Teal Properties, Inc. v. C&H Commercial Contractors, Inc.
Relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(5) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Outcomes, specifically judgments, occasioned by a party’s own inaction or lack of attention are not extraordinary. And a court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60.02(5) motion when a judgment results from such circumstances. So we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Horizon Trades, Inc. v. Aubrey Givens, Et Al.
The defendant in a malicious prosecution action moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He contended that the prior suit that engendered the malicious prosecution action was not terminated on its merits. The plaintiff responded that the prior suit was dismissed on multiple grounds and that one of those grounds was on the merits. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. We do as well and affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found the sole ground raised by the Department for termination against the child’s father of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child or assume financial responsibility pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) had been established. The court further found that the termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father filed a timely appeal. On appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating father’s parental rights due to the court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground for termination. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Laurel Martin Griffin v. Kevin Michael Griffin
After seventeen years of marriage, a wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband answered and filed a counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, named her primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, classified and divided the marital estate, ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,941 per month in child support, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $6,000 per month. The husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent and the division of the marital estate as modified. We vacate the award of child support and the amount of alimony and remand for recalculation. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Demetrice A. Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demetrice A. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jim Daniel Story, Jr. v. Heidi Rebekah Nussbaumer-Story
A husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido to his wife for a period of eight years. Having examined the record and the trial court’s analysis of the statutory factors, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision. We further award the wife her reasonable attorney fees on appeal |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trin Villa Suttles, III
The defendant, Trin Villa Suttles, appeals his 2019 Hamilton County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of leaving the scene of an accident, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentence of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Surber v. Mountain States Health Alliance d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center - Concurring
I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County. I write separately to explain what I think is an additional crucial difference in this case from Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. 2010). In addition to what is stated in this Court’s Opinion, I believe what distinguishes this case from Barkes is the respective plaintiff’s proof as to the defendant hospital’s duty of reasonable care to its patients and the applicable standard of care relative to that hospital’s duty. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Blount Memorial Hospital v. Eric Glasgow
This appeal arises from a hospital’s action against a patient to recover payment for medical services. After a bench trial, the court determined there was not an enforceable contract between the parties, but the hospital was entitled to recover the value of its services under a quantum meruit theory and ruled that the charges billed to the patient represented the actual value of the hospital’s services. The court based its determination on the testimony of the hospital’s witness that, because the rates that a hospital could charge were set by Medicare, the amount charged to the patient was comparable to what other hospitals would charge for the same or similar services. The patient appeals and asks this court to consider whether the hospital proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount it charged for medical services represented the actual value of those services. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Knapp v. Jason Boykins
This appeal involves the issuance of an order of protection based on allegations of stalking. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Surber v. Mountain States Health Alliance d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center
This is a medical malpractice action1 in which the plaintiff filed suit against the hospital for treatment he received following an eye injury, raising claims of direct and vicarious liability. The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which the court granted a directed verdict on the claim of direct liability at the close of the plaintiff’s proof. The plaintiff filed this appeal, claiming the trial court erred in limiting his expert witness testimony. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jackson D.
Ricky D. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Jackson D. (“the Child”). In July 2018, Heather M. (“Mother”) and her husband, Jason M. (“Stepfather”), filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). Following a trial, the Trial Court found that Mother and Stepfather had proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of Father’s ten-year sentence entered when the Child was younger than eight years old and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jose Sifuentes, D/B/A Jose's Electric v. D.E.C., LLC
A general contractor hired a subcontractor to install wiring and machinery for a bowling alley. The subcontractor completed the work, but the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor’s last five invoices. The subcontractor sued the general contractor for breach of contract, quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and promissory fraud. The general contractor moved to dismiss, asserting that the subcontractor was unlicensed. The trial court granted the motion based on the subcontractor’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-6-103(b) (2019). Applying the standard of review applicable to a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the quantum meruit claim based upon the statute. We affirm in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alex Greer
The Defendant, James Alex Greer, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, by a Putnam County Criminal Court jury. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree premeditated murder), 39-17-1324 (2014) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony). The trial court imposed sentences of eighteen years and six years, respectively, and ordered mandatory consecutive sentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(e)(1), for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s mid-trial request to withdraw based upon the Defendant’s attempt to waive the right to counsel and the Defendant’s demand to proceed pro se. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lavar R. Jernigan v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, LaVar R. Jernigan, appeals the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief from his convictions for six counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. See State v. LaVar Jernigan, No. M2016-00507-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1019513 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017). The Petitioner argues the State failed to disclose the existence of a “notebook” compilation containing over 6000 text messages between the victim and the Petitioner, in violation of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). He additionally argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) advise the Petitioner of the existence of the notebook thereby resulting in the Petitioner’s rejection of a four-year offer by the State to settle the case; (2) object to the admission of the “notebook” at trial; and (3) prepare and preserve the record in his direct appeal. Upon our review, we vacate the Petitioner’s convictions, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, and remand this matter for a new trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andy F. Nunez
Andy F. Nunez, Defendant, and two co-defendants, Joseph Santillan and Daniela Cruz, were indicted for first degree murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment after a Nashville visitor was shot and killed while walking with his friend in September of 2016. Prior to trial, the State entered into a use immunity agreement with co-defendant, Ms. Cruz. Her case was severed from Defendant’s and Mr. Santillan’s case and she ultimately testified for the State. Prior to trial, counsel for Defendant subpoenaed the ten most recent use immunity agreements in first degree murder cases where a testifying co-defendant’s indictment was severed and the case proceeded to final judgment. The State filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The trial court granted the motion. The case proceeded to trial. Based partly on co-defendant Cruz’s testimony, Defendant was convicted as charged. He received an effective sentence of life plus five years. After trial, Ms. Cruz entered into a plea agreement to a reduced charge. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to quash the subpoena. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andy F. Nunez - Concurring
I concur in the results reached by the majority opinion. I write separately to express my opinion that the trial court erred by ruling that the evidence sought by Defendant via the subpoena would be irrelevant. The proposed evidence was never submitted at the pre-trial hearing. Thus, the trial court could only speculate as to what any evidence would reveal. However, any error was harmless in my opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Lee Williams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Williams, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated kidnapping, reckless endangerment, and domestic assault, and resulting effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Johnson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Curtis Johnson, Jr., was found guilty of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgments on appeal. State v. Curtis Johnson, Jr., No. W2016-02439-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 324455 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 5, 2018), no perm. app filed. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven Counsel was deficient or shown prejudice. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jennifer Langley And James Broce
In this consolidated, interlocutory appeal, we review the order of the trial court granting the motions of the defendants, Jennifer Langley and James Broce, to dismiss the drug-free zone enhancement alleged in their presentments. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court determined that the Mark Vance Memorial Greenway located in Sullivan County, Tennessee was not a public park and in turn, was not a designated drug-free zone under the Drug-Free School Zone Act. The trial court’s finding rendered the enhancement provision of the Act inapplicable to the defendants’ presentments. Upon our review, we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the enhancement alleged in the presentments because the determination of whether the Mark Vance Memorial Greenway is a public park as contemplated by the Drug-Free School Zone Act is a question of fact to be decided by the finder of fact. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelvin A. Lee v. Shawn Phillips, Warden
The Petitioner, Kelvin A. Lee, appeals as of right from the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his life without parole sentence for his first degree felony murder conviction was illegal because it was imposed for a crime he committed as a juvenile. The Petitioner contends that the petition stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Wayne Garner v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals as of right from the Giles County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his life sentence for his first degree felony murder was illegal because the statute governing his release eligibility does not allow for the possibility of parole. The Petitioner contends that the petition stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Brian Robinson
The Defendant, William Brian Robinson, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of seventeen years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his request to present evidence that the State had previously pursued two theories of guilt that were inconsistent with its theory at trial; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, specifically, challenging the mens rea element of knowing; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about blood spatter evidence when that witness had not been qualified as an expert; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors requires a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial on the charge of second degree murder, during which the Defendant shall be permitted to present evidence of the State’s previous theories of guilt. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario Bateman aka Mario Woods v. State of Tennessee
In 2007, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mario Bateman a/k/a Mario Woods, of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life in prison. This court affirmed the conviction. State v. Mario Bateman a/k/a Mario Woods, No. W2007-00571-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4756675, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 28, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2009). The Petitioner then unsuccessfully filed, in turn, a petition for post-conviction relief, a writ of error coram nobis, and a federal habeas corpus petition. He then filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis at issue in this case, alleging that he had newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from the victim’s father asserting that the victim was “violent, aggressive, and a bully.” He contended that he may have been convicted of a lesser-included offense had the jury heard this testimony and asked that the lower court toll the statute of limitations. The lower court summarily dismissed the petition for a writ of error coram nobis, finding that the Petitioner could have discovered the evidence sooner, that the evidence was cumulative to the evidence presented at trial, and that the Petitioner had not shown that the evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. The Petitioner filed this appeal. After review, we affirm the lower court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Cory Halliburton v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Cory Halliburton, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |