State of Tennessee v. LaDarius Berry
A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, LaDarius Berry, for attempted second degree murder (count 1), aggravated assault (count 2), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count 3), and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon (count 4). After trial, a jury convicted the defendant as charged in counts 2, 3, and 4 and found him guilty of the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eugene Spivey v. Shawn Phillips, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Eugene Spivey, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald C. Young v. E.T. Stamey et al.
This appeal concerns whether a city councilman is disqualified from office because he also is employed by his city’s municipal school system. Ronald C. Young (“Young”) ran against E.T. Stamey (“Stamey”) for a seat on the Clinton City Council. Stamey, the incumbent, won. Afterward, Young filed suit in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) against Stamey as well as the Anderson County Election Commission and its members (“the Commission”). Young alleged that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 and the Clinton City Charter, Stamey is disqualified from being a city councilman because he works for Clinton City Schools (“CCS”), albeit in a noninstructional capacity. The Commission filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Stamey filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted both motions. Young appeals. We hold, first, that Stamey is not a city employee. We hold further that even if Stamey is a city employee, as a noninstructional public school employee he is allowed to run for city council pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-301. Finally, we hold that Young failed to state a claim against the Commission, which acted solely in its ministerial capacity in certifying the election results. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Kaviandra James
A preferred-service employee with the Department of Children’s Services was terminated for accessing a case file involving her sister and sending an email to the case manager assigned to her sister’s case and the case manager’s supervisor, with a copy to her sister. The employee ultimately appealed her termination to the Board of Appeals of the Department of Human Resources, which modified her termination to a suspension without pay and reinstated her with back pay. The Department appealed to chancery court, which affirmed the Board’s determination. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Board of Appeals for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Lee Johnson v. Knoxville HMA Cardiology PPM, LLC
In this action involving injuries allegedly caused by the defendant medical providers’ failure to provide a safe examination table, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was actually a health care liability claim and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to provide written pre-suit notice to the defendants within the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a) (Supp. 2019) of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”). The plaintiff has appealed, conceding that he failed to provide written presuit notice but asserting that his claim should not have been dismissed because it was not a health care liability claim. Having determined that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability action, we affirm the dismissal of this matter. However, having also determined that the proper sanction for the plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice under the THCLA was dismissal without prejudice, we modify the trial court’s dismissal of the claim to be without prejudice. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sherilyn Mary Dawson v. Dana Lee Dawson
In this divorce matter, the parties engaged in protracted litigation concerning the initial amount of the father’s child support obligation before the trial court set the amount of child support to be paid. Meanwhile, the father sought a modification of his child support obligation. The trial court determined that its order entered on January 27, 2014, was final as to the amount of the father’s initial child support obligation because the order left no remaining issues to be determined. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Harold D. Doss, Jr., And Johnathan Lamar Hathaway v. State of Tennessee
Harold D. Doss, Jr., and Johnathan Lamar Hathaway filed separate petitions for post-conviction relief. Because Petitioners were tried together, the post-conviction court conducted a single post-conviction hearing and denied relief as to both Petitioners. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Waynard Quartez Winbush
Defendant, Waynard Quartez Winbush, was convicted of various drug offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sever prejudicial offenses; (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the trial court erred by failing to include lesser-included offenses in the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; (6) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the case based on a violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (7) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial after failing to rule on Defendant’s pretrial motions; (8) the trial court erred by allowing the State to improperly introduce evidence; (9) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on witness perjury; (10) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (11) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession for conspiracy; and (12) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on cumulative errors. After conducting a full review of the record, we determine that Defendant is entitled to relief from his convictions for conspiracy in Counts 3 and 4 because the instructions given to the jury did not match the charges in the presentment, and we vacate Defendant’s convictions as to those counts. As to the remaining arguments, we find Defendant is not entitled to relief. Consequently, we reverse the judgments of the trial court in part and affirm the judgments in part. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie James Bradley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Willie James Bradley, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reginald D. Tumlin v. State of Tennessee
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Reginald D. Tumlin, of two counts of child abuse, one count of criminally negligent homicide, and one count of aggravated child neglect. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State v. Reginald D. Tumlin, No. E2013-01452-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7073752, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 15, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner maintains on appeal that his attorneys’ representation was deficient and he was prejudiced by the deficiencies. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos Smith v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carlos Smith, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, seeking relief from his convictions of two counts of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun and resulting effective sentence of one hundred twenty years. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this court affirmed the denial except for one issue: whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to advise the Petitioner that he was a career offender, which resulted in his rejecting a plea offer. Regarding that issue, this court remanded the case to the post-conviction court because that court failed to making any findings. Upon remand, the post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to inform him of his career offender status. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mateem Hudson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mateem Hudson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl S. Dixon
Defendant, Carl S. Dixon, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve two years, to be suspended on probation, and ordered Defendant to pay the victim $600 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s order of restitution was proper when Defendant’s only source of income was Social Security Supplemental Security Income. Having reviewed the record and the applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony James Zonneville v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Anthony James Zonneville, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone and simple possession of alprazolam. Petitioner contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Oviasojie v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, George Oviasojie, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re H. S.
The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of E.R. (mother) and T.S. (father) with respect to H.S. (the child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on multiple grounds. By the same quantum of proof, the court determined that termination of mother and father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Only mother appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re H.S. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I fully concur in the majority opinion’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions exist. I also agree that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting a finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Therefore, I agree with the ultimate result reached by the majority. However, I do disagree with the treatment of the ground found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The majority opinion follows In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018), which engages in a complicated use of statutory construction and grammar rules to essentially conclude that “and” actually means “or” in the language “ability and willingness.” I prefer the interpretation found in In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). I believe the General Assembly purposefully chose the word “and” in order to differentiate this ground from other grounds. Interpreting “and” as “or,” in my opinion, makes Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) a weaker version of other grounds. I do not believe such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion’s interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Connor B.
In this termination of parental rights action, the mother has appealed the trial court’s grant of a default judgment to the petitioners following the mother’s filing of an answer that did not contain her signature in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-117(o). Although we determine that the trial court properly granted a default judgment to the petitioners based upon the mother’s failure to file a proper answer within the time allowed, we vacate the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights, determining that the appellate record is insufficient to afford appropriate review of the statutory grounds for termination and best interest analysis. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Francine S. Labbe v. James Eric Karn II
The appeal arises from a divorce. Acting pro se, the former husband seeks review, of what we cannot be certain. Because his brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Glenn Allen Atkins
In this estate proceeding, the original petitioner, an adult child of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration, averring that the decedent had died intestate. The trial court initially granted the petition, designating the petitioner as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s surviving spouse subsequently filed a petition requesting the trial court’s acceptance into probate of a holographic will, purportedly executed by the decedent, which the surviving spouse presented to the court. The original petitioner and another adult child of the decedent then filed motions contesting the validity of the holographic will. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the holographic will to be valid, accepted the will into probate, and named the surviving spouse as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The adult children contesting the holographic will have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quintavious Montez Patton and Donte R. Swanier
A Davidson County jury convicted Quintavious Montez Patton of first degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Donte Ricardo Swanier of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced both Defendants to effective sentences of life in prison. On appeal, Defendant Patton: (1) challenges the trial court’s admission of video evidence; (2) claims his right to a speedy trial was violated; and (3) seeks relief based upon the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors. Defendant Swanier appeals the trial court’s admission of: (1) rap music; (2) Facebook posts; and (3) prior bad acts. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antoine Hinton
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Antoine Hinton, of first degree felony murder; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and he received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as provided by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), and that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction because the underlying felony was complete at the time of the victim’s death. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Appellant’s convictions and his total effective sentence of life plus twenty-eight years but remand the case to the trial court for amendment of the judgments to reflect that the Appellant’s conviction of aggravated kidnapping in count three is merged into his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping in count two and for correction of the judgments regarding concurrent and consecutive sentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Zachary Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board
The issue presented is whether the Shelby County Fire Department provided a firefighter with sufficient notice of the reasons for his termination. The Fire Department advised the firefighter that he was facing possible termination for violating two specific Fire Department rules. After further investigation and a meeting with the firefighter, the Fire Department gave him a termination letter that recited the two rules and detailed the factual basis for his termination. The firefighter appealed, and the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board upheld the termination in a written decision that stated the facts and reasons supporting the termination. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the firefighter did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for his termination. We hold that the Shelby County Fire Department provided the firefighter with sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements of due process. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of pretermitted issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re David S. Et Al.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. In terminating the parental rights of the children’s father, the trial court found that two grounds for termination had been properly established: abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court also determined that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. In addition to terminating the father’s rights, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother. On appeal, we conclude that considerations of fundamental due process require us to vacate that portion of the final order terminating the rights of the mother. We also conclude that one of the grounds relied upon for terminating the father’s parental rights, persistent conditions, must be vacated due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground. The termination of the father’s parental rights is otherwise affirmed, however, for the reasons stated herein. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re David S. Et Al. - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I concur in the affirmance of the decision to terminate the parental rights of David S. (“Father”). I write separately to address the majority’s decision to vacate the judgment terminating the parental rights of Cecilia S. (“Mother”) despite the fact that no party to the appeal has raised an issue with respect to the judgment against Mother. The issue not being raised is perhaps understandable. As the majority points out, the one person most likely to raise an issue with the termination of the Mother’s parental rights, Mother, may not have been served with process and may be completely unaware that her parental rights were being terminated. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals |