State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services, v. Sylvia Fetterolf Ford, and Stanley Fetterolf
01A01-9704-JV-00171
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

The State of Tennessee filed a petition to rehear in the above styled case on November 24, 1997. The State contends this court should rehear the case pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, it contends our decision 1) conflicts with existing case law, 2) conflicts with a principle of law, and 3) overlooks a material fact upon which the parties were not heard. It is the opinion of this court that the motion is not well taken and, therefore, should be denied.

Roger Perry and Doris Perry, v. Donald Van Hise and Josephine Van Hise, Individually and D/B/A Van Hise Construction Company
01A01-9705-CH-00227
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles D. Haston, Sr.

This appeal involves the construction of a home. Plaintiffs engaged one of the defendants, Donald Van Hise, (hereafter, the defendant) to construct a home on their property. On May 24, 1994, defendant signed a proposal to construct the house, reserving the right to withdraw the proposal within 30 days, if not accepted by plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs signed an acceptance of the proposal. The other did not. On June 25, 1994, defendant tendered another proposal on different terms, which proposal was accepted by both plaintiffs. The second proposal contained an estimated time of completion of 3-1/2 - 4-1/2 months. Both proposals contained a base contract price subject to revision for changes during construction. Both contracts refer to “plans and specifications” but the record contains no plan and only a partial set of specifications. The plans and specifications were not specifically prepared for plaintiffs, but were “generic,” that is, sold on the general market, to be altered as desired; and alterations were made, producing part of the present controversy. Promptly after the second proposal was accepted.

Charles O'Guinn v. State of Tennessee
03C01-9703-CR-00084
Authoring Judge: Judge Lynn Brown
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt

Charles Ray O’Quinn, the petitioner, appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On July 27, 1989, the petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated rape. The offenses occurred in April or May, and in June, 1988. He received Range II sentences of 35 years in the aggregate. The petitioner contends that his convictions for aggravated rape are void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea for that offense. See State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 20, 1996), rev'd, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997).

John Edmund Streun vs. Delores Jean Streun - Concurring
03A01-9707-CV-00299
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert M. Summitt

This is a divorce case. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Delores Jean Streun (“Wife”) an absolute divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the parties’ property, and ordered John Edmund Streun (“Husband”) to pay periodic alimony in futuro of $350 per month.  Husband appealed, arguing, in effect, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that Wife was entitled to periodic alimony in futuro. Wife contends that the alimony award is appropriate. She submits an additional issue -- that, in her words, “the trial court erred in not enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement of November 7, 1995.”

John L. Miller v. Scott D. Williams
03A01-9707-CV-00270
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William E. Lantrip

This appeal questions the adequacy of a jury’s verdict. The plaintiff, John L. Miller (“Miller”)1, alleged in his complaint that he sustained physical and emotional injuries and medical expenses when his automobile was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by the defendant, Scott D. Williams (“Williams”).2 After Williams admitted liability at trial, the jury awarded Miller damages of $45,000. Miller then filed a motion for an additur or a new trial. The trial court denied his motion, and this appeal followed. The sole issue3 on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to suggest an additur or grant a new trial due to the alleged inadequacy of the jury’s award.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Anna Patricia Malone -Concurring
03A01-9706-JV-00224
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Bailey

The trial court’s judgment terminated the parental rights of Anna Patricia Malone (“Mother”) in and to her children, Willard Fillmore Rednower (DOB: October 1, 1983) and Jessie Mae Rednower (DOB: September 15, 1985).¹ She appealed, arguing, in her words, that the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) “failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family as required by T.C.A. [§] 37-1-166"; that the court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s “substantial noncompliance” with a plan of
care formulated by DCS pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-2-403; and that the court  erred in finding clear and convincing evidence of a basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights under T.C.A. § 37-1-147.²

Manuel Branch, Jr., v. Rodney McCroskey and Governor John Sevier Memorial Association
03A01-9709-CV-00385
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dale Workman

In this action, the appellant (plaintiff) sought a recovery for damages sustained to his pickup truck, lost earnings and related expenses caused by a collision between his vehicle and a horse belonging to the defendant, Rodney McCroskey. The accident occurred in the plaintiff's lane of travel on a public road, generally referred to as the Governor John Sevier HIghway. The defendant, Rodney McCroskey, filed a cross-claim against the defendant, Governor John Sevier Memorial Association. He, owever, was permitted to take a voluntary non-suit. The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict for the appelles (defendants) in the original action. Judgment for the defendants was duly entered on the verdict. The plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or in the alternative for a new trial. The motion was overruled and this appeal resulted. We affimr the judgment of the trial court.

Steve Payne v. Jan Savell, C.S.J. Travel, Inc., and Carleen Stephens
03A01-9708-CV-00352
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

Steve Payne (“Payne”), a stockholder and former employee of CSJ Travel, Inc. (“CSJ”), sued CSJ and the corporation’s other stockholders, Jan Savell (“Savell”) and Carleen Stephens (“Stephens”)1, seeking damages for the defendants’ alleged breach of a contract to repurchase Payne’s CSJ stock. Payne’s action was filed in the Blount County General Sessions Court at a time when earlier litigation between Payne and CSJ in the Blount County Chancery Court was pending on appeal to this court. In the instant action, the defendants allowed a default judgment to be taken against them and thereafter appealed to the Blount County Circuit Court for a de novo trial. The Circuit Court denied the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment, and instead granted summary judgment in favor of Payne and against CSJ for $6,666.64. Payne then filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his suit against Savell and Stephens. The defendants appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Circuit Court erred in failing to grant them summary judgment, and erred in granting Payne a money judgment against CSJ.

State of Tennessee vs. Stephen Udzinski and Donna Stokes a/k/a Donna Story
01C01-9610-CC-00431
Authoring Judge: Judge Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

The defendants, Stephen J. Udzinski and Donna Stokes a/k/a Donna Story, present a certified question of law following Udzinski’s conditional guilty plea to a Class E felony of possession of marijuana for resale and Stokes’s guilty plea to a Class A misdemeanor for possession of marijuana. Udzinski entered judicial diversion, and Stokes received a conviction and a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Both defendants attempted to reserve the right to pursue a certified question of law of whether the search warrant under which Udzinski's house was searched was supported by probable cause. In this appeal, the defendants present that question, and the state raises the issue of whether the defendants have properly preserved the question for our review. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the suppression issue raised by the defendants’ certified question.

McCallie Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. D/B/A McCallie Health Center v. Erwin Dinsmore, Police Commissioner and the City of Chattanooga
03A01-9708-CH-00318
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Howell N. Peoples

The appellant (plaintiff) instituted this action against the appelles (defendants) in an attempt to gain access to copies of police reports of automobile accidens investigated by the Chattanooga Police Department. The plaintiff had requested by letter to inspect "[a]ll traffic accident reports maintained by your department which relate to any accident occuring with in seven days preceding the date of this letter. "The defendants had refused access to the plaintiff on the theory that such accident reports are made confidential under the provisions of T.C.A. § § 5 5 -10 - 108 , ets eq . The action was brought pursuant to the provisions of the Tennessee Public Records Act codified in  T.C. A . § § 10 -7-503 , et seq.  The trial court denied relief and this appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

John D. Lockridge v. Mary Janet Wise Lockridge - Concurring
03A01-9709-CH-00392
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John A. Turnbull

In this post-divorce case, John D. Lockridge (husband) appeals the trial court's judgment ordering him to pay $16, 021.70 in educational expenses incurred by his former wife, Janet Wise Lockridge (wife), pursuant to a contractual agreement between them made shortly before the divorce. The husband also appeals the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife in the amount of $20, 552.57. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse in part.

Underground II, Inc., D/B/A The Boiler Room, v. The City of Knoxville, et al.
03A01-9709-CH-00425
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon Bell

In this action the plaintiff-appellant (plaintiff) challenges the validity of an ordinance of the City of Knoxville which prohibits the practice of "brown bagging" (bringing your own alcoholic beverage) into restaurants, clubs, and businesses between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., Monday through Saturday and 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Sundays. It further makes it unlawful for businesses of any kind to permit or allow any customer to "bring in, carry, or possess, or consume beer or alcoholic beverages" during specified times as set out above. The proprietors of the designated places are also prohibited from selling any non-intoxicating beverabe to be mixed with and/or consumed with alcoholic beverages between the designated times. The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance. We reverse the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. Michael G. Rose
01C01-9611-CC-00478
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe B. Jones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

The appellant, Michael G. Rose (defendant), was convicted of driving while under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, by a jury of his peers. The trial court sentenced the defendant to pay a $1,500 fine and serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Williamson County Jail. The trial court suspended all but 180 days of the sentence, and required the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence on probation. The court also revoked the defendant’s license for two years. In this court, two issues are presented for review. The defendant contends (a) the evidence contained in the record will not support a finding by a rational trier of fact that he is guilty of driving while under the influence, and (b) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by denying his motion to suppress certain statements he made to a law enforcement officer. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

State of Tennessee vs. Joseph Pendergrass
03C01-9706-CC-00210
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

This appeal attempts to present certified questions of law pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The certified questions primarily involve the legality of a stop of a motor vehicle and a subsequent search and seizure resulting therefrom. Because we conclude that this matter is not properly before us, we dismiss this appeal.

Tommy Freeman v. Madison County Sheriff's Department
02S01-9704-CH-00034
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues presented by this appeal are whether the trial court erred in finding that the statutory presumption created by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 7-51-21 applied to plaintiff and whether or not the defendant's medical proof overcame the presumption. The panel concludes that the judgment of the trial court awarding benefits should be reversed and the case dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Thomas Freeman ("plaintiff") was employed by the Madison County Sheriff's Department in 1971. He served as a deputy for a year and then was promoted to the rank of Captain. He stayed in the rank of Captain until 1991, when he was appointed Assistant Chief Deputy. He had been appointed to the position of Chief Deputy at the time of trial. In the early days following his promotion to Captain, plaintiff assumed supervisory duties along with his regular duties. However, as the department grew he began to delegate more of the regular duties and moved into a more supervisory role. With the promotion to Assistant Chief Deputy, he assumed even more of a supervisory and administrative position. Since 1991, his job duties have been primarily that of supervisor and he was not required to go out on patrol or do things such as working on accidents as part of his regular job duties. In November, 1994 plaintiff begin to experience symptoms of a heart attack while sitting at his desk at work. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred on the job either on that day or in the time period before that. He was subsequently treated for a heart attack at a local hospital and was diagnosed with coronary artery disease. He underwent quintuple bypass surgery thereafter. He returned to work on a gradual basis and is now working full time in his former position as Chief Deputy. Plaintiff was fifty-one years old at the time of his heart attack. The medical proof consisted of the testimony of several physicians by deposition, which testimony is summarized as follows: Dr. James Crenshaw, a cardiologist, testified that he was called to the emergency room to examine plaintiff, after plaintiff was admitted complaining of chest pains and suffering from an acute myocardial infarction. Following Dr. Crenshaw's examination, 2

Nathan Wayne Smith v. Maremont Corporation
01S01-9703-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim Hamilton
This Workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that he has suffered permanent partial disability as a result of an accident in the course and scope of his employment with the Defendant. The matter was heard by the trial court on May 1, 1993. The court awarded plaintiff 25% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole. The trial court also awarded benefits paid in a lump sum. Within 3 days from the judgment of the trial court the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; the substance of plaintiff's motion to alter and amend was that the court should have awarded a greater percentage of permanent partial impairment based on the proof. Later, in l995 the motion to amend and alter the judgment was amended to contain allegations of newly discovered evidence; this new allegation was based on alleged new discovery of a cervical problem, a slipped disc; plaintiff alleged that this new injury related back to the original lumbar back injury. The trial Judge heard the motion to amend and the later filed amended motion alleging newly discovered evidence. The motion was denied in October, 1996. The court ruled that T.C.A._ 5-6-231 provides that lump sum payments are final and dismissed plaintiff's motion. This appeal presents two issues: (1) Whether the court erred in awarding 25% permanent partial disability, and (2) Whether the court erred in not granting plaintiff's motion for a hearing based upon newly discovered evidence. The panel affirms the trial court on both issues. However, the Panel remands the question of whether the newly discovered cervical disc problem, that led to a subsequent cervical surgery which is the focal point of the motion to alter and to amend, relates back to the original lumbar back injury which, in turn, would render the defendant liable for medical expenses. The proof discloses that Mr. Smith, the plaintiff, at the time of the trial was 51 years old, and possessed a high school education. He has a variety of job skills including previous employment as a carpenter, employment with a termite company, electrical and other diverse jobs. At the 2 time of the injury involved in this lawsuit he was employed with Maremont having worked there from June, 1967 to October, 1988. The plaintiff has been unemployed since 1988.

State vs. Clarence Washington
02C01-9703-CC-00097

State vs. Clarence Washington
02C01-9703-CC-00097

State vs. Torrance Johnson
02C01-9610-CR-00350

State vs. Noah Noble
02C01-9701-CC-00060

State vs. Melvin Currie
02C01-9701-CC-00047

State vs. Richard Young
02C01-9703-CR-00130
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Estes Anderson
02C01-9704-CC-00141

02C01-9611-CR-00384Cecil
02C01-9611-CR-00384Cecil
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman

01C01-9607-CC-00308
01C01-9607-CC-00308