01A01-9511-CH-00499
01A01-9511-CH-00499
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell

01A01-9512-CH-00558
01A01-9512-CH-00558
Trial Court Judge: Christina Norris

01A01-9512-CH-00579
01A01-9512-CH-00579
Trial Court Judge: William B. Cain

01A01-9512-CH-00560
01A01-9512-CH-00560
Trial Court Judge: Henry F. Todd

01A01-9602-CV-00067
01A01-9602-CV-00067
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

01A01-9509-CH-00404
01A01-9509-CH-00404
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith

01A01-9510-CH-00471
01A01-9510-CH-00471
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

03C01-9406-CR-00209
03C01-9406-CR-00209
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle

03C01-9503-CR-00087
03C01-9503-CR-00087
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

03C01-9508-CC-00245
03C01-9508-CC-00245

03C01-9512-CC-00390
03C01-9512-CC-00390

Bill Purcell v. The Lilly Company and Federated Insurance Company
02S01-9508-CV-00073
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George H. Brown, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Purcell, contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings (1) that he did not have a reasonable excuse for failure to give the written notice required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-21 and (2) that there was insufficient proof of a causal connection between his injury and a work- related accident. The panel has concluded that the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant worked for the employer, The Lilly Company, as a field service battery technician, replacing or servicing heavy duty batteries. In November of 1992, during a week-long trip servicing customers in the Tupelo, Mississippi area, he awoke with pain in his right buttock and leg. The pain subsided after about half an hour. The claimant later was diagnosed with a ruptured disk. There is no evidence that the pain was precipitated by any particular fortuitous occurrence, but the claimant's own testimony was that "I thought maybe I just bumped myself on some equipment the day before at the customer's location...." He told his supervisorabout the pain but gave no written notice and said nothing about his thought concerning the source of it. In fact, he filed a claim with his health insurance carrier on January 27, 1993, claiming that the injury was work-related, although he had never made such a claim to the employer. It was also during that month that his doctors had told him his injury could be work-related. He had been terminated by the employer on January 15, 1993, and had consulted an attorney,because he suspected he had a workers'compensation claim. The employer did not know of any claim that the injury was work-related until April 8, 1993, when it received written notice, dated two days earlier, from the claimant's attorney. The trial judge dismissed the case for failure of notice, or a reasonable excuse for such failure, and because the proof failed to establish that the claimant's injury was one arising out of and in the course of the employment. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Immediately upon the occurrence of an injury, or as soon thereafter as is reasonable and practicable, an injured employee must, unless the employer 2

Bill Purcell v. The Lilly Company and Federated Insurance Company
02S01-9508-CV-00073
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George H. Brown, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Purcell, contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings (1) that he did not have a reasonable excuse for failure to give the written notice required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-21 and (2) that there was insufficient proof of a causal connection between his injury and a work- related accident. The panel has concluded that the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant worked for the employer, The Lilly Company, as a field service battery technician, replacing or servicing heavy duty batteries. In November of 1992, during a week-long trip servicing customers in the Tupelo, Mississippi area, he awoke with pain in his right buttock and leg. The pain subsided after about half an hour. The claimant later was diagnosed with a ruptured disk. There is no evidence that the pain was precipitated by any particular fortuitous occurrence, but the claimant's own testimony was that "I thought maybe I just bumped myself on some equipment the day before at the customer's location...." He told his supervisorabout the pain but gave no written notice and said nothing about his thought concerning the source of it. In fact, he filed a claim with his health insurance carrier on January 27, 1993, claiming that the injury was work-related, although he had never made such a claim to the employer. It was also during that month that his doctors had told him his injury could be work-related. He had been terminated by the employer on January 15, 1993, and had consulted an attorney,because he suspected he had a workers'compensation claim. The employer did not know of any claim that the injury was work-related until April 8, 1993, when it received written notice, dated two days earlier, from the claimant's attorney. The trial judge dismissed the case for failure of notice, or a reasonable excuse for such failure, and because the proof failed to establish that the claimant's injury was one arising out of and in the course of the employment. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Immediately upon the occurrence of an injury, or as soon thereafter as is reasonable and practicable, an injured employee must, unless the employer 2

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

03C01-9507-CC-00202
03C01-9507-CC-00202

03A01-9603-CH-00090
03A01-9603-CH-00090

Ted C. Smith v. The Shelby Insurance Company of The Shelby Insurance Group
03A01-9603-CH-00076
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard G. Johnson

This is a declaratory judgment action. The complaint seeks a declaration that a loss caused by damage to the plaintiff's building is covered under a commercial property insurance policy issued by The Shelby Insurance Company (Shelby). Following a bench trial, the Chancellor held that there was coverage under the policy and awarded the plaintiff a judgment for $12,352.92. Shelby appeals, arguing that there is no coverage because the premises were vacant at the time of the loss.  It also argues tha the loss is not covered because the policy excludes coverage for damages "[c]aused by or resulting from theft." The plaintiff, Ted C. Smith (Smith), raises, as an additional issue, the failure of the trial court to award the statutory bad faith penalty authorized by T.C. A. § 56- 7- 105( a ) .

03C01-9502-CR-00052
03C01-9502-CR-00052

03C01-9502-CR-00052
03C01-9502-CR-00052

03C01-9502-CR-00052
03C01-9502-CR-00052

State vs. Mack Samuel Stokes
M1999-02252-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

03C01-9409-CR-00313
03C01-9409-CR-00313
Trial Court Judge: R. Steven Bebb

03C01-9409-CR-00313
03C01-9409-CR-00313
Trial Court Judge: R. Steven Bebb

01A01-9408-CV-00398
01A01-9408-CV-00398
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace