Opinions

02C01-9503-CC-00092
02C01-9503-CC-00092
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley

02C01-9506-CC-00171
02C01-9506-CC-00171
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn

02C01-9507-CC-00193
02C01-9507-CC-00193

03C01-9508-CR-00248
03C01-9508-CR-00248
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Reva Pitts v. National Union Fire Insurance Company and Sue Ann Head Director of The Division of Workers' Compensation Tennessee Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund
03S01-9509-CH-00108
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer's insurer, National Union, asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that (1) the claimant's injury was one arising out of her employment, (2) the claimant is permanently and totally disabled , and (3) the claimant gave the required notice to the employer. The Second Injury Fund (the Fund) asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that (1) the claimant is permanently and totally disabled and (2) the claimant is entitled to more than twenty-two weeks of temporary total disability. The panel has concluded that the judgment should be modified as set forth below. The employee or claimant, Reva Pitts, is thirty-nine and has ahigh school education. She has some computer training. From a previous injury she received a workers' compensation based on forty percent to the body as a whole. In her duties as a tire builder for the employer, Dico Tire, Inc., she operated a machine by pushing foot pedals. As a result, she gradually developed foot pain in both feet, which, on July 24, 1992, Dr. James Engblom diagnosed as tarsal tunnel syndrome, superimposed on other foot maladies. The doctor operated on both feet and estimated her permanent impairment at fourteen percent to both feet. She reached maximum medical improvement for her left foot on August 3, 1992 and for her right foot on November 6, 1992. Dr. Catherine Gyurik, a psychiatrist, began evaluating the claimant on July 28, 1993, and diagnosed recurrent depression chronologically related to her foot problems. The doctor did not testify the claimant was permanently impaired by her mental condition. Dr. Norman Hankins, a vocational expert, testified that the claimant was eighty-one percent disabled from the foot injury and subsequent surgery, based on restrictions from a physical therapist. The chancellor found the employee to be permanently and totally disabled and apportioned forty percent of the award of disability benefits to the Fund and sixty percent to the employer. Additionally, the chancellor awarded temporary total disability benefits from May 21, 1992 to August 22, 1992, and from September 4, 1992 through November 6, 1992. 2

01S01-9503-CC-00034
01S01-9503-CC-00034
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

01S01-9503-CC-00034
01S01-9503-CC-00034
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

James v. Ball
02C01-9511-CR-00353
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

02C01-9510-CR-00295
02C01-9510-CR-00295

03A01-9601-CH-00030
03A01-9601-CH-00030

03A01-9510-CH-00372
03A01-9510-CH-00372
Trial Court Judge: Inman

03A01-9509-CV-00332
03A01-9509-CV-00332

02S01-9501-CH-00005
02S01-9501-CH-00005

William Richardson v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company
01S01-9508-CV-00130
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James L. Weatherford,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The defendant below appeals, challenging the trial court's finding that plaintiff retains a permanent impairment as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 38 at the time of trial is a high school graduate. W hile moving a roll of sheet metal on June 2, 1992, plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his groin. He was referred to Dr. Robert Coble, who diagnosed a right inguinal hernia and performed a surgical repair. After surgery, plaintiff returned to his former employer, performing light duty work for a while and then returning to his former duties. Plaintiff testified that he re-injured this area in October, falling into a split. Plaintiff is now self- employed, painting and cleaning carpets. He testified that he continues to experience pain, soreness and pulling in his groin. Dr. Coble assigned plaintiff an impairment rating of 1% to 15%. He admitted on cross-examination that the A.M.A. Guides allow only a zero to five percent impairment rating for a hernia. He relied in part on the first edition of the A.M.A. Guides but testified that he considered vocational factors such as the employment activity described to him by plaintiff and the problems plaintiff described having while performing those activities. He did not place any permanent restrictions on the plaintiff. Our review is de novo on the record accompanied by the presumption that the findings of fact of the trial court are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The plaintiff must prove every element of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. Werthan Industries, 824 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tenn. 1992). Causation and permanency of a work-related injury must be shown in most cases by expert medical evidence. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987).

William Richardson v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company
01S01-9508-CV-00130
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James L. Weatherford,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The defendant below appeals, challenging the trial court's finding that plaintiff retains a permanent impairment as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 38 at the time of trial is a high school graduate. W hile moving a roll of sheet metal on June 2, 1992, plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his groin. He was referred to Dr. Robert Coble, who diagnosed a right inguinal hernia and performed a surgical repair. After surgery, plaintiff returned to his former employer, performing light duty work for a while and then returning to his former duties. Plaintiff testified that he re-injured this area in October, falling into a split. Plaintiff is now self- employed, painting and cleaning carpets. He testified that he continues to experience pain, soreness and pulling in his groin. Dr. Coble assigned plaintiff an impairment rating of 1% to 15%. He admitted on cross-examination that the A.M.A. Guides allow only a zero to five percent impairment rating for a hernia. He relied in part on the first edition of the A.M.A. Guides but testified that he considered vocational factors such as the employment activity described to him by plaintiff and the problems plaintiff described having while performing those activities. He did not place any permanent restrictions on the plaintiff. Our review is de novo on the record accompanied by the presumption that the findings of fact of the trial court are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The plaintiff must prove every element of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. Werthan Industries, 824 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tenn. 1992). Causation and permanency of a work-related injury must be shown in most cases by expert medical evidence. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987).

Teresa G. Bradford v. Donnie R. Bradford
01A01-9603-CH-00121
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Alex W. Darnell

On May 16, 1996, appellant moved this Court to rule that this cause is properly before this Court.

K.K., v. The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company
01A01-9511-CH-00541
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Plaintiff K. K. appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company ("Paul Revere") his motion for summary judgment, and the failure of the trial court to grant its motion for partial summary judgment.

Page G. Stuart v. State of Tennessee Department of Safety - Concurring
01-A-01-9601-CH-00033
Authoring Judge: Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves a judicial review of administrative proceedings before the Commissioner of Safety seeking the release of property seized by law enforcement officers pursuant to T.C.A. Section 53-11-451.

Malcolm Yates Worley, v. Rita K. Worley
01A01-9601-CH-00037
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Cornelia A. Clark

This is a suit and countersuit for divorce in which the wife was granted an absolute divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct of the husband. On appeal, the husband presents issues which relate only to identification and division of the marital estate: The parties were married in 1958 and separated in 1995. Both parties worked during the marriage. Their earnings were approximately equal. There are no minor children.

Jerry T. Beech, Concrete Contractor, Inc., v. Mary Henderson
01A01-9507-CH-00308
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Williams
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This case concerns the payment on a contract for installation of a concrete driveway. Jerry T. Beech Concrete Contractor, Inc. (hereinafter, "Beech") filed suit against Mary Henderson (hereinafter, "Henderson") on a sworn account for nonpayment of the contract price for installing a concrete driveway and a box drain. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Beech and Henderson had contracted to install a driveway and a box drain, but the trial court determined that Beech had installed the driveway in an unworkmanlike manner causing it to have defects. As a result, the trial court awarded Beech the contract price offset by the amount of property damage Henderson allegedly suffered. Beech appealed, and the appeal is properly before this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Anne Adams Hurdle, by and through her Attorneys-in-Fact, Walker Hardy Hurdle, III and William F. Hurdle, and Walker Hardy Hurdle, III and William F. Hurdle, Individually, v. William W. Dunlap, Jr and Wife, Mary Ann Hurdle
02A01-9502-CV-00023
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert A. Lanier

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

Ellers, Oakley, Chester, and Rike, Inc., v. DPIC Companies Security Insurance Company of Hartford, et al.
02A01-9501-CV-00008
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Janice M. Holder

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1

Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony.