State of Tennessee v. Glyn Terrance Dale, Sr.
The Appellant, Glyn Terrance Dale, Sr., appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court's summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by increasing the Appellant' s sentence at the resentencing hearing; (2) counsel abandoned him during his resentencing hearing; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Brian Gwaltney
The trial court revoked the community corrections sentence of the Defendant, Jeffrey Brian Gwaltney, and ordered that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that, while he did violate his alternative sentence, the trial court’s full revocation of his fifteen-year sentence was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert T. McLeod
Robert T. McLeod, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea to five counts of violating the sex offender registry, one count of violating community supervision, and one count of tampering with evidence with an effective sentence of three years. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Glynn Allen
Defendant, Marvin Glynn Allen, appeals his conviction for DUI, fourth offense, arguing that, based on the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-405(a), his charge should have been DUI, third offense. After a thorough review of the record, applicable case law, and the legislative history, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodriccus Funzie v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rodriccus Funzie, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder. Over a year after this court affirmed his conviction, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court subsequently denied the petition on its merits. Following our review of the record and relevant law, we conclude the petition was untimely, and, therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Wilson
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Wilson, of first degree felony murder, criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Lillian W.
Father living in California had his parental rights terminated by default judgment. Father appealed, and we vacate the termination because the trial court failed to conduct a best interest analysis. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Arianna B.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amy B. (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Arianna B. (“the Child”). At Mother’s request, Kayla A. (“Petitioner”), the Child’s paternal aunt, assumed temporary custody of the Child. Petitioner later filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding that Petitioner had proven the ground of failure to support and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1), as amended in 2018, is unconstitutional for shifting the burden of proof on willfulness to parents. As Mother failed to raise this issue below and the statute is not obviously unconstitutional on its face, we decline to consider Mother’s tardy constitutional challenge. We find the ground of failure to support was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and, by the same standard, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Noah A.
This action involves the termination of both parents’ rights to a minor child. Following a trial, the Loudon County Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support five statutory grounds for termination of both parents’ rights: (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent; (3) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and a willingness to assume custody. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Both parents appealed. We vacate in part and affirm in part. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Melanie Shea Thompson, Et Al. v. Southland Constructors Et Al.
This action involves a tragic accident resulting in the death of Tommy Smith (“Decedent”), who was working as a plumber connecting a sewer line when the trench he was in collapsed and crushed him. Decedent’s children (“Plaintiffs”) sued, among others, Focus Design Builders, LLC, general contractors for the building project, alleging negligence. The trial court granted Focus Design’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court held that Focus Design did not owe a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances because Decedent’s death was unforeseeable. We hold the complaint states a cause of action for negligence and consequently reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Edward R.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination had been proven and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on two grounds for termination but otherwise affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas John Pitera v. Samantha Pitera
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband is a resident of Connecticut with no ties to Tennessee. Wife and minor child, also former residents of Connecticut, have resided in Tennessee since December of 2018. Wife filed for divorce in Tennessee in May of 2019 and personally served Husband in Connecticut. Husband moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court thereafter entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Wife. Because we find that Wife was not a resident of Tennessee for six months preceding the filing of the complaint for divorce, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the divorce. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Edward R. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
Although I concur with the end result reached by the majority in this case, I write separately to address two issues. First, while the majority correctly concludes that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated based upon the persistent conditions ground, more analysis is warranted in light of the sparseness of DCS’s case. Second, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to conclude, based on In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COAR3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018), that DCS satisfied its burden of proving that Mother failed to manifest a willingness and ability to assume legal or physical custody of her children. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HOWARD JASON STEWART
The Defendant, Howard Stewart, was convicted by a Lawrence County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (first degree murder), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft), 39-14-105 (2018) (grading of theft). The trial court modified the Defendant’s theft conviction to theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for first degree murder and eleven months, twenty-nine days for theft. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting inadmissible hearsay evidence, (3) the court erred by admitting two photographs of the victim, and (4) the cumulative error of the evidentiary issues entitles him to a new trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kerry Davis v. Garrettson Ellis, MD
This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee/doctor finding that Appellant’s expert witness failed to connect the decedent’s death to Appellee’s alleged deviation from the standard of care. We conclude that Appellant presented sufficient evidence, at the summary judgment stage, to create a dispute of fact concerning deviation from the standard of care and causation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Lewis v. State Farm
Appellant was injured in an automobile accident, and a jury found that an unknown motorist was 100% at fault and awarded damages in favor of Appellant. Thereafter, the trial court denied Appellant prejudgment interest on its finding that Appellant’s uninsured automobile insurance policy with Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company precludes an award of prejudgment interest. We conclude that the policy language “all damages” is sufficiently broad to include prejudgment interest. However, because the award of prejudgment interest is an equitable consideration within the discretion of the trial court, we decline to address Appellant’s issue concerning whether prejudgment interest is necessary and equitable in this case. This question is remanded to the trial court. Vacated and remanded. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Daphne Saunders v. Y-12 Federal Credit Union
The plaintiff, Daphne Saunders, filed a complaint against Y-12 Federal Credit Union (“Y-12”), alleging breach of the parties’ banking contract. Ms. Saunders asserted that Y- 12 had charged excessive fees for items presented for payment from Ms. Saunders’s account that were returned due to insufficient funds. Ms. Saunders also alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and asserted that Y-12 had been unjustly enriched by charging excessive fees. The trial court dismissed Ms. Saunders’s claims with prejudice, finding that Ms. Saunders had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Ms. Saunders has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
MC Builders, LLC v. Fuad Reveiz, Et Al.
On the day of trial, the parties to this action, through counsel, settled the case amongst themselves and testified in open court as to the specific terms of the settlement and their consent thereto. One party filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to repudiate the settlement agreement before the trial court entered an order adopting the settlement and ordering judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude the appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
New Phase Investments, LLC, et al. v. Elite RE Investments, LLC, et al.
An internecine conflict led to a suit asserting breach of contract and a variety of torts. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court deferred ruling on the motion. Instead, the court granted the plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction and ordered the parties to mediate their dispute. When the defendants refused to participate in mediation, the court held them in contempt. We granted the application of the defendants for an extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in not proceeding summarily to the determination of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate. Upon review, we vacate the three orders issued after the motion to compel arbitration was filed and remand for the court to determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kendall Rivers
The defendant, Kendall Rivers, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a video recording taken from the defendant’s cellular telephone, by imposing the maximum sentence, and by ordering the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jaron Harris v. State of Tennessee
Jaron Harris, Petitioner, filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, claiming he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, due process, and equal protection based on the racial composition of the jury. The post-conviction court denied relief. Although Petitioner mentions ineffective assistance of counsel in his brief, the only issue raised on appeal is the stand-alone equal protection issue, citing the racial composition of the jury. Because Petitioner failed to raise the jury composition issue on direct appeal of his convictions and because Petitioner abandoned the other issues raised in his post-conviction petition, those issues are waived. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Associates Asset Management, LLC b. Sheila Smith
The issue in this appeal is whether the defendant waived the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction through insufficient service of process by making a general appearance. It is undisputed that service of process on the defendant was insufficient when this case commenced in the general sessions court. Nevertheless, the defendant’s counsel appeared on behalf of the defendant in the general sessions court, and the court set a trial date. Prior to a trial on the merits, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the civil warrant premised on insufficient service of process. The record does not include any ruling on that motion, and the general sessions court transferred the case to the circuit court by agreement of the parties before a trial on the merits. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed her second motion to dismiss the action based on insufficient service of process. The circuit court denied the motion ruling that, although service of process was insufficient, the defendant waived the issue by making a general appearance in general sessions court. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $35,667.42, and this appeal followed. In Tennessee, a party makes a general appearance for the purposes of waiver by seeking affirmative action from the court on an issue related to the merits of the dispute. See Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tenn. 1994); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-505 (any issues related to the general sessions court’s jurisdiction must be raised “before the hearing, or they will be considered as waived.”). There is nothing in the record indicating that the defendant sought affirmative action from the court on an issue related to the merits of the dispute in the general sessions court prior to filing her motion to dismiss. Further, the record shows that the defendant promptly filed another motion to dismiss on the same ground when the case was transferred to the circuit court. Therefore, the defendant did not waive the issue of insufficient service of process. Because it is undisputed that service of process was insufficient, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and this case is remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the action. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Michele Dial v. James Klemis, M.D., et al.
This is a health care liability case. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), arguing that the plaintiff had not provided them HIPAA compliant medical authorizations allowing them to receive medical records from the other providers being sent statutorily-required pre-suit notice. The trial court agreed with the defendants’ argument and, upon observing that the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the 120-day extension of the statutory limitation period pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), held that the complaint was time-barred and should be dismissed with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Burnett Montgomery v. Gary Alan Montgomery
This divorce action concerns the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate, among other issues concerning the trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Ray Moats
The Defendant, Billy Ray Moats, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court convictions for two counts each of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient relative to the value of the stolen property in support of his theft convictions; in addition, he raises for the first time on appeal a challenge to the version of the theft grading statute applied during sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that although the evidence regarding the property’s value was sufficient, the trial court should have applied the amended theft grading statute that went into effect on January 1, 2017, and that plain error relief is warranted. We remand for the entry of corrected judgments in Counts 3 and 4 reflecting Class A misdemeanor convictions and a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve. The trial court’s merger of the convictions and its determination regarding consecutive sentencing will remain the same. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |