State vs. James Corder
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Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State vs. Ray Douglas
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Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State vs. Haney
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Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall E. Deskins, et ux., v. Beulah M. Williams
Randall E. Desksins and his wife Thelma Jean Deskins, appeal a judgment of the Circuit Court for Sevier County, entered pursuant to a juryverdict, which dismissed their claim against Beulah M. Williams for personal injuries suffered by Mr. Deskins and loss of consortium and services by Mrs. Deskins, resulting from an automobile accident occurring on June 3, 1989. Mr. Deskins also appeals a judgmentin favor of the original Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff, Beulah M. Williams. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Mario Campbell
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Abraham Galmore
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Jerry Dorsey
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Jerry Dorsey
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Johnny Mukes
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Paul Mason
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Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gloria Spivey, et al vs. James Robinson, et al
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Neal, et ux vs. Keith Boggs, et al
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Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Eileen Smith vs. Shelby Co. Government
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Coy Hardaway, et al vs. William Burnett
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vernon Ray Davis v. Jim Reagan and Howard Sexton, D/B/A Precision Construction Traveler's Insurance Co.
We granted this consolidated appeal to determine whether permanent total disability can be awarded when an anatomical disability rating is less than 16.7 percent. In Seiber v. Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 906 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1995), this Court adopted a panel decision holding that the limits in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 (1996 Supp.) precluded an award of total disability when the anatomical impairment was less than 16.7 percent. A later, but unpublished, workers' compensation panel decision held that the limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(b) are not applicable to permanent total disability claims. Warren v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 03S01-9506-CV-00061 (Nov. 29, 1995, at Knoxville). We granted review to reconcile these two cases and decide this issue. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the panel's findings in Warren and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241's limitations on permanent partial disability do not apply to awards of permanent total disability. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jefferson C. Pennington
We review this cause to determine whether detention immediately after arrest, purposely continued because of the accused’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, constitutes punishment that prevents, under double jeopardy principles, punishment upon conviction. Because we find that jeopardy did not attach to the proceedings before the judicial commissioner and because the detention, even if punitive, did not constitute punishment for the charged offenses, we find no double jeopardy violation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the indictments are reinstated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Supreme Court | ||
Robert Bean, Franklin Shaffer, David Autrey, et al., v. Ned Ray McWherter in his capacity as Governor of the State of Tennessee, et al., - Concurring
This appeal addresses the General Assembly's power to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative agencies. The Court of Appeals held that the General Assembly could not constitutionally delegate power to the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission ("TWRC") to add or delete animals from the dangerous species list. We reverse and hold that the legislature may delegate power to add and delete items from a statutory schedule absent explicit guidance standards. The legislature, however, must provide a basic standard accompanied by a general policy when delegating in areas concerning public health, safety, and general welfare. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
02A01-0611-CV-00279
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Mabon, et al vs. Jackson-Madison Gen. Hosp., et al
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Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Arnold Carter v. State of Tennessee
We granted the State's application in this case to determine whether the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995 (“the new Act”), provides to petitioners for whom the statute of limitations had expired under the old Act additional time in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief. We conclude that although the language of the new Act is ambiguous, the legislative intent is clear: petitioners for whom the statute of limitations expired prior to the effective date of the new Act, i.e., May 10, 1995, do not have an additional year in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief. Thus, the petition filed by Arnold Carter is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the petition is dismissed. |
Supreme Court | ||
Dorothy R. W. Barham v. Diane W. Cooper
This case involves a complaint for an accounting and injunctive relief. Plaintiff, Dorothy R. W. Barham, appeals the order of the trial court affirming the report of the Special Master in favor of defendant, Diane W. Cooper. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Chase, Jr., v. Physiotherapy Associates, Inc., F. Wiliam Hackmeyer, Jr., and Everett P. Hailey
This is premises liability suit. Plaintiff, James Chase, Jr. (Chase), appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment on the jury verdict finding that the defendants, F. William Hackmeyer, Jr. 2 and Everett P. Hailey, were 50% negligent and that Chase was 50% negligent, therefore barring Chase’s recovery. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ann Umstot v. Edward Shirer Umstot
This is a divorce case. Edward Shirer Umstot (Husband) appeals the order of the trial court awarding a divorce, alimony in solido, and child support to Mary Ann Umstot (Wife). 1 At the time of the divorce, one of the children was eighteen years old and the other child was fifteen years old. 2 Wife’s expert, who valued the plan, testified that a defined benefit plan is a plan in which a benefit is accumulated during one’s working years or tenure with a particular employer that will ultimately be paid out upon retirement or the attainment of so many years of service or a certain age. 3 The trial court accepted the lower value because the parties testified that the property occasionally floods. 2 The parties were married on August 16, 1977 and had two children during the marriage.1 At the time of the divorce, Wife was 52 years old, and Husband was 53 years old. Husband is in good health, but Wife was recently diagnosed with malignant melanoma. She testified that she has a 40% chance of living another five years. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ann Umstot v. Edward Shirer Umstot - Dissenting/Concurring
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority's opinion which concludes that the trial court's award of alimony in solido was excessive. As noted by the majority, the trial court's order awarded 58% of the marital estate to the wife and 42% percent of the marital estate to the husband. This court's ruling, in its attempt to achieve “a more equitable division," awards 51% of the marital estate to the wife and 49% percent to the husband. |
Court of Appeals | ||
William J. Chase, Yr., as Administrator C.T.A of the Estate of Betty Lou Stidham, Deceased, v. The City of Memphis, Tennessee
This appeal involves a suit for wrongful death based on negligence under the Tennessee governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. § 29-20-101 et seq. (1980) and for wrongful death based on the creation of a special relationship and a nuisance. Defendant, the City of Memphis, 2 appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff, William J. Chase, as Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Betty Lou Stidham. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found that plaintiff’s damages totaled $1,897,713.03, and that the City’s negligence caused 40 percent of those damages. However, because of the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (hereinafter the Act), the court limited plaintiff’s recovery to $130,000.00, and entered a judgment in that amount. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |