection from them of certain charges appearing on the records of the deceased. The Probate Court resolved the issues in favor of the executors, and two of the devises appealed. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Ann Hall and David A. Hall, v. St. Thomas Hospital\, Rachel Kaiser, M.D., and Daniel L. Starnes, M.D.
This is a medical malpractice suit in which the plaintiffs have appealed from a summary |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Daniels v. Charles Traughber, Chairman, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Daniels, v. Charles Traughber, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Erwin and Susan Erwin, as surviving parents of and next of kin of Bethany Suzanne Erwin, et. ux. v. James M. Rose, Wade Matheny, in his capacity as Sheriff of Maury County, Tennessee, and Tracy Joe Lovell
The appellants have filed a petition to rehear based on the Western Section’s opinion in Sims v. Stewart, No. 02A01-9706-CV-00123 (Jackson, Jan. 21, 1998). In Sims the court relied on an earlier case of Dwight v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 701 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. App. 1985), and decided that the policy in question “provides that reduction for worker’s compensation benefits applies to damages and in no way affects the coverage available.” We think that Dwight stated the opposite; it stated that coverage was reduced by any worker’s compensation benefits paid or payable. We respectfully overrule the petition to rehear. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, v. Gary Lewis Thompson
The appellant, Gary Lewis Thompson, was indicted by a Monroe County Grand Jury for the offense of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. On July 22, 1996, the appellant pled guilty to DUI, third offense, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Prior to the guilty plea hearing, the State moved to nolle pros the vehicular homicide charge, which was granted. Additionally, the trial court, upon appellant’s motion, dismissed the charge of driving on a revoked license. Immediately following entry of the guilty plea, the State, for the first time, requested seizure and forfeiture of the appellant’s John Deere tractor, which he was operating at the time the DUI offense occurred. Following a sentencing hearing on September 6, 1996, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days in the county jail and assessed a fine of $7,500 for the DUI, third offense conviction. The appellant’s release percentage was fixed at 75%. The trial court also ordered that the farm tractor be “confiscated” from the appellant’s possession and forfeited to the State. On November 8, 1996, the written order to seize and forfeit the tractor was entered. The appellant appeals from the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(ii), raising the following two issues: I. Whether the period of confinement in the jail is excessive; and II. Whether § 55-10-403(k)(1) properly authorizes forfeiture of his tractor. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Darrell Braddock
On Septem ber 12, 1996, a Shelby County jury found Appellant, Darrell E. Braddock, guilty of first degree felony m urder, criminal attem pt: to wit especially aggravated robbery, criminal attempt: to wit murder in the first degree, and two counts of aggravated assault. Appellant appeals from his convictions, raising two issues:
After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff Hubrig v. Lockheed-Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Linc Hall, Individually; Larry Pierce, Individually, and Jim Kolling, Individually
The plaintiff describes himself as a whistle blower, as that term has come to be used, and seeks damages for his termination from employment because he allegedly refused to participate in and keep silent about certain allegedly illegal corporate activities. The allegations were denied by the defendants whose motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issues of (1) whether he was terminated for time card abuse and sexual harassment or whether these reasons were pretextual, (2) whether a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge remains viable in this jurisdiction, and (3) whether his termination constituted outrageous conduct by the defendants. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is denovo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of thecorrectness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d). See, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). We will refer to the plaintiff as Hubrig, or as the appellant, or as the plaintiff. This record is unusually prolix; prima facie, it appeared to reflect a trial by affidavit, an impermissible use of RULE 56, see: Womack v. Blue Cross- Blue Shield, 593 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. 1980), but an in-depth analysis reveals that the trial court correctly held that the totality of the evidence demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact or law. We therefore affirm the judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee vs. William Robert Diaz
The appellant, William Robert Diaz, appeals as of right the convictions and sentences he received in the Criminal Court of Anderson County. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder and was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty-two (22) years for the murder and to twelve (12) years for attempted murder.1 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hon. Frank v. Williams,
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Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Ronnie Erwin v. Moon Products
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Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Cunningham vs. Baker, et al
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Court of Appeals | ||
State vs. Pam Davis
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McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Mario Boyd
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regan vs. Malone
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Court of Appeals | ||
McClellan vs. Stanley
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Court of Appeals | ||
DHS vs. Epps
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Court of Appeals | ||
Miller vs. Hembree
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Court of Appeals | ||
Foulke vs. City of Greeneville
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Greene | Court of Appeals | |
03A01-9901-CH-00015
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Court of Appeals | ||
Russell vs. Crutchfield
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Court of Appeals | ||
City of Blaine vs. Hayes
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Court of Appeals | ||
Greene vs. Evans
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Court of Appeals |